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 PREFACE 
Behind the research reported in the present thesis is the thought that the study 
innovation systems should be conducted within a multi-spatial framework which 
facilitates analysis of the how places are connected to one another. This emerged, 
eventually, from attempts at questioning the current spatial dimension of the 
innovation literature.
It is common in the research literature to accept that innovation is shaped 
predominantly by national characteristics. In this view, the spatial dimension of 
innovation is encompassed by geo-political territories of great diversity in economic 
size. Many other studies of innovation have emphasised sub-national characteristics 
which although often smaller geographically and frequently focussed on production 
systems are also typically limited by those same political territories. These clusters of 
activities are not just conceived as national but are often analysed as enclaves with 
little reference to their relationships with the rest of the world.
This paradigm of national spatiality seemed not so much irrelevant as incomplete 
given the industrial structure of the world economy is changing shape. Also puzzling 
was the unquestioning acceptance of the political definitions of these systems and the 
resulting scale differences. I therefore went looking for a framework that could 
integrate a neo-Schumpeterian perspective with analysis of phenomena such as 
seemed to exist in relationships between Japan, the emerging economies of Asia and 
Silicon Valley.  
Three things have shaped my view of the need for analysis of linkages between 
clusters.
First, a number of emerging clusters in Australia only exist because they are 
suppliers to a more powerful cluster elsewhere in the world. For example, during the 
1990s a cluster emerged in Sydney that specialised in special effects for major 
motion pictures. It looked like a cluster of expertise, innovation capabilities and 
capital, yet it wasn’t a typical textbook European and Northern American 
manufacturing agglomeration. Second, in 19991 a processing failure at one factory in 
1 See New Scientist (12 June 1999: 3) Only One World.
Belgium resulted in dioxins accidentally contaminating a batch of feed for chickens. 
This caused a massive food poisoning scare across Europe and a huge effort to track 
down all the production processes into which the egg derivative products had been 
incorporated. This event brought into focus a little of the scale of current 
international production activities. Third, I heard a radio interview with Saskia 
Sassen on the topic of global city networks (see e.g. Sassen 2002). She articulated the 
idea that global financial centres (what would be called clusters if they were in 
manufacturing) had a hierarchical structure and a set of differentiated linkages 
between various centres.
These issues and ideas came together in the form of the idea of linked cluster-to-
cluster networks in a combination of spatial systems and the flows between them.  
A very early draft of material that now appears in chapters two, three and four was 
first presented in 2000 (Wixted 2000). A revised version of that paper with early 
modelling results, including a preliminary draft of material for chapter five, was 
presented at the 2002 International Conference on Input-Output Techniques in 
Montreal (Wixted and Cooper 2002). Although, this project in its current form would 
not have been possible without the modelling assistance of Professor Cooper (for 
which I have already noted my thanks) the present thesis is my own responsibility. 
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 ABSTRACT 
The study of technological innovation covers a broad range of issues. Everything, 
from the public funding of science, research policy to the role of universities, from 
the business development of new products and services, the financing of innovation, 
institutional arrangements through to the  spatially located conditions that promote 
innovation has been considered by analysts. Mostly these subject matters have been 
conceptualised as components of 'national’ systems of innovation even when studied 
at different spatial levels (including regions and clusters). The emphasis of systems 
research is that places (nations or localities), within the global economic landscape, 
are especially important for the creation, spread and use of innovations.  
The systems perspective on innovation (see chapters two and three) encourages, due 
to results on the development of endogenous capabilities and the proximity of 
knowledge spillovers, a view that production and innovation geographies are 
enclaves of activity, innovating largely in isolation from what is occurring in other 
technologically isolated systems. A central concern in the present thesis is that this 
view of national and sub-national systems does not provide a sufficiently 
comprehensive perspective on the global architecture of production. The primary 
goal is to begin to develop an innovation systems framework that combines the 
consideration of the advantages of individual spatial entities (clusters) with an 
analysis of value chains as they extend across regional and national borders. To 
achieve this, the analysis focuses on evaluating the role, scale and spatial structure of 
inter-cluster linkages.  
The literature on role of interdependencies within clusters suggests that user-
producer and tacit knowledge flows are more important for innovation than traded 
interdependencies. Some existing research suggests that knowledge links diminish 
with distance, however emerging trade research (chapter four) implies that person-to-
person links exist across borders to a degree that was previously unexpected.
To aid the analysis of the scale and spatial structure of interdependencies and rather 
than be restricted by case studies methods which would facilitate analysis of only one 
or two clusters, two inter-country input-output datasets covering nine OECD 
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countries (33 sectors) and fifteen European Union countries (25 sectors) were 
developed for the research project. To analyse these datasets in a manner that was 
consistent with the goals of the research new modelling software was constructed.  
The modelling of connectedness reveals the scale of extra-territorial linkages, in 
terms of the degree of production that is internationalised across industries (chapter 
six), the economic power of various national clusters (chapter seven) and the scale of 
bilateral links (chapters eight and nine).
The spatial architecture of inter-cluster structures for the transport equipment 
industries (motor vehicles and aerospace) is presented in chapter eight and for 
computing and electronics in chapter nine. The analysis of these spatial structures 
reveals that substantial associations exist between some clusters, with most national 
clusters maintaining one important connection. The analysis reveals differences in 
the global architecture of production for assembly based systems (motor vehicles and 
aerospace) when compared to modular component based systems such as electronics 
and computing.  Just as businesses form networks, then it seems reasonable, on the 
basis of the research presented here, to suggest that global production consists of 
networks of clusters which are organised in hierarchical circuits.  
This evidence supports the argument developed through the present thesis that 
certain elements of innovation systems can be better understood through a cross-
border cluster-to-cluster framework. The research results also challenge the current 
emphasis, within the neo-Schumpeterian literature, of focusing almost exclusively on 
innovation within national borders.
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‘Silicon Valley in California and the Hsinchu-
Taipei region of Taiwan are amongst the most 
frequently cited ‘miracles’ of the information 
technology era. The dominant accounts of their 
success treat them in isolation … This paper 
argues that the dynamism of these regional 
economies is attributable to their increasing 
interdependencies’ (Saxenian and Hsu 2001: 893 
emphasis added). 
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CHAPTER 1:  
 INTRODUCTION 
 
‘Although there is a large literature on the 
internationalization of economic activity 
(including R&D) at the corporate level, there are 
relatively few studies of the degree of 
internationalization of innovation systems’ 
(Carlsson 2003: 20). 
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1.1 The economics of location vs. globalisation  
Over the past twenty years or so, the landscape of economic development around the 
world has been changing remarkably quickly. The continued economic advance of 
Asian countries like South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, the emerging strength of 
China, the new software development hotspots in India and the movement of 
factories to countries like Malaysia and Mexico point to significant changes in the 
organisation of industrial production.  
Such changes, on the ground, highlight a growing divide in the literature on the 
factors for successful economic development and industrial location. Some authors 
emphasise the significance and role of the nation and national institutions for the 
development of technological capability and innovation across an economy. Others 
dismiss the nation state as increasingly irrelevant with waning powers to influence 
development trajectories in a globalised economy. Understanding, even a few more 
of the critical elements of the processes leading to the visible structural changes 
would be valuable for devising policies in advanced, emerging and less developed 
economies alike.  
The academic literature on technological innovation has not only argued for the 
importance of the generation of knowledge to industrial competitiveness and 
economic growth but also for the importance of national characteristics for the 
creation of that knowledge. Freeman (2002) and Lundvall et al. (2002) continue to 
argue for the focus of analytical effort to remain on national innovation systems as 
the set of social arrangements in which learning and the development of 
technological capability principally occurs. This field of research emphasises the 
systemic nature of knowledge, technology and product and process innovations in 
successful industry evolution2, rather than traditional industrial structure, micro and 
macroeconomics analyses. As components of nation states, the so-called ‘sub-
national’ systems of innovation, which include clusters and regions, is now an 
established area of interest, which whilst accepting the basic principles of the 
                                                 
2 Measurement relies largely upon indicators of R&D funding, patenting, numbers of innovations and 
export performance by industry (see e.g. OECD 2002d). 
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national systems approach nevertheless, takes a different spatial frame, even if that is 
within the borders of nations. As Carlsson states: 
‘in view of the fact that most studies of innovation systems focus on national 
innovation systems, it is not surprising that little direct evidence is found that 
innovation systems are becoming global. The main focus in this literature is on 
institutions at the national level. But national institutions may influence innovation 
systems at regional, sectoral, or technological levels differently. However, at these 
lower levels there has been little work done with a view toward internationalization 
of systems (as distinct from corporate innovative activity). Also, not all institutions 
are national. For large firms, national institutions may be most important, while for 
small and new firms, sub-national institutions may also be important’ (2003: 21). 
Alongside this perspective on the role of nations is an extensive discussion in other 
literatures on the fragmentation of production processes across borders, the growing 
levels of international trade and flighty FDI capital that appears to be moving easily 
around the world in search of opportunities for generating high returns. This focus on 
the international division of labour based on costs and the shifting geography of 
manufacturing activities has led many researchers to conclusions which are opposite 
to those of the researchers studying innovation. The patterns of increasing trade can 
be interpreted as the weakening of the nation state and for some even as its demise 
(Ohmae 1995). Thus the term ‘globalisation’ (Hatzichronoglou 1999, Yeats 1998, and 
Ng and Yeats 1999) has entered the popular vocabulary, signifying not simply trade 
patterns but also the increasing levels of foreign ownership of assets and the 
expansion of the role of international agreements3 that constrain a variety of 
government policy actions.  
The division between analysis that emphasises the importance of location and the 
flows of trade and the relocation of production needs to be bridged. As Sturgeon 
comments:   
‘We need to better understand the various roles that local agglomerations play 
within spatially extensive value chains and begin to map the activities that tend to 
concentrate in particular places even as the geographic ‘footprint’ of linked 
economic activity expands. (2003: 200). 
                                                 
3 NAFTA, USAFTA (proposed United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement), WTO www.wto.org 
etc.  
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1.2  Bridging the gap: places and extra-territorial spaces 
The advantages of place: innovation and innovation systems 
Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has been increasingly clear that technological 
innovation has an important role in economic development and growth. The think 
tank of world’s wealthiest countries, the OECD, has been at the forefront of 
promoting this view, publishing a number of influential studies (see for example 
OECD 1992, 1996c and 2001b). 
Within the study of technological innovation, sometimes referred to as neo-
Schumpeterian, for the contribution Josef Schumpeter made to positioning 
innovation at the centre of economic processes, or alternatively as the economics of 
innovation and technological change (EITC4) there are many important research 
themes currently being investigated. From analyses of individual technologies, 
corporate activities (knowledge management and technology creation), and 
government policy interventions and through to the analyses of the innovativeness of 
entire countries (e.g. see Nelson 1993), a vast array of topics are being discussed and 
debated in the international literature. Increasingly, a large proportion of the literature 
is influenced by geography-based analysis of the systemic characteristics of 
innovation (national and regional innovation systems).  
The insight that innovation is systemic and thus, that places are important sites of 
economic advantage has been a critical change in thinking. Businesses, far from 
being purely independent actors, rest on a series of foundations of knowledge 
generation institutions (research organisations and universities), cultural influences 
on learning, knowledge dissemination organisations (schools and universities), 
government policies and the network of other firms that exist in particular places (see 
chapters two and three below). These system variables influence the trajectories of 
‘national innovation systems‘, which Patel and Pavitt have shown to be quite stable, 
relative to other countries, over the long term. There are now a number of different 
'system' levels of analysis, including: 
• national innovation systems (nation states); 
• regional innovation systems (states, provinces – substantial but sub-national 
politico-administrative geographies); 
                                                 
4 Verspagen and Werker (2003). 
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• sectoral innovation systems (emphasises corporate and public organisations 
contributing to particular production systems which in practice tend to (but 
need not necesarily) be limited by nation state borders; and 
• clusters (these extend over various spatial scales but emphase knowledge 
and production systems). 
Of the sub-national themes, the concept of clustering has become the more popular 
term and spans both the economic geography and EITC fields of studies for sub-
national analyses. The OECD has played a role in bringing together cluster case 
studies (OECD 1999d and 2001c) and now there are at least three major research 
projects currently being conducted on clustering which are investigating a significant 
number of case studies. The Innovation Systems Research Network5 is concluding a 
study of 26 ‘clusters’ in Canada ranging from small local clusters to large clusters of 
national importance (auto), from the high technology (biotechnology) through to 
lower technologies (food), and all being examined with a common methodology 
(Wolfe and Gertler 2004). IT clusters in Taiwan, America, the UK, Israel and 
Scandinavia are the focus of a group that involves Saxenian (e.g. see Bresnahan et al. 
2001). Finally, the Institute for Strategy and Competitiveness’ Cluster Mapping 
Project
6 at Harvard University is analysing the location quotients and growth 
performance of clusters in the USA (see Porter 2003). This and other research has 
already played a valuable role in advancing our knowledge of the characteristics of 
local economic agglomerations.  
The problems of not looking beyond borders 
On one hand, it is clear that economic geographers are interested in addressing this 
issue of global production, even if they think it has not been dealt with adequately 
(Dicken 2004) or they are setting out a research agenda for the ‘spatial logic of 
economic development’ (Tellier 1997).  Carlsson (2003), however, suggests (quoted 
above) that neo-Schumpeterians do not have a developed language for describing the 
global scale of economic structures or the international system of innovation 
systems. This is despite the disparity in national systems ranging, for advanced 
economies,  from the United States of America with 291 million people (the largest 
                                                 
5 See Holbrook and Wolfe 2000, Holbrook and Wolfe 2002, Wolfe 2003 and Wolfe and Lucas 2004. 
6 https://secure.hbs.edu/isc/login.do?http://data.isc.hbs.edu/isc/index.jsp 
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OECD country) and Iceland with just 289,000 people (the smallest) (data from 
OECD 2004: 6-7). 
Analysts of national and sub-national innovation systems have often adopted a 
research methodology based on endogenous capability (e.g. see Lundvall 1992, 
Nelson 1993 and see chapter two and three), as opposed to developing models of 
cross-spatial interdependency. As Breschi and Malerba comment ‘a key feature of 
successful high-technology clusters is related to the high level of embeddedness of 
local firms in a very thick network of knowledge sharing’ (2001: 819) with firms 
able to tap into a ‘body of localized knowledge and capabilities’ (p820). This 
paradigm seems to prevail even when a particular set of activities is explicitly 
conceived of as a ‘node’ within a global value chain. The ‘thickness’ of relations with 
local institutions was used by Henry and Pinch (2001) to determine the 
‘embededness’ of the system with little if any determination of its nodal dimensions 
within global knowledge and industrial networks.    
Whilst much of the literature on clustering and economic agglomeration has focussed 
upon particular places as if they were not connected to the rest of the world, very 
recent evidence emphasises that the national and international linkages maintained 
by cluster-based firms are vital sources of knowledge. Wolfe and Gertler (2004) as 
well as Simmie (2004) take the position that such linkages are as important as local 
ones. Simmie, for example, notes that leading innovators in the UK rely more on 
national and international linkages than on local and regional linkages (2004: 1105). 
Meanwhile, Wolfe and Gertler (2004) take issue with the Porterian concept that 
clusters require supply networks to be in close proximity. These articles are, 
however, the exception and notable because they highlight the dearth of research on 
the connectedness of clusters (see chapter three below).  
There are a few obvious examples of situations where clusters of all sizes are 
strongly linked in economic space but are either geographically distant or separated 
only by a national or politico-administrative border. Some easily identifiable 
examples include: 
• Detroit (USA) – Windsor (Canada) [auto clusters]; 
• New York – London – Tokyo [world financial centres]; 
• Silicon Valley – Bangalore [ICT clusters]; and 
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• Melbourne (Australia) – Adelaide (Australia), [sub-national auto clusters]. 
It has been widely suggested (see chapter four) that the assembly of final products is 
increasingly integrating components made or designed in many parts of the world. 
Everything from low cost products (such as textiles, clothing and footwear), to 
processing centred production activities (steel and aluminium) and complex products 
(electronics, vehicles and aerospace) utilise a high level of imported components and 
industrial ingredients (see chapter six). Our poor awareness of the knowledge and 
production geography of individual products is an increasingly critical gap but at 
least this is covered at the corporate level by the global production networks 
analyses. 
The wider research agenda on innovation systems at the spatial level therefore needs 
to move beyond location and ask whether particular clusters are in specialised niches 
or are globally powerful. Are some clusters relatively independent or so dependent 
on products purchased extra-regionally that, in fact, it is a broader economic space7 
spanning political jurisdictions which should be considered as the functional 
cluster8? The advantage of conceiving of ‘functional clusters’, as geographies being 
linked within a production value chain, is that it neither diminishes the economic 
importance of locations nor ignores the wider changes in economic geography.  
It is not that local systems are unimportant, only that they need to be identified 
within the global architecture of production. As one example, as there are now only 
two major assemblers of commercial aircraft (Boeing and Airbus), aerospace 
clusters9 across the world need to be highly inter-linked with each other and the 
major assemblers. 
1.3 The thesis research problem 
The entire intellectual territory of what might constitute a research agenda on 
innovation systems beyond borders is far too broad to be considered here. What 
needs to be established, in the first instance, is whether the phenomena of 
                                                 
7 Economic space is used here to denote the concept that economic activites are by their nature not 
limited by borders but they do have boundaries, they do have a shape, and these need to be mapped.  
8 Rather than delineating a cluster geo-politically, it ought to be possible to map value chains and thus 
define the extent of a cluster functionally – combining both geographic and economic space.   
9 This is a topic which is discussed in a small case study of an embryonic aerospace cluster in 
Australia in chapter four (below) and the spatial structure of the aerospace value chain is discussed in 
chapter eight (below). 
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connections between specific sub-national systems matters a great deal or is 
somewhat peripheral – i.e. what is the significance of cluster linkages? The idea of 
significance, itself, can be separated into a number of different components. Because 
the focus is on the connections between places, the ones of interest here are the role, 
the scale and the spatial structure of linkages and interdependencies. Importantly, it 
is necessary to determine whether the patterns of linkages and local strengths matter 
for the study of innovation. Whether the role, scale and structure of linkages matters 
will be established here, at least in a preliminary manner, by determining whether 
sub-national systems of innovation are linked in networks or develop such a wide 
spread of connections that there no discernable pattern of inter-cluster interaction.  
To conduct this type of research it is necessary to develop a multi-spatial10 
perspective. This term is used throughout the present thesis to denote both an 
analytical frame of reference and the methodological tools necessary for the analysis 
of cluster-to-cluster relations in economic space and across geographic space. Multi-
spatial analysis potentially includes any study that could identify linkages between 
different places, whether those connections are in the use of products, knowledge, 
patents or the flow of human capital in migration patterns  
Thesis questions 
To achieve the goals of researching the role, scale and spatial structure of 
interactions, more specific research questions were developed. These were: 
1. Why does the ‘innovation systems’ agenda give primacy to political 
geography (nation states and regions within nations) over other possible 
frameworks including economic space, which may lead to more research 
on extra-territorial links;  
2. What is it about linkages between economic actors (relationships 
particularly between users and producers) within innovation theory that 
makes them so important for the development and diffusion of new 
products and services; 
                                                 
10 This term has been used in preference to either inter-regional or multi-regional because of their 
direct associations with input-output (I-O) modelling.  Although the present thesis utilised I-O 
analysis, this does not indicate that the methodology is seen as the only way of conducting appropriate 
analysis, and so a new term was valuable. 
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3. What is known about product and knowledge linkages that extend beyond 
the borders of particular innovation systems (especially industrial 
clusters); 
4. To construct an analysis of the spatial structure of external linkages, is it 
best to use an intensive case study approach or a statistical tool such as 
input-output modeling; 
5. Can multi-regional input-output modelling be used to analyse the strength 
of user-producer relationships between places in a way that can highlight 
connections more clearly that other methodologies including trade data; 
6. Do the results of inter-country modelling reveal linkages between systems 
that are statistically important; 
7. Does the structure of international input-output relations make sense 
when other evidence on knowledge flows, technological specialisations 
and national and sub-national systems of innovation are considered; and 
8. What new insights into systems of innovation and the interdependencies 
between them emerge from understanding the spatial structure of 
linkages? 
These questions are covered within the following chapter structure. 
Thesis contents 
In introducing the linked clusters research agenda into the neo-Schumpeterian field, 
not just as a theoretical proposition but also with an attempt at developing a 
substantial volume of data, it was considered necessary to examine, in detail, how the 
relevant literature addresses border issues as well as the issue of interdependencies 
inside them and across them. For this reason, the present thesis is built upon 
extensive analysis of three broad themes of research. National innovation systems 
(chapter two), sub-national innovation systems (chapter three) and international trade 
(chapter four) literatures are analysed with a focus on the role of knowledge, why 
location matters and the nature of industrial interdependencies. To assist the reader 
navigate the literature covered in the present thesis, the following diagram has been 
developed to help identify the topics of interest. It is repeated in a modified form at 
the beginning of chapters two, three and four. 
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Figure 1.1: A literature map of relevant themes for this research 
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The components of this diagram, how they are incorporated into the thesis, and an 
outline of the contents of the chapters are as follows. 
Chapter 2: Systemic Innovation and Nation States 
It has already been noted that business innovation is now understood to be an 
outcome of system characteristics, which have traditionally been understood as 
developing within nation states. Chapter two explores the way innovation contributes 
to growth and competitiveness. It also examines the strengths and weaknesses of a 
system perspective founded on the geo-political entities of nation states. 
Chapter 3: Sub-national Innovation Systems: Clusters and Regions 
Although the spatial reference is different, the analytical themes of the sub-national 
systems of innovation research are similar to the concerns of national innovation 
systems (NIS) research. At the meso level (not companies and not nations) the 
studies are more focussed, than NIS analyses, on specific geographic locations often 
specialising in a particular production activity. The research literature emphasises the 
importance of knowledge flows between organizations within a limited spatial area, 
with only limited evidence on the nature and structure of extra-regional (intra-
national or international) linkages. The organisation of traded and untraded 
interdependencies and user-producer relationships are of particular interest.  
Chapter 4: Beyond Borders: The Nature of Linkages 
Research findings from the fields of EITC, neo-classical economics, input-output 
economics, global production networks and world city networks are presented, as 
they relate to the evolution of the spatial structure of trade. Chapter four also 
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highlights social network explanations of trade, as the findings are significant for 
understanding the flow of innovation and knowledge between localities.  
The second section of the chapter assesses the evidence from the first section of 
chapter four together with that presented in chapters two and three to draw 
conclusions on the likely role, scale and spatial structure of extra-regional linkages. 
The section also maps out in greater detail the multi-spatial research necessary to 
construct a functional view of innovation space.   
Chapter 5: A Methodology for Measuring Inter-Country Linkages  
Chapter five has two major sections. The first assesses the benefits and weaknesses 
of using an input-output methodology to map the scale and structure of relationships 
and includes a consideration of the compatibility of this approach with the aims of 
innovation systems research. The second section describes the construction of two 
inter-country input-output models used in the research to analyse the flows of 
intermediate goods between industries and countries. The first model is based on data 
for fifteen European Union countries for the year 1995 (Eurostats 2000) and the other 
uses data for nine OECD countries for the year 1990 (OECD 1996b). The chapter 
includes the algebraic expression of the modelling calculations.  
Chapter 6: The Internationalisation of Production 
Input-output modelling has a number of important advantages. One of them is that it 
enables a calculation of the value of purchases of industrial ingredients from different 
industries (in different countries) as a share of value added. The first section of 
chapter six presents data from the two models on those industries that require the 
highest levels of imported ingredients. The second section of chapter six focuses on 
these high import industries and, in particular, those that have a higher R&D 
intensity. The particular interest is whether measures of technological complexity can 
help account for the high import higher R&D clusters. The final section of the 
chapter presents data on the changing pattern of consumption and trade by OECD 
countries categorised by a modified version of Pavitt’s 1984 taxonomy of industries, 
which is revealed to have some explanatory qualities for industry import patterns. In 
so doing chapter six addresses both the role and scale of international 
interdependencies.  
Chapter 7: The Economic Power of Clusters 
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As input-output models calculate not just the first round of requirements for imports 
but also the subsequent requirements they enable statistical testing that cannot be 
conducted with trade data. For example, for Country A to trade with Country B in a 
particular industry it will need components from other domestic industries as well as 
imports. This complex inter-play of relationships offers the prospect of testing for a 
very interesting possibility. Some countries may accumulate more (or less) value 
added through trade than would be apparent from just the direct volume of trade 
because they can capture more round-about activity. In fact this proves to be the case 
and the results are presented in chapter seven. This chapter addresses both the scale 
and spatial structure of cross-border linkages. 
Chapter 8: The Spatial Structure of Transport Cluster Networking 
One of the central themes of this thesis is whether clusters form spatially structured 
external relationships or whether linkages are dispersed across a wide variety of 
other systems. Chapter eight is an analysis of the interdependencies between national 
transport equipment clusters (EU model), motor vehicles clusters (OECD) and 
aerospace clusters (OECD model). The chapter marries analysis of the input-output 
data with some of the available evidence on the technological and trade strengths of 
these industries in relevant countries. 
Chapter 9: The Spatial Structure of Cluster Networking in ICT and 
Electronics 
Chapter nine has a similar focus and goal to that of chapter eight and, therefore, has a 
similar structure. On this occasion, the interest is in cluster-to-cluster 
interdependencies for the office machines and computing and electronics EU and 
OECD models). As Asian countries have a strong position in the world economy in 
these sectors but neither of the models used here integrates them (apart from Japan) 
into the analysis, chapter nine also considers the intra-Asian and extra-Asian 
interdependencies.  
Chapter 10: Conclusions on the Architecture of Economies 
The concluding chapter reviews the evidential strengths and weaknesses of the linked 
clusters framework and evaluates the use of input-output data. From the analysis of 
the spatial structure of linkages it is apparent that there are differences in the way 
countries and industries are connected. Some national clusters are hubs for a large 
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system of networks, with some countries heavily dependent on goods developed in 
other countries. There also appear to be differences in the global organisation of 
assembler industries (e.g. motor vehicles) and those with modular product 
architectures (electronics).  The chapter also emphasises future research possibilities. 
Boundaries and contributions of this research project 
This research project cannot address all of the important questions derived from a 
focus on the structure of linkages beyond the borders of regions. Whilst, the systems 
of innovation literature emphasises the historical, institutional and government policy 
factors in promoting system innovativeness, there is not the space here to consider 
such issues for the shape of cluster network structures. The structure of intra-national 
linkages has been left to a future date. However, this thesis contributes to the analysis 
of innovation and the modelling of inter-regional interactions, in a number of ways. 
For innovation systems research: 
• this thesis identifies a serious deficiency in the way it currently treats 
industrial production and geography, suggesting that multi-spatial analysis 
should be included as one aspect of the research agenda; and  
• this thesis reveals that the current approach to 'national' or local systems is 
ignoring the scale and spatial structure of the transfer of components across 
borders and the various types of connections that exist between production 
locations.  
In the field of spatial modelling the present thesis: 
• applies a proposed methodology (Cooper 2000) for calculating net 
multipliers to two large multi-country datasets to analyse the linkages 
between industries and countries; and 
• reports on the development of various new measures of the strength of 
linkages between economies which generates new analyses of industrial 
interdependencies. 
Whilst, the data analysis reported here remains structural an effort has been made to 
interpret them within the wider innovation systems context. 
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1.4 Overview 
It is obvious that in moving away from simply locating clusters and assessing their 
advantages to a framework that examines them within longer value chains, the issue 
of the treatment of political borders with the innovation systems literature is an 
important sub-theme. As the dust jacket for a recent book on clusters reads ‘… the 
authors are able to explore the role that national innovation systems play as a 
framework in which clusters operate’11. It was, therefore, felt that to construct an 
innovation system framework around value chains it was essential that the study 
needed to include a careful consideration of why borders are so important in the 
study of innovation.   
It is not the argument here that national borders or regional systems do not matter, 
clearly they remain important (see in particular the analysis of the role of borders on 
trade in section 4.2.2 below). It is, however, the argument of this thesis that there is a 
need for an extension of the vision of the innovation systems approach to go beyond 
borders and examine how the different systems interact. The corollary argument is 
that it would be equally mistaken to move from the current situation to a position 
where international links are only generally considered. In this way, the current 
project goes some way towards addressing an earlier proposal by Lundvall, when he 
suggested: 
‘It would be very interesting to extend the mapping of innovation flows to 
international input-output tables, in order to see what degree flows of innovations 
are international rather than national, and how this differs between sectors. Again 
this would present us with very complicated methodological problems. In order to 
understand the international relationships, it might be necessary to combine the 
structural analysis with an institutional approach’ (1996: 363). 
The connections between systems need to be understood in terms of the role, scale 
and spatial structure of those links, and although this study has addressed the issue of 
internationalisation, the findings are very likely applicable intra-nationally.  
                                                 
11 Pressi and Solimene (2003). 
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 SYSTEMIC INNOVATION AND NATION 
 STATES 
 
‘I distrust all systematisers, and avoid them. The 
will to a system shows a lack of honesty’. 
(Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche 1888). 
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2.1 Knowledge, technology, innovation and nation 
states  
The decade of the 1980s was one where Japanese industrial competitiveness in a 
number of technology based industries notably computers, consumer electronics and 
motor vehicles came to the fore. Dosi et al. (1990) considered this example of 
Japanese development as the only case of economic catch-up from less developed to 
advanced economy status in the post World War II era. Throughout this catch-up 
period, corporations based in Japan expanded their technological capabilities and 
progressively introduced new processes and products that were at the leading edge in 
many industries.  
With the exception of the case of Japan there was, at least until the mid 1990s, an 
interesting feature of research and development (R&D) indicators in particular, and 
innovation indicators more generally. Relevant data reveals that the relative position 
of many OECD countries does not vary significantly across time (Patel and Pavitt 
1994). As one example, Voyer (1999) argues that Canada did not significantly 
increase its gross expenditure on research and development (GERD) across a 30-year 
period.  
These observations – one country’s improved competitive position (Japan), the 
inability of Canada to improve its expenditure on research and development and the 
general pattern of the difficulty for countries to shift their trajectories – strongly 
suggests that a company’s technological capabilities are not just its own business. 
The progress of the major Japanese companies, in particular, had a considerable 
impact on researchers with an interest in technological competitiveness. Their 
success suggested that the national milieu, in which businesses were embedded, is 
influential in their behaviour and success. Thus by the late 1980s the concept of 
national innovation systems (NIS) was born (Freeman 1987 and many since).  
A decade and a half later, this concept is discussed or implied in the vast majority of 
research articles on innovation. NIS research has revealed that a country’s research 
and education systems, its government policies on industry and innovation, and even 
the operation of its labour market, can all affect the ability of a firm to introduce new 
products and processes. Access to highly skilled personnel, appropriate infrastructure 
Chapter 2: Systemic Innovation and Nation States 
Brian Wixted 17
and an environment conducive to co-operatively developing research opportunities 
between publicly funded research laboratories and business, all play a part in the 
overall innovativeness of economies.   
This chapter analyses the major threads of NIS research, as it is relevant to 
international production structures – which is not by any means the totality of the 
NIS literature. It evaluates the role of the ‘system’ in shaping technological 
competitiveness, promoting economic growth and the way in which knowledge 
production remain remarkably stability through time. Figure 2.1 locates this 
chapter’s contents within the overall research framework of the thesis. 
Figure 2.1: Chapter 2: National innovation systems in the literature 
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National innovation systems research has focussed on determining the characteristics 
of particular countries that have aided or hindered economic success. However, this 
has been done largely by treating each nation as essentially independent. As this 
chapter reveals there has been little work on the linkage between the knowledge 
economy and the national economic interdependencies within the growing structure 
of global production. This chapter also shows the NIS focus on the importance of the 
internal dynamics of economies, to the neglect of external connections, can be seen 
in the very early work of Josef Schumpeter. 
NIS definitions and theory. 
Technology, innovation, economic growth and the nation-state. 
Technological and industrial specialisations. 
National learning systems
The non-globalisation of corporate R&D 
The extent to which NIS research has studied 
the relationships between economies. 
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2.2 Technology, competitiveness and systemic 
components 
2.2.1 Economic growth 
In the long run, what matters for human societies are economic growth (World Bank 
1999), environmental sustainability (Diamond 1998 and World Commission on 
Environment and Development 1987) and social capital (Vinson 200412). Although 
this triple bottom-line has been gaining more prominence in recent years, the 
economic wealth of nations is critical for quality of life and the health of populations. 
As the history of economic development is such a popular topic (Landes 1998), it is a 
little surprising that the understanding of the conditions that facilitate economic 
growth is advancing very slowly. Temple (1999: 112) goes so far as to say that the 
analysis of economic growth has often been a backwater within macroeconomics. 
This neglect makes it is easy to make big claims for what is known of economic 
growth, particularly as it relates to the role of new technology, but unfortunately less 
seems to be known than is claimed. 
For the last twenty years there has been a gradually growing interest in researching 
economic growth. Within the neoclassical economics tradition, ‘new growth theory’ 
emerged with the work of Romer (1986) who drew attention to the role of new 
knowledge creation in fostering economic growth. Neo-Schumpeterians have had a 
continuing interest in the role of knowledge and new technologies in generating 
faster economic growth longer than this and during the 2000s the OECD has had a 
significant project reviewing the evidence on economic growth (OECD 2001b and 
OECD 2003a). 
Neo-Schumpeterian authors have approached the analysis of economic growth from 
a number of angles. Fagerberg points out that prior to new growth theory it was 
expected that capital and labour contributions would be the preponderance of factors 
contributing to economic growth (2001). As much as 80% of growth (p5) remained 
outside the models in the first attempts at growth accounting. Fagerberg argues that 
there are various bits of evidence supporting the significance of technology diffusion, 
knowledge spillovers and localisation of knowledge in economic growth. However, 
                                                 
12 a revealing study of the importance of ‘social cohesion’ in economically disadvantaged 
communities in rural, regional and urban Australia. It reveals that outcomes for communities with 
greater social capital were better than for those with less social capital. 
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Temple (1999), in analysing the empirical evidence on these and other factors, is less 
confident that there are any clear answers. Importantly, there is a difference between 
national economic growth that can be influenced by many factors, such as 
macroeconomic management and consumer confidence related factors, and business 
competitiveness which is more directly related to innovation. The OECD highlights 
the growth experience of Member countries and in so doing reveals the difficulties of 
determining the factors that encourage economic growth.  
‘Some point to the role of new technology and innovation, but if that were the only 
answer, then why did growth languish in Japan, which has a large and successful 
computer hardware industry, but soar in Australia, which has virtually no such 
sector at all?’ (2001b: 9)  
The OECD’s conclusion, whilst hard to fault, does not actually help very much. 
‘Consequently, policies that engage ICT, human capital, innovation and 
entrepreneurship in the growth process, alongside fundamental policies to control 
inflation and instil competition, while controlling public finances are likely to bear 
the most fruit over the longer term’ (2001b:10). 
Although new technologies play a part in national economic growth, determining the 
value of that contribution remains a challenge. Partly, the problem with calculating 
the outcomes of aggregate investment in new technologies is the urgent need for 
improved theoretical models and tools for measuring creative destruction processes, 
as noted by Haltiwanger (2000). New technologies do in time replace13 older ones or 
change the relative pace at which different sectors change rates of employment or 
productivity. As global competition increases, the race to develop new technologies 
may just help countries keep pace with one another. 
Since the 1970s, there have been some remarkable changes in the world economy. 
New technologies and innovation have become ever more important to business 
success. The massive increase in computing power with benefits for national 
productivity (Jorgensen et al. 2003), the Internet and with it the emerging 
possibilities of electronic commerce (OECD 1999a), the beginnings of biotechnology 
for both health and agriculture (Industry Canada 1998 and MacIntosh 1998) have 
encouraged governments to focus on the economic potential of emerging 
                                                 
13 See Christensen, Craig, and Hart (2001)  
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technologies14. Nanotechnology is already being seen as the next ‘big thing’, with 
substantial investment in the USA (through the NSF15). The EU is also focussed on 
this set of technologies, already devoting a chapter to measuring the level of 
investment in Member countries in the European Commission’s 2003 indicators 
report. Business communities now lobby Government for innovation programs (see 
e.g. Australian Industry Group 2002) and technology and knowledge is now an issue 
for debate by neo-classical economists. Even a bastion of economic theory and 
tradition, The Economist journal reflects these changes with a quarterly review of 
science and technology. Perhaps most surprising, governments in the world’s poorest 
countries, such as Mozambique, have a growing interest in science, technology and 
business innovation (Garrett-Jones, Wixted and Turpin 2003). 
2.2.2 Innovation aids all sectors, from agriculture to services 
Academic interest in industrial innovation is often traced back to Joseph Schumpeter, 
an Austrian economist, who until recently received little attention in economics 
courses. In A Theory of Economic Development, first published in English in 1934, 
Schumpeter (1968) considered technological innovation not merely as the driving 
force of growth but as being the very essence of development (p65 ff). Schumpeter’s 
insights are now largely supported by the results coming from a broad range of 
authors. Porter (1990) suggests that the ability to create new products or processes 
allows firms to be freed from the traditional sources of advantages such as lower 
labour costs and resource access, to be replaced by the advantages of skilled labour 
and technological infrastructure. But this change from ‘comparative’ to ‘competitive 
advantages’ does not make the factors behind business development less local – it 
makes some factors even more localised.  
By the 1960s and 1970s, Schumpeter’s ideas on the innovation process were being 
put to the test with studies of company research and development practices and their 
capacity to introduce new products to the marketplace. Freeman comments on one of 
the path-breaking studies of the time: 
‘The SAPPHO project (Freeman, 1974 and Rothwell 1974) had already shown that 
good internal coupling between design, development, production and marketing 
                                                 
14 The USA’s Government expenditure on health research alone has grown from around US$15b in 
1998 to nearly US$30b in 2004 (constant 2004 dollars) AAAS (2004b). 
15 See www.nsf.gov  
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functions was one of the decisive conditions for successful innovation. Many 
failures could be attributed to the lack of communication between the R&D, 
production and marketing functions as was also shown in the brilliant sociological 
study of Burns and Stalker [1961]’ (1994: 472).  
These early studies focussed primarily on the development of new products that were 
based on scientific research by firms in the manufacturing sector. Whilst, this focus 
inevitably concentrated analysis on industries that require more research and 
development (electronics, pharmaceuticals, aerospace and motor vehicles), over time 
this has changed. Nelson (1993: 513), for example, in his volume comparing national 
innovation systems demonstrates that there is a strong connection between a nation’s 
competitive agricultural sector and the funding of agricultural research.  
It has taken much longer for service businesses to be treated on their own merits, in 
terms of innovative capacity. Initially, services were understood for their role within 
the traditional areas of interest (manufacturing and new technologies). Freeman 
noting the significant investment by business service firms in technological change, 
comments: 
‘In-house software development ... is now characteristic of many firms in financial 
services, who also have a heavier investment in ICT equipment than most firms in 
manufacturing. At the same time, specialist software companies are proliferating 
and have a very dynamic role in technical change’ (1994: 478). 
There continues to be interest in how services and manufacturing interact in the 
innovation process (Tomlinson 1997) and there is a growing body of research on the 
dynamics of services innovation (see Tether and Metcalfe 2003 and Baark 2001). The 
SI4S16 and RISE17 projects have greatly improved the information on services 
innovation and the role of public sector research organisations. This broadening 
interest of innovation researchers now even extends as far as consumer preferences 
with a research project on ‘consumption and demand’ (Harvey et al. 2001). 
Innovation, is not just the activity of high technology manufacturing firms, it is the 
business of firms throughout a modern economy. However, innovation studies now 
overwhelmingly emphasise the systemic dimension of innovation.  
                                                 
16 http://www.step.no  
17 http://www.centrim.brighton.ac.uk  
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2.2.3 Innovation embedded in nations 
In neo-classical trade theory the factors of production are traditionally considered as 
national but knowledge is freely available (Lundvall 1998), which should lead to the 
global movement of production to where there are comparative advantages. 
However, neo-Schumpeterians have a better understanding of knowledge, 
highlighting that it is not easily accessible and is related to industrial structure. 
Therefore, they continue to retain a focus on the role of the nation state. 
Whilst there are commonalities within the definitions of what is systemic in 
innovation processes within nation states, there is no agreed theory of cause and 
effect mechanisms. In Edquist’s (1997b) view, systems of innovation, which 
encompasses a range of spatial scales (not just nation states), is a framework for 
investigating the development and evolution of technological capabilities, 
concentrations and specialisations. Edquist provides a guide to the systems of 
innovation perspective, emphasising it:  
• is ‘holistic and interdisciplinary’ – for constructing a broad understanding of 
the ‘determinants of innovation’ (1997b: 17); 
• is a presentation of the ‘historical perspective’ on geography and natural 
resources access etc (1997b: 19); 
• focuses on the ‘differences between systems and non-optimality’ (1997b: 
19) – all systems are different and defining a priori an optimal system is not 
sensible; 
• stresses ‘interdependence and non-linearity’ (1997b: 20) – as it is ‘an 
approach in which interdependence and interaction between the elements in 
the system is one of the most important characteristics’ (1997b: 21); 
• focuses on ‘product technologies and organisational innovations’ (1997b: 
22); and 
• places institutions at the centre of analysis.   
This list by Edquist breaks down into essentially two categories: the first three points 
position the approach to the economics of innovation and technological change vis-à-
vis neo-classical economics; whilst the second three points identify the key issues in 
the study of innovation. Institutions, interdependencies and product innovations in a 
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particular place draw upon history, culture and a set of policy interventions, that 
implies that the nation state is seen as a natural boundary for the actors and activities 
that are relevant to the creation of economically useful knowledge.  
Freeman (1995) reviews a number of cases where the different way innovation 
systems developed was important to the broader trajectories of economic 
development. He argues that Japan encouraged the integration of production with 
research and development and technology acquisition whilst in the USSR these were 
all components that were separated from one another. In Japan, networks of users and 
producers developed whilst in the USSR these never developed. In East Asia, there 
was heavy investment in the education systems whilst in Latin America the education 
systems deteriorated. In East Asia, industrial research and development expenditure 
increased whilst in Latin America it remained steady.  
The emphasis on the nation dates at least back as far as Schumpeter. Recently, a 
chapter written by Schumpeter for the first edition of his ‘A Theory of Economic 
Development’ and not included in the first English translation has been translated into 
English and analysed. The text indicates that back in the early years of the 20th 
Century Schumpeter already envisioned economic growth deriving from 
entrepreneurship as an endogenous process captured by nations. Matthews (2002) 
writes. 
It is this seventh chapter, lost to the world after Schumpeter’s decision to drop it 
from his second edition (which then formed the basis of the English translation 
published only in 1934) …The chapter, entitled Das Gesamthild der 
volkswirtschaft (the economy as a whole) provides a fascinating missing “chapter” 
in Schumpeter’s thought, previously inaccessible to the English-speaking world. 
The chapter clearly written in haste late in 1911 to catch a printing deadline, 
sketches a highly original summation of his model of internal economic 
development, where transformation is generated from internal dynamics 
represented by entrepreneurial initiative – in contrast with the prevailing doctrines 
which saw change in economic circumstances, and growth, as responding to 
external stimuli, such as population growth, or technological innovation, or the 
opening up of new geographic markets.  
This emphasis on the role of domestic dynamics contrasts starkly with the literature 
and policy recommendations that emphasise export-oriented growth and the 
contribution of global economic growth to national growth performance. The IMF 
(2001) has had a consistent focus on encouraging developing and heavily indebted 
countries to support export oriented industries. In this view continuing liberalisation 
of national economies will lead inevitably to a decline in the importance of the 
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economic and social policy making of national governments. As Rangan and 
Lawrence (1999: 4) argue: 
In the absence of border barriers, competition would be global. Corporations would 
rapidly shift to locations that offered lower costs. Indeed, global competition would 
compel them to do so, because victory would go to the firms with the lowest costs, 
whereas firms mired in high-cost locations would eventually be driven out of 
business. 
On the other hand, Schumpeter’s view that domestic capabilities matter is supported 
by the empirical evidence presented by Rowthorn and Kozul-Wright in their analysis 
of globalisation. ‘Domestic determinants of economic growth remain significant’, 
even though capital investment flows are increasing, because the drivers of ‘capital 
accumulation retain domestic roots’ (1998: 31). Thus, those that claim globalisation 
is the death of the economic influence of nation states appear to have rushed to 
judgement. The OECD (1992) suggests that the effective structuring of a country’s 
NIS can help a country progress rapidly and that conversely weaknesses may lead to 
the squandering of other resources. 
2.2.4 Systems theory 
Although it took some time for implications of innovation based competitiveness 
theories to be applied to the full range of industries, the change to systems thinking, 
by comparison, was relatively quick (a point noted by Edquist (1997b: 3). In the late 
1980s, the concept that innovation was a systemic property of the nation state 
emerged with Freeman’s (1987) use of the term ‘National Innovation System’ (NIS) 
with an application to the growing strength of Japanese businesses. Since then there 
have been many systems of innovation approaches (regional, technological, sectoral), 
but the national perspective remains the primary framework. The purpose of this 
section is to present an overview of the major strands of NIS theory and evidence as 
they relate to the structure and evolution of the geography of global production. 
The international circumstances which encouraged the neo-Schumpeterians to 
analyse the role of the nation state led others to a similar interest and reinvigorated 
debates about the future of nations. Tyson (1992) perceived economic policy in 
national terms, whilst Ohmae (1995) was predicting the looming irrelevance of the 
nation state. Through this period of the late 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, 
research on economic growth returned as a core topic in economics (see for example 
The Economist 1992a, 1992b, 1996a and 1996b and Mankiw 1995).  
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The nation state has come to be at the centre of innovation studies because the ability 
of companies’ to develop new products, processes, services and technologies does 
rest not solely on the resources and capabilities that can be controlled by the firm 
itself. NIS is a way of considering variables that are both within the influence of 
nation states and those which, although difficult to change are nonetheless apart of 
the evolutionary patterns of country development. In the former category are 
government interventions such as; industry policy, the higher education system, 
technical education, social welfare and public R&D funding (level and research 
fields). In the latter category are specific features of an economy such as specialised 
supplier businesses in particular industries, venture capital access and the way labour 
relates to employers (pay and non-pay conditions), all trajectories that are difficult to 
influence.  
What does define an NIS? There are common themes but there are many subtly 
different emphases in the various definitions. The first books on this topic Lundvall 
(1992) and Nelson (1993) took quite different approaches. Nelson’s book was a 
country-by-country description that was prone to the individual predispositions of the 
local authors. For example, the author of the chapter on Australia (Gregory 1993), a 
labour market economist, emphasised the role of human resources and the 
organisation of labour relations for innovation capacity. Lundvall’s book, in contrast, 
explored the theoretical dimensions and presented empirical data on innovativeness 
and technological competitiveness within a thematic presentation. Lundvall remains 
a key promoter of the NIS perspective and the nationalism of innovation (1998, with 
Maskell 2000 and et al. 2002).  
In trying to define NIS, Freeman suggests that it is more than just R&D but 
encompasses the entire way a nation is organised, commenting: 
‘most neo-Schumpeterians, following Lundvall (1992) and his colleagues, stress 
that a 'national system of innovation' is much more than a network of institutions 
supporting R&D, it involves inter-firm network relationships and especially user-
producer linkages of all kinds (Anderson 1992a) as well as incentive and 
appropriability systems, labour relations and a wide range of government 
institutions and policies’ (1994: 484). 
Smith, in contrast, places more emphasis on the interactions between different 
elements of the knowledge production system (companies, labs etc) and the 
facilitating institutions (the legal system). Smith also emphasises the influence of 
cultural factors (values and norms), arguing:  
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‘the innovative performance of an economy depends not only on how the 
individual institutions (e.g. firms, research institutes, universities) perform in 
isolation, but on how they interact with each other as elements of a collective 
system of knowledge creation and use, and on their interplay with social 
institutions (such as values, norms, legal frameworks)’ (Smith 1994: 3). 
Another definition has a greater focus on the role of government, Metcalfe 
suggesting: 
‘A national system of innovation is that set of distinct institutions which jointly and 
individually contribute to the development and diffusion of new technologies and 
which provide the framework within which governments form and implement 
policies to influence the innovation process. As such, it is a system of 
interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and 
artefacts which define new technologies’ (Metcalfe 1995: 463). 
The OECD (1999c) combines many of the variables in these and other definitions of 
NIS in a diagram of the operations a national systems (Figure 2.2) but neither the 
diagram nor the book, in which it appeared, goes beyond generalities.  
Figure 2.2: Actors and players in national innovation systems 
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Source: Redrawn from OECD 1999c: 23 
The OECD is not alone in attempting to create ‘maps’ of the innovation system. The 
Australian Government has recently published its guide to Australian innovation 
(Science and Innovation Mapping Taskforce 2003). The report states that ‘For the 
first time, we have been able to present a detailed overview of our science and 
innovation system in Australia’ (2003: i), but it presents little that is different from 
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other indicator publications that have been published in Australia for sometime (see 
for example Department of Industry, Technology and Commerce 1987). Furthermore, 
its analysis is commonplace in other countries (National Science Board 2002 and 
European Commission 2003).  
What becomes clear, however, from these attempts at defining and mapping 
innovation systems is that we are far from a macro-innovation theory of economies, 
in the same way as macro-economics exists and which purports to depict the 
interactions that occur within modern economies. It may not even be desirable to 
progress towards such a theory. Instead, NIS is a body of research which adopts a 
number of different viewpoints and methodologies which nevertheless all progress 
the general proposition that political geographies still matter for the innovativeness 
of businesses located within their borders. Dosi (1999) provides a much needed 
classification system of the various research approaches to analysing the influences 
on innovation which are ‘national’. Dosi categorises both the major processes driving 
systems of innovation as well as the diverse meta views on the operational features 
of national systems (with appropriate author attribution). 
Processes in national innovation systems: 
1. Production systems  
2. Innovation system operations. 
3. Knowledge accumulation. 
Dosi’s typology of analytical lenses on national significance for innovativeness: 
1. National innovation institutions & policies [R&D funding and universities 
etc] (Nelson) 
2. User-producer relations (Lundvall) 
3. Technological accumulation (Patel & Pavitt) 
4. National institutions [Financial markets, labour markets and training 
institutions] (Soskice)  
From these two lists, three categories are important for this thesis. 
1. Technological accumulation (see section 2.5 of this chapter) 
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Knowledge and technology creation are viewed as important engines of long-term 
economic growth (Nelson 1990) but, like natural resources, they are accumulated 
unevenly across nations. Similar to other resources, history plays a part in 
exploitation and the rate at which countries develop knowledge resources is 
fundamentally shaped by the operation of national institutions. Knowledge typically 
accumulates along pathways. Investment in science and technological capabilities in 
one generation is usually consistent with previous investment decisions. This is 
because knowledge production relies on self-reinforcing mechanisms including 
physical capital (infrastructure in the form of existing laboratories or expensive 
scientific equipment) and human capital (training of personnel). Knowledge also 
tends to be ‘sticky’ (Dosi 1999) to given locations both because it is accumulating 
and as most knowledge is uncodified - it does not diffuse easily. Such tacit 
knowledge is held in the minds of people and is passed on by either learning by 
doing or word of mouth. Increased knowledge accumulation is thus likely to foster 
increased diversity rather than convergence amongst the world’s economies and is 
one of the prime reasons for any understanding of globalisation retaining a focus on 
specific locations. 
2. Production systems (see section 2.3.2 of this chapter) 
Systems of innovation research contributes to improving the understanding of 
production specialisations, trajectories and industrial location at the national and the 
sub-national level18. NIS analyses have focussed on examinations of industry 
competitiveness (Fagerberg 1998), business R&D (Patel and Pavitt 2000 and 
Gassman and von Zedtwitz 1998), patenting patterns (Archibugi and Pianta 1992) 
and export growth (Dalum 1992 and Laursen 1998a and 1998b). Although the 
framework of innovation systems extends beyond industrial activity, it is necessary 
to focus on corporations, industries, sectors and whole value chains.  It is through 
these actors and activities that technologies come to market. 
3. User-producer relations (see chapters three and five) 
One of the most important findings of innovation research is that the interaction of 
the producers and users of industrial components and services can create an 
                                                 
18 see chapter three for a discussion of geography based analyses including filieres; development 
blocks and clusters. 
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environment for new products to emerge. The communication of needs (users) and 
possibilities (producers) opens the way to the creative processes and the incentives 
for investing in research and/or product development. Thus, ‘user-producer relations’ 
are seen as one of the key characteristics of business innovation (von Hippel 1988, 
DeBresson 1996 and Edquist 1997b). In some cases the intensity and nature of 
relations has been seen as an attribute of nation states (Lundvall 1992a).  
The cooperation seen in user-producer relations runs counter to the assumptions of 
market competition and arms length open contracting that exists in neo-classical 
economics. Far from simply emerging from the operation of markets, competition 
and inventive businesses, the development of technology evolves from an interaction 
between the different actors (see Hofer and Polt 1998) and can even be observed at 
the system level (DeBresson 1996). Unfortunately, there has been very little analysis 
of cross border user-producer relationships. Although DeBresson et al. (1998) imply 
a positive role for international linkages; they could not provide information on the 
scale or spatial structure of the extra-territorial links. The issue of linkages between 
businesses across borders is quite different to the topic of international R&D 
spillovers which has been of some interest to researchers but which have been 
perceived as small (i.e. see van Pottelsberghe 1998). Due to its relevance for 
developing an understanding of the extension of innovation systems across borders, 
the topic of user-producer relations research is returned to throughout this thesis. The 
next two sections further develop the reasons for considering nations as the 
appropriate spatial scale at which to analyse innovative activities.   
2.3 The historical and continuing importance of nations 
Neo-Schumpeterians, to date, have seen competitiveness predominantly in national 
terms. It is thus necessary to map this existing thinking on the role of nations before 
being able to highlight the weaknesses of the approach and the need to look at the 
interdependencies between systems.   
2.3.1 Learning Nations 
The ability of countries, through their businesses and populations, to learn, to access 
current knowledge and to understand how to transform existing data into new 
knowledge is crucial to social and economic progress. Although nations have 
developed many traditions in the funding and organisation of their education 
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systems, some features are arguably fundamentally ‘national’. Qualification 
standards are often a national responsibility and intra-national labour mobility is 
rarely hindered, whereas movement across international borders is more restricted.  
Accessing human capital and knowledge have been critically important for economic 
success since at least the beginning of the industrial revolution, even earlier 
according to Smith (2000). In the view of Landes (1998) access to codified 
knowledge is no guarantee of being able to successfully adopt technologies, noting 
that during the industrial revolution even with ‘sample products and equipment’ or 
‘blueprints and explicit instructions, some know-how can be learned only by 
experience’ (1998: 278). Not surprisingly, European countries designed policies, 
during the industrial revolution, that not only built their own capability but aimed at 
acquiring new ones through, initially, hiring British workers; ‘foreign governments 
paid people to come and helped them set up in business’ (Landes 1998: 279). Landes 
comments that some of these workers were: 
‘anonymously ordinary, most British expatriates were workmen drawn by wages 
that ran twice and three times higher than home. (British wages were ordinarily 
considerably higher than those across the channel, but these experienced craftsman 
and mechanics were scarce commodities in follower countries)’ (1998: 280).  
Whilst the measures taken by follower countries were partially successful, it was the 
eventual development of formal technical education systems, first in France and then 
copied across Europe that powered success. Germany developed the approach to its 
fullest extent at that time. It formed a network of trade schools and technical high 
schools as well as changing the universities to conduct teaching and research in 
chemistry and engineering (Landes 1998: 283). The German universities became 
centres of technological diffusion because they focussed on both theory and 
applications of science. In contrast the approach in Britain still relied upon ‘learning 
by doing – the strategy had driven the Industrial Revolution’ but failed as ‘the 
frontiers of technological possibility and inquiry moved outward, exploration went 
beyond the lessons of sensory experience’ (1998: 283). The education system helped 
Germany take the lead in the chemicals industry, in which Britain had previously had 
an obvious competitive and comparative advantage (Landes 1998).  
The change in the structure and content of the education system in Germany led 
directly to significant changes in the economic fortunes of nations and accords with 
Lundvall’s strong emphasis on the learning capabilities of nations. He notes 
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‘Innovation appears now, not primarily as a single event, but rather as a process’ 
(1992b: 9). Thus it is:  
‘argue[d] that most important forms of learning may fundamentally be regarded as 
interactive processes, and that together with the economic structure and the 
institutional set-up form the framework for, and strongly affect processes of 
interactive learning, sometimes resulting in innovations’ (1992b: 9).  
For Lundvall a national framework is necessary for understanding this learning 
process for the development and diffusion of knowledge, which is critical to the 
creation of innovations and competitiveness (see also 1998, with Maskell 2000 and et 
al. 2001). Consistent with this perspective, are the conclusions that universities and 
publicly funded research needs to be seen primarily as an investment in the 
development of human capital rather than investment in new technology (Salter et al. 
2000). Although new technologies may or may not emerge, it is talent not 
technology
19
 which has the greater economic benefit. The investment payoffs include 
(amongst others) ‘increasing the stock of useful knowledge’, ‘training skilled 
graduates’ and ‘creating new scientific instrumentation and methodologies’ (2000: 
59). 
Knowledge accumulation 
Increasing knowledge creation in a given field tends to be dependent on previous 
investment in knowledge creation. The idea of cumulative causation in traditional 
economics has been discussed for the better part of a century (see Toner 1999) and its 
application to endogenous growth theory has been intensively debated over the last 
decade. The emphasis historically has been on increasing economies of scale, 
increasing specialisation and the central importance of manufacturing. It is, however, 
the cumulative causation of investment in knowledge that has gained very wide 
acceptance with the neo-Schumpeterian community. Investment in knowledge is path 
dependent and generates positive feed back effects. 
Capability and capacity with one field of knowledge enables future research within 
that same field but it is difficult to change scientific fields. Each field of knowledge 
requires existing training expertise, scientific infrastructure and relationships with 
researchers across the world facilitating access to tacit and codified knowledge. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) were the first to suggest that there are ‘two faces of 
                                                 
19 Also the title of their report. 
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R&D’. Business expenditure on research and development both generates new 
knowledge and, more importantly, it assists the company in attempts to access the 
greater part of knowledge that is external to the business. Without conducting its own 
R&D, companies will be largely ignorant of the leading edge and be unable to absorb 
new technologies. Cohen and Levinthal also argue ‘accumulating absorptive capacity 
in one period will permit its more efficient accumulation in the next’ (1990: 136 – 
emphasis added). Dowrick, quoted by the Industry Commission (1995) in its wide-
ranging inquiry into the importance of R&D to Australia’s competitiveness and the 
role of R&D policy, notes that R&D investment also has positive feedbacks and 
spillovers: 
‘Crucially, the larger the stock of knowledge, the easier it is to increase it. Better 
educated and more knowledgeable people learn faster and develop new ideas more 
easily’ … ‘The second channel is R&D spillovers, which involves the notion of 
transfers of knowledge among firms for which no payment is made’ (1995: 153) 
There are many ways of improving an organisation’s knowledge base including 
research, learning by doing, reverse engineering, imitation and the purchase of 
equipment (Dosi and Castaldi 2002) but all encourage specialisation and trajectories. 
Patel and Pavitt (1998) argue that technology development by nations is both uneven 
and divergent and earlier (1994) they suggested that whilst national technological 
specialisation trajectories are not predetermined, the incentives structure and the 
available resources do create likely evolutionary patterns. Dosi and Castaldi (2002) 
find evidence in the literature to support the argument that, globally, countries have 
diverging technological capabilities. However, this trend is less pronounced for 
countries within the OECD group. Interestingly, economic growth patterns reveal 
that the advanced economies are converging with each other but largely diverging 
from the rest of the world (see e.g. Dowrick and DeLong 2001).  
The non-globalisation of corporate R&D 
Knowledge (as opposed to information) is not only cumulative but is also 
geographically ‘sticky’ (in Dosi’s 1999 words). Such stickiness derives from several 
dimensions including the cumulative nature of knowledge specialisations (as above) 
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and the limited geographic spillover of tacit knowledge (discussed below in section 
3.4.320).  
In terms of the role of nations, it maybe expected that as production activities are 
internationalised, multinational corporations may wish to internationalise their 
research efforts. Neo-Schumpeterian research has, however, not found strong 
evidence for the decentralisation of R&D centres away from being geographically 
near the home bases of multinational corporations. Patel (1997) finds that firms tend 
to keep their R&D activities in their home country, although there is a trend towards 
increasing the amount of R&D that is located abroad. Whilst generally supporting 
this existing view of the involvement of multinationals in R&D, Carlsson suggests 
that ‘innovation systems may have become more leaky over time. The role of tacit 
knowledge and the spatial limits of knowledge spillovers have caused firms to locate 
R&D facilities where new knowledge is being created’ (2003: 21). There is a 
significant literature on the knowledge production and absorption-activities of multi-
national enterprises21 and international knowledge spillovers.22 This line of research 
is not pursued in depth in the present thesis, as the purpose here is not to map the 
extent to which knowledge flows, but to begin to develop an understanding of how 
local knowledge contributes to local specialisations within internationally extended 
value chains. 
2.3.2 Production system specialisation and trajectories 
As noted above knowledge specialisations accumulate in trajectories and it can also 
be shown that knowledge and industrial specialisations trajectories co-evolve. It has 
already been pointed out that in the early stages of the industrial revolution the 
development of formal training systems aided Germany’s ability to gain the 
predominant share of the European industrial chemicals sector. Landes describes this 
shift as one of the most rapid industrial transitions in history (1998). This link 
between learning and industry is not, however, just an interesting facet of the birth of 
the modern age. A statistically significant association between scientific performance 
                                                 
20 In chapter three (below) it is shown that the limited spatial spillover of tacit knowledge is a key 
argument for industrial agglomeration. 
21 Readers interested in R&D location and internationalisation can start with Paoli and Guercini 
(1997), Gassman, and von Zedtwitz (1998a) and OECD (1998a). 
22 On the role of FDI and international knowledge spillovers - see Van Pottelsberge De La Potterie 
(1998) or Verspagen and Schoenmakers (2000) on the spillover of knowledge in patents. 
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and economic specialisation for science based, scale intensive23 and some resource-
based industries has been found by Laursen and Salter (2001: 18).  
In view of this connection, and because the countries of the OECD have very 
different industrial structures, Figures 2.3 and 2.4 are presented to reveal the national 
configuration of manufacturing value added (Figure 2.3) and manufacturing exports 
(Figure 2.4). Figure 2.3 shows that there are few manufacturing industries, apart 
from the processed food industry where many countries have high levels of 
concentration. The choice of percentage GDP layers in the chart contributes to this 
perception but they do aid the development of a perception of prominent national 
industry specialisations.  
In contrast to this, Figure 2.4 demonstrates that many countries have export 
specialisations in the same industries. The transport, non-electrical (industrial) 
machinery, electrical machinery as well as food and textiles all appear as having 
overseas sales above 2 per cent of GDP for a number of countries. As most East 
Asian economies are not represented in the database, export strengths in electronics24 
do not feature prominently. This cross-country profile of export specialisation is 
consistent with the World Trade Organization (2003) list (in order) of the most 
globally traded industries; transport and machinery equipment, office and telecom 
equipment, mining commodities, chemicals, automotive and agricultural products. 
 
                                                 
23 these classifications of industries are also used in the current analysis and discussed in chapter six, 
and the link between science and scale based activites is interesting in the light of the research 
presented there. 
24 see Appendix 2 for more information on the evolution of these countries trading patterns 
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Figure 2.3: The industrial specialisations of OECD countries - % GDP 
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Figure 2.4: The export specialisations of OECD nations - % GDP  
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How these country specialisation patterns emerge and how they evolve has been of 
interest to neo-Schumpeterians, although the processes leading to increased levels of 
cross border economic activity in these industries is of less interest. Evidence on 
structural stability of the specialisation of economies is a key piece of evidence in 
debates over the nationally bound conditions for knowledge creation and innovation 
which are the basis for arguing for NIS. In particular, the speed of change can be 
used as measure of the scale of economic movements and the continuing importance 
of both the nation state and knowledge production for industry. Slow change, for 
example, is used as evidence that ‘globalisation’ processes are limited by endogenous 
factors of knowledge accumulation.  
The evidence, in fact, is that industrial structures do evolve relatively slowly. 
Archibugi and Michie (1998) note that manufacturing specialisations change ‘very 
slowly’ with it being difficult to ‘move from an established competitive advantage in 
one industry to another’ (1998: 11). These authors draw attention to the underlying 
technological competencies of industries which link industry development to the 
cumulative processes of knowledge progress. Industrial employment structure is 
shown by Metcalf et al. (2002) to change, at a fairly constant rate but industrial 
structure as measured through production output shares exhibit a degree of continuity 
over approximately 20 years. Output shares appear to resist change for a period of 
time and then change can occur quite rapidly – relative to the initial conditions. At 
the level of manufacturing sector sub-branches, Wolff argues that the industrial 
specialisation of OECD countries changes very slowly, commenting:  
‘The finding of little change in the degree of specialization among manufacturing 
industries may appear somewhat surprising in light of the evidence that aggregate 
measures of factor endowment (such as capital-labour ratio for the whole 
economy) have become similar in these advanced economies. On the other hand, 
the result is consistent with the finding that dispersion of productivity at the 
industry level remains high, and that there has been no strong trend toward cross-
country convergence of industry-level productivity since mid 1970s. It appears 
countries are maintaining specializations in different industries; in this way 
convergence of aggregate productivity can be consistent with continuing 
divergence of industry-level productivity and a continuing high dispersion in 
production patterns’ (2000: 200).  
Curiously, therefore, despite a convergence of factor endowments across advanced 
economies, industry specialisations are not converging. Even so-called low 
technology industries are resistant to wholesale movement. Dosi et al. (1994) suggest 
that textiles and clothing have often been the starting rung for industrialisation for 
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developing economies and, by implication, is more easily internationalised. 
However, low technology industries have, in a number of cases, not moved off-shore 
as expected. In an article titled ‘the strange life of low tech America’ (1998: 81-82), 
The Economist, in almost surprised tones, explores the continuing success of some 
very low cost, low technology activities in America. Amongst the various 
explanations of this success are the prevalence of trade protection barriers, the 
benefits of being close to markets for these industries, and the accumulation of skills 
which are necessary for industry competitiveness together with unexpected levels of 
ongoing product development in these industries.  
Such trends point to the importance of local sources knowledge and innovation, and 
it is argued by some that these sources are likely to remain predominantly national 
without large movements across the borders of developed countries (see Ernst 2000). 
This ‘spatial stickiness’ (Ernst 2000:2) of knowledge and innovation facilitates 
countries developing measures that maintain their technological superiority and 
could be behind the increased movement of goods and services, as there is a growing 
need to integrate technologies that have not been developed ‘in country’. 
2.4 NIS in a changing world: weaknesses of the nation 
state perspective 
The evidence presented so far in this chapter provides strong grounds for continuing 
to believe that political nation states remain economically important domains of the 
world economy. Particular characteristics of the processes that lead to the generation 
of new knowledge, together with the dynamics of technology diffusion, appear to 
preference national spaces over a borderless world. This does not, however, imply 
that the national systems of innovation approach is without serious problems, 
particularly in relation to exploring the current changes in the global architecture of 
production. These are explored in the section below. 
2.4.1 NIS and national geography 
The seemingly unquestioning acceptance of national borders within the NIS 
framework ignores the differences generated by the scale and structure of countries. 
In America, the national Government funds, by global standards, a very large defence 
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and medical research25 program. Thus, the USA’s Federal Government clearly has 
had a very strong long-term impact on the dynamics of the US innovation system. At 
the same time, California by itself is the world’s 6th largest economy. California has 
benefited from federal research funds and from the opening up of new urban spaces 
during the 20th century – in a movement of population from east to west (see 
Saxenian 1994). Today, California has substantial clusters in manufacturing and 
services with a major share of world demand for ICT equipment26. It thus appears 
that California has benefited both from being included within the overarching 
political structure of a large nation state (itself the world’s largest economy) and from 
regional spatial agglomeration processes. 
The NIS approach seems to both suffer from, and to continue a confusion caused by 
the lack of long-term statistics at the sub-national level27. The nation state is the 
dominant statistical feature of our understanding of global economics. International 
trade data is generally collected at the level of the nation state and not regions. Other 
data, such as industry value added or research expenditure for some countries, also 
becomes problematic below that of the national level. This availability of data biases 
analysis towards nation states. So whilst the emphasis of the NIS approach is on the 
uneven development paths of nations, even Freeman (2002: 209) points out that 
uneven development exists within countries. Therefore an interesting possibility it 
that the irregularities in development of long-term specialisation patterns (knowledge 
accumulation and industry) seen in NIS studies may well be present at the level of 
states, provinces or regions but these issue are little analysed due to data deficiencies 
(see chapter three for discussion).  
                                                 
25 AAAS (2004b)  
26 The latest estimates reveal that the USA has a significant share of the world market for ICT 
(Eeurpean Information Technology Observatory (EITO) 2004 estimates that the USA has 32 per cent 
of the world market and all of Europe (including the East) has 30 per cent of the world market. 
Analysis of Bureau of Economic Analysis data suggests that California represents approximately 17 
per cent of the USA’s value added in electronic and electrical equipment. 
27 Classifications of ‘regions’ still suffer from problems – see Casellas and Galley ‘The EU 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics, referred to by the French acronym NUTS, is very 
heterogeneous in character. Tiny islands, cities, large rural regions and entire countries are considered 
to be comparable units for analysis’ (1999: 551). 
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2.4.2 NIS politically defined 
Freeman’s view that the ‘phenomena of forging ahead, catch-up and falling behind in 
19th and the 20th centuries can most plausibly be explained in terms of national 
systems’ and needs to be tempered as such a generalisation ignores the changes to the 
power, borders and nature of those nations (2002: 209). As Elam writes:  
‘While technologies have been successfully portrayed as fluid and always in the 
making, nation-states have been largely accepted as fixed, stable and ready made. 
What has escaped attention is that just like technologies, nation-states are also 
being continually envisioned, designed, launched, remodelled, renamed, 
disassembled and scrapped. By failing to take adequate account of the historical 
contingency of modern nation states, research on national systems of innovation 
has been handicapped in its attempts to grasp contemporary phenomena such as 
globalisation and European integration’ (1997: 157). 
Borders and constitutional political power evolve over time and may change more 
quickly and more often than those in the EITC field appear to acknowledge. The 
powers of the European Union have been in a constant state of flux since its birth in 
the post World War II period, as Table 7.1 (below) makes clear. Each change and 
each enlargement of the European Union alters the dynamics of development and the 
process of change is unlikely to stop in the near future with ongoing negotiations for 
a written constitution and the enlargement process is envisioned to continue beyond 
the 10 countries that joined in 2004. The 10 new members coming under the rules of 
the EU will alter the dynamics of the pre-2004 economies in ways that are not 
entirely clear (see Gorzelak and Jalowiecki 2002). Recent research suggests that 
supra-state structures can play a role in promoting innovation and development28 
through a re-distribution of funds to lagging regions and even assists in determining 
nation state borders29. Although their impact is less, multi-lateral agreements on trade 
and intellectual property30 can influence the commercialisation of innovation and the 
catch-up processes. 
Only a few authors seriously suggest systems of innovation can extend beyond 
national borders. Even fewer studies can be identified that actually conduct supra-
                                                 
28 see for example the discussions in Cappelen, Fagerberg and Verspagen 1999 and 2000 on the effect 
of European Union structural funds for promoting regional development.  
29 The Economist (2003c) When small is beautiful (p103) argues that the trend in recent examples of 
nation-state formation is towards smaller rather than larger borders. Crucially, however, it suggests 
that this might be due to supra-state structures such as the European Union that offer free trade zones 
across borders and other benefits of Federalism.  
30 See for example Turpin (2000) for an interesting discussion of IPR in Asia Pacific countries. 
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national research. The OECD identifies the concept of worldwide systems but notes 
that ‘national characteristics and frameworks always play a role in shaping them’ 
(1999c: 23). However, despite the acknowledgement, the study does not actually 
identify any specific research that fits such a category.  
Elsewhere the term 'supra-national systems of innovation' has emerged. It is used by 
Bergman, Charles and den Hertog (2001: 9) and by Edquist (1997b and 2001). Few 
references are provided a alongside the use of this term to give an indication of 
suggested studies. However, it is typical to conceive of the supra-nation system as 
the entirety of a distinctive political system, as Edquist indicates, ‘one may - in 
Europe – distinguish between a supranational system at the European Community 
level, the national level, and the regional/local level’. The examples of both 
Caracostas and Soete (1997) and Gregersen and Johnson (1997) would both support 
the principle that innovation systems researchers have a tendency to think in terms of 
politically defined structures as the starting unit of analysis before focusing on the 
working dimensions of the ‘system’. The latter commenting that the ‘European 
system of innovation only exists, so far, in a rather narrow sense’ (1997: 489). Rather 
than focusing on potential cross-border functional subsystems they were testing for 
the rather more nebulous idea of generalised European integration. 
Such a perspective excludes the possibility that there might be supra-national 
systems that encompass, for example, the Scandinavian countries (noting that 
Norway is not a member of the EU) or that Germany and France might have close 
ties without the need for the all the countries to have ties with each other in a 
European System. Such unity is unlikely to occur even within a single country’s 
borders. The political definition of systems also excludes analysis of cross-country 
economic links, which change structure depending upon the sector (see chapters 
eight and nine). 
As a consequence, promoters of the NIS perspective over-emphasise the position of 
countries within the global economy. There are too few analyses of the causes and 
drivers of production fragmentation and studying the emerging evidence of 
technological fragmentation (Pavitt 2003a & b31, and see chapters six, eight and nine 
                                                 
31 Pavitt in a series of articles on globalisation discusses the shift of manufacturers in advanced 
economies from owning factories to focusing on design and product integration. Pavitt foresees a 
likely shift of manufacturing to developing economies but does not discuss the possibility that 
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of this thesis) – where technological products are integrated from across the world. 
Instead policy recommendations such as those suggested by Archibugi and 
Iammarino (1999) are designed to strengthen individual countries. 
Table 2.1: A response to globalisation: widening national technology 
portfolios 
Categories Targets  Instruments 
International 
exploitation of 
national 
innovations 
Inward 
flows 
Achieving lower foreign 
dependency and filling 
technology gaps, 
increasing learning. 
Incentives to infant industries. 
Promoting collaborations 
between national firms and 
leading firms in the field. 
Incentives to selected FDI in 
the country. 
Source: Archibugi and Iammarino (1999: 327). This is a row from Table 7: Public policies ‘targets 
and instruments for the globalisation of innovation [emphasis added]. 
Given the evidence, already presented in this chapter regarding the difficulties of 
shifting technological or industrial specialisations, the advice here to ‘fill 
technological gaps’, is surprising. The technological complexity of products is 
increasing and thus the ability of countries to specialise in all the components for a 
given product would appear to be decreasing. 
2.4.3 NIS and economic space: production networks across borders 
Carlsson puts it so simply ‘in view of the fact that most studies of innovation systems 
focus on national innovation systems, it is not surprising that little direct evidence is 
found that innovation systems are becoming global’ (2003: 20). Carlsson could 
uncover only a few analyses of the internationalisation at the spatial scale of systems. 
The analysis presented here is in agreement with Carlsson’s assessment of the 
literature. However, to simply expand the definition to larger but, nevertheless, 
politically defined territories such as the European Union also seems to be a dead end 
analytically. 
Many of the findings of the national innovations systems literature appear to be 
strongly substantiated by empirical evidence. What is strongly disagreed with here is 
the lack of attention that has been given to explaining the increasing prevalence of 
economic links and embodied knowledge flows (and innovation flows?) that are 
crossing national borders. The big question for those that promote NIS over other 
approaches is, if, as Edquist (1997b) notes, interdependency is central to the very 
                                                                                                                                          
components or complementary products sourcing may move across border but be built in developed 
economies.  
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essence of innovation theory, then why are interdependencies bounded by national 
borders?  Niosi and Bellon (1994) is the only major exception that could be 
identified for this study. They identified a trend of increasing interconnectedness in 
the development of national systems of innovation as companies and scientists 
interact and move across borders.  
Too frequently, data results of cross border innovation patterns are presented as a 
general preference for national systems or proximity without the means to look for 
specific spatial structures in the data that might represent functional systems of 
innovation that extend internationally at important levels of scale. 
Although the nation state is an enduring politico-economic phenomenon, to construct 
the analysis of the massive changes in political and economic power that is occurring 
with the rise of East Asia and China, whilst existing economies remain prosperous, 
purely around nation state entities ignores critical dimensions of the 
interdependencies between countries. It is argued throughout this analysis that there 
are clear theoretical, empirical and methodological reasons to choose an analytical 
tool that allows the strengths of linkages between two places to define the spatial 
cores of interacting systems. Analysis should retain a spatial and therefore a systems 
perspective as is argued in the next chapter which explores the research on sub-
national systems (clusters and regions etc). 
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CHAPTER 3:  
 SUB-NATIONAL SYSTEMS OF  INNOVATION:
 CLUSTERS & REGIONS 
 
‘Innovative networks cluster in different parts of 
each national economy, and seem related to the 
economic structure and their location seems to 
stay relatively stable over time. This is why the 
national – perhaps regional – systems of 
innovation matter’ (DeBresson et al. 1998: 4) 
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3.1 Innovation territories 
In chapter two (above) it was shown that some characteristics of nations have been 
important for determining the level of technological innovation and knowledge 
generation effort. The processes of technological accumulation, for example, are 
influential in the co-evolution of the scientific and industrial specialisations of 
countries. Although, the level of innovative effort of countries is not pre-determined, 
it does seem that trajectories are established which are hard to alter relative to that of 
other countries. An analytical perspective that adopts, as its starting point the nation 
state can be shown to provide valuable insights as to why particular pieces of 
geography succeed more than others at generating, acquiring and utilising 
knowledge. Chapter two also revealed that this national approach to innovation has 
only partially succeeded in developing tools that can analyse the changes occurring 
in the geography of global production (see for example Friedman 2000). The 
emphasis on endogenous capability and the comparative benchmarking approach 
inherent in NIS analysis also highlights the need to build a multi-spatial innovation 
framework that can integrate the continuing benefits of place and the growing levels 
of trans-border production.    
This chapter takes the next step by focusing on the research which has investigated 
the competitiveness of specific places, whether they are industrial agglomerations 
(clusters) or regions. This ‘agglomeration’ or ‘clustering’ is important to those with 
an interest in innovation because some locations are clearly more prosperous and 
successful at bringing innovations to the market. Why do firms in similar or related 
industries tend to locate themselves in close proximity to one another – what benefits 
are there and why are some places clearly more productive are producing new 
knowledge? The research on this topic within the neo-Schumpeterian field can be 
broadly labelled as sub-national systems of innovation (Freeman 2002) and as 
clusters, industrial districts and regional competitiveness (Kitson et al. 2004) in 
economic geography. 
As with the analysis of the national innovation systems research, the discussion here 
of the importance of regions, clusters, sectors and industrial agglomeration is 
focussed on furthering an understanding of the connections between particular places 
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and external locations. By firstly comprehending the dynamics of clusters and the 
value of proximity for the producers and users of knowledge and products, it is 
possible to draw conclusions on the significance of endogenous capabilities and the 
characteristics of extra-territorial (intra-national or international) linkages in 
knowledge and products. 
In developing an analytical perspective on this very diverse literature, the discussion 
in Maskell (2001) was particularly useful. Maskell analyses the most frequently 
discussed theme in the sub-national systems innovation literature – clustering, 
observing that there is not yet a formulated theory of why certain industries group 
together in particular places. Further he argues, for there to be a theory in the future 
there must be progress towards ‘an explanation for the existence of the cluster’, ‘an 
explanation for the growth of the cluster’ and methodologies for defining ‘the 
boundaries of the cluster by specifying why the clustering of some economic 
activities precludes the integration of others’ (2001:937). These three dimensions 
cover most of the important questions and provide a way of assessing the existing 
literature.  In this chapter, the analysis of the research literature is constructed around 
the following themes (see also the literature framework diagram Figure 3.1): 
• Locating clusters at different spatial scales (definitions etc); 
• The geography of agglomeration;  
• Cluster theory (the driver of proximity - traded and untraded 
interdependencies); and 
• Cluster boundaries and extra-territorial linkages. 
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Figure 3.1: Chapter 3: Regional and cluster-based systems of innovation 
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Significantly, for this thesis, the framing of Maskell’s questions reveals the intra-
regional bias of the innovation discipline’s analysis of clustering on the basis of 
‘differentiating between local ‘sticky’ knowledge and globally ‘ubiquitous’ 
knowledge (see Doloreux 2004). This is in contrast to the possibility of a framework 
that integrates local knowledge and inter-regionally differentiated knowledge that is 
spatially structured within networks. 
3.2 Locating clusters 
As early as the mid-1990s, Storper identified a decade-long resurgence of interest in 
local development dynamics (1995), but since then a very large volume of research 
on the importance of location has emerged from economic geographers and 
increasingly from neo-Schumpeterians as well. It seems plausible to suggest that for 
some researchers interested in the processes which foster innovation; this new focus 
on regions was a reaction against the sole reliance on the national approach of NIS. 
For the geographers it was the re-discovery that, even with globalisation, place still 
matters. The main concerns of regional development, economic advantage, clustering 
and the economies of scale and the role innovation and knowledge are common to 
both disciplines. ‘Sub-national systems of innovation’ (Freeman 2002) is now the 
topic of a burgeoning literature. 
One advantage of analysing the development of specific regions is that, whilst it can 
be the case that statistical analysis of national economies becomes too abstracted 
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from the business realities, identifying territorial concentrations of industry, 
particularly of international scale, can give recognition to individual businesses as 
well as institutional and technological histories. Many places of industry strength 
have names that have become brand labels for ‘their’ industry. A few from the past 
and present include: 
• Manchester – cotton during the early period of the industrial revolution; 
• Detroit – car manufacturing; 
• Wall St – the USA’s stock market; 
• New York – global financial services; 
• London – banking and insurance etc; 
• Hollywood – motion pictures; 
• Silicon Valley – information and communications technologies; and 
• Seattle – aerospace and software. 
Such examples of global industry capitals32 provide iconic symbolism for the study 
of clusters but can hide the fact that regional agglomerations33 are more ubiquitous 
than unique. Porter (1998 and 2003), for example, provides an analysis of clusters he 
has identified across the USA using a location quotient methodology. His results 
highlight concentrations of particular sub-branches of industries, such as carpet 
making or instrument making, which can reside in small regional cities. All of these 
industries and locations have unique histories of development that led to the 
agglomerations visible today.  
Clusters, regions and sectors  
It is important to recognise, that while there is a growing body of research on the 
economics of innovation in specific places, there are still debates as to the 
appropriate geographic and industrial level of analysis. As Cooke notes, some 
analysts still strongly advocate a national system approach.  
                                                 
32 Klepper (2001) refers to Detroit as the capital of the US’s automotive industry. This idea seemed a 
particularly good one to borrow and apply on a broader basis.  
33 The issue of differing scales of economic agglomeration is taken up in the last section of this 
chapter. 
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‘Because innovation systems analysts have been wedded to sentiments of ‘national’ 
economies, the concept of a RIS [regional innovation system] is a relatively new 
one ... The development path of the concept was almost entirely from regional 
science and economic geography. Indeed, authors like Lundvall (1992) were 
strangely hostile to the concept’ (2001: 949). 
Cooke is particularly attracted to politico-administrative regions (see especially 
Cooke 2001 and Morgan 1997) as the appropriate scale of analysis but industrial 
agglomerations (clusters) sectors, industrial districts and other labels exist in the 
literature. Clustering can refer to groups of firms producing similar products34 at a 
similar production stage or firms spread across horizontal or vertical supply 
networks35. Clustering can also refer to situations where knowledge infrastructure 
(universities and public research laboratories) are co-located with relevant branches 
of industry. Alternatively, sectoral innovation systems (Malerba 2002) and product-
service systems (Marceau, Wixted and Basri 2001), which are similar frameworks; 
focus on analysing a range of characteristics, including government policy, 
knowledge infrastructure, training institutions and industrial activity, R&D and 
suppliers and users. Malerba’s ‘sectoral systems of innovation and production’ 
concept, for example, is based on ‘a set of products and the set of agents carrying out 
market and non-market interactions for the creation, production and sale of those 
products. A sectoral system has a specific knowledge base, technologies, inputs and 
demand’ (2002: 247). At the present time Malerba is one of the few researchers 
writing on sectoral systems compared to the burgeoning analysis of clusters and the 
concept does not have a specific geographic scale, although it does seem to be used 
sub-nationally. The concept of technological systems ‘in which the focus is mainly 
on networks of agents for the generation, diffusion and utilization of technologies’ 
(Malerba 2002: 248) is not considered here. It has a focus on the technical skills and 
communities associated with specific technologies, rather than industries, it has 
spatial elements.  
The OECD (1999c) makes the following distinction between a traditional industrial 
economics sectoral approach (note this is not the same as Malerba’s sectoral system 
of innovation) and innovative clusters. 
                                                 
34 This can be identified by showing which locations have a higher concentration of industry activity 
(through employment statistics or value added) when compared to other places. 
35 This has often be analysed with the use of input-output data that facilitates the identification of 
industries which are related through supply chains within a particular location. 
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Table 3.1: Statistical industrial sectors versus clusters 
Sectors [traditional economics] Clusters 
Groups with similar network 
positions 
Strategic groups with mostly complementary and 
dissimilar network positions 
Focus on end-product industries Includes customers, suppliers, service providers and 
specialised institutions 
Focus on competition Incorporates the array of interrelated industries sharing 
common technology, skills, information, inputs and 
customers. 
Hesitancy to cooperate with 
rivals 
Most participants are not direct competitors but share 
common needs and constraints. 
Dialogue with government often 
focuses on subsides and 
protection 
Wider scope for constructive and efficient business-
government dialogue. 
Looks for diversity in existing 
trajectories 
Looks for synergy and new trajectories. 
Source: OECD (1999c: 86). 
Neo-classical economics, in this view, over emphasises price-based competition, 
products for final consumption (rather than intermediate goods and services), and 
that businesses are primarily isolated entities largely independent of other firms and 
organisations such as universities or government research laboratories. By contrast, 
research on sub-national systems of innovation emphasises government policy, 
publicly funded research, and interdependencies between businesses and businesses 
and universities in the co-location of corporate development. In one way or another 
all of the factors listed by the OECD under the clusters label has a focus on the 
interactivity of the different actors. The OECD is not alone in noting this distinction 
of ‘competition over cooperation’ (see in particular De la Mothe and Paquet 1996: 
11). Interdependency, as was noted in the chapter two (above), is an important factor 
within the NIS framework. At the scale of regions and clusters, it is easier to measure 
the value and volume of a range of types of interdependencies.   
Defining and finding the places of interest  
As might be expected, from the range of labels for the phenomenon of regional 
agglomeration just listed, there is no agreed methodology for identifying where such 
clustering occurs or what constitutes these districts. The definitions and the language 
of description for clusters are still badly under-developed. Clusters have been 
portrayed as ‘high-productivity, knowledge-rich, decentralised, entrepreneurial, and 
socially progressive economy within the reach of local policy makers’ – in effect as 
Martin and Sunley (2003:29) note clusters are seen as a policy panacea. A number of 
authors have also expressed similar sentiments to those of Martin and Sunley who 
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commented that ‘the cluster literature is a patchy constellation of ideas’ some ‘clearly 
important’ and ‘some which are either banal or misleading’ (2003: 28). In effect 
clustering is a ‘brand’ label so ‘elastic’ (p29) so as to be almost universally 
applicable. More critically, Martin and Sunley observe that an association between 
high growth industries and geographic concentration does not mean the 
concentration is the cause of the success and whilst the vision of local economically 
prosperous industries is attractive; the evidence is still in its ‘infancy’ (2003: 29).  
Regional systems are normally more easily defined because, typically, they coincide 
with politico-administrative spaces such as states, provinces or urban areas. The term 
‘cluster’, however, has been attached to every scale of economic agglomeration – 
everything from a few businesses or scientific labs in a small town through to the 
national ‘mega-clusters’ (see Roelandt and den Hertog 1999: 14). All such ‘clusters’ 
are identified with a wide variety of methodologies (see for example Roelandt and 
den Hertog (1999: 16). It is thus important to have a way of quickly categorising 
existing research and clearly identifying the approach used in the research completed 
for this thesis. Only a few authors have attempted to bring some order to the 
classification of cluster types. According to Verbeek (1999), there is one broad 
division in the clusters literature. The first class of clusters is based on similarity, 
which includes the analysis of geographic concentrations of industries. The second 
class focuses on interdependence, chains of production and filières. This is not a 
completely satisfactory typology as it neglects to focus on geographic scales of 
activity. Unfortunately, both Drejer et al. (1999: 294) and Roelandt (1998: 8) who 
attempt to give greater weight to spatial scale and to adhere to some degree to the 
position proposed by Verbeek, have confused different types of data and different 
geographic scales (see Table 3.2).  
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Table 3.2: Cluster analysis at different levels of analysis 
Level Cluster concept Focus of analysis 
National level 
(Macro) 
Industry groups linkages in 
the economic structure. 
Specialisation patterns of a 
national / regional economy. 
Need for innovation and 
upgrading products and 
processes in mega clusters. 
Branch or industry level 
(Meso) 
Inter and intra-industry 
linkages in the different 
stages of the production 
chain of similar end products. 
SWOT and benchmark analysis 
of industries. 
Exploring innovation needs. 
Firm level 
(Micro) 
Specialised suppliers around 
one or a few core enterprises 
(inter-firm linkages) 
Strategic business development. 
Chain analysis and chain 
management. Development of 
collaborative innovation 
projects. 
Source: Roelandt (1998: 8) [emphasis added – bolding]. 
At the meso and national levels this presentation creates a number of confusions. At 
the national level it suggests that the cluster concept covers linkages but focuses on 
specialisation patterns. As data on industrial interactions and specialisation are quite 
different, it is unclear how this schema works, or how it would be implemented. At 
the ‘meso’ level, the authors do not explicitly identify a geographic scale for the 
spatial distribution of the branch of industry and could therefore effectively be a 
national spatial range. Finally, it is worth noting that the content of the table implies 
the use of both statistical data and qualitative data across both columns.  
This attempt at clarifying the analytical possibilities does, it seem, only add to the 
confusion surrounding the identification of clusters. Such vagueness between the 
different cluster concepts, data types and geo-political scales would suggest it is 
necessary to attempt to clarify some of the language. In particular, some transparency 
in distinguishing between the two dimensions of industry and geography would seem 
to be helpful. Table 3.3 presents an attempt at just such break down which are then 
used throughout the rest of this thesis (as much as is reasonable).  
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Table 3.3: Cluster typology: industry statistics and geographic nomenclature 
Analytical approach including 
data  
Geographic descriptor Name 
Specialisation: Value added, 
production, export or employment 
data. [National industries such as the 
auto industry etc]. 
Nation state 
 
National-macro 
clusters 
Specialisation: Value added, 
production, export or employment 
data. [Location quotient methods]. 
Regions 
(Provinces/States) 
 
Regional-macro 
clusters 
Specialisation: Value added, 
production, export or employment 
data. [Location quotient methods]. 
Cities, urban complexes or 
other specific sub-regional 
locations. 
Urban-macro clusters 
Inter-industry and intra-industry 
linkages. Input-output analysis, 
supply (value) chains etc. 
Nation state 
[national I-O or similar data] 
National-meso 
clusters 
Inter-industry and intra-industry 
linkages. Input-output analysis / 
supply chains etc. 
Regions (Provinces/States) 
[regional I-O or similar data] 
Regional-meso 
clusters 
Business to business networks 
Qualitative evidence of business 
connectedness. 
Nation state 
(business networks with no 
particular geographic locus) 
National business 
networks 
Business to business networks 
Evidence of business connectedness 
and supply chains in specific 
locations. 
Cities, urban complexes or 
other specific sub-regional 
locations. 
Industrial district 
networks 
 
In Table 3.3 the use of the term macro has been used to signify analysis based on 
relative specialisation patterns. Such analysis might use location quotients to 
compare the strength of one industry against others across geographic locations. The 
geographic scales suggested here include nations, regions and urban centres, but are 
suggested only as examples. As the empirical research for the present thesis has been 
based on inter-country (national) input-output (inter-industry linkages) data, the 
individual clusters have been defined as ‘national meso-clusters’. This categorisation 
has problems but it makes progress towards a necessary clarification of spatial and 
data types.  
3.3 The geography of agglomeration 
Comparing how (sub-national) regional strengths evolve across time has been, very 
difficult until quite recently, in comparison to analysing national development trends 
due to data limitations. There is a growing opportunity for improved analysis of 
regional activities, advantages and trends as national statistical agencies focus more 
of their effort on collecting data on regions. 
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Across the European Union, there is multi-country structural pattern of uneven 
regional development. Combes and Overman (2003) identify a strong pattern of core 
and periphery36 regions. When analysed for their proximity to markets (GDP per 
capita), regions in Western Germany, Northern France and South East England are 
revealed as the concentrated zone of value added (GDP) for Europe. The authors 
reveal that beyond this core there is a graduated drop in GDP per capita as distance 
increases. In these EU economies, regional income converged between countries in 
the period 1980 to 1999, but regional income disparities within countries widened 
(see Le Gallo and Dall’erba 2003). Interestingly, the degree of regional industry 
concentration in the USA (States) and Europe37 is not significantly different, but in 
Europe, the trend has been towards greater regional concentration more rapidly than 
in the USA (see Andaluz et al. 2002).  
The underlying drivers of such trends are still hotly debated. There are many 
arguments for the economic significance of regional concentrations but one of the 
more important ones is that knowledge generation is spatially agglomerated and 
knowledge diffuses poorly across distance (see the next section on theories of 
proximity).  The cumulative nature of knowledge (explored in chapter two above) 
and the link between the generation of knowledge and the ability to benefit 
economically is likely to be one set of characteristics that contribute to uneven 
development.  
Knowledge and innovation geography 
Just as the clustering of a great number of industries has been considered (from 
processed food through to ICT, see for example OECD 1999d and 2001c), a range of 
indicators has been used to measure knowledge generation activities. Eurostat (2002) 
has analysed the geographic dispersion of patent applications for the EU 15 group of 
countries’ across statistical regions.   Table 3.5 lists the top 15 regions for high 
technology patent applications (per mill of labour force).  
 
 
                                                 
36 The analysis of inter-country input-output modelling presented in chapters eight and nine of the 
present thesis provides some support the core-periphery ideas, revealing that Germany is the economy 
in Europe most relied upon to supply industrial components across many industries. 
37 75 statistical territorial units (NUTS) used included the country of Denmark and provinces in 
Germany, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain. 
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Table 3.4: EU Regions with the most high-tech patent applications per-mill 
labour force (2000) 
 Member State NUTS 2 region High-tech 
patent app 
per million 
labour force 
High-tech 
patent 
applications 
High-tech 
patents as % 
of all patent 
applications 
1 Germany Oberbayern 540.9 1132 37% 
2 Finland Uusimaa (Suuralue) 530.4 416 52% 
3 Netherlands Noord-Brabant 524.2 633 40% 
4 Sweden Stockholm 430.0 416 40% 
5 Sweden Sydsverige 336.3 199 35% 
6 Finland Pohjois-Suomi 312.1 86 54% 
7 United Kingdom East Anglia 236.3 265 39% 
8 Finland Etelä-Suomi 202.4 188 37% 
9 Germany Mittelfranken 189.7 160 19% 
10 United Kingdom Gloucestershire, 
Wiltshire & North 
Somerset 
169.6 197 39% 
11 United Kingdom Hampshire & Isle of 
Wight 
169.0 156 43% 
12 Germany Stuttgart 162.9 315 12% 
13 Sweden Övre Norrland 160.5 39 35% 
14 Germany Oberpfalz 159.6 84 20% 
15 France Ile de France 155.1 854 25% 
Source: Eurostat 2002. 
In 2000, there were nearly 57,500 applications to the European Patent Office (EPO) 
for patents from all regions within the EU’s 15 member states. This included 10,500 
applications for patents in high-tech38 industries. The geographic distribution of the 
patents is highly concentrated – ‘21 regions out of 211 accounted for more than half 
of all the patent applications filed with the EPO, and only 13 regions produced more 
than half of the high-tech applications’ (Eurostat 2002). In a similar vein, Paci and 
Usai (2000) analysed innovation (patents per million inhabitants), labour 
productivity and industrial specialisation in 109 regions in Europe reporting that:  
‘there is a tendency towards the formation in Europe of highly specialized 
technological enclaves, especially in some sectors - machinery, transport 
equipment and energy. Moreover, we have documented how the spatial and 
sectoral specialization of innovative and productive activities is positively and 
significantly correlated’ (p108). 
Therefore, there is a link between the degree of specialisation in knowledge 
generation, seen in patent applications, and the pattern of industry specialisation. 
However, patenting may not provide a good indicator of innovative behaviour 
                                                 
38 Aviation, computers and automated business equipment, communication 
technology, lasers, micro-organism and genetic engineering, semi-conductors. 
Chapter 3: Sub-national Systems of Innovation 
Brian Wixted 56
because a few urban centres may be the base for the major corporate research and 
development facilities and the sites for patent initiation. This would not indicate 
whether, innovation is geographically agglomerated. By analysing data from the 
European Community Innovation Survey on businesses that identify themselves as 
innovating and identifying them by region, Evangelista et al. (2002) reveal that there 
were only a limited number of districts in Italy which could be described as regional 
innovation systems. Beaudry and Breschi add an important dimension to this finding. 
They report that firms are more likely to be innovative if they are co-located with 
other innovative firms and in the ‘presence of spillovers associated with a large 
accumulated stock of knowledge’ (2003: 339). The converse is also true - 
disadvantages arise from the ‘strong presence’ of non-innovative firms in a cluster. 
Beaudry and Breschi found for Italy, but not for the UK, that the presence of firms in 
related industries enhanced innovativeness. Thus, there are economies to 
innovativeness, in that regions that are innovative stimulate more innovative activity.  
Finally, concentrations of entrepreneurial innovativeness revealed through new firm 
births had better employment growth prospects than places that have a higher 
reliance on large corporations in a comparison of 74 districts across West Germany 
(see Audretsch and Fritsch 2002).  
Clearly, there is strong evidence that production and innovation clusters within 
particular locations in economies. There is also good evidence that there are strong 
dynamics that drive a tendency for knowledge to be localised. Within the confines of 
the current research project, this evidence is not in dispute. What matters, is not that 
clustering occurs, but the importance (the role, scale and spatial structure) of external 
links which, it is argued have notbeen thoroughly explored, to date. A general 
tendency towards proximity for knowledge and industry is the not the same as 
specifying how those agglomerations fit within multi-spatial innovations systems, 
e.g. the systems of systems. 
Supply architecture  
It is most common to be interested in value chain interdependencies for descriptive 
purposes rather than seeing them as a cluster’s raison d’etre (see the next section 
below). Measuring production interdependencies at both the national and regional 
levels has been used to locate clusters (economically and geographically) and to 
describe the scope and density of relations. Input-output (I-O) methodologies have 
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been used widely (see for example OECD 1999d and 2001c) to map value chains 
because it can trace the flow of intermediate goods and services. Such flows are the 
supply and use of industrial ingredients which are required for further processing. At 
this point, to analyse value chains through a time dimension with I-O data is most 
easily conducted at the national scale. Most regional analyses exist only as one off 
studies. At the regional level, Trends Business Research (2001) utilised I-O and value 
added data to identify clusters in the United Kingdom. Feser and Bergman (2000) 
used national input-output data and economic data for the American State of North 
Carolina to create information on regional supply chain clustering patterns in that 
State. The benefit of their approach is that it identifies inter-industry linkages and 
thus vertical and horizontal linkages at the sub-national level rather than just relying 
upon location quotient approaches. In research that could prove to be complimentary 
to existing approaches that map industry inter-linkages, Hoen (2002a) has developed 
a methodology for calculating the importance of particular linkages to potential 
clusters and is thus able to determine, statistically, linkages that are within a 
particular cluster and those outside. Not only can I-O data be used to understand the 
web of industry relationships (see Haukness 1999) at a point in time, it can also be 
used to measure changes across time. 
Taking a different direction, the research which follows was designed to investigate a 
time dimension in the structuring of supply chains. Apart from the work of the 
REAL39 research group on the USA’s mid-western States, there is little research or 
data on changes at the regional level. Instead of a regional analysis, the following 
charts depict changes in national domestic inter-industry relations between 1970 and 
1990. The following series of figures (3.3 to 3.8) establish the nature of shifts in the 
national structure of business-to-business relationships. The point of this analysis is 
to show that for a number of countries the structure of value chains in manufacturing 
was relatively stable during the twenty year period investigated. The charts reveal 
important changes, such as the growth of value chains based around service 
industries generally, and business services in particular. With a view to the question 
behind the present research, the charts provide some evidence that tempers the 
commonly held view that western economies lost significant amounts of 
                                                 
39 http://www2.uiuc.edu/unit/real/  
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manufacturing activity40 during this period. Supplies to manufacturing industries, 
often from other manufacturing industries (which are obviously not the same as 
goods for final consumption), often grew at the same rate as the economy overall and 
thus remained surprisingly stable as a share of GDP.  
The following figures have been designed to compress a large volume of data into a 
small but informative format. Each dot in the charts represents the sales of supplier 
industries (X axis) to a customer industry (which are not shown). The scaling is the 
change in percentage share of GDP for the period nominated. Thus, if a particular 
interaction represented two per cent of GDP in 1970 and three percent in 1990, then 
a one per cent change in the share of GDP will be shown on the chart. The charts 
represent inter-industry interactions of entire economies, characterised at the level of 
33 by 33 industries.  
                                                 
40 This distinguishes between the industrial economy and employment patterns as employment in 
manufacturing has been declining in manufacturing in most OECD countries (see Godbout, T. (1993). 
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• mostly intra-industry connections for manufacturing could be sens as 
generally stable with the rate of growth of GDP, with declines typically 
(outside some in Japan) less than  one per cent of GDP;  
• the largest apparent decline was for intra-industry iron and steel supplies in 
Japan;  
• there was a widespread decline in textiles and clothing industry supplies, 
mostly to the textiles and clothing industry; and 
• supplies growth in the service sector is clearly visible for most countries – 
particularly in industries such as business services. 
Input-output relations – that is the ingredients that is takes to make a given product - 
look to be much more resistant to change compared to other variables such as 
employment or an industry’s overall share of GDP. Total manufacturing employment 
declined in many OECD countries41 during the 1970s and 1980s, (see Godbout 
1993). Manufacturing’s share of GDP for OECD countries has also been constantly 
declining, shifting from 29.1% in 1960 to 28% in 1968 to 21.6% in 1990 and then to 
19.9% in 1995. Thus within the space of twenty years, manufacturing’s share of GDP 
had declined by 22.9% for the OECD (a share that is representative of the decline in 
individual countries – see OECD 1999e: 67). The comparatively stable nature of 
inter-industry linkages is supported by Verspagen (2002: 11) who notes that for the 
US economy, the linkage structure is rather sticky. ‘Rank correlations between 
forward and backward linkages of sectors over periods of roughly 10-15 years are 
rather high. This also explains why industries related to ‘old’ technological 
revolutions dominate the linkage structure for a long time’.  
It should be noted, that it is probable that the import intensity of manufacturing 
production is increasing, indicating that more components are necessary to make the 
same products. It can also be observed that within the literature on innovation in 
regions and clusters, where input-output data was used, there were no examples of it 
being developed within a multi-spatial (regions or countries) framework. A few 
                                                 
41 Canada is revealed as the only exception to declines in the absolute levels of employment in 
manufacturing in a study covering the USA, Canada, Australia, Japan, France Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. 
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examples of analysis of inter-city trade linkages have been described. These are 
discussed in section 3.5.2. 
3.4 Cluster based theories on the drivers of proximity 
The recognition of the tendency for economic activity to agglomerate in particular 
places has been written on for over a century. The intellectual history is often traced 
back to Alfred Marshall’s discussion of industrial districts in the 1890s. His 
commentary on industrial districts was particularly focussed on the significance of 
the advantages accruing from large pools of people with specialised skills that can 
exist in local labour markets due to many businesses in a similar industry co-
locating. The contents list for the relevant chapter is instructive: 
‘Chapter X. Industrial organization, continued. The concentration of specialized 
industries in particular localities. 1. Localised industries: their primitive forms. 2. 
Their various origins. 3. Their advantages; hereditary skill; the growth of 
subsidiary trades; the use of highly specialized machinery; a local market for 
special skill. 4. The influence of improved means of communication on the 
geographical distribution of industries’ (1890/1961 xxiii).  
It seems, however, that for most of the 20th Century there was little interest in the 
economics of regions. Baumol (2000) argues that the big changes in the discipline of 
economics after Marshall were in the formalisation of macroeconomics and the 
contribution of Schumpeter to initiating the interest in technological innovation. It is 
worth noting that Baumol shows no interest in the industrial location contributions of 
Marshall, perhaps emphasising the current economics textbook focus of macro, 
micro and trade theory. Weintraub (1999) would seem to be in agreement. In a 
review of the important revolutions of twentieth century economics thinking, he 
suggests that many important changes to economic ideas to have emerged across the 
century. The changes are catalogued under various headings, but neither innovation 
nor regional development are included the lists. In contrast, Crafts (1999) review of 
twentieth century economic growth research, reveals much more interest in the role 
of R&D, technology and innovation as a driver of economic growth, although the 
focus is on national growth and not regional development. These reviews throw some 
light on the lack of interest in innovation and regions. For economic theory, the 
excitement has been largely elsewhere - welfare economics, Keynesian 
macroeconomics and the monetarist response. One problem with neoclassical 
economics is that the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade is not a theory of location. 
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Venables points out. ‘The spatial unevenness of industrial development requires an 
explanation beyond that offered by comparative advantage ... Heckscher-Ohlin 
theory is, unsurprisingly, not good at explaining the location of industry across areas 
where factor endowments are broadly similar (as in much of Western Europe)’ 
(1998: 2). In contrast to this deficiency in traditional analysis, a growing number of 
researchers are keen to pursue Marshall’s interest in the economics of place.  Storper 
attributes the re-emerging interest in regional economics to a growing recognition 
that the differences at the local level might be both important and informative. 
‘the region might be a fundamental basis of economic and social life ‘after mass 
production’. That is, since new successful forms of production – different from the 
canonical mass production systems of the post–war period – were emerging in 
some regions and not others, and since they seemed to involve both localisation 
and regional differences and specificities (institutional, technological), it followed 
that there might be something fundamental that linked late twentieth-century 
capitalism, regionalism and regionalization’ (1995: 191).  
Hall in his monumental analysis of the development of cities on various continents in 
various ages has the following to say about Detroit during the early years of its 
growth.  
‘The question still must be: why did Ford arise where and when he did? He could 
have been born anywhere, and maybe could have succeeded anywhere; there was 
no inevitability that put his name and Detroit’s together. Yet there was a strong 
probability. Detroit in the 1880s and 1890s was at the industrial frontier. It was not 
one of the great industrial cities of America, like New York, Philadelphia, 
Pittsburgh or Chicago. But neither was it at the edge of the world. It was growing 
very rapidly on the basis of natural resources around it and of the industries that 
had sprung up to transform those resources into products. It was thus a rich and 
varied engineering centre, and it specialized, above all, in producing transportation 
equipment; it was one of America’s major railroad car manufacturers. The big 
firms subcontracted jobs to smaller ones, so there was a rich network of 
interdependencies and skills’ (1998: 423). 
According to Hall, Detroit gave Henry Ford three things; venture capital, ‘fellow 
spirits’ interested in the potential of the motorcar and a network of contractors (1998: 
423). These three features of Detroit in the 1890s are the characteristics which are 
commonly attributed to development of clusters.  
In following section on cluster theory, the role of the ‘fellow spirits’ in passing on 
information (untraded interdependencies) and traded interdependencies for the flow 
of components are discussed in depth. The section also analyses the role of business 
supply relationships (user-producer relations) for their role in promoting innovation.   
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Many of the characteristics of innovation and knowledge considered important to the 
operation of national innovation systems, outlined in chapter two (above) can be 
applied to regional levels of analysis, the basis for an emphasis on regions and 
clusters is that firms gain particular benefits from proximity. Amongst others, Cooke 
and Morgan (see Cooke and Morgan 1998, Cooke 2001, Cooke et al. 2004, Morgan 
1997, 2001) have particularly emphasised the role of the local milieu of local 
businesses, universities, policy and institutional arrangements for promoting 
innovative and competitive businesses.  
3.4.1 Traded interdependencies: vertical and horizontal supply 
chains 
One reason why companies might co-locate parts of the their production system with 
those of other businesses in the same industry is to benefit from the synergies of 
cheaper access to components, quicker delivery times and perhaps cost effective 
access to raw materials arising from a sufficiently large demand base. Supply chain 
interdependencies are not often seen as a major factor of co-location outside of a few 
industries such as the passenger motor vehicle manufacturing (see Riemens 2002 and 
Gereffi 1998). More frequently, the innovation literature points to other factors such 
as untraded interdependencies in knowledge and access to knowledge which provide 
the incentives for industrial agglomeration. 
The structure of supply chain networks are, nevertheless, the focus of a few authors 
whilst also being an important data element in the descriptions of many clusters. In 
Porter’s view (1990) there are three important regional conditions which together 
with appropriate corporate strategies can give rise to successful firms. The mix of 
demanding clients, access to industrial supplies and a deep market of skilled labour 
within regions, it was argued, provide the critical conditions for industry 
competitiveness. Porter presented a ‘diamond’ of factors that drove clustering (Figure 
3.8). 
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Figure 3.8: Porter’s diamond 
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Source: redrawn from Porter (1990). 
Porter’s argument is that these factors work best within close geographic proximity, 
even though at times ‘clustering’ is considered in a national context. Porter’s analysis 
has, however, not been uncontentious. Yetton et al. (1992), for example, argue that 
the evidence does not support the argument and especially highlight the economies of 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand as three resource rich high income countries that 
do not fit the manufacturing industry orientation of Porter. Rugman and D’Cruz 
1993) are also interested in the economies of Canada and New Zealand, criticising 
Porter’s analysis for its lack of understanding when it comes to the market operations 
of smaller economies. They suggest that rather than taking a nationalist approach, the 
functional market area would provide a better definition of the diamond. Thus, 
Canada and the USA would be part of a North American ‘double diamond’ (more on 
this in section 4.2.3, below). 
In contrast to his earlier work, later research by Porter (1998 and 2003) has been 
increasingly quantitative, re-dressing the lack of data in the 1990 book and aims to 
show that clustering is not a special phenomena but a general economic feature of 
countries. The later work relies upon location quotient analysis which is an effective 
methodology for comparing the relative regional specialisation (urban-macro 
clustering) patterns based on statistical geographic units. Location quotients compare 
indicators (e.g. employment) for one area and compare them against the average for a 
wider geographic area (sometimes the nation). 
Porter’s work, increasingly, is more about the existence of clusters and their 
economic role than advancing the discussion as to why they exist. Only Steinle and 
Chapter 3: Sub-national Systems of Innovation 
Brian Wixted 67
Schiele (2002) present an analysis of the possible dynamics that generate the 
incentives for industrial agglomeration on the basis of supply industry interactions. 
They suggest that there are both necessary (NC) and sufficient (SC) conditions for 
clustering. 
• NC1: divisibility of process (including scale)  – multiple specialist 
businesses; 
• NC2: ease of transport of final product & difficulties with transportability of 
components; 
• SC1: longer value chains 
• SC2: multiple dissimilar but complementary competencies 
• SC3: importance of innovation. 
Two of the five stimuli towards clustering appear to be related as the divisibility of 
the process and dissimilar competencies seem to be different expressions of the same 
concept. These conditions for clustering would suggest that the more complex the 
final product, the greater the incentive for firms to geographically cluster. Dissimilar 
but complementary competencies would often lead to the development of specialist 
businesses (possibly through outsourcing). According to Steinle and Schiele longer 
supply chains for components and difficulties in transporting components in a 
particular industry would add to the conditions promoting co-location. Final goods, 
then with bulky components, in this structure would tend to be clustered. A notable 
exception might be the Airbus A380 being built in multiple locations across Europe 
and assembled in France (see section 8.6.2).  
Other authors have put forward analysis that suggests that industries based on new 
knowledge (see Audretsch and Feldman42) tend to cluster. Results presented later in 
this thesis (chapters six & nine) would indicate that this theoretical construct needs to 
be extended to include inter-regional supply chains as entire clusters appear to be 
specialising in complementary products (Bresnahan et al. 2001). It is also worth 
                                                 
42 ‘Indeed, we find that a key determinant of the extent to which the location of production is 
geographically concentrated is the relative importance of new economic knowledge in the industry. 
Even after controlling for the concentration of production we find evidence that industries in which 
knowledge spillovers are more prevalent – that is where industry R&D, university research and skilled 
labor are the most important – have a greater propensity for innovative activity to cluster than 
industries where knowledge externalities are less important’ (1996: 639). 
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noting that industries which broadly rely upon production scale for competitiveness 
(resource processing and transport equipment industries) account for the majority of 
highly internationalised industries reported in thesis and presented in chapter six 
(below). These results suggest that industries where the components are 
transportable, but where there is either a resource or skill complementarities – supply 
structures might elongate globally through networks.  
If supply chains are not typically thought to be the drivers of proximity, then what is? 
3.4.2 User-producer relations: the link between production and 
innovation 
The nexus between innovation and production and then through to locality rests with 
the fundamental characteristic of innovation that it is not often due to a heroic sole 
inventor, but rather due to the interactions between product producers and product 
users (DeBresson 1999). The finding that innovations, particularly those that require 
technological change, involve a relationship between businesses as users and 
businesses as component producers is both robust and one of the few properties of 
innovation that can be related to data on economic structures. DeBresson et al. 
(1998: 39) emphasise that collaboration and cooperation are a prerequisite for 
innovation. Long-lived demand-supply contexts which build trust between the 
partners and tacit knowledge on the requirements of users and the capabilities of 
producers are significant for minimising the risks associated with innovating (see 
Lundvall 1992 and Fagerberg 1992 amongst others). In his study of a series of 
technological innovations, von Hippel (1988) emphasised that the creation of 
innovations was not a ‘market’ exercise but were often designed within a network. 
The inside information on problems and capabilities is what enables the 
organisations and people involved to know enough to redesign, re-organise, or invest 
in new products. On occasions, organisations need to co-develop technologies. 
DeBresson has analysed the importance of the networks across a wide variety of 
industries (with Murray 1984) and more recently, he has argued that almost all 
innovations result from the linkages between users and suppliers (1999). His survey 
of innovative businesses has revealed that some Canadian firms have as many as 
seven key users of innovations. Table 3.4 presents DeBresson’s results for just the 
‘world first innovations’. In this latter category of innovative businesses, 23 per cent 
of firms were innovating with three firms. From Debresson’s analysis of businesses 
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either adapting innovations or developing ‘world first’ innovations it is apparent that 
there were no cases where other firms where not involved in the innovative activity.  
Table 3.5: Number of independent organizations required for each 
innovative act in Canada, 1945-1979 (DeBresson 1999) 
No. of firms 
in innovation 
Total % 
World first & adoption 
1 9 
2 16 
3 23 
4 21 
5 19 
6 7 
7 5 
Total 100 % 
Source: DeBresson (1999: 4). 
These findings are supported by the work of Porter’s qualitative (1990) and 
Fagerberg’s quantitative (1998) studies, that both argued that the participation of 
advanced domestic users of products was correlated to higher levels of industry 
competitiveness. Fagerberg argues that there was an association between the home 
market and industrial competitiveness for the period of (available data) 1965 to 1987. 
Drejer’s analysis of the hypothesis that the home market matters, suggests that there 
is a connection between input-output linkages and export specialisation. 
‘Hence, it seems fair to conclude that both interindustrial linkages and 
technological activities in the nationally located industry are important in the 
determination of national export specialization patterns. However, the importance 
differs according the mode of innovation in the industries, distinguished according 
to Pavitt sector characteristics’ (1999: 164). 
This relationship, based paradigm of innovation, is in stark contrast to the market 
based approach of neo-classical economics. Instead of the destiny of businesses 
being dependent on their individual ability, DeBresson observes that networking 
combines capabilities and market positions which are critical for the development of 
new products and services.  
‘As no one organization can possibly keep internally all these dissimilar 
competencies, but tends to focus on similar competencies, innovation can only be 
undertaken through the collaboration of different enterprises. Yet the social 
sciences at the end of this century, except for a tiny part of economic sociology (for 
instance Burt, 1982, 1992), still only use the individual organization as the sole unit 
of coordination …This thesis also claims that innovative networks are now central 
to the understanding of all contemporary economic processes - not just innovation’ 
(1999: 2). 
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The finding that user-producer relationships are critical for innovation provides an 
analytical and theoretical bridge between the innovation at the corporate scale and 
innovativeness at the economy wide scale of activity as well as between 
innovativeness and the productive structure of economies. The latter being 
observable through, for example, input-output data, as DeBresson (1996) and 
DeBresson et al. (1998) have shown. Economic input-output structures can be 
closely (although not perfectly) related to the data available on the producers and 
users of innovations. Apart from the latter analysis, which makes some brief 
observations on the subject, there appears to be scant consideration of innovation 
based user-producer relationships extending across national borders. 
3.4.3 Untraded interdependencies: knowledge flows 
Traded goods are based in contractual transactions, while user-producer relations 
develop through repeated use of those same channels for accessing components and 
are thus less formal. The most informal of influences on the existence of clusters is 
the flow of information one person to another. Although van den Berg et al. 
emphasise that clustering is a combination of production and knowledge institutions; 
it is the dynamics of uncodified knowledge which has attracted the greatest attention 
in the innovation literature: 
‘most definitions share the notion of clusters as localised networks of specialised 
organisations, whose production processes are closely linked through the exchange 
of goods, services and/or knowledge. In particular, the informal exchange of 
information, knowledge and creative ideas is considered an important characteristic 
of such networks. This is often referred to as “untraded interdependencies” 
(Storper, 1997; see also Yeung, 1994).’ (2001: 187).  
As has been shown in chapter two (above), at the level of nation states the study of 
knowledge focuses on specialisations in science fields and the path dependent 
trajectories of knowledge accumulation and national innovativeness. At the local 
level, the interest in knowledge is particularly engaged with the role of tacit 
knowledge in fostering a general climate of innovation. Tacit, as opposed to coded 
knowledge (information contained in scientific journals and books etc) is a catchall 
definition for different kinds of knowledge that cannot be repeatedly and reliably 
accessed. A number of authors have attempted to develop taxonomies of knowledge 
types. Johnson (1998: 10) brings many of these together for comparison with two 
being especially interesting [the first based on Blackler]; 
Chapter 3: Sub-national Systems of Innovation 
Brian Wixted 71
• Embrained knowledge (abstract knowledge); 
• Embodied knowledge (learning by doing); 
• Encultured knowledge; 
• Embedded knowledge (routines or in technology); and 
• Encoded knowledge (signs & symbols – books, manuals etc). 
The second list is based on Lundvall and takes a different tack (Johnson 1998: 12): 
• Know-what (information); 
• Know-why (science); 
• Know-who (social knowledge); 
• Know-when and know-where (markets); and 
• Know-how (process knowledge). 
Johnson’s summary reveals that both authors attach key significance to tacit 
knowledge. Social knowledge, market knowledge, encultured knowledge can rarely 
be found written down completely and many activities need to be learnt by doing. 
Tacit knowledge is often focussed on how to do, how to fix, or who to go to 
(suppliers or markets). It is easy to overestimate how much production knowledge is 
recorded in a way that could be replicated because there is an expectation that 
production knowledge should be written down somewhere. Information is often 
specific to individuals created from their individual experiences. Tacit knowledge is 
also often seen as problem-solving knowledge, as opposed to codified knowledge 
which is accessible to all but does not reveal all. Tacit knowledge is especially useful 
for obtaining techniques to get around technical barriers. Typically, ‘knowledge 
remains tacit if it is complex or variable in quality’ according to Lundvall and Borrás 
(1997: 14). It is often context rich, with its relevance highly geared to particular 
situations. As such, it is locally relevant and increasingly valueless the further it 
moves from that specific context.  
Tacit knowledge is bound to humans who live and work in specific places rather than 
the geo-political spaces of nations or the global economy and it is more embedded 
within specific place / technological contexts. It is not just that tacit knowledge is in 
the heads of locals, it does not flow easily, quickly or far, passing often by word of 
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mouth. It is therefore considered to be spatially limited. Saxenian attributed some of 
the success of Silicon Valley’s businesses competing so effectively to local pub talk43 
(1994:32). She found that information on ‘competitors, customers, markets, and 
technologies’ was accessible, so ‘entrepreneurs came to see social relationships and 
even gossip as a crucial aspect of their businesses’ (1994: 33).  
However, such ideal types of clusters where there is a free flow of valuable 
information are probably comparatively rare. ‘Local knowledge spillovers’ might be 
mediated by ‘economic (market and non-market) mechanisms’ according to (Breschi 
and Lissoni 2001b: 270). In their analysis, instead of knowledge flows being gossip, 
swapped over a beer, the communications between engineers are informally 
regulated and traded. Breschi and Lissoni are, however, broadly in agreement with 
other literature on tacit knowledge, commenting that it has more effect on speeding 
up the innovation cycle than providing ‘new ideas’ (2001a: 1000). 
Despite the strong argument for learning (Malmberg and Maskell 2001) or untraded 
interdependencies as a key influence on clustering, it is unfortunate that the majority 
of the data that is used to assess clustering cannot measure knowledge flows. Holmen 
and Jacobsson’s do not criticise the assumption that knowledge spillovers are 
important, just ‘that when the theoretical basis for cluster formation largely lies on 
knowledge externalities, the methods employed to delineate clusters are based not on 
classes of knowledge but on product or industry classes instead’ (1999: 335). Breschi 
and Lissoni (2001a and 2001b) agree, arguing that an important research agenda for 
the future will be to follow the actual knowledge networks of individual companies 
and then map these against physical geography.  
One way this has been analysed already has been to use the citations of relevant 
scientific research included in patents to evaluate whether there are any regional 
patterns. Hicks et al. found that inventors have an inclination to acknowledge 
university research conducted in the same region (USA State). They comment that 
the bias towards authors of research in the same state provides evidence ‘that 
technological development has strong links to local scientific research’ (2001: 692). 
In a similar study, Verspagen and Schoenmakers tested the citing of patents within 
                                                 
43 Saxenian identifies the wagon wheel bar in California as a key location for the flow of informal 
information in the early semiconductor industry (1994: 32). 
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other patents to analyse intra-firm and inter-firm knowledge spillovers within a 
geographic setting. Their results ‘generally confirm’ that proximity matters for 
technological spillovers, finding ‘significantly negative coefficients on the 
geographical distance variable’ (2000: 17).  
However, such analysis does not specify whether there are sectoral or spatial 
structure differences. There can be a significant distinction between a general 
confirmation of a hypothesis that knowledge is localized and a finding that there is a 
specific structure to the linkages or that the importance of inter-regional links are 
differentiated across sectors. Thus, more research on knowledge linking patterns 
together with more precision in the language used to describe extra-regional linkages 
would be a welcome development. This is particularly necessary, as the latest clusters 
research reveals that firms in clusters do not necessarily preference local knowledge 
over national or international knowledge (see for example Simmie 2004, and Wolfe 
and Gertler 2004). 
3.5 Cluster boundaries and extra-territorial linkages  
When the prevailing paradigm for geography based analysis of innovation systems is 
itself questioned it rapidly becomes apparent that the perspective on such systems is 
that they are ‘islands’ of activity. Many of the studies are designed to show why 
proximity matters. The methodologies and the generality of the conclusions focus 
attention on where agglomerations exist, and the degree to which knowledge 
spillover the borders of the locations of interest. This intent for projects specifically 
excludes the consideration of multi-spatial structures. This presentation of ‘islands’ 
of production and innovation sets them adrift from a more transparent presentation of 
the role of location. Maskell and Lorenzen observe that cluster studies are about co-
location (note that there is no mention of how such clusters are linked to elsewhere): 
‘There are many competing schools of thought concerned with industrial clusters 
but they all agree that this real life phenomenon has to do with the co-localisation 
of separate economic entities, which are in some sense related but not joined 
together by any common ownership or management. In spite of this basic accord 
no general understanding has yet emerged regarding the paramount reason why the 
separate entities became co-localized in the first place, what has made them stick 
together, what the effects maybe, and – at an even more basic level – why this 
matters at all’ (emphasis added 2004: 991). 
This attention to the characteristics of places corresponds with the position taken in 
chapter two (above) that it is a focus on endogenous dynamics for growth and 
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development which defines the study of systems of innovation. Learning, knowledge, 
research and innovation are all argued to have built in incentives for accumulation 
trajectories and limited spatial knowledge spillovers which preferences some places 
over others. Therefore, clusters with ill-defined industrial and geographic boundaries 
and regions (typically with politico-administrative borders) are both typically 
perceived as located within national borders. Only the analysis of Saxenian and Hsu 
(2001) could be found that similarly identifies cluster analysis as overly focusing on 
isolated locations and not the linkages between places.  
The last analytical section of this chapter examines studies that, in one way or 
another, can be shown to be related to borders. The first class of research retains the 
geographic dimension (proximity) of clustering whilst loosening another dimension 
(national borders). The studies of contiguous regions (regions that reside on both 
sides of a border) reveal that borders are not unimportant for the structuring of 
economic activity. The second class of studies considered here are those that loosen 
both cluster dimensions of proximity and border boundaries by investigating the 
conduct of multinational enterprises.  
3.5.1 Contiguous regions 
It is argued in the present thesis that neo-Schumpeterian researchers have placed 
undue emphasis on the nation state44 as the overriding spatial dimensions of 
innovation, without considering enough of the external influences and 
interdependencies. It is not the argument here that either nations or their borders do 
not matter. As Anderson and Dowd suggest, borders are a critical element of social 
development: 
‘Borders, states and societies are mutually formative – borders shape what they 
contain and are shaped by them – but border research undermines lazy assumptions 
that ‘state’ and ‘society’, ‘state’ and ‘nation’ or ‘state’ and ‘governance are co-
terminus. Instead of becoming redundant in a borderless world, increased 
differentiation, complexity and contradictions of political borders make border 
research more important and more revealing of wider social change’ (1999: 602-
603). 
                                                 
44 It has already been noted the statistics on trade and innovation used in NIS studies are biased 
towards a consideration of nations, but one element that is not analysed fully in the current work is the 
incomplete consideration of the significance of differences in the size of nations. Some regions of 
larger countries have a bigger population than some of the smaller OECD countries.    
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The growing interest in the role of borders in shaping development is seen through 
Paasi (for example) on the socio-political implications (1999), Scott on cross-border 
institutions (1999) and Kraetke (1999) on the influence of borders on regional 
economic development for firms on both sides of a border. Although cross-border 
activities could be, conceptually, a label for any range of distances beyond a 
particular border, it is a term that typically refers to contiguous physical spaces that 
are divided by political boundaries (Silvers 2000). More rarely, the term has been 
used when borders occur in combination with physical environment discontinuities 
such as the English Channel (Church and Reid 1999).  
The economic geography of neighbouring places45 does seem particularly interesting. 
The ‘innovative activity in a local system is positively influenced by the level of 
innovativeness of contiguous systems’ according to the study of Paci and Usai (1999: 
18) based on patent applications to the European Patent Office in 85 branches of 
industry for 784 municipal regions in Italy. Paci and Usai also note that 
‘technological spillovers are not spatially unbounded since they actually die out with 
increasing distances from the area considered’ (1999: 18). This conclusion is not 
dissimilar to the findings on the spatial structure of international trade (discussed at 
greater length in chapter four below) which indicates that trade is often 
geographically biased towards closer larger markets.  
The evidence on the geographic dispersal of technology spillovers is also helpful for 
understanding the operations of large cross-border regional clusters such as the 
Detroit-Windsor auto corridor. Canada’s auto cluster is just across the river from one 
of the USA’s prime locations for car manufacturing (see Fitzgibbons et al. 2003). 
Such an example of a cross border industrial agglomeration is not totally unique but 
not all are as successful. Hassink et al. (1994) found that technological cooperation 
across the nation state borders of the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, in the so-
called Maas-Rhine region, was lower than expected. They attributed this to nature of 
the institutional arrangements which they argued played an important part in 
encouraging the development of contiguous clusters.  
                                                 
45 Interestingly, the European Commission would appear to want to encourage cross-border clusters 
(2002: 32) but the supporting analysis of the phenomenon remains slender. 
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Elsewhere, the Øresund Region which covers the territory from Copenhagen 
(Denmark) to Malmo (Sweden) is being promoted as a possible emerging cross-
border region, largely because of the construction of a very large bridge between the 
two cities. Bucken-Knapp thinks that in the medium term future, rather than the 
development of a unified region, it is more likely that initially Copenhagen based 
workers might relocate to the cheaper Malmo area. Inturn and in time this might then 
entice businesses to set up in Malmo. Whether the evolution suggested by Bucken-
Knapp would lead to one Øresund region or two linked regions is not addressed and 
may be a question of perspective.   
3.5.2 Clusters beyond proximity 
Unfortunately, conceiving of space as a series of places which are linked by 
differential ties is rare within the literature on clustering. The literature on economic 
geography and clusters in particular has only moved in small steps towards a 
framework that can integrate an acceptance of both the importance of spatial 
innovation systems (see Martin and Sunley 2003) and the importance of distance 
centres of production and knowledge creation. It is clear, however, that this is a 
direction which is beginning to emerge in the literature (see in particular Wolfe and 
Gertler 2004). 
Although, the leading edge of research suggests that external linkages are important 
(Wolfe and Gertler 2004), apart from suggestions in Simmie (2002 and 2004) it has, 
largely, not yet advanced to measuring the strength of ties between places. A few 
different perspectives on dispersed production systems exist. Markusen (1996) 
describes three types of clusters with external relations; ‘Marshallian’, ‘hub and 
spoke’ and ‘satellite districts’. Marshallian industrial districts have a strong set of 
internal capabilities with a mix of different sized businesses, whilst ‘hub and spoke’ 
regions are dominated by a few large organisations that are supplied by many small 
businesses that are often but not necessarily located in the region of interest. In 
contrast ‘satellite districts’ are dominated by large businesses that are focussed on 
supplying business units that are external to the region, which results (in Markusen’s 
view), in the lowest range of regional capabilities. These typologies, although based 
on empirical analysis, are only identified with specific locations in the most generic 
terms. This is unlike Guerrieri and Pietrobelli (2000) who have tried to apply 
Markusen’s Marshallian districts typology to their work on regions in Italy. Their 
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focus on the ability of systems and actors to evolve and technologically upgrade led 
them to conclude that firms working solely within a cluster may not be able to access 
relevant technological knowledge. They argue that businesses not within global 
production networks (discussed in chapter four below) will not have access to 
important commercial and technological knowledge.  
Other researchers also question whether clusters are based in proximity economics at 
all. ‘Innovation relationships’ in the German mechanical engineering industry ‘are far 
less spatially restricted than generally assumed. In many cases, access to 
interregional contact networks is much more important, especially for technology-
intensive firms’ according to Grotz and Braun (1997: 555). The policy implications 
they draw is that cluster or regional policies that result in tight integration is not 
necessarily always the best result.  
Buyers and sellers are also often located distant from core centres of attention. 
Suppliers to innovative firms46 in Amsterdam, Milan and Stuttgart were more local 
than extraterritorial yet suppliers to innovative firms in the two global cities of 
London and Paris were more internationalised. In all five cities, customer relations 
were more internationalised than, supplier relationships, according to Simmie et al. 
(2002) and Simmie (2002). These results are not generally surprising given the 
existing research on world cities and the business service firms that are located 
within them (see chapter four below). The literature on cities reports that the top tier 
are more linked to cities in other countries than their own, whilst others tiers of cities 
are more focussed on intra-national markets. Later work by Simmie (2004: 1111) on 
firms in the UK leads him to argue that ‘contrary to the local clustering hypotheses, 
market-leading innovative firms seem to be more a part of an internationally 
distributed system of innovation. Their clients and customers are located around the 
advanced economies particularly in Europe and the US’. 
The flip side of research, that identifies the external relations of firms based in 
particular places, is the analysis of the rationale behind multi-national enterprises 
                                                 
46 The methodology was based on interviewing a selection of firms that had won ‘grants from the 
BRITE-EuRam III programme. BRITE awards for Basic Research in Industrial technologies for 
Europe were provided, using consistent criteria across Europe, to firms, academia and research 
organizations for pre-competitive collaborative and co-operative research in materials, design and 
manufacturing technologies’ and was supplemented with firms from local datasets on known 
innovative firms (2002: 52).  
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establishing themselves in specific locations. Approximately half of all majority 
owned foreign affiliates (MOFAs) establishing in Sweden located their operations in 
just three competitive host clusters (Ivarsson 1999). Once embedded in these clusters 
the foreign affiliates oriented their production towards export markets. The other half 
of the newly established MOFAs did not base themselves in clusters and were found 
to be primarily selling to Sweden’s domestic market. Both types of MOFAs relied on 
local material inputs to about the same extent and both sets of MOFAs co-operated 
(to a small degree) on technology development predominantly with sister firms in 
their own business group. The results of Ivarsson would indicate that the export-
oriented firms were targeting specific advantages that could be gained from 
accessing resources (human capital etc) embedded within Swedish clusters. Thus 
whilst formally tapping into technology in local clusters may be difficult, a 
conclusion that is in agreement with other research (see for example Patel 1997), it 
points to other economic benefits of being inside clusters. This is an important 
conclusion. In general the finding on MOFAs in Sweden provides some support for 
the concept of linked clusters as the export oriented firms were drawn to clusters and 
therefore indicating a multi-spatial strategy on the part of the MNEs. 
There are also prominent cases where omitting such linkages has resulted in clearly 
deficient analysis, in contrast to the forgoing research which adds to an 
understanding of extra-territorial linkages. The emergence of Ireland as a high-
income country via a sustained period of high growth is one of the most important 
changes in a country’s industrial trajectory in the last quarter of a century. There are 
various analyses of the success of Ireland but there is an obvious inadequate 
consideration of international links. The research of Green et al. (2001) includes a 
discussion of the relative scale of MNE investment in the Irish ICT sector with the 
claim that this activity has become ‘embedded’ in the national structures through the 
rise of local firms – and thus the formation of local clusters. There is only a passing 
mention in the paper to the scale of imports that the Irish cluster relies upon, which 
as chapter nine (below) reveals is above a third of all value added. In a similar article 
on the role of investment and R&D, O’ Sullivan attributes Ireland success in 
attracting foreign investment to the profitability of plants based in Ireland which in 
turn is founded on wage rate advantages and high productivity. The extent to which 
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this “production base’ for Europe (2000: 278) is in fact supported by significant 
volumes of imports is again not discussed.  
The emphasis on local factors seen in the research of Green et al. (2001) and 
O’Sullivan is relatively commonplace in the literature on innovation. As another 
example, Hicks et al. (2001) who wrote on the citations of local academics within 
patents in the USA, which was identified earlier, also has a twist. The article 
emphasises the relative importance of local connections but it notes only in passing 
that in absolute terms the corporate patents overwhelmingly cited47  academic 
research conducted in just two US States (California and Massachusetts). Thus, 
although there was only a relative preference for local research, it was this finding 
that was emphasised over the strong levels of inter-regional citations.  
3.6 Multi-spatial production spaces and innovation 
networks 
It is clear from the evidence presented in this chapter that the phenomenon of 
industrial clustering is significant, even if the questions of appropriate spatial scales 
(Malmberg and Maskell 2001) or which industries (Steinle and Schiele 2002 or 
Audretsch and Feldman 1996) remain contested. From all the evidence compiled for 
the current chapter it is argued that a multi-spatial perspective on innovation systems 
is largely missing from the sub-national systems of innovation analyses, just as it was 
when the focus was explicitly on national systems. Increasingly, however, there is 
emerging fragmentary research that reveals that clusters are linked to national and 
international sources of technology. Wolfe and Gertler comment:  
‘The picture already emerging from our study departs substantially from the 
received wisdom—most notably concerning the alleged importance of a strong 
local customer base and strong local competition in spurring the emergence and 
evolution of dynamic, knowledge-based clusters. … In particular, it appears that a 
large component of the knowledge inputs to local production—at least in certain 
sectors—is drawn from well outside the region’ (2004: 1090). 
This acknowledgment is welcome but there is still very little information on the scale 
or spatial structure of such external connections. Despite this, the literature on region 
based innovation systems is more productive in examining the role, scale and spatial 
configuration of interdependencies than the national level studies.  
                                                 
47 31 per cent of all references. 
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The available research literature tends to suggest the following conclusions: 
• productive systems tend to agglomerate in particular locations; 
• there are many names for these agglomerations, but ‘clusters’ has become 
the most frequently used term to designate a combination of both geography 
and sectoral emphasis; 
• clusters are seen as having both untraded (knowledge) and traded 
dimensions (industrial supplies); 
• untraded interdependencies are seen as the diffusion of predominantly tacit 
knowledge within a limited geographic area (so proximity is important for 
knowledge flows); 
• long-lived user-producer relations tend to encourage innovation and are a 
prerequisite for innovation; 
• such user-producer relations are thought to be stronger is particular localised 
spatial identities (regions or nations); 
• clusters have been identified using input-output analysis to reveal highly 
linked industry groupings;  
• cluster studies tend to focus on the internal dynamics of particular 
geographic entities; and  
• crucially for the argument here, those studies that have specifically focussed 
on the question of the external connectedness of regions have mostly 
suggested that the linkages were stronger than a proximity-based hypothesis 
would assume. 
On the basis of the research reported here, it can be argued that the cluster literature 
provides enough evidence to support an argument that proximity does in some way 
influence outcomes and that firms do tend to co-locate whether competing, supplying 
or consuming. It has also been demonstrated here that this exclusiveness of 
perception is missing important details. There is no theoretical framework for 
considering clusters with a multi-spatial agenda. Research that has highlighted the 
importance of imported knowledge or supplies do not go the next step and 
investigate the spatial structure of those extra-regional linkages. In the next chapter, 
it is the linked component of the linked clusters framework that is examined. The 
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chapter reports on current research findings and approaches48 to trade, both intra-
nationally and especially internationally. It establishes the usefulness of current 
methodologies for trade analysis and research findings on the spatial structure of 
global trade. To do this, the chapter examines the literature on bilateral trade 
relationships (specialisation, development, duration, and strength), the impact of 
borders on trade, global production networks, world city trading networks and multi-
regional input-output research. The chapter also brings together the evidence from 
chapters two, three and four to present an overall summary of the arguments for a 
linked clusters research agenda that concentrations attention on the role, scale and 
spatial structure of linkages in innovation systems beyond national borders or 
regional boundaries. 
 
 
                                                 
48 Not just from within the innovation systems framework 
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CHAPTER 4:  
 BEYOND BORDERS: THE NATURE OF 
 LINKAGES 
 
‘We need to better understand the various roles 
that local agglomerations play within spatially 
extensive value chains and begin to map the 
activities that tend to concentrate in particular 
places even as the geographic ‘footprint’ of 
linked economic activity expands. It is the 
linkages mechanisms, between firms and between 
places that especially deserve more of our 
research attention’ Sturgeon (2003: 200). 
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4.1 Traded interdependencies beyond borders  
In chapters two and three (above) it was shown why neo-Schumpeterian researchers 
focusing on the operations of systems of innovation have emphasised both the 
nationally conditioned factors fostering innovation and those elements of the 
processes of innovation that drive proximity dynamics.  
It was also shown however, that the innovation literature has been overwhelming 
captured by a paradigm of endogenous capability. Analysis of the literature reveals 
that it undervalues the significance of the external environment by largely ignoring 
the scale of extra-cluster linkages and, in particular, being disinterested in the spatial 
structure of interdependencies. This chapter explores how a number of different 
research traditions have investigated both trans-border activities and multi-spatial 
systems, whether they are connected across intra-national regions or countries. This 
analysis facilitates a presentation of the linkage aspects of the linked clustering 
framework suggested in this thesis. In doing so, this chapter traverses some diverse 
academic traditions. Bilateral trade analysis (both neoclassical and neo-
Schumpeterian) is considered, especially noting the empirical evidence on the role of 
international borders and regional boundaries in strongly influencing the strength of 
trade. The evidence for international inter-connectedness is considered from a broad 
spectrum of analytical perspectives, including trade theory, global production 
networks, global commodity chains, global and world cities, and production 
fragmentation. The emphasis is to scan the literature for empirical clues on the scale 
and spatial structure of trans-boundary interdependencies. The breadth of literature 
covered is designed to ensure as far as possible that the suggested multi-spatial 
innovation systems framework is not simply a re-statement of research already 
presented elsewhere just wrapped in a new guise.   .  
Figure 4.1 translates these foci into the format of the literature diagram. 
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Figure 4.1: Innovation, trade and international networks literatures 
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The important feature of data on industrial production over the last twenty years of 
the 20th Century is that whilst advanced economies have maintained their 
specialisations, the production of technologically complex products has emerged in 
newly industrialising countries. No longer is it just production of low cost per unit 
products such as textiles, clothing and footwear that is conducted in developing 
countries. As an example, Appendix 2 maps the evolution of industry exports and 
destination markets for East Asian economies, revealing the change from ‘low 
technology’ industries to a concentrated specialisation in electronics. Various 
research traditions have met (or not) the challenge of understanding this change. 
Each have there own emphasis, but rarely do they combine trade with spatial and 
innovation elements. 
4.2 Trade, borders & the international sourcing of 
production 
There are two dimensions to trade analysis, regardless of whether the goods and 
services are crossing international borders or simply politico-administrative 
boundaries within a nation state (e.g. States and Provinces). These are the ‘what is 
traded’, in relation to other products (specialisation) and the ‘with whom it is traded’ 
(bilateral relations). Both topics are included here to gain an understanding of the 
The production of product 
components is fragmenting 
to new locations. 
Complex products are built 
by networks of companies. 
Business services are dispersed 
globally in a system of cities 
that is inter-linked horizontally 
and vertically in hierarchical 
networks. 
Borders reduce the level of 
trade. 
Exports have been used as an 
indicator of national innovation 
system strength. 
 
New centres of 
technology production. 
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evolutionary patterns of trade and how those patterns are related to patterns of 
technological innovation.  
4.2.1 Trade specialisation patterns  
The first step in understanding the characteristics of linkages is an examination of the 
determinants of industries moving beyond boundaries and trading with other places, 
whether in industrial components or consumer oriented products.   
It is a central argument of the present thesis that there is a need for more analysis of 
the significance of external interdependencies for regions and countries. It is thus 
necessary to present an overview of the present understanding of trade patterns.  
Neoclassical trade theory of comparative advantage is still the most widely accepted 
paradigm for understanding international economic relations. Comparative advantage 
is not just the dominant perspective on why countries trade what they do, but is the 
paradigm against which the neo-Schumpeterians have developed their research 
agenda. Comparative advantage exists where countries trade together in products 
where they have a relative advantage. Comparative advantage is concerned with the 
industrial specialisation of nations which Leamer and Levinsohn explains as 
‘international economics is concerned with the trade of a country vis-à-vis the world 
and has little to say about trading partners’ (1995: 1385). The current incarnation of 
the theory is the result of various changes as noted by Krugman and Obstfeld: 
‘The Ricardian model. Production possibilities are determined by the allocation of 
a single resource, labor, between sectors. The model conveys the essential idea of 
comparative advantage but does not allow us to talk about the distribution of 
income. 
The specific factors model. While labor can move freely between sectors, there are 
other factors specific to particular industries. This model is ideal for understanding 
income distribution but awkward for discussing the pattern of trade. 
The Heckscher-Ohlin model. Multiple factors of production can move between 
sectors. This is a harder model to work with than the first two but conveys a deeper 
understanding of how resources may drive trade patterns’ (1997: 93). 
Supporters of comparative advantage theory still accept its applicability (see Leamer 
and Levinsohn 1995 or Davis and Weinstein 1996) and strongly advocate its 
continued accuracy. However, one of the developments that have in recent years 
posed a challenge to the theory is the global growth of intra-industry trade between 
many pairs of countries. Intra-industry trade (IIT) is the export and import of 
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products from the same industry (defined by statistical codes) between two countries. 
It is probably the most cited criticism of neo-classical trade theory. The argument is 
that pairs of economies trading in their respective industries of comparative 
advantage should be specialising in different industries, not the same ones. This 
problem is, however, according to Fontagne and Freudenberg only a statistical 
artefact. They have shown, by using a sufficiently disaggregated dataset, that intra-
industry trade ceases to exist and is replaced by highly differentiated trade, which is 
in accordance with traditional economic theory. ‘Using a dataset embodying data 
flows of 11 European countries facing 10 partners for around 10,000 products, the 
methodology emphasises that the recent increase in IIT in Europe is entirely due to a 
trade in vertically differentiated products’ (1997 p8). Thus, countries specialise in 
different products, either through product variation or through product quality.  
These results go some way towards reconciling comparative advantage theory with 
the empirical evidence, but of more concern to researchers of the economics of 
innovation is the comparative advantage model of the division of labour. The primary 
concern of these researchers is the unrealistic assumptions of knowledge generation 
and diffusion. Neo-Schumpeterians are keen to develop a framework that replaces 
comparative with technological advantage. Rather than altering the assumptions of 
neoclassical trade theory of common technology and the relative prices of the factors 
of production (land, labour and capital) accounting for the differences in trade or 
extending these comparative advantage models to include the factor endowment of 
‘knowledge’49, this body of research advances an endogenous view of differentiated 
technological capability. One of these key endogenous variables is that there is a link 
between areas of knowledge creation, trade specialisation and economic growth. 
In the first instance, the evidence for trade specialisation is similar to the findings on 
industry specialisation reported in chapter two (above). There is a high degree of 
stability50 in trade patterns, although technological change can disrupt these 
configurations, as Amendola et al. (1998: 152) note ‘there are sectors in which 
technological and trade advantages (disadvantages) have remained stable and sectors 
in which comparative advantage (disadvantages) have changed substantially during 
                                                 
49 See Verspagen and Wakelin (1997). Of course the entire premise of knowledge endowment is 
disputed by neo-Schumpeterian authors that argue that; human capital, R&D and knowledge all arise 
from systematic investment. See Davis and Reeve 1997 for an endogenous model of human capital. 
50 Observed by both Guerrieri 1999 and Amendola et al. 1998. 
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the longer time span considered (1967-87 for patenting and 1970-87 for trade)’. In 
this analysis of OECD countries, three groups emerged. The groups are the countries 
that were technological leaders and which had developed strong links between 
technological and trade specialisation, countries with weaker connections and thirdly, 
small countries that had a strong association between trade and technological 
specialisations. For many high income countries, therefore, investment in technology 
co-evolves with trade development.  
Although, countries are not typically de-specialising (Amendola et al. 1998: 147), 
country competitiveness as analysed by Guerrieri and Milana (1998) has changed. 
Between 1970 and 1992, Japan improved its position, while European countries 
suffered losses to their competitiveness. Fagerberg (1996) attributes long run 
competitiveness to the level of R&D and innovation, the size of the domestic market 
for very high technology industries (e.g. aerospace) and the benefits that accrue from 
overall national R&D expenditure to a wide number of industries through indirect 
knowledge spillovers. What is less clear is how trade patterns evolve within a neo-
Schumpeterian framework. Amendola et al. (1998) argued there is more interest in 
the variables associated with trade patterns than the trade patterns themselves, a 
position that is still persuasive. 
It is, therefore, worth recognising that both factor endowments and endogenous 
innovation are important for the continuance of trade specialisations, although this is 
more than would be recognised in the in the neo-classical literature51.    
4.2.2 Bilateral trade relations  
If the first dimension of trade analysis is the ‘what of trade’ (specialisation patterns), 
the second dimension is the spatial structure of linkages. Bilateral trade research 
most directly addresses the issue of the destination of trade and the reasons behind 
the choice of trade partner. This field, like that of trade specialisation, is also divided 
between neo-classical and neo-Schumpeterian perspectives. Of particular concern 
here is discovering whether the linkages across geographies exhibit a nodal structure 
in an extended version of the characteristics of social relations and knowledge 
diffusion apparent in the networked nature of geographically concentrated clusters. 
                                                 
51 See for example the references in Davis’ paper ‘Understanding International Trade Patterns: 
Advances of the 1990s (2000). 
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The contours of bilateral trade: an overview of trade structures 
It is worthwhile starting the discussions of bilateral trade patterns by presenting some 
baseline on manufacturing trade between OECD countries. Figures 4.2 and 4.3 reveal 
the specificity of trade relationship composition (at a highly aggregated level both 
sectorally and in trade volume). Using the OECD Bilateral Trade Database (1997), a 
matrix of manufacturing trade was constructed for 199452 with a threshold for the 
exporting country in Figure 4.2 of two percent of GDP, and in Figure 4.3, a threshold 
of one per cent of GDP was adopted. The choice of either importer or exporter is 
critical for the overall visual outcome of the charts. Exports are a standard economic 
interest, because it is seen as a measure of the competitiveness of economies and the 
results for smaller countries are more easily interpreted. If imports were the basis of 
analysis, imports by larger economies from smaller ones would be harder to detect 
against the volume of other economies.  
The high statistical threshold for trade linkages was adopted as at very low levels of 
the value of trade, especially for the entire manufacturing sector, most OECD 
countries would be seen to be trading with most other OECD countries.  
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Chosen because the modelling work presented in later chapters of this thesis was based on data for 
both for 1990 (OECD countries) and 1995 (EU 15 countries). 
Chapter 4: Beyond Borders: The Nature of Linkages 
Brian Wixted 89
Figure 4.2. Export linkages greater than 2% GDP (1994) 
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Source: Data from OECD (1997) and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
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Figure 4.2 reveals that at these high levels of trade concentration it is the smaller 
economies with very high levels of exports (as a percentage of the domestic 
economy) to the larger economies of the USA, UK and, in particular, Germany stand 
out. Trade source countries tend to have one or two significant destination countries, 
a few have more. Some of the significant links are: 
• Austria exporting to Germany; 
• Canada exporting to the USA; 
• Denmark exporting to Germany;  
• Iceland exporting to Japan and the Netherlands 
• Ireland exporting to France, Germany and the UK; 
• The Netherlands exporting to Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Germany and 
the UK; 
• New Zealand exporting to Australia and the UK; and 
• Switzerland exporting to Germany. 
Australia is an interesting case because although it is a mid sized economy it does not 
export manufactured products to any country at or beyond the two percent of GDP 
threshold.  
Whilst Figure 4.2 is useful as a picture of the level of trade concentration between 
industrialised countries, by dropping the threshold by half to one per cent of GDP 
(again for the exporting country) more links are revealed. Figure 4.3 again reveals 
the destination countries of Germany, the UK, the USA and also France are the 
primary markets. Some smaller countries such as Finland, Ireland and New Zealand 
have a significant number of links whilst the mid-sized economies of Canada and 
Australia have only one trade link (USA and Japan respectively). The Netherlands, in 
contrast, which is another mid-range economy, has six trade partners. Surprisingly, 
the larger economies typically also have a number of significant trade partners – not 
just with the other large economies, including, for example, the Bel-Lux statistical 
agglomeration for Germany and France. 
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Figure 4.3. Export linkages greater than 1% of GDP (1994) 
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Source: Data from OECD (1997) and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Note: The different shadings denote greater concentrations of export linkages. Where these appear 
black, it is because the software cannot depict enough layers – refer to Figure 4.2 for a clearer 
indicator of scale. 
These results clearly illustrate just how concentrated the pattern of bilateral 
relationships are, with the major world economies being the major destination of 
exports. At higher levels of aggregation, most economies are focussed on very few 
destination markets. 
Long lived relationships – exports and imports 
Not only is the web of relationships for particular sets of partners relatively 
concentrated at greater levels of trade volume, the structure of relationships for 
OECD (and for many) countries only changes very slowly. From a macro statistical 
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perspective, Drysdale and Garnaut (1994: 29) identify imperial trading blocs as an 
initial determinant of trading partner preference. As these blocs disintegrated, there 
was a very gradual movement from these linkages towards ‘relative distance’ (larger 
closer markets) as an explanatory variable of trade partner choice.  
Bilateral relationships do change and those revealed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 are 
gradually de-specialising – each country trading with a greater number of partner 
countries. Laursen (1998a and 1998b) suggests that this ‘country-wise’ specialisation 
trend is generally holding but the sectoral trade specialisation varies between various 
machinery industries (transport, and energy etc) which are not greatly internationally 
mobile and electronics based industries that are more mobile. Analysis by Laursen of 
specialisation trajectories for technological development revealed a more country 
dependent arrangement. Combining technology and bilateral relationship data reveals 
that for many sectors, technology gaps partially explain trade partner choice (see for 
example Wakelin 1998).  
However, there has been less consideration of the role of imports than the 
significance of exports. Export specialisation has been used to test a wide variety of 
hypotheses ranging from the significance of investment in technology, the degree of 
path dependency and cumulative causation in trade development, and the role of 
national innovation systems. However, imports across nation state borders are seen 
as a negative (see Archibugi and Iammarino 1999). At the same time inter-regional 
trade, as the previous chapter showed, is rarely considered, yet traded 
interdependencies within a region are used as an indicator of cluster strength, 
business networking, and corporate technological specialisation.  
Only a few studies of imports and technologies could be identified for the current 
study. Notably Laursen and Meliciani (2002) recently conducted an extensive 
econometric analysis of the value of imports for international competitiveness. They 
found that, in general, international technological spillovers were small. Their 
methodology attempted to account for the individual country sources of technology 
by incorporating a calculation of the R&D intensities of trade partners, but the model 
developed needed to rely upon the sum of imports. In this way, it is not possible to 
use their results to explain whether imports from particular countries were important. 
In general, the evidence from the modelling conducted for the present thesis would 
support a general conclusion that imports still play a small part in competitiveness. 
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However, on the basis of intermediate goods transactions alone (presented in later 
chapters), without any calculation of embodied R&D, there would appear to be cases 
for specific combinations of bilateral trade relations for specific industries where 
imports are important.  
Trade relations: social and economic factors in business to business networks 
These statistical analyses of trade direction, as valuable as they are, don’t assist with 
developing a conceptualisation of what is underling the creation of trade 
relationships – one firm at a time. One of the important ingredients in cluster 
development (as shown in chapter three above) is the social relations that exist in 
particular localities and assist with the flow of knowledge. Relationships between 
producers and users can also develop to the point where they promote the 
introduction of innovations. The argument in the neo-Schumpeterian literature often 
implicitly and, on occasions, explicitly assumes that a dense network of social 
relations are based in regional proximity and do not extend across national borders. 
Inter-regional or international trade under this theory only builds traded 
interdependencies (with embodied technology) and not tacit knowledge flows or 
user-producer relations.  To argue therefore, as the current thesis does (in part), that 
trade between places is more than merely traded interdependencies, but it also likely 
to embody user-producer relationships and some tacit knowledge, then it is necessary 
to show the social basis of trade relations.  
One of the clearest pieces of evidence on the knowledge density of international 
trade, the value of business networks and the role of person-to-person contacts is 
provided by Drysdale and Garnaut who describe a previous study of Garnaut’s (who 
had interviewed company executives) on the development of export markets. 
‘The study revealed that the preferences of ultimate users were important in 
determining bilateral trade patterns in highly differentiated commodities, but not in 
more homogeneous commodities. For the latter, biases in the trade decision-
making processes of companies were of considerable importance. For affiliates of 
multinational enterprises, which accounted for a substantial part of Australian and 
Southeast Asian foreign trade, there was a high degree of intra-company trade, so 
that the location of affiliates was a major determinant of bilateral trade patterns. 
For independent enterprises, the particular order in which pioneering trading firms 
searched the international environment for trading opportunities was of 
considerable importance, especially since many firms relied heavily upon other 
trading firms in their own country for leads on new markets. Explicit internal 
constraints on profit maximising behaviour appeared relatively unimportant in the 
determination of trading patterns’ (1994: 29). 
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Drysdale and Garnaut here provide three insights. First, in highly differentiated 
products users of those products were important for creating and sustaining the 
relationship. This fits very neatly with the user-producer innovation literature. From 
this it is possible to conjecture that in technology based products users know which 
technologies / products are required to fill their own technology gaps. Secondly, 
intra-firm trade as the movement of goods and services inside a multi-national’s own 
existing network can bias statistics towards a nodal structure (if it accounts for a high 
percentage of trade). Thirdly, the search for business partners is conditioned and 
structured by the knowledge of where other similar businesses have opened up 
markets. This would involve the transfer of tacit knowledge at one end of the 
production chain (sellers) and probably both ends with potential buyers being aware 
of the reputation and value of products from a particular source location. This 
dynamic would also influence trade decision making to fit a nodal structure. As the 
cumulative causation of imitating behaviour leads more and more businesses based 
in one location to seek customers in similar markets would build the structure of 
relations seen in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.  
Interestingly, a research lead from the clusters literature may shed new light on why 
firms in a particular location may follow other businesses (including potentially 
competitors) into the same markets. Chapter three (above) analysed many of the 
existing threads of research in the clusters literature but it did not highlight one 
particularly novel approach put forward recently by Maskell and Lorenzen (2004) that 
seems to be a particularly strong argument for local economic agglomeration. It is 
discussed here because it links well with some literature on international trade networks. 
Although the profit maximisation function of businesses typically receives the most 
attention, firms operating within market economies are also attempting to minimise 
risks. Domestic firms face technological discontinuity, competitor strategies, 
business cycles and exchange rate fluctuations, whilst those corporations that export 
face multiplied risks53, as there are now two or more markets to be managed with 
less access to information on the buyers. The advance of Maskell and Lorenzen is to 
address how some of these risks can be minimised in a local setting.  
                                                 
53 See for example the UK government related website 
http://www.sitpro.org.uk/trade/managingrisk.html  
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The local cluster, as these authors describe it, is one type of a number of different kinds 
of markets. The cluster then, is a ‘market organization that is structured along 
territorial lines because this enables the building of a set of institutions that are 
helpful in conducting certain kinds of economic activities’ (2004: 1002). Maskell and 
Lorenzen’s insight is to show that a restricted market in the form of a cluster allows 
for the development of a selection of producers or users without being forced into an 
open market situation with the greater risks and less opportunity for technological 
choice, that situation entails. 
‘Industry uncertainty implies that not all industries are characterized by reasonably 
stable sets of suppliers, customers and products. With high levels of uncertainty it 
makes little sense for firms to engage in network building with what will soon 
become yesterday's partners. Firms finding themselves in such circumstances tend 
instead to opt for a strategy of being a stakeholder in a cluster. Within a cluster, the 
structuring of markets usually takes place with the participation of more ‘insider’ 
firms and on a broader level than if embedded in a business network only. The 
extended range of 'insiders' with their own capabilities and resources allows for 
experimentation, flexibility and the use of shifting combinations of partners 
without carrying the full burden of spot-market transaction costs’. (2004: 995) 
Clustering can thus reduce uncertainty whilst facilitating experimentation and ipso 
facto reduces search costs simultaneously. Although Maskell and Lorenzen keep their 
focus on localised markets their framework for considering clusters as a market 
organisation for reducing risks has strong parallels in the work of Rauch on 
international trade networks, although the similarity may not be immediately 
obvious. Rauch notes that trade occurs in networks not markets.  
‘It is well known that very few manufactured (as opposed to primary) commodities 
are traded on organized exchanges. … Instead, connections between sellers and 
buyers are made through a search process that because of its costliness does not 
proceed until the best match is achieved. This search is strongly conditioned by 
proximity and pre-existing ‘ties’ and results in trading networks rather than 
“markets”’ (2001: 7-8). 
Maskell and Lorenzen understand the networks in clusters as a form of ‘market’ but 
Rauch argues that the lack of ‘spot-markets’ and the creation of ‘networks’ should be 
interpreted as the existence of non-markets. In fact, in Maskell and Lorenzen’s 
terminology markets exist when ‘some sets of characteristics are so common that 
they represent a specific market organization or market form’ (2004: 1001-1002), 
whereas to Rauch, a market is an openly competitive system of contract purchasing 
based on product qualities, price and other attributes. Thus, rather than simply 
limiting the definition of markets to be perfectly competitive markets, the arguments 
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used by both are basically in alignment. Businesses need to reduce the costs of open 
competition markets and create a new economic space that is structured to trade off 
flexibility and lowest costs against less uncertainty to form what could be described 
as restricted markets (clusters or trade networks). Rauch notes that ‘numerous 
statistical and case studies provide evidence that trans-national business and social 
networks promote international trade by alleviating problems of contract 
enforcement and providing information about trading opportunities (2001: 1200). 
Put succinctly, Rauch comments ‘[social] transnational networks can help to 
overcome informal barriers to international trade’ (2001: 1190). These networks in 
the sense used here by Rauch are typically social groups (ethnic or religious groups) 
or business associates (allied but without formal ownership, e.g. ex-employees of the 
same company). He limits his analysis (2001) to those networks that were initiated 
domestically and expanded across borders. Thus, networks whether they be local 
(clusters) or dispersed (international trade) are a necessity of business practice in 
reducing the risks associated with open markets.   
Rauch’s analysis is based upon the operations of both social and business networks. 
His research findings on social networks are reinforced by Wolf (2000: 555) who 
notes that ‘inward migration appears to be robustly associated with export growth’.  
The operation of business networks has been the subject of its own specialised field 
(industrial marketing54) that dates back at least fifty years.  The core research agenda 
of industrial marketing has been the creation, nature and continuance of long lasting 
relationships between industrial suppliers and users of products. Much of the analysis 
has had a focus on the behavioural elements of network development rather than the 
purely economic incentives. Cova and Salle (2000) analyse the social dimension of 
business relationships by examining the rituals of business-to-business relationships, 
Ritter (2000) studied the impact one set of relationships has on the web of network 
partners developed by a business and Katsikeas and Kaleka (1999) looked at ‘import 
motivations’. 
Lastly, although the literature presented in chapters two and three (above) of this 
thesis emphasises the necessity of proximity for a link between user - producer 
                                                 
54 Wilkinson (2001) provides a very readable account of the history of ideas on the development of 
(industrial) marketing networks and channels creation.  
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relationships to promote innovation and learning, this may not be required. 
Apparently, buyer-supplier networks that extend across international borders can also 
be channels for technology and knowledge transfer. The industrial marketing 
literature (see for example Thompson et al. 1998) reveals detailed information on the 
complex nature of buyer-seller communications and the importance of reducing the 
risks of non-compliance with requirements. Rauch (2001: 1197) as well, finds that 
buyers in developed countries are a major source of information for producers in less 
developed countries, particularly through instructions and standards. 
Therefore, trade partner developments are a mixture of social, behavioural and 
economic factors, which are business practices that are unlikely to change with new 
communications technologies. In the view of Leamer and Storper ‘the Internet will 
probably re-enforce the roundaboutness of production and hence the importance of 
face-to-face contact, though it will also probably make possible greater linkages 
between different localised clusters at very long distances’(2001: 658). More 
recently, Storper and Venables (2004) have argued that the changes in the world 
economy and technological change creates uncertainty and complex co-ordination 
tasks that require the transmission of a high volume of tacit knowledge, which is 
most readily done face to face in local geographic area.     
The advantages of creating networks of business-to-business relationships, whether 
such networks are local or global, are that they reduce uncertainty and increase 
flexibility and learning. The idea that clustering is a means of structuring a market 
needs to be followed up with more research in particular with reference to the 
possibility raised here that trade patterns are structured by the same need to reduce 
risks. Curiously, valuable results on this question are emerging from a growing sub-
field within neoclassical economics that is attempting to quantify the economic 
dimensions of the lines that appear on maps, in other words – borders. The analysis 
has focussed on measuring the effect on the volume of trade of both international and 
politico-administrative borders. This research has been labelled the ‘border effect 
puzzle’ (Obstfeld and Rogoff 2000).  
Borders and trade: the border effect puzzle 
The first major paper on the effect of borders on trade was by McCallum (1995) who 
examined the effect of the Canada-US border on Canadian inter-provincial trade and 
provincial trade with 30 US states. Using a basic gravity model of trade, McCallum 
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compared actual trade flows to the modelled trade flows. Gravity models of trade 
essentially take account of economic size and distance of markets and are relatively 
good at accounting for real trade activity. Such models would predict that for a 
certain transport distance a larger market should receive proportionally more exports. 
However, McCallum reported that 22 times more trade remained internal to Canada 
in reality, than was predicted by the gravity trade model. 
This is a puzzle because within a free trade zone, such as exists in North America, 
neoclassical trade theory would suggest that the absence of trade barriers should lead 
to trade flowing freely to new markets. The extent of national product preference 
revealed in the work of McCallum is difficult to explain. Helliwell (1995) 
determined that the preference to trade inter-provincially within Canada was even 
higher for Quebec than McCallum’s average for Canada as a whole. It appears that 
later analysis has reduced the estimates for the home bias of Canadian-US trade to 
about a ten-fold increase above the gravity model predictions (see Wolf 2000). In 
contrast, Anderson and Wincoop (2001) disagree with the home market hypothesis, 
suggesting that such large trading biases are mostly likely due to the misspecification 
of the models. Combes et al. (2003) list the top four reasons for why the literature on 
international borders maybe wrong. These reasons include; poorly constructed 
analysis and mis-specified equations and models, formal and informal trade barriers 
could be impediments and thereby reduce cross border trade, the need for different 
currencies may be a transaction cost that gets in the way of trade, and it has been 
suggested that national consumer preference for home products could reduce trade 
across borders. 
A few authors have looked at intra-national regions. Wolf’s (2000) analysis of intra-
national trade in the USA found a similar level of home state bias for States, a factor 
of approximately ten over the expected neoclassical outcome, as was found for the 
intra-Canadian trade preference. New research by Combes et al. is also based on 
intra-national analysis. Covering bilateral trade flows between 94 French regions, for 
10 industries and two years (1978 and 1993) (2003: 4) the study focussed on the 
effect of regional borders to remove all four of the ‘likely’ problems from the 
research design. Their finding is that business and social networks affect the degree 
of cross boundary trade even with an intra-country situation. 
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‘We have shown that intra-national administrative borders significantly matter in 
trade patterns inside France with an impact of the same order of magnitude that 
Wolf (2000) finds for trade inside the United States. …When controlling for both 
type of networks, a French region is estimated to trade only twice more with itself 
than with a non-adjacent region of similar size and distance’ (2003: 34). 
Thus social and business networks, which were determined by Rauch (discussed 
above) to be an important determinant in the structuring of trade relations and 
reducing risks can also be shown to  account for a significant percentage of the trade 
patterns that do not fit with gravity flow models – the extra intra-national inter-
regional trade (see Combes et al. 2003). Given the importance of networks, the 
following section focuses on research emphasising the spatial dimension of value 
chains.  
However, it is worth noting in passing that none of the suggested reasons for the 
border puzzle takes account of knowledge, technology or innovation. This is 
somewhat disappointing as innovation theory has solid explanations (as has already 
discussed in chapters two and three above) for why proximity matter.  
4.2.3 International value chains and spatial specialisations 
Leamer and Storper (2001) acknowledge that production is already clustered, but 
note that the global trend is towards increased levels of spatial specialisation and 
more elaborate divisions of labour. In such an environment, it not surprising that in 
recent years a number of research fields focussed on the internationalisation of 
production have emerged. Today, many products are made from parts and industrial 
ingredients that have been transported across the world. The fragmentation of value 
chains, the analysis of commodity chains and the flow of knowledge and 
technologies within product networks all reveal something of how supply lines are 
organised to make a product. Other analyses point to the production and distribution 
of financial and business services being organised within world-wide networks of 
cities.   
The international fragmentation of value chains 
‘Value Chain Fragmentation’ analysis is frequently an analysis based in the welfare 
economic considerations of the winners and losers of moving production off-shore. 
The authors in this area are often interested in the welfare55 implications of changes 
                                                 
55 For example the impact on wages see Egger, Pfaffermayr and Wolfmayr-Schnitzer (2001) 
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in trade patterns (see e.g. Jones and Kierzkowski 2001 and Feenstra 1998), but are 
also interested in mapping the extent to which change is occurring in intermediate 
goods production (see Hummels et al. 1998). The approach relies heavily on the neo-
classical trade theory of specialisation (Arndt 1998) rather than on developing an 
understanding of technological and business environments. Instead, often relying 
upon modelling, factor endowments and wage competitiveness are considered to be 
the main drivers of international competitiveness and economic change. Whilst the 
empirical analysis of the location of intermediate goods production is useful and has 
been utilised in chapter nine (ICT production), reliance on cost based assumptions of 
competitiveness whilst ignoring the consideration of human capital and developing 
technological capacity in emerging countries hinder the analysis.  
In stark contrast to the traditional neo-classical economic analysis, the ‘Global 
Commodity Chains’ approach promoted by Gereffi (1998) is more interested in the 
political economy of relationships. The interest in wages remains, but it also 
emphases the differential power of purchasing and supplier businesses (supply chain 
governance). Gereffi comments: 
‘What is novel about GCCs is not the spread of economic activity across borders 
per se, but rather the fact that international production and trade are increasingly 
organised by industrial and commercial firms involved in strategic decision-
making and economic networks at the global level’ (1998: 40) 
Probably in view of their political importance, Gereffi is especially interested in the 
GCCs for textiles, clothing and footwear as well as the auto industry. These 
commodity chains are particularly envisaged in terms of the power relations that 
evolve when segments of an industrial process are spread between both developing 
and developed countries.  
The strength of this analytical tool is its consideration of the strategic positioning of 
lead players. Its weakness, from the perspective of innovation systems, is that it does 
analyse the spatial distribution of technological activities and knowledge. Therefore, 
as with the production fragmentation literature, GCC analyses have been 
incorporated into the discussion of the modelling results in chapters eight and nine 
(below) but overall both approaches were seen to give too much attention to cost 
competitiveness and not enough to spatial technological specialisation.  
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Global production networks and technological innovation 
In contrast to the GCC approach, the ‘Global Production Networks’ (GPN) 
methodology (see e.g. Zysman et al. 1996, Ernst 2000 and Henderson et al. 2001) 
does focus on the issues of importance here; production structure, technology 
development and knowledge transfers. GPN analyses tend to focus on high 
technology products such as those emerging from the ICT industries or complex 
product chains such as the auto industry. Ernst (2000) points out that the assembly of 
an individual computer may involve products from a large number of firms in a 
number of countries. Another feature of the GPN literature is that it has been 
focussed on the international business networks operating in Asia, due to the interests 
of one of the key authors (Ernst).  
Ernst explicitly adopts a ‘regional division of labour’ perspective (Zysman et al. 
1996) acknowledging that it is the combination of geographically centred innovation 
systems and business networks that are developing and producing the leading edge 
products. On the basis of his analysis which is mostly at the level of individual 
corporations, Ernst is in general agreement with the argument that knowledge is 
geographically immobile, but indicates it is beginning to move more easily, 
commenting: 
‘It is important to emphasize that globalisation should not be reduced to geographic 
dispersion … [and] does not lead to the wonderland of the ‘borderless world’ 
where capital, knowledge and resources flow freely around the globe … 
geographic dispersion has been combined with spatial concentration: much of the 
recent cross-border extension of manufacturing and services has been concentrated 
on a handful of specialized local clusters’ (2000:9). 
This emphasis on geography, technology and trade is valuable. It would suggest that 
clusters might indeed be networked through trade into a wider regional production 
system. In particular, chapter nine of this thesis draws upon the work of Ernst and 
others quite heavily to develop the analysis of what is emerging within the ICT 
production system within the East Asian regional bloc.  
As GPN studies naturally focus predominantly on business-to-business network 
development and the emerging technological capabilities of firms in emerging 
economies, the spatial dimension of development is often underplayed. Instead, it is 
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the role of ‘flagship’ corporations56, which are important developers of new 
technologies developers and the builders of global production networks, which 
attracts attention. Thus, the evidence on the benefits of specific places and the spatial 
structure of linkages (at the spatial – not corporate level) is more often implied than 
specifically addressed and is therefore quite fragmentary.  
Value chain fragmentation, global commodity chains and global production networks 
research all point to a trend towards increasing levels of production occurring outside 
advanced economies but none combine the elements of local agglomeration strengths 
linked via trade to other agglomerations, with an emphasis on the role of knowledge.  
Clusters beyond the nation state, but still thinking about political systems 
It has already been commented upon several times in the present thesis, that the 
systems of innovation paradigm is framed from the point of view of political entities 
most frequently – nation states. On the few occasions in which innovation systems 
are discussed within a multi-national framework, it is not a multi-spatial agenda 
being proposed. For example, Bergman et al. comment: 
‘International trade among cluster members has completely different implications 
for large vs. small country clusters. A recent study of trade in OECD member 
countries (Hummels, Rapoport and Yi, 1998) shows that vertical trade among 
international members of a value chain is a much higher proportion of total trade in 
small vs. large countries. For example, vertical trade is 25% and 42% for Denmark 
and Netherlands vs. 7% and 14% for the United States and Japan, respectively. The 
authors consider that these findings reveal a greater likelihood that a cluster’s 
trading partners are within and therefore responsive to a large home country’s 
national and regional policies. Paradoxically, however, it also means that supra-
national innovation systems (S-NIS) may be essential to sound cluster policies, 
particularly for small countries. Thus it could well be the case that relevant 
elements of cluster or innovation policy might logically migrate to the policy 
frameworks of relevant OECD Member customs unions, such as the EU or 
NAFTA’ (2001: 9) [emphasis added]. 
There are a number of serious problems with this commentary. First, the conclusion 
that regions in smaller countries are more dependent on ‘international’ trade than 
those within larger countries is purely an artefact of the definition. By defining trade 
as international trade57 rather than inter-regional trade, then companies in smaller 
countries will by definition trade on a more internationalised basis. Secondly, what is 
completely baffling about this paragraph is that the analyses and the conclusions 
                                                 
56 see Ernst and Kim 2002: 1421 for a diagram. 
57 Trade could be defined as inter-regional, whether or not it crosses and international border. For 
example do companies in an Australian state, a US State or a small country in Europe trade more? 
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should be seen as a non-sequitur as they address different issues. The data presented 
on international trade in the quote reveals nothing of the destination of the trade and 
therefore no particular reason why there is a need for policy making to shift to next 
political level above the nation state (free trade zones and supra-national states such 
as the EU). The S-NIS perspective has already been analysed in section 2.6.2, noting 
that there has been little analysis of them – even if defined as the EU or NAFTA.   
However, in contrast to the argument put forward by Bergman et al, (2001) the 
quoted trade data on the break up of value chains would suggest that analysis which 
follows value chains across borders, yet acknowledging the systemic dimension of 
technological innovation, is precisely what is required. In some ways, the disjuncture 
between data and conclusions apparent in this comment by Bergman et al. (2001) 
highlights the failure of researchers within the neo-Schumpeterian paradigm to break 
free of their theoretical constraints.  
In a strikingly similar approach to the proposed S-NIS, Rugman and D’Cruz (1993) 
criticised Michael Porter’s ‘Competitive Advantage of Nations’ (1990) theory of 
clusters as a framework that is inadequate for small open economies. Because Porter 
emphasised the importance of domestic demand, Rugman and D’Cruz argue that his 
analysis understates (for a limited set of economies) the role of leading international 
supply connections. They develop the idea that as Canada, for example, is strongly 
linked to the US economy then America represents an extension of the Canadian 
diamond. This is the basis of their ‘double diamond’ framework. The effect of 
combining Canada with America is the creation of the North American diamond of 
business factors.  
In the Canadian case, the approach seems particularly pertinent but extending this 
model to countries within the triad58 regions is not necessarily as sensible. There are 
two criticisms of this multi-diamond approach. First, trade is not necessarily triadic 
in nature. Poon et al. (2000) show there at least four significant trading groups in the 
world, including the Americas, East Asia, Germany (capturing most of southern and 
western Europe) and the United Kingdom (which includes some of Africa and 
Northern Europe). On this analysis, Europe is split between UK and German 
                                                 
58 A broad definition of international regions that include a number of countries: Asia, North America 
and Europe. 
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dominated trading systems, and America as a major destination of trade from East 
Asia is unrepresented.  
The second reason for being critical of the approach put forward by Rugman and 
D’Çruz is that even this aggregation of trade zones fails to reveal the complexity of 
arrangements for any particular industry or country. As an example, New Zealand, a 
case discussed in passing by Rugman and D’Cruz, but possibly without knowledge 
of its bilateral trade pattern, has significant exports of manufactures to Australia, 
Japan, the United Kingdom and the USA (as was shown in Figure 4.3 above). This 
represents links with members of all three triads, with Australia often not included in 
any of them. So what would be the geography of New Zealand’s diamond?   
It is understandable that policy makers both bureaucratic and political, who are 
ultimately answerable to a polity, focus on the borders of their responsibility. 
However, researchers should be aware that this perspective potentially misses the 
opportunity to uncover economic territories that are not necessarily co-determinant 
with political territories.  
World cities: places, linkages and hierarchies 
Curiously, the fumbling for a description that can adequately handle changes in the 
world economy can be contrasted with the long standing tradition of investigating 
city systems. Although the research on city development is extensive, there is one 
aspect of it that is highly relevant to the discussion here. The emergence during the 
20th Century of particular cities as centres for the international agglomeration of 
business and financial service activities has given rise to research on the growth 
dynamics and interdependencies of so called ‘global’ and ‘world’ cities. This 
literature considers both place and interconnections as integral to the discourse. 
Beaverstock, for example, has noted the approach of Sassen’s 1991 book. 
‘the concept of the global city has emerged because of two inter-related factors: 
globalization of economic activity, and the organizational structure of the producer 
service and finance industry itself … the globalization of economic activity, 
translated as being the shift to services and finance on a global scale, Sassen (1991) 
believes that these processes have brought “about a renewed importance of major 
cities as sites for certain types of production, servicing, marketing, and 
innovation”. In particular, the internationalization of both the producer service 
sector and financial system has made cities vital centres for the “management and 
coordination” of economic power in the global economy … the rapid growth, 
specialization and agglomeration of producer service firms and the organization of 
the financial industry itself has to some extent been responsible for the formation 
of global cities. The locational preferences of producer  service activities, like, for 
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example, accountancy, advertising and banking, … [means that] producer service 
firms “obtain agglomeration economies when they locate close to others that are 
sellers of key inputs or are necessary for joint production of certain service 
offerings”’ (1999: 447-449). 
In this view, locations have accumulated advantages and the associated trajectories 
have often seen places becoming increasingly specialised as the centres of service 
production. The basis of this hierarchical structuring and spatial specialisation is 
argued by Sassen (2002) to be facilitated by access to a deep pool of information 
technology workers and massive broadband capacity. Across time, the accumulation 
of business service firms and workers can generate economies of scale with spaces 
becoming increasingly attractive. Given the universal trend amongst high-income 
economies to move away from manufacturing as a share of domestic income and 
towards services, particular cities within each economy have become key centres of 
expertise.  
Many authors, including Beaverstock et al. (1999), and Smith and Timberlake (2001) 
have developed ranking methodologies to nominate the networked structure of cities 
across the globe. At the first tier of cities are places such as New York, London, 
Tokyo and Paris. Beaverstock et al. (1999) allocated scores to different cities on the 
basis of the presence of particular global accounting and business service firms. In 
their tally, Sydney (Australia) scored nine points out of a possible twelve, putting it 
alongside San Francisco, Toronto and Zurich, all in their second tier of world cities. 
Cities can move up or down the ranking and are differentially linked both to their 
national economies and to the first tier cities. So, ‘Sydney and Toronto have equally 
gained power in continental sized countries and have taken over functions and 
market share from what were once the major commercial centers, respectively 
Melbourne and Montreal’ (Sassen 2002: 20). 
There has been some criticism (e.g. Markusen 1999: 875) of the world cities analysis 
because the concept of the ‘global city’ is indicative of different phenomenon for 
different authors. It can mean either, a leadership position in terms of international 
transactions, a concentration of internationally oriented activities or it is a ranking 
amongst other ‘world cities’ with the implication of some coordinating role of the 
local financial system. These differences lead to obvious problems in attempts at 
quantifying the city rankings and any underlying changes. This criticism does have 
some validity; Smith and Timberlake (2001), for example, used air travel data as an 
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indicator of inter-connectedness, whilst Beaverstock et al. (1999) used the location of 
large accounting and consultancy firms to rank the world cities. However, without 
denying that these concepts remain ill defined59, the lack of a ideal set of empirical 
tools, in this case, should not diminish the observation that different cities are more 
or less important than others in a national or global context. 
In the analysis of cities, the features of individual places matter, as does the 
connections between cities. Pred (1977) has made a number of very important 
conclusions regarding systems of cities. The primary observation was that American 
cities with dominant positions in the early stages of the industrial revolution retained 
them until the 1950s and 1960s. Such relative stability profiles have been a theme of 
research on innovation systems as noted in chapters two and three (above). Pred 
thought that the networks of interdependency between cities were probably the 
mechanism behind the hierarchical stability commenting that ‘long-term rank 
stability of large metropolitan complexes … can be most plausibly explained by the 
tendency of early established major channels of interdependence … to be self-
reinforcing’ (1977: 36-37). Such interdependencies were also the probable conduit 
for the transmission of economic growth between locations.  
On the basis of Pred, it is possible to construct a line of reasoning on the 
characteristics of linkages between places. It has been shown earlier that regions and 
nations have trajectories in economic and technological specialisations which are 
hard to shift into a new direction. It has also been shown that bilateral relations are 
stable for long periods of time. Pred brings these threads together indicating that 
relationships are a mechanism for positional stability. Interdependencies bind 
economic islands into economic (or innovation) systems even in a geographically 
distributed system. The networks of relations establish a set of incentives for a 
particular trajectory that make it difficult, although not impossible, for any particular 
location to reposition itself away from an existing trajectory. 
Therefore, the literature on urban systems contributes many valuable findings. Cities 
are places of differentiated advantage (clustering), which retain the advantages over a 
long period of time (specialisation patterns) and exhibit patterns of hierarchical 
                                                 
59 A recent article has discussed 100 terms in the urban and regional economic development literature 
(see Taylor and Lang 2004). 
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stability (national innovation systems argument). Most importantly, what links these 
facts together in the urban environment is a system of interdependencies that are both 
horizontal (the same city tier), and vertical (different tiers) and which lock in the 
relative hierarchical strengths.   
The puzzle of location is, however, ‘firms want to locate in an economic centre, but 
the economic centre is a centre only because many firms are located there. This 
suggests a process of cumulative causation, in which successive firms entering a 
location make it more attractive to further firms’ (Venables 1998: 4). In contrast, 
Krugman emphasises that there are economic incentives for centralising as well as 
movement away from the centre - ‘centrifugal’ processes 
‘Many economic activities are markedly concentrated geographically. Yet we do 
not all live in one big city, nor does the world economy concentrate production of 
each good in a single location. Obviously there is a tug of war between forces that 
tend to promote geographic concentration and those that tend to oppose it - 
between ‘centripetal’ and ‘centrifugal’ forces’ (1998: 8).  
To some extent, centripetal forces were addressed in chapters two and three (above) 
with the analysis of why proximity matters to businesses and the question of 
centrifugal forces returns us to some of the issues addressed in this chapter. 
Comparative advantage, technology gaps, the fragmentation of value chains with 
ever greater degrees of division of labour specialisation and the establishment of 
social and business networks together with evidence on the vertical and horizontal 
spatial structure of linkages between cities all contribute components to our 
understanding of the movement of production.   This is therefore, a useful point to 
return to the questions, with which the present thesis began and addressing the way 
forward for new research.  
4.3 Proximity and multi-spatial innovation systems 
This last section of chapter four summaries the evidence on the spatial and systemic 
nature of innovation, analyses the multi-spatial gap in the research methodology, and 
presents the research focus on the role, scale and spatial structure of linkages. 
4.3.1 Spatial innovation systems: NIS and clusters 
In chapter one a number of key goals were set for the analysis of the existing 
literature on innovation, spatial specialisation and the linkages between places. The 
first question posed was: 
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1. Why does the ‘innovation systems’ agenda give primacy to political 
geography (nation states and regions within nations) over other possible 
frameworks including economic space, which may lead to more research 
on extra-territorial links?  
It appears from a critical assessment of innovation systems research that the spatial 
scales of ‘systems’ are limited by regional and nation state borders. This seems to be 
due to:  
• a predominant emphasis on endogenous technological capability as the key 
attribute of competitive economies generating wealth;  
− many technological development processes are cumulative, as they 
build on themselves and thus re-enforce particular geographic 
trajectories. 
• an overt emphasis on government policy, which is clear in the work of 
authors such as Lundvall, for example, who notes that ‘instead of looking 
for clear-cut intellectual origins of the innovation system concept, its main 
background should rather be found in the needs of policy makers and 
students of innovation’ (2002: 215) particularly with national perspective; 
and lastly 
• there seems to be confusion between the national collection of statistics 
which makes it simpler to derive national benchmarks (R&D, exports and 
growth etc) and economic structures which may be more regionally based or 
flow across state or national borders.   
Despite these limitations, the study of the systemic features of innovation has 
contributed many valuable insights into the operations of businesses and the 
dynamics of knowledge within spatial contexts, both national and sub-national. 
These include the findings that: 
• rankings of innovation reveal patterns that are relatively stable across time 
and so these trajectories have been interpreted as reasons for national 
innovation system (Patel and Pavitt 1994); 
• national industrial specialisations remain relatively stable across the 
medium term; 
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• national technological specialisations remain relatively stable across time; 
• national scientific effort is often related to its industrial specialisation 
pattern; 
• technological specialisations are related to trade specialisations for many 
countries but technological discontinuities can disrupt the pattern; 
• there has been no extensive movement of the R&D labs of multi-national 
businesses away from their home country, even if they have shifted their 
production activities;  
• geographic proximity appears to be important both for knowledge transfer 
and value chain development which contributes to the geographic 
concentrations of industry [clusters]; 
• industrial input-output relationships are relatively stable over the medium 
term (Verspagen 2002).; 
• national input-output structures have been shown to have some correlation 
to user-producer relationships [which are critical part of the innovation 
process] (DeBresson et al. 1998); and 
• bilateral export patterns are relatively sticky but European countries patterns 
are slowly de-specialising (Leamer and levinsohn 1995 and Laursen 1998a 
and 1998b).  
The second goal for the literature analysis was to develop an understanding of the 
role of interdependencies in economies. The question posed was: 
2. What is it about linkages between economic actors (relationships 
particularly between users and producers) within innovation theory that 
makes them so important for the development and diffusion of new 
products and services? 
The evidence on the role of relationships and interdependencies between economic 
actors include: 
• the transfer of goods and services (traded interdependencies); 
• the acquisition of embodied innovation through traded interdependencies 
[access to the benefits of the innovative work of other businesses]; 
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• business-to-business relationships, which can be the basis of innovation 
[user-producer relations]; 
• user-producer relationships which within nation states are important for 
generating new product and process innovations and support geographic 
clustering; 
• generally; local talk and the passing on of tacit problem based knowledge 
(untraded interdependencies) are seen as the key to regional agglomerations; 
and 
• generally, technology spillovers via national linkages have a higher 
correlation with export market shares than spillovers through international 
imports (see Laursen and Meliciani 2001). 
4.3.2 The multi-spatial gap – cluster context and trade linkages 
This evidence, although, revealing that specific locations within the world economy 
have individual technological strengths that continue across time, also reveals that 
the innovation systems research agenda has not developed a sophisticated multi-
spatial perspective. It was noted in chapter one that a multi-spatial perspective differs 
from a benchmarking and comparative approach in so far as it investigates the 
integration of activities across places and the way performance of one location 
influences the development of others  
The treatment of nations or regions as if they are discrete, as if interdependencies 
beyond borders or the spatial structure of these linkages have nothing to contribute, 
is ignoring important information on the course of economic history and change at 
the global scale60.  There can be little dispute that the systems of innovation literature 
does not seriously address issues of industrial internationalisation61 beyond the level 
of the firm or attempt to analyse the co-development of clusters. Högselius observes 
there has been ‘little research on how and why connections between systems develop 
and how these connections affect innovation’ (2002: 4). Carlsson notes that 
‘Although there is a large literature on the internationalization of economic activity 
                                                 
60 Although there have been other periods in history with high levels of international trade (see 
Williamson 2002), the movement of of significant levels of economic activity to new countries is 
nevertheless an important phemenon (Gereffi and Sturgeon 2004).   
61 A similar view was expressed by Ernst ‘very little empirical or theoretical research has been done 
on the way globalisation increases the mobility of innovation across national borders…’ (2000: 1).  
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(including R&D) at the corporate level, there are relatively few studies of the degree 
of internationalization of innovation systems’ (2003: 20). Saxenian and Hsu also 
make a similar contribution when they note: 
 ‘Silicon Valley in California and the Hsinchu-Taipei region of Taiwan are amongst 
the most frequently cited ‘miracles’ of the information technology era. The 
dominant accounts of their success treat them in isolation … This paper argues that 
the dynamism of these regional economies is attributable to their increasing 
interdependencies’ (Saxenian and Hsu 2001: 893 emphasis added). 
One of the few authors that explicitly confront the issue of the interdependency of 
national innovation systems are Niosi and Bellon (1994) investigate how national 
strengths evolve alongside international networks. Interestingly, just as been seen in 
previous studies, these researchers look to the emergence of supra-national systems 
rather than the global extension of value chains, noting ‘only one major supra-
national system of innovation is presently emerging: the European Economic 
Community. Canada and the U.S. show a similar, but less intense, interpenetration of 
their R&D activities. There seems to be no similar supra-national system emerging 
that involves Japan’ (1994: 195).  
A different model of analysis, and one which was influential in designing the current 
study, is Wyckoff’s (1993) work on macro interdependencies between countries and 
the imported intermediate goods content within industries in OECD countries. The 
analysis was based on trade and input-output linkages but he was unable to combine 
the data into a multi-regional input-output model. Wyckoff’s research does not seem 
to have been followed up with subsequent studies. Wixted has proposed that given 
the observations in the literature that user-producer relations were often related to 
innovation and that levels of trade in intermediate goods and services are increasing, 
it could be possible that international links form ‘supranational clusters’ (2000). 
Wixted and Cooper (2002) took this further by arguing from preliminary modelling 
of the industrial interactions of ten countries in Europe, that some industries clearly 
exhibited a highly linked structure across national borders. 
The present thesis has continued the argument of the earlier two works that the 
literature on the economics of innovation and technology does not have a highly 
developed multi-spatial perspective and that such a framework should be defined 
around the international structure of industrial activity and not political entities. 
However, it has been consistently argued that the contribution that can be made here 
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is to focus on the role, scale and, with special emphasis, the spatial structure of extra-
territorial interdependencies. In particular, the question is whether clusters are nodes 
within larger production networks or primarily hotspots of economic activity or even 
relatively independent62.  
In the present study of cluster, the focus is specifically on the role, scale and spatial 
structure of trans-regional links, particularly within the innovation systems 
perspective. 
4.3.3 Linked clusters: specialised nodes, globalised products 
As Leamer and Storper (2003) noted, the world economy is evolving towards greater 
geographic specialisation and greater density of linkages between places. Thus, the 
third research question raised in chapter one asked: 
3. What is known about product and knowledge linkages that extend beyond 
the borders of particular innovation systems (especially industrial 
clusters)? 
Whilst there is a growing literature on international trade which highlights perceived 
problems with the predominant neoclassical view, it remains entrenched and 
advocates remain resolute that comparative advantage can explain trade. Leamer and 
Levinsohn have stated ‘the voluminous and complex literature on the Heckscher-
Ohlin models may appear to have left the framework battered and beaten, but 
nonetheless it remains entirely healthy’ (1995: 1375). Importantly, they go one step 
further, implying that what matters with trade theory are the theoretical and policy 
consequences rather that empirical observation: ‘gravity models63 are strictly 
descriptive. They lack a theoretical underpinning so that once the facts are out, it is 
not clear of what to make of them. In addition they do not link clearly with any 
issues’ (1995: 1387). 
In contrast, a network based view of trade which has been the analytical emphasis of 
this chapter, is different and does address the ‘so-what factor’. It appears from the 
study of the economic effects of borders that trade is more concentrated within a 
                                                 
62 On the basis of a statistical measure as there will always be some extra-regional linkages. 
63  As noted earlier in this chapter gravity models are generally good at describing trade flows, as 
typically larger, closer markets are the largest destination for exports – taking note that borders do 
alter trade patterns.  
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nation than would be compared to what is expected. Social links and business 
networks have both been shown to be related to this borders puzzle, and are 
associated with export growth. Company directors (Drysdale and Garnaut 1994) have 
identified the successful trade patterns of other companies as influencing their own 
decision-making. Similarly, statistical analysis reveals that social connections 
between two countries and immigration patterns are mutually associated with trade 
pattern development (Rauch 2001). This chapter has also raised the possibility that 
just as local agglomerations of economic activity might be a means for companies to 
manage market uncertainties (see Maskell and Lorenzen 2004), and then businesses 
might operate within a network of spatially distant cluster nodes to reduce the 
uncertainties associated with accessing new sources of production and technology. 
For manufactured products, various frameworks for understanding the operations of 
multinational enterprises and business networks have been proposed. Global product 
networks, as one example, are based in specific geographies as well as noting the 
trade spread internationally. Production and product integration functions can occur 
in different places and depending upon the technological complexity, it can be a 
significant number of locations. Technology development functions can be split 
between network co-ordinators (what Ernst and Kim 2002 might call flagship 
companies) and local players within the network. Lastly, there is some evidence, 
although it is disputed, that MNEs might locate in particular places to access local 
technological strengths (Ivarsson 1999). Finally, for business and financial services it 
has been observed that the pattern of city development around the world is structured 
through spatial strengths and business interdependencies.  
What is known of extra-territorial interdependencies can be summarised as: 
The roles of extra-territorial interdependencies: 
• trade in goods and services (trade interdependencies); 
• the transfer of information, product standards etc (knowledge); 
• the transmission of economic growth (on the basis of Pred 1977); and 
• the locking in of hierarchical relativities (suggested by Pred 1977).  
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The scale of extra-territorial linkages: 
• is very unclear on the basis current literature, but all types of linkages 
(traded and untraded) are understood to be strongest within localities and 
diminish with distance; 
• is indicated by recent research (Simmie 2004 and Wolfe and Gertler 2004) 
to be stronger that previously understood, with the knowledge sources of 
clusters having no particular  local bias; and 
• based on trade linkages data, borders reduce the level of trade over what 
would be expected, based on gravity flow models.  
The spatial structure of extra- territorial linkages: 
• for manufacturing industries traded interdependencies are often with the 
nearest largest region; 
• bilateral trade patterns are specialised and at high levels of aggregation and 
are long lasting; 
• is influenced by nearby regions, as Beaudry and Breschi (2003) have shown 
the innovativeness of one region appears to be related to the innovativeness 
of neighbouring regions;  
• for manufacturing industries it is unclear whether interdependencies simply 
extend beyond borders in no particular pattern beyond that which is required 
for individual businesses or whether they are highly spatially structured so 
that clusters exist as nodes within linked cluster networks; and  
• for service industries, the linkages are more likely to be between spatially 
distant nodes (see for example Gertler and Levitte 2003 and Sassen 2002).   
With so little research conducted to explore the role, scale and spatial structure of 
extra-cluster linkages the following case study was developed as a preliminary means 
of teasing out the issues around the central topic of the present thesis and to assist in 
designing the analysis methodology.  The case study is of Australia’s emerging 
technological strength in a specialised sub-set of aerospace products. A number of 
issues pertinent to the development of this cluster, particularly the role of 
government policy on foreign investment and purchasing and inter-governmental 
agreements are not discussed here, although their importance is acknowledged.  
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Box 1:  Australia’s aerospace components micro-cluster  
The products and the company 
Hawker De Havilland Australia Pty Ltd manufactures and sells the upturned wingtips 
as well as other control surfaces necessary for modern commercial jet liners. Recent 
variations of the Boeing 747 and Airbus aircraft as well as the next generation of 
passenger airliners require these wingtips for improving aerodynamic performance 
and fuel efficiency. 
Figure 4.4: Modern Commercial Aircraft with Wingtips  
 
Photograph by Brian Wixted, 24 October 2003. 
The aerospace company, which is owned by Boeing, has won a number of contracts, 
including one to make components for Airbus's new ‘super jumbo’ A380 jet. 
‘Hawker de Havilland will design and manufacture wing tips and vortex control 
devices for the A380 at its Fishermens Bend plant’ in Melbourne. The new contract 
will be worth up to AUD$200m (Masanauskas 2003a). In recent years the company 
has been able to pick up important contracts with Airbus.  
    ‘Hawker de Havilland already has contracts worth up to $90 million a year with 
Airbus, including the manufacture of undercarriage doors and floor support 
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structures. The company's Sydney plant produces wing and landing gear 
components and will also be involved in the new A380 work’ Masanauskas 
(2003a). 
The global production network  
The wingtips, control surfaces and other aerospace components are sold to both 
Boeing and Airbus, the two remaining global players in the commercial aircraft 
industry, even though Boeing owns the company. There is no local market for the 
company’s advanced composite components so the arguments for local demand 
being necessary for cluster creation do not hold in this case. However, the current 
situation does fit within the framework for global production networks. The flagship 
companies of Airbus and Boeing play the central role in co-ordinating the 
development and assembly of aircraft. The only major supplier in Australia to these 
companies is Hawker De Havilland Australia, which against the international 
corporations building modern commercial airliner components is just a small player. 
It nevertheless has its own network of specialised suppliers. 
A GPN framework would also seemingly fit with Hawker de Havilland’s own point 
of reference. Creedy has reported the managing director as stating that ‘the company, 
which employed 1400 people in Sydney and Melbourne, would still position itself as 
a first-tier supplier for the global aerospace industry and was well placed for the 
industry's recovery. It would also continue to play a key role in Boeing's plan to 
become a global company’ (2003).  
A linked cluster  
However, is this all there is to it – just a case of an international supply chain divided 
amongst businesses that are linked through ownership or traded interdependencies? 
The alternative, can this case be interpreted as a multi-spatial system of innovation 
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with specialised nodes within a globalised production system? To argue that Hawker 
De Havilland Australia is at the core of an Australian node of the global Aerospace 
industry, it is necessary to be able to show that it is conducting more than just 
business-to-business sales and that that it is more than a GPN. Put differently, if 
Boeing owns the company, why would Boeing not simply take the knowledge home 
to the USA?  
The reason this is not simply a case of a technology-based company investing in 
research and finding its niche in a world market nor a case of a GPN is because of 
the involvement of public research and the emerging strength of other companies. 
The original process technologies for making the composites were developed by the 
Cooperative Research Centre for Advanced Composite Structures. Australian 
Cooperative Research Centres64 (CRCs) are a federal Government program which 
was established in the early 1990s to encourage government laboratories, universities 
and businesses to co-invest in a single research and development program. Many of 
the CRCs are incorporated entities with a board and other corporate governance 
processes and legal rights to the knowledge generated. The contractual arrangements 
for each CRC and the intellectual property rights of the partners can be very different 
from one another. This particular CRC involves (see65) the Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organisation, researchers (including postgraduate students) 
from four universities, a range of SMEs, the Federal Government and various 
collaborators, including Airbus. Hawker de Havilland by being a core member of the 
CRC, and having contributed both in kind and financial support to the research and 
development, is able to access the knowledge developed by the CRC.  
                                                 
64 https://www.crc.gov.au/  
65 http://www.crc-acs.com.au/link.html viewed on 31 August 2004. 
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Until the breakthroughs developed within the CRC and now being successfully 
commercially developed by Hawker de Havilland Australia, the aerospace 
components (wingtips etc.) had to be hand made. The expensive process of manually 
building parts by adding each layer of composite material separately has now been 
superseded.  
     ‘Dr Ian Crouch, of the CRCACS, says that by using a technique known as 
diaphragm forming (DF), the process has been successfully automated. Hawker de 
Havilland's manager of business development and strategic planning, Miro 
Miletic, says although the benefits are small in percentage terms, they are huge in 
dollar terms”. "It's a process which produces a 2 per cent reduction in terms of 
raw cost of making composite aircraft components, but overall we are looking at 
multimillion dollar savings from this process on an annual basis’ Scott (2002). 
Although there is little published on this micro cluster, it is known that Hawker de 
Havilland machinery is built by a set of local suppliers (see Royall 2001) and other 
Australian companies have been successful in winning contracts for aerospace 
composites, principally in new military aircraft (see Hill 2003). 
Rather than taking the knowledge back to Seattle, Boeing has been looking to invest 
in R&D in Australia. Creedy (2002) reported that some of the research for the 
[discontinued - Masanauskas 2003b] Boeing Sonic Cruiser was to have been done in 
Australia. The status of that research funding was unclear in mid 2004, but the 7E7 
will adopt much of the preliminary research work done for that project.  
Clearly, this is not a case of outsourced production – where the technology is owned 
and developed offshore and manufacturing is trans-located, as the technology is 
locally developed. Because demand is not located in Australia it is reasonable to 
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suggest that this cluster is not an archetypical cluster, yet the involvement of public 
institutions points to it being a ‘sub-national innovation system’ (spread across two 
Australian cities) and also points to it being more than purely a corporate GPN. The 
small group of firms and research groups involved in this cluster are positioning 
themselves in a global industry with a set of valuable technologies where the entire 
production system is spatially distributed across the globe. The two dominant players 
in civil66 aerospace appear to need to import the Australian expertise in the form of 
particular products and the Australian cluster has no market without Airbus and 
Boeing and military aerospace firms.  
Although the aerospace industry is an extreme example of a globally structured value 
system, on the basis of this analysis, the concept of linked technological and 
industrial clustering appears to be a valuable way of understanding economic change. 
This case example does point, however, to the need to determine the production 
systems to which the relevant concepts are most applicable. The following chapter 
(five) discusses the methodological choices for delving deeper into the spatial 
structure of interdependencies within a multi-spatial context and explains why it was 
decided to utilise an input-output based approach. 
                                                 
66 The situation with military aerospace is more complex and not addressed here. 
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‘International networking and the resulting 
exposure of national clusters, however, has a 
positive impact on innovative activity, reduces 
costs and increases its economic returns. National 
systems where firms openly engage in 
international networking are more successful than 
closed systems’ (DeBresson et al. 1998:4). 
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5.1 Measuring flows in multi-spatial analysis 
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to the understanding of the ways separate 
innovation systems interact within a multi-spatial economic environment. To this 
point, this has been done through an extensive overarching review of the literature on 
national innovation systems and sub-national innovation systems.  It has also 
required the need for a specific focus within such a broad research agenda. That 
focus has been defined here as researching the role, scale and spatial structure of 
cross-border interdependencies, with a special interest in the pattern of cluster 
linkages.  This extends the relationship based perspective that contends that 
knowledge flows within a local or national environment have fostered clustering and 
innovation, to those interdependencies that stretch across borders. Ideally, to analyse 
the latter type of linkages, a researcher would be able to draw upon a wealth of data 
collected by statistical agencies on the sources of product component being 
incorporated into different products. Unfortunately, this is hard to determine even in 
a national setting (see for example DeBresson et al. 1998), let alone internationalised 
innovation.  
Even within the very specific focus of this thesis, the lack of previous research forces 
important choices on the value of a deep study of particular examples versus a study 
with greater breadth, but which might lack the case study depth but nonetheless can 
outline the general characteristics of the phenomena. It also forces a choice on the 
degree of emphasis the three foci receive – a choice which is interactive with the 
choice of depth or breadth.  An interest in emphasising the role (and scale in terms of 
comparative knowledge value) of multi-spatial relationships would require a 
different methodology to one aimed at an interest in the spatial structure (with 
relevant scaling) of relationships.  
5.2 The appeal of I-O modelling 
Because little work has been done on this topic, it was decided that determining a 
few of the dominant characteristics would be more valuable than an in-depth study 
which against the weight of research promoting proximity would be lost. Adopting 
an approach that could rank the value of extra-territorial linkages for different 
industries as well as emphasising the spatial structure of relationships was, therefore, 
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deemed to be the important criteria in choosing the methodology. Research that is 
broadly similar in focusing on trade relationships has had a tendency to rely upon 
export and more rarely import data. The desire here was to move away from just 
indicators of the output of a production system (exports) or the inputs (imports) but 
to focus attention on the integration and use of traded products. Trade data cannot be 
easily used to examine the use of the imports. The measurement of trade in the same 
industry in both directions (intra-industry trade) has been as far as trade analysis can 
be developed for user-producer connectivity. Traditional trade analysis therefore, 
tends to focus simply on the increasing amount of trade, particularly intra-industry 
trade, and also on changes in market share (see Appendix 1). Analysis of changes in 
market share, however, only bring into sharper relief the need for an assessment of 
interdependencies because it highlights the way countries often grow their foreign 
market shares but loose much less across time67.  
Of all the possible methodologies, inter-regional input-output modelling offers a way 
of integrating regional production data (in this case for reasons explained later in this 
chapter –national data), and trade data to calculate the destination of products and the 
scale of their importance as a share of industry value added.   
The great insight of Wassily Leontief, the founder of I-O economics (see for example 
Landefeld and McCulla 1999), was that industries rely upon each other in a system 
of mutual interdependency. Much of the use of input-output modelling has been for 
policy purposes. Rose and Miernyk (1989), for example, describe three general 
economic analyses that were typically of interest, namely; hypothesis testing, policy 
analysis and economic planning. For advanced market economies only the former 
and the second of these are of real interest. Hypothesis testing revolves around 
assessing economic theory against empirical evidence, often on the basis of the factor 
of production (capital, labour etc). Of interest to this research project is the more 
straightforward use of I-O for tracing the lines of supply and use (across national 
borders). 
                                                 
67 Perhaps providing cross national evidence for Pred theory’s of the dynamic behind the hierarchical 
stability of American cities. 
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5.2.1 Criticisms of using I-O in innovation studies 
This choice would, however, not be without its critics. There are a few recurring 
themes in the criticisms of using input-output (I-O) data as a framework for 
innovation studies. Typically, I-O is dismissed, first because it is based in the 
production and transfer of goods and not the generation, diffusion and sales of new 
knowledge and innovations. Secondly, I-O is based in static equations that are 
derived from surveys of businesses to determine their use of products from the range 
of different industries. I-O modelling does not typically incorporate changes to the 
qualities of the products or dynamic processes such as knowledge accumulation and 
other feed back effects, so strongly argued for in innovation studies.  
Carlsson et al. are not alone in their criticisms, continually referring to I-O as a static 
representation: They say ‘the links among the components of the system are basically 
one-way, i.e. the system is static’ (2002: 235). In contrast to input-output analysis, 
they wish for data such as that produced by Dahmén which incorporated 
disequilibrium and could reveal how the ‘output of the system not only grows over 
time but also changes in character and content’ (2002: 236). Dahmén’s analysis, 
however, exists for only one period in time (the interwar years) and only for Sweden. 
His studies and others like them are very difficult to replicate consistently across 
time and countries. This makes analysis of the character and configuration of 
innovation systems through time very complex. More important than whether I-O is 
a static model and therefore inappropriate is determining the types of questions to be 
addressed. Carlsson et al. have a particular interest in the operations of existing 
technologies and development of new technologies. Their description of the 
networks of people involved in technological systems is not dissimilar to the 
discussions in chapter three on the drivers of clustering.  
‘Technological systems involve market and non-market interaction in three types of 
network: buyer–supplier (input/output) relationships, problem-solving networks, 
and informal networks. While there may be considerable overlap between these 
networks, it is the problem-solving network which really defines both the nature 
and the boundaries of the system: where do various actors in the system turn for 
help in solving technical problems? Buyer–supplier linkages are important, the 
more so the more technical information is transmitted along with the transactions 
and less so, the more commodity-like the transactions are’ (2002: 237). 
Particularly for these authors, the interest is in ‘problem solving networks’ and the 
technical details of innovation and have approximated that interest with the 
operations of the system as a whole. Yet there are many dimensions to a given system 
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that can be examined – not just the knowledge flows. What technologies, what role 
for each type of network, what scale of economic activity and where are these 
systems located etc, are all valid questions on the operations of systems of 
innovation. No single methodology could address all these questions, yet I-O is 
criticised because it does not provide answers on the specific questions these authors 
want to answer. A more fruitful approach to analysing available methodologies 
would seem to be to match the different questions with different analytical 
approaches, rather than equating an interest in innovation systems with one 
perspective.  
5.2.2 Benefits of I-O modelling 
Input-output data is good for what it is designed to do – provide information on the 
economic structure of relationships within a given spatial territory or extended across 
territories. Every economy has a unique structure of relations between businesses. 
Each economy has a different set of industries with different technical input 
coefficients within different geographic settings. The strength of input-output data is 
that it reveals these structures clearly in a way which can be compared across 
countries and time, as was done in one form in chapter three (above). Input-output 
analysis can thus be very useful for overcoming the deficiencies identified by 
Markusen (1999) who argued that regional and cluster studies often lack information 
on the wider economic context.  
I-O data has been gathered for a large number of countries over a long time span so it 
is possible to investigate the changing structure of relations through time and cross-
nationally. Models based on input-output data have been very frequently used for 
measuring the effects on economic growth of arising from changes to government 
policy, new economic activities or new trading arrangements. Methodologies have 
been developed for considering the flows of goods between different regions and as a 
statistical tool I-O is amenable to filtering out data noise and focusing on significant 
information. 
Another role for input-output economics is its potential use in examining global 
production networks. Whilst, case studies can highlight the role of imported vehicle 
components in the auto industry, for example, (see Dicken 2003) these studies tend to 
underestimate the value added that accumulates to assembler regions because they 
Chapter 5: A Methodology for Measuring Inter-Country Linkages  
Brian Wixted 125
are focused on imports and production out-sourcing. The purchases of local services, 
for example, including utilities and the wages for local workers appear to be ignored. 
Alternatively, as is pointed out by Polenske and Hewings (2004) there is a need to 
conduct input-out studies of individual production systems. 
Apart from these general benefits, input-output economics offers very specific 
advantages to a study of the multi-spatial characteristics of innovation systems. 
I-O and knowledge interdependencies 
Although, as has already been discussed I-O information does not provide some 
important evidence on knowledge systems, neither is it totally unrelated. When a 
company markets a product, that product embodies the knowledge that been used in 
its creation. The business-to-business component of I-O (intermediate use 
transactions table) in combination with industry research and expenditure data can be 
used to analyse the flow of transactions weighted by the embodied R&D. This 
facilitates an analysis of the spillover of knowledge between industries. Standard 
R&D intensity measures of industry investment in scientific knowledge do not 
include the knowledge being accessed through purchasing components or capital 
equipment. Industries with lower R&D expenditures can rely on knowledge 
developed in other industries and those with higher R&D expenditures can require a 
complex range of components.  
Input-output transactions tables enable a construction of models of embodied 
knowledge which flows from producers to users. Domestic flows of this sort have 
been calculated for Germany, Japan and the USA by During and Schnabl (2000) and 
for Germany, the United Kingdom, Japan and the USA (Drejer 2000). International 
flows of embodied technology have been examined by Papaconstantinou et al. 
(1996) and Laursen and Meliciani (2002). The latter authors argue that in general 
imported technology do not contribute significantly to competitiveness and 
Papaconstantinou et al. (1996) note that larger economies rely less on imported 
technology than smaller economies, which they argue can source more than 50 per 
cent of their technology from foreign markets. Papaconstantinou et al. (1996) reveal 
that the trend across time has been for increasing reliance on imported technology 
with Germany and the USA being the major sources. ICT purchases accounted for 
the majority of the imported technology.  
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I-O, user-producer relations and innovation 
It has already been discussed in chapter three (above) that user-producer 
relationships are one of the few analytical variables that can be used to predict 
possible sources of innovation. DeBresson’s analyses of business product 
innovations led him to construct innovation interdependency matrices and to later 
conclude that these were on occasions similar to national intermediate production 
activity input-output matrices (1991, 1996, et al. 1998, 1999). The statistical 
correlation between their matrix of the supply and use of innovative activity and the 
standard I-O matrix for Italy was 0.836 (DeBresson et al. 1996). Unfortunately, it is 
not yet established for most countries that national input-output matrices have a high 
degree of correlation with innovative activity supply and use tables. DeBresson (et 
al. 1996), however, explain that the high association between innovation transactions 
and traded transactions: 
‘appeal[s] to common sense. They are also consistent with economic theory, which 
has related the orientation of innovative efforts with demand. …In other words the 
innovative output of one supplier industry will likely be used in greater proportion 
by a user industry that consumes more of that industry’s output’ (1996: 115). 
These findings are only for a domestic setting and might not apply to an extension of 
such relationships across national borders. But, on the basis of the arguments by 
DeBresson and the literature on industrial marketing (see for example Thompson et 
al. 1998) an assumption that the relationships do cross national borders would appear 
to be consistent with economic theory and the evidence on the social nature of trade 
and the role of GPNs in transferring knowledge. After all, why should user-producer 
relationships be co-terminus with borders? Instead, evidence presented by DeBresson 
et al. (1998) points to international linkages being important for corporate 
innovativeness. They comment: 
‘International networking and the resulting exposure of national clusters, however, 
has a positive impact on innovative activity, reduces costs and increases its 
economic returns. National systems where firms openly engage in international 
networking are more successful than closed systems’ (1998: 4) 
This research project has, therefore, proceeded on the basis that input-output inter-
industry linkages, both domestically and internationally, would be correlated to user-
producer relations. Ideally, in time, there may be the widespread collection of the 
type of innovation relationships data that DeBresson has pioneered, but in the 
meantime a combination of existing input-output analyses for an understanding of 
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the production structure of relationships, case studies of innovative products and 
cluster developments need to be progressed together. 
I-O Clusters 
Input-output analysis has also been used widely in cluster studies (see chapter three 
above), despite the criticisms (noted in this chapter) on their use in innovation 
systems studies. I-O data has been used to identify clusters geographically and 
industrially (which branches of industry are connected to a cluster and which are not) 
and to describe the linkages within a given cluster of interest.  
A major report on clustering in the United Kingdom (Trends Business Research 
2001) identifies regional and national clusters using a combination of input-output, 
employment and value added data at a very detailed level of industry data. Using a 
combination of national cluster ‘templates’ constructed using national input-output 
data and location quotient analyses, Feser and Bergman (2000), describe the structure 
of clusters at the regional level in the USA (US States). Other authors have used 
input-output methods as a basis for describing particular clusters within a given 
country. Hauknes (1999) examines the agro-food, oil and gas, construction, transport, 
paper and graphics and information intensive clusters in Norway. Marceau (1999) 
has used input-output data to look at the overall structure of manufacturing clusters 
in Australia whilst den Hertog and Maltha (1999) used very detailed data to 
investigate the linkages amongst information and communications industries in the 
Netherlands.  
Alternatively, both Verbeek (1999) and Hoen (2002a) have developed algorithms for 
defining clusters on the basis of input-output relations. Hoen’s paper identifies a 
number of common problems with cluster identification using I-O, amongst them 
that using linkage measures tends to leave large (left over) systems of 
interconnections – or what he calls mega-clusters. He then proposes a means of 
calculating relatedness on the basis of significance levels which appears to be able to 
robustly identify linked activities (clusters) across different national tables and based 
either on the Leontief inverse, or the intermediate transactions tables. This later 
achievement is an advance on other methodologies which produce different clusters 
depending upon which table is used.  
Chapter 5: A Methodology for Measuring Inter-Country Linkages  
Brian Wixted 128
The spatial structure of linkages beyond places 
However, to date this work on innovative clusters has been limited to single region 
models. Using bilateral trade data in combination with input-output tables that 
separate domestic use from imported intermediate goods facilitates the multi-spatial 
inter-regional analysis desired. Imports can be utilised in industries other than their 
own and industries in different locations have different mixes of imports from 
different industries. There is a long tradition of using I-O in this way to examine 
industrial interdependencies across boundaries which can be traced back to Walter 
Isard (see Rey 2004, Hewings et al. 2004 and Jackson 2004). Much of this research 
effort has been in assessing traditional economics questions related to factors of 
production and the Heckscher-Olin theory of trade (see Polenske and Hewings 2004) 
there has also been a tradition of measuring the changing structure of linkages 
between industries and regions.  
It was noted earlier that economic development at different spatial scales seems to 
exhibit some similar features such as uneven growth and rigidities which block 
overall economic convergence. Another feature which seems characterise different 
spatial scales within a multi-spatial context is the shifting structure of production and 
relations. As one example, analysis of the Chicago economy has revealed that 
between 1980 and 2000 there was a decline in intra-metropolitan transactions in 
manufacturing industries, but service industries increased their levels of interaction 
with other sectors. Whilst manufacturing output in Chicago did not decrease, the 
intensity of intra-metropolitan linkages did decrease and the inter-regional 
manufacturing interactions increased (Guo et al. 2003). This later evidence confirms 
earlier material on the hollowing out of the Chicago economy (Sonis and Hewings 
2001 and Hewings et al. 1998). If the output of a location can stay the same and the 
local interactions decline and then reliance on imports is rising. These changing 
patterns of relationships across boundaries can be related to the processes of 
international production fragmentation (discussed in chapter four). One implication 
of such findings is that regional US economies appear to be concentrating their 
specialisations and possibly de-specialising their partner relations as they increase 
their inter-regional linkages – a finding that was made by Laursen (1998b) for OECD 
bilateral international trade. 
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International I-O modelling supports similar findings for Europe as it does for the 
mid-west of America. Van der Linden confirms that countries in Europe increased 
their sectoral specialisation and spatial concentration between 1965 and 1985 with 
the inter-country patterns ‘hardly changed’ (1998: 267). Interdependence grew 
particularly to 1975, with the small countries most dependent on the larger 
economies of Europe. Once again, neighbours have been found to have the strongest 
inter-linkages. These connections give rise to between 10-15 ‘íntercountry clusters’ 
(p268). However, whilst these conclusions are in the same direction as the 
expectations of the Heckscher-Ohlin theory of trade developing towards higher levels 
of specialisation and greater interdependencies, both van der Linden (1998) and 
Hoen (2002) report a level of change, for European countries, that is smaller and 
slower than expected. Further, bilateral trade patterns did not specialise within the 
EU as also would be expected (Hoen 2002b).   
These existing bodies of research show the utility of multi-regional input-output 
techniques which combines trade information with domestic interactions and other 
value added items such as wages. The advantages of adopting a multi-regional input-
output methodology for this study are thus the ability to:   
• assess the whole value added chain, not just trade volumes;  
• ‘map’ linkages between countries; 
• evaluate the importance of particular source countries in particular sectors 
and not rely simply on intra-industry trade assumptions; and 
• relate the data on value chains to innovation theory through existing 
embodied knowledge and user-producer relations analyses. 
Choosing an I-O approach for research on the scale and spatial structure of 
interdependencies can therefore be justified, but there are only a few databases that 
can be utilised for constructing multi-country tables.  
5.3 Developing the matrices of input-output transactions 
5.3.1 A twin model strategy 
Worldwide there are four multi-regional input-output datasets available for purchase 
and three of them are country level sets. They are: 
Chapter 5: A Methodology for Measuring Inter-Country Linkages  
Brian Wixted 130
• Bilateral Asian tables covering a number of countries such as Korea and 
Japan for period of at least 1970-1995 with a very detailed industry 
classification, they are produced by the Institute for Developing 
Economies68; 
• Eurostat 1995 tables for 14 European Union countries plus a single table 
covering all 15 members (EuroStat 2000), utilising the NACE-CLIO 25 
sector classification; 
• OECD Input-Output Database with good coverage of industries and 
important economies for the period 1970-199069 (OECD 1996b); and   
• Statistics Canada’s inter-provincial input-output accounts70. 
Although the Asian tables are ideal, the electronic version of the data is often 
extremely difficult to use and acquiring the data electronically from the paper version 
is very time consuming. This set of data is also the most costly. The European Union 
data is cost effective and relatively recent. The current research project initially 
(Wixted and Cooper 2002) worked with modelling the interactions between the 15 
members of the European Union. The exciting feature of the EU data is the number 
of countries and the variability in economic size as it covers countries as small as 
Belgium and Luxembourg through to the powerhouse of the European economy; 
Germany. 
There are, however, a number of important disadvantages with this dataset. The first 
limitation is that due to its focus (European Union) it naturally does not include 
important economies such as the USA and Japan, the world’s biggest economies. 
Secondly, just relying upon the EU data would unintentionally raise again the 
concept of the European supranational innovation system, an idea that has been 
already been critiqued in the present thesis. The third problem with the Eurostat data 
is the industry classification. As one example, the European data aggregates both 
motor vehicles and aircraft industries into the classification of transport equipment. 
This combines two technology intensive industries with very different industrial 
                                                 
68 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/index4.html  
69 http://www1.oecd.org/dsti/sti/stat-ana/index.htm  
70 http://www.statcan.ca:8096/bsolc/english/bsolc?catno=15F0042X – also note this is not a cheap 
option.  
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structures. Such an aggregation hides too much information. Therefore, the Eurostat 
classification whilst not useless is not ideal.   
For these reasons, it was decided that whilst the EU data provided valuable insights, 
it should be combined with modelling the older OECD data (1996b) to develop a 
dual model strategy. The OECD database has fewer countries but includes three G8 
countries (the USA, Japan and Canada) as well as incorporating Australia, which is 
of personal interest, that are not included in the EU database. Italy is in the original 
set of OECD tables, but only for one year (1985) and which is much older than the 
latest year possible for most of the other countries. Italy, was, therefore, excluded 
from the OECD modelling, noting it was included in the EU modelling. The OECD 
data is superior to The EU data in terms of the greater level of industry 
disaggregation, which separates aircraft and motor vehicles, petroleum as well as 
pharmaceuticals from other chemicals and mining from non-ferrous metals. The 
importance of such disaggregation becomes clearer with the presentation of the 
results in chapter six (below) on the different volume of imported components by 
different industrial segments, and in chapter eight (below) on transport cluster 
networks. The OECD data is not perfect either as is it is now somewhat outdated 
with the latest data for the year 199071. 
Unfortunately, the selection of two inter-country models might leave the impression 
that multi-spatial innovation systems analysis is the equivalent of internationalised 
innovation systems – which is definitely not the intention. If an intra-national inter-
regional dataset had been available for this research project, it would have been 
included as an extra or in preference to one of the other models. The Statistics 
Canada provincial database was too expensive to include in the present research. 
Recognising that the purpose of this research was to improve the understanding of 
the role, scale and spatial structure of linkages across borders, then the disadvantages 
listed above are overcome by the advantages of being able to analyse the linkages 
between economies at the national cluster level. The data is entirely adequate for 
advancing the central arguments of the present research. 
The next steps in the process of building the models were: 
                                                 
71 An updated version of the OECD data base was released in January 2005.  It retains the previous 
manufacturing classification, updates countries to at least the mid-1990s and is for twenty nations. See 
Wixted and Cooper (forthcoming) for analysis utilising this database. 
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1. the construction of the transactions matrices; 
2. the development of methodologies and software for calculating value flows; 
and 
3. the design of analytical techniques for maximising the utility of the modelling 
output. 
5.3.2 The available data 
The Eurostat input-output tables are for 14 European countries together with a 
combined data table for the 15 countries of the European Union 15 (Greece did not 
provide any I-O tables for 1995). The base year of the national data is around 1990-
92 with the data being projected forward to the standardised year of 1995 by 
Eurostat. Of the full set of fifteen tables, all 14 full country tables were employed 
here, with the overall European tables being used in-conjunction with the country 
tables to create a remainder matrix for what is called here; Greece – RoE (Rest of 
Europe), as it is not accurate to identify this entity merely as ‘Greece’.  
Data for each EU country is contained in four tables: [1] domestic transactions (intra-
country intermediate input flows and value added components- 25 sectors), [2] intra-
European imports (in 25 sector detail but aggregated across the other 14 EU import 
source countries), [3] all non-European imports (25 sector detail) and [4] the matrix 
of the total of domestic and imported value added activity. The exception to this 
format is the full EU tables, which by definition has intra-European trade embodied 
within the domestic transactions matrix.  
The data structure of the OECD database was much simpler. For each of 10 countries 
domestic, capital, import and total transactions were supplied in both current and 
constant local currencies. In this project only the domestic and imports matrices were 
incorporated into the modelling. Table 5.1 lists the countries in the two models and in 
the case of the European tables the last published input-output data upon which the 
1995 update was based. 
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Table 5.1: Countries and base years for the data 
EU 1995 DATABASE OECD 1990 DATABASE 
EU country code abbreviation & 
Country 
Base year – 
Eurostat  
projected forward 
to 1995 
Country Year used for 
Model 
1. A Austria 
2. B Belgium 
3. DK Denmark 
4. FIN Finland 
5. F France 
6. D Germany 
7. EL Greece 
8. IRL Ireland 
9. I Italy 
10. L Luxembourg 
11. NL The Netherlands 
12. P Portugal 
13. E Spain 
14. S Sweden 
15. UK United Kingdom 
1983 
1990 
1992 
1993 
1992 
1991 
No data 
1990 
1988 
1990 
1995 
1993 
1991 
1985 
1990 
1. Australia 
2. Canada 
3. Denmark 
4. France 
5. Germany 
6. Japan 
7. The 
Netherlands 
8. United 
Kingdom 
9. USA. 
 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
 
1986 
 
1990 
1990 
 
Sources: Eurostat 2000 and OECD 1996b 
Table 5.2 compares the industry classifications used in the two sets of I-O data. 
Table 5.2: Industry classifications for the EU (15) 1995 and OECD (9) 1990 
Data 
EU OECD 
NACE 
01 Agriculture, forestry and fishery products 
06 Fuel and power products 
13 Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals 
15 Non-metallic mineral products 
17 Chemical products 
19 Metal products except machinery 
21 Agricultural and industrial machinery 
23 Office and data processing machines 
25 Electrical goods 
28 Transport equipment 
36 Food, beverages, tobacco 
42 Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear 
47 Paper and printing products 
49 Rubber and plastic products 
51 Other manufacturing products 
53 Building and construction 
ISIC Rev.2 codes Description 
1 Agriculture, forestry and fishery 
2 Mining and quarrying 
31 Food, beverages and tobacco 
32 Textiles, apparel and leather 
33 Wood products and furniture 
34 Paper, paper products and printing 
351 + 352 – 3522 Industrial chemicals 
3522 Drugs and medicines 
353 + 354 Petroleum and coal products 
355 + 356 Rubber and plastic products 
36 Non-metallic mineral products 
371 Iron and steel 
372 Non-ferrous metals 
381 Metal products 
382 – 3825 Non-electrical machinery 
3825 Office and computing machinery 
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56 Recovery, repair services, wholesale, retail 
59 Lodging and catering services 
61 Inland transport services 
63 Maritime and air transport services 
65 Auxiliary transport services 
67 Communication services 
69 Services of credit and insurance institutions 
74 Other market services 
86 Non-market services 
 
383 – 3832 Electric apparatus, nec 
3832 Radio, TV and communication 
equipment 
3841 Shipbuilding and repairing 
3842 + 3844 + 3849 Other transport 
3843 Motor vehicles 
3845 Aircraft 
385 Professional goods 
39 Other manufacturing 
4 Electricity, gas and water 
5 Construction 
61 + 62 Wholesale and retail trade 
63 Restaurants and hotels 
71 Transport and storage 
72 Communication 
81 + 82 Finance and insurance 
83 Real estate and business services 
9 Community, social and personal services 
Producers of government services 
Other producers 
Statistical discrepancy 
Sources: Eurostat 2000 and OECD 1996b. 
5.3.3 Constructing the transactions table 
The transactions matrix is a table in which the sales between industries are detailed 
in a square matrix. As multi-country datasets, such as those for the EU or OECD, 
only have information on domestic inter-industry interactions and the use of all 
imports by domestic industry, by the source industry, it is important to separate out 
the source countries of the imports. This is essential in expanding the square matrix 
from one country through to being inclusive of all the countries desired in the 
modelling. In general, a similar process was used for developing the transactions 
matrices for both inter-country models. However, because of the complications 
caused by the missing data for Greece, the process of creating the EU was more 
complex and is used here as the example of the process.  
Developing the EU transactions matrix was done using a two-step procedure. The 
first step was to organise the domestic tables and calculate the intra-European trade 
between all partner regions for the 14 countries (collectively referred to here as the 
14 Nation state European Economies – NEEs) for which original tables were bought. 
The second step required the construction of a domestic matrix and an intra-
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European imports matrix for the Greece – RoE region before we could then use the 
method adopted in step one to calculate its trade spread. 
Step one – trade preferences for NEE countries 
The bilateral import propensities of the 14 NEEs were calculated at an industry level 
using the OECD (2002) Bilateral Trade Database (BTD). This database provides data 
on bilateral trade flows by industry. The BTD uses the International Standard 
Industry Classification ISIC rev 3, and has been structured to be consistent with the 
OECD STAN72 Database and the OECD Input-Output Database (OECD 1996b), 
whilst the EU I-O tables are classified using the European industry classification 
system for input-output tables (NACE-CLIO). At high levels of aggregation, the two 
classifications are not so dissimilar as to cause major problems in creating a 
concordance. The industries in the BTD upon which the EU inter-industry import 
calculations were based are provided in Appendix 3 (below). For many of the 
manufacturing industries there was quite a reasonable correspondence. The 
construction of the BTD makes it straightforward for ensuring that intra-Europe trade 
ratios tallied 100 per cent of the imports totals.   
One serious difficulty for the project was that there is not yet any data available on 
services trade at a combined bilateral partner and industry level basis. This is 
mitigated somewhat in the current project by the very low levels of services trade. 
However, as trade in services continues to rapidly increase, future research will 
benefit from the availability of such data. The simplifying assumption used in this 
model was that the direction of services industries trade would flow in the same 
proportions as the entire services sector or where data was not available on bilateral 
services trade data (see Appendix 3 below), it was calculated on the basis of the 
overall direction of manufacturing trade. This is the best assumption possible at 
present, but due to this uncertainty, a reduced level of analytical weight is placed on 
the results for service sector industries.  
Once import propensities for partner countries were derived, the ratios were then 
applied to the total intra-Europe intermediate imports data for a particular country to 
construct a separate implied intermediate trade sub-matrix for each import partner. 
                                                 
72 STructural ANalysis (STAN) database 
http://www.oecd.org/document/15/0,2340,en_2649_201185_1895503_1_1_1_1,00.html is updated as 
data becomes available. 
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The import propensities were applied on a row73 basis. The NEE blocks incorporate 
trade from the country not in the dataset (Greece) in the same proportion as trade 
with Greece is reported in the BTD. Finally, to complete the transactions worksheets 
for the NEEs, the non-EU trade matrix was used directly to create a Rest of the 
World regional block. The modelling implications of this choice are dealt with later 
in this chapter. 
Step two – Greece – RoE 
Calculating the Greece – RoE matrices requires a number of calculations and some 
assumptions that though justifiable are more extended that the simple ones applied to 
the trade distribution for the known nation-state European economies. 
(Step A) It is possible, because of the existence of the EU 15 economy table as well 
as the 14 individual tables, to create a table that captures the entire activity of Greece 
– RoE. This was calculated as follows, where T is domestic inter-industry 
transactions and M is imports from within Europe. 
Greece – RoE (T + M) = EU 15 (T + M) – EU 14 (T + M). 
(Step B) The next step was to split domestic transactions from intra-European 
imports for Greece – ROE. To do this a ratio of domestic to imported transactions is 
required. It was decided to use a ratio calculated from the average of domestic to 
imported requirements for Spain and Portugal. These countries are the two least 
industrialised countries in the NEE group, are in southern Europe and produce the 
highest imports ratio of the various experiments with obtaining an average that made 
economic sense.   
Greece – RoE ratio = Portugal + Spain (M) / Portugal + Spain (T+M). 
This ratio is then applied to generate a Greece – ROE domestic transactions table and 
an intra-Europe imports table.  
                                                 
73 At present there does not appear to be a logical approach to calculating appropriate propensities on 
a column basis or alternatively a row-column combination to generate a unique ratio for each cell. At 
present it is straightforward to calculate the overall trade preferences (total imports divided by imports 
from Country A) on a row basis. There is no information that informs us of the purchasing preference 
of individual industries in a particular country. Presumably, in the absence of actual information some 
assumptions could be devised on the basis of quality, for example. There are, however, some 
interesting possibilities that could be explored initially in a more theoretical discussion in conjunction 
with a more detailed assessment of trade theory. 
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(Step C) With both a domestic matrix and an intra-European imports matrix, the 
methodology applied to splitting the trade between the EU 14 NEEs partners (step 1 
indicated earlier) could finally be performed for the Greece – RoE region.  
(D) Finally, to calculate the Greece – RoE region’s non-EU imports, the sum of the 
non-European trade by the 14 NEEs was subtracted from the full EU non-EU imports 
table. 
OECD 1990 model 
For the OECD model there is a direct match between industries in the model and the 
BTD, again with the exception of the service industries (see Appendix 3). The OECD 
(1996b) I-O database provides only two spreadsheets of relevance here, the domestic 
transactions and imports. The trade between countries internal to the model and the 
Rest of the World countries was simply calculated directly from trade flows data in 
the OECD BTD (2002b) – see figure 5.2. 
Diagrams of transactions data construction 
A schematic diagram of the multi-country EU transaction table construction process 
is in Figure 5.1 and the OECD is depicted in 5.2.  
Chapter 5: A Methodology for Measuring Inter-Country Linkages  
Brian Wixted 138
Figure 5.1: Part A - EU 1995 Model construction – purchased data 
EU Total
VA
Imports from non EU
Imports from EU
United Kingdom
Sweden
Spain
Portugal
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
Ireland
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
UKSweSpaPorNethLuxItalyIreGrcGerFraFinDenBelAut
 
The Eurostat database has separate domestic tables, imports 
 intra-EU and from outside the EU. There is also a total EU activity table and a table of total non-EU imports.
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Part B: The completed transaction matrices. 
VA
Rest of world
United Kingdom
Sweden
Spain
Portugal
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Italy
Ireland
Greece
Germany
France
Finland
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
UKSweSpaPorNethLuxItalyIreGrcGerFraFinDenBelAut
 
 
The final super matrix has sub-blocks for domestic activity and imports from countries within the EU and the rest of the work block – all 25 cells X 25 cells. 
This gives the transaction matrix a structure of 25*25*240 [e.g. 15 countries * 16 import sources]. This is a total cell count of 150,000. 
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Figure 5.2: OECD 1990 Model construction – purchased data 
Value Added
Imports from the world
USA
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Japan
Germany
France
Denmark
Canada
Australia
USAUKNethJapanGerFraDenCanAus
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Part B: OECD 1990 completed transaction matrix. 
Value Added
Rest of World
USA
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Japan
Germany
France
Denmark
Canada
Australia
USAUKNethJapanGerFraDenCanAus
 
The matrix of intermediate goods transactions for the OECD model has a structure of 33 industries * 33 industries * 9 countries * 10 import 
regional sources. This is a total cell count of 98,010. 
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5.3.4 Limitations of trade data 
Before going further, it is important to make some observations about trade data. 
Increasingly, statistics on national trade performance is becoming problematic. There 
is a significant deficiency of data on the activities of companies, trade in intermediate 
products and, as already mentioned, for industry level bilateral services trade flows.   
Intra-firm statistics, for example are still poor, despite multinational enterprises 
controlling a substantial proportion74 of trade. 
Whilst companies are legal entities, ‘industries’ are the creation of statisticians. For 
example, in the official United Nations definitions for ISIC Rev 3 code 3000 is 
office, accounting and computing machinery
75 which includes ‘complete digital 
systems’ but excludes computing components such as semiconductors which are in a 
completely separate division (32)76. Finally, sophisticated electronic games (that 
incorporate software) could be split across 3694 (manufacture of games and toys [the 
electronic equipment]), 7220 (software – [the writing of the software]) and 2230 
(reproduction of recorded media [the mass production of the software on disks]).  
Reading the fine print of classifications maybe tedious but is essential. 
Finally, trade data is traditionally aggregated to the national level. Therefore, 
although we are aware that the regional agglomeration of industry is an important 
characteristic of economies (noted in chapters three and four above), there is little 
data on how such clusters or regions trade either domestically or internationally.  
5.4 The modelling 
5.4.1 Inter-country modelling analyses 
In contrast to other analyses of inter-country inter-industry linkages which use the 
‘hypothetical extraction’ methodology or other production output based 
methodologies, the current research project adopts the net multiplier techniques 
                                                 
74 For countries such as the USA 25% of exports are with affiliated businesses, whilst for others such 
as Sweden 80% of exports by foreign controlled affiliates were to other affiliates in the same business 
group – see OECD (2003b) pp108-109. 
75 office, accounting and computing machinery 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcs.asp?Cl=2&Lg=1&Co=3000  
76 3210 Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components within Division 
32 Manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus. 
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developed by Cooper (2000). The current research project, which includes Wixted 
and Cooper (2002) is the first application of this methodology to a dataset.   
Dietzenbacher and van der Linden (1997), van der Linden (1998) and Hoen (2002b) 
employ a modified Strassert method that enables the “hypothetical extraction” of 
industries to identify backward and forward linkages across EU countries. As is usual 
with this method, the results are reported in terms of output effects. The hypothetical 
extraction technique proceeds by progressively removing sectors and then modelling 
the effects of that sector on the rest of the system. This works as if each sector were, 
in turn, considered as only importing with no domestic activity. It is a good 
methodology for understanding so-called ‘key sectors’ – those that have a greater 
influence on production and productivity than others. In this way it also identifies the 
linkages to other sectors and regions. The following observation by Diezentbacher 
and van der Linden highlights the operation of the model. 
‘For example, hypothetically removing the German food sector yields the 
following reductions in the outputs (all as a percentage of this sector’s actual 
output) 82.0 in Germany, 14.2 in the other six EC countries, and 96.2 in total (see 
Table 1). Therefore 15 percent of the total backward linkages is intercountry and 85 
per cent is domestic’ (1997: 244).  
Because the hypothetical extraction methodology is deigned to provide output 
effects, the numbers as seen in the quote, are in relation to output and are quite 
difficult to relate to the literature on trade and the internationalisation of production. 
By contrast, Cooper’s methodology for calculating net value added applied here 
gives a much more interpretable result. An increase in the domestic demand for food 
in Germany in 1995 would result in the following division of activity: 
• 53.72% of the increase would be direct German value added; 
• 27.44% would be indirect value added, remaining in Germany;  
• imports from the other 14 economies of the EU would account for  9.2% of 
the demand increase (indirect); and 
• imports from the rest of the world would account for the remaining 9.7% of 
the value added increase (indirect). 
This presentation of modelling results is more attractive because it focuses attention 
on easily interpretable indicators of production internationalisation and bilateral 
linkages.  
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Using a third technique, van der Linden et al. (2000) identify propulsive, reactive 
and dependent sectors. One of the important points they make is that despite the 
apparent integration of the European Union, inter-country value added spillovers are 
quite small. Although this ‘fields of influence’ approach is quite a different technique 
to the hypothetical extraction method, it also concentrates on measuring production 
effects. An additional common feature is that it can be used for understanding both 
backward and forward linkages. Van der Linden et al. (2000) use the methodology 
for tracing the effects of technological change (the technical coefficients) through 
linkages rather than measuring the strength of the linkages.  
Both hypothetical extraction and fields of influence should be capable, in principle, 
of identifying trans-border clusters. The hypothetical extraction method should be 
able to indicate which sectors and countries will be most affected by the lack of a 
sector that would otherwise provide a market for their intermediate goods and 
services. Nevertheless, because of the sheer size of production effects, the number of 
sectors in a multi-sector and multi-country model that one would need to sequentially 
extract and the smallness of inter-country spillovers relative to domestic output 
effects, there is a case for considering other approaches in terms of both the 
methodology and the effects that are measured. Similar points apply to the fields of 
influence approach. In addition, there is a case to examine the existence of trans-
border clusters quite independently of what might be the case under alternative 
technology scenarios.  
One objective in modelling the interactions of economies is to search for “above 
normal” inter-country spillovers, which are “normalised” so that the small inter-
country spillovers are not dominated by the naturally larger intra-country effects, so 
the net multiplier approach was seen as particularly useful.  
5.4.2 ‘Net multipliers’  
The methodology used here for research on trans-border clusters in the European 
Union and the OECD is therefore different to the application of input-output analysis 
in current inter-country EU models. The focus here is on tracing flows of value 
added arising indirectly through inter-industry and inter-country linkages via a 
backward linkages approach. Essentially, we need to obtain partial sums of backward 
indirect production multipliers using value added coefficients as insights. The 
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measures are based on indirect value added flows to examine the strengths of 
linkages between a sector and a region (not necessarily the home region of the 
sector). One measure of the importance of a sector to a region is its contribution to 
indirect value added.  
Such a ‘net multipliers’ approach facilitates a focus on the multi-regional linkages 
much better than do other approaches currently proposed in the literature on input-
output economics. 
5.4.3 The development of new software 
Because the results required from this modelling project were non-standard for input-
output modelling and because the scale of the models being developed was very 
large (150,000 cells in the EU model) it was necessary to develop an application for 
this study which could also be useful for future projects. The solution was to custom 
build a piece of software that utilises the Microsoft Visual Basic programming 
language in Excel. This was a complex task and the software was the outcome of 
collaboration between Professor Russel Cooper (who devoted a significant effort to 
the exercise) and the author77. 
The resulting software is quite flexible as it allows an analyst to select which regions 
will be modelled, but automates the location of relevant regional names within the 
dataset. The software will generate a Leontief inverse, calculate the coefficients 
matrices and also create a set of value added results matrices which match in layout 
(cell for cell) the original transactions table. The software calculates these value 
added results by increasing demand by 1 unit in all industries in all selected 
countries. Whilst the software generates the linkages effects through a series of 
simultaneous equations calculating the value of a linkage from the total effect on an 
economy it is designed to ensure that the value added distributed across industries 
and countries still equals the additional demand (1 unit). The current version of the 
software does not use the final demand vectors of the input-output tables nor does it 
permit variable increases in industry demand. 
                                                 
77 Who constructed all the transactions matrices used in this study from the data already cited and 
worked on debugging early versions of the software. 
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5.4.4 The modelling algebra 
Following assembly of the multi-regional multi-sectoral transactions table for the EU 
economy, a mirror coefficients matrix was constructed by dividing elements in each 
column by the total value of the sectoral output. The input-output model itself is 
standard. However, in analysing results from the model emphasis is placed here upon 
the flow of value added effects rather than the multipliers. The present thesis also 
presents specific non-standard measures related to indirect value added which are 
designed to help in the search for linkages between national clusters. These 
specialised measures need to be discussed. To do this efficiently it will be useful to 
summarise the analytical model and introduce relevant notation. This notation is 
adopted from (Wixted and Cooper forthcoming). 
The 15 country EU model and the 9 country OECD model both have the same basic 
structure. For the purposes of describing the notation, the EU model will be used as 
the example. Each of the 15 regions in this model distinguishes 25 sectors. In 
addition, there is a Rest of the World region providing imports, also disaggregated 
into 25 sectors. Exports from the EU to the Rest of the World are aggregated into one 
sector and combined with other final demand. To describe the basis of the 
measurement of indirect value added, it is initially useful to consider this model as 
one huge (15 times 25)-sector model, without necessarily distinguishing the different 
regions. Following this, the multi-regional structure will be discussed in order to 
highlight the ability of the model to trace the regional distribution of value added.  A 
general transactions table for the (15 times 25)-sector overall model can be 
represented as 
 
0
' 0
'
R
xT f
T
w
x
 (1) 
where:  
T  is a ((15 times 25) x (15 times 25)) multi-sectoral multi-regional transactions 
table of intermediate flows;  
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RT  is a (25 x (15 times 25)) matrix of import flows – intermediate goods 
imported by the 25 sectors and 15 regions in the model - originating from 25 
sectors distinguished in the Rest of the World;  
f  is a ((15 times 25) x 1) column vector of combined exports and other final 
demand;  
x  is a similarly dimensioned - i.e. ((15 times 25) x 1) - column vector of sectoral 
outputs; and  
'w  is a (1 x (15 times 25)) row vector of gross value added for the various 
sectors. 
Dividing the 15 times 25 inter-industry flow columns in (1) by their column totals 
(and concentrating just on these), the transformation to coefficients can be depicted 
as 
 
' '
' '
R R
T A
T A
w v
x i
⇒  (2) 
where:  
A  is a ((15 times 25) x (15 times 25)) matrix of multi-sectoral multi-regional 
input-output coefficients;  
RA  is a (25 x (15 times 25)) matrix of import coefficients - originating from the 
25 sectors distinguished in the Rest of the World;  
'v  is a (1 x (15 times 25)) row vector of value added coefficients; and  
'i  is a unit row vector depicting the vertical adding up identity in (2), viz.. 
 ' ' ' 'Ri A i A v i+ + =  (3) 
Traditional application of the input-output model involves combination of the 
horizontal adding up identity in (1), viz. 
 Ti f x+ =  (4) 
with the Leontief technology assumption  
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 ˆT Ax=  (5) 
where xˆ  denotes that the output vector is laid out as a diagonal matrix of column 
multipliers. The combination suggests 
 
( ) 1
ˆ
x Ti f
x Axi f
x Ax f
x I A f
−
= +⇒ = +⇒ = +⇒ = −
 (6) 
which introduces the Leontief inverse ( ) 1I A −−  as a multiplier matrix. In addition to 
its ‘multiplier’ interpretation in (6), however, the Leontief inverse has an interesting 
distributional implication when applied to (3). This combination gives 
 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
1 1
' ' ' '
' ' '
' ' '
' ' ' '
ˆ' ' ' '
R
R
R
R
R
i A v i i A
i A v i I A
i A I A v I A i
i A I A v I A I v i
i A I A i v I A I v i
− −
− −
− −
+ = −⇒ + = −⇒ − + − =⎡ ⎤⇒ − + − − + =⎣ ⎦⎡ ⎤⇒ − + − − + =⎣ ⎦
 (7) 
and this suggests a further rearrangement of (2) to highlight an indirect adding-up 
identity: 
 
( )
( )
1
1
ˆ
'
'
'
'
R
R
v I A IA
A
A I A
v
v
i
i
−
−
⎡ ⎤
− −⎣ ⎦
−⇒  (8) 
 The LHS of (8) indicates that an ECU’s (European Currency Unit) worth of product 
in any sector of any region goes partly as direct value added to that region (the 
relevant element of 'v ), partly as payment for imports (the relevant column of RA ) 
and partly as payments for the intermediate inputs purchased from any of the sectors 
and regions distinguished in the model (the 15 times 25 components of the relevant 
column in A ).  Of course, intermediate input payments end up themselves as value 
added for some sector/region or as additional import leakages after further rounds of 
inter-industry transactions.  The final direct and indirect distribution of value added 
is indicated on the RHS of (8). A dollar’s worth of production in a sector ultimately 
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leads to a reallocation of the value of intermediate inputs to indirect value added. A 
portion of this dollar’s worth of production leaks from the EU as indirect value added 
to imports. This portion is contained in the relevant column of ( ) 1RA I A −− . The 
portion that is retained within the EU, and is redistributed among the various sectors 
and regions distinguished in the model, is given by the components of the relevant 15 
times 25 element column of ( ) 1vˆ I A I−⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦ .        
The importance of the viewpoint indicated by RHS (8) is especially apparent when 
the various regions are explicitly distinguished.  In the case of the EU model, the 
number of distinct regions is n = 15 countries. Thus the (15 times 25) x (15 times 25) 
coefficient matrix A  is represented in detail by 
 
11 1
1
n
n nn
A A
A
A A
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥⇒ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
L
M M
L
 (9) 
where kjA denotes a 15 x 15 inter-country coefficient matrix depicting flows from 
country k to country j. Using this notation, (8) can be written out in country by 
country detail as 
 
( ) ( )
11 1 1 11 1 1
( ) ( )
1 1
( ) ( )
1 1
1 1
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ
' ' ' '
' '
n n
n n
n n
n nn n n n nn
n n
R Rn R Rn
n n
A A v A v A
A A v A v A
A A A A
v v v v
i i
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⇒
L L
M M M M
L L
L L
L L
 (10) 
where ( ) ( )n nRj Rj R jA A A A= + g g  and the notation on RHS (10), defined in (11) and (12) 
below, makes use of results on partitioned inversion of the Leontief inverse 
developed in Cooper (2000). Specifically, for an n block partition, Cooper shows that 
the Leontief inverse can be represented as 
 1 ( )( ) nI A I A−− = +  (11) 
where ( )nA  is constructed recursively by successive addition of blocks, viz.: 
 ( ) ( 1) ( 1) ( 1) 1 ( 1)( ) , 1,...,i i i i ii ii iA A A I A A i n
− − − − −
= + − =฀ ฀  (12) 
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starting from (0)A A= , where 
1i
i
ni
A
A
A
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
≡ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦฀ M  and [ ]1i i inA A A≡฀ L .   
Apart from computational advantages in multi-country/sector cases and the analytical 
advantage of being able to compute the Leontief inverse for sub-groups of countries 
along the way, the main advantage of this formulation for present purposes is an 
interpretational one. To develop this aspect, note that (11) and (7) imply: 
 ( ) ( )' ' ' 'n nRv A i A I A v i⎡ ⎤+ + + =⎣ ⎦  (13) 
Now ( )nA  is by definition the matrix of sectoral multipliers abstracting from an initial 
unit injection to final demand. Moreover, the double entry accounting ensures that a 
unit of final demand either leaks out of the EU via payment for imports or eventually 
finds its way to a unit of value added somewhere within the various regions 
distinguished in the model. Thus ( )' nv A  measures EU-wide indirect value added. 
Equivalently, by comparison of (13) with (3) we have: 
 ( ) ( )' ' 'n nRi A v A i A A= +  (14) 
so that the total value of within-EU intermediate inputs is fully accounted for either 
by contributing to indirect value added within the EU or by further leakages via 
imports (in successive rounds of inter-industry transactions). 
Utilizing the detail in (9) we may define a 15 x (15 times 25) matrix of partial 
intermediate sums: 
 
11 1
1
' '
' '
n
n nn
i A i A
B
i A i A
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
L
M
L
 (15) 
where the unit vectors in (15) are each 25 element.  Thus, the matrix B  summarises 
the direct intermediate input value flows from sectors (in columns) to whole 
regions/countries in rows and is simply a partial aggregation of the A  matrix with 
the same column totals. From (9) and (15) it follows that ' 'i A i B= . On the other 
hand, given that ( )nA  is constructed from an n = 15 block partitioned system, we can 
represent it in block detail as: 
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( ) ( )
11 1
( )
( ) ( )
1
n n
n
n
n n
n nn
A A
A
A A
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
L
M M
L
 (16) 
and we now wish to use this to define an 15 x (15 times 25) matrix of partial indirect 
value added sums:  
 
( ) ( )
1 11 1 1
( )
( ) ( )
1
' '
' '
n n
n
n
n n
n n n nn
v A v A
B
v A v A
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥
= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
L
M M
L
 (17) 
Thus the matrix ( )nB  is a partially aggregated variant of ( )nA  with value added 
coefficient weights employed in the aggregation across sectors in any given region. 
By construction ( ) ( )' 'n ni B v A= . Given (14) and the definitions (15) and (17) it is also 
obvious that: 
 ( ) ( )' ' 'n nRi B i B i A A= +  (18) 
which expresses in an aggregated form the identity that the value of within-EU 
intermediate inputs is equal to within-EU indirect value added plus indirect import 
leakages. What is equally clear, however, is that there is no necessary reason why the 
individual (region/country specific) elements within (15) and (17) should be related 
in any obvious way. In fact, it is the differences between these elements with which 
we are especially concerned in this analysis. Consider a typical (row vector) element 
in both matrices, say the 1 x 25 row vector ' iji A  in the B  matrix (15) compared to 
( )' ni ijv A  in the 
( )nB  matrix (17). A particular element of these vectors, say the thk , 
relates to the effect of activity within sector k  in country j . The thk  element in ' iji A  
measures the extent to which sector k  in country j  has business links (in the form 
of purchasing relationships) with country i . The value of these within-EU 
intermediate purchases ultimately becomes value added to some sectors in some 
countries within the EU or leaves the EU subsequently as indirect imports. However, 
subject to the overall restriction (18), there is no reason for the indirect value added 
flow resulting from the chain of interactions set off by these intermediate purchases 
to necessarily favour country i . Of particular interest, in fact, are cases where the thk  
element in ( )' ni ijv A  is substantially greater than the corresponding element in ' iji A . 
This can only arise from a further chain of activity that has some degree of focus 
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within country i , which then results in country i  accumulating additional indirect 
value added as a result of a chain of activity which has begun in sector k  of country 
j  but has now switched to interactions within country i . 
Identification of clusters based on supra-critical linkages  
To investigate these types of effects we can construct the difference matrix: 
 ( )nD B B= −  (19) 
Of course, the restriction (18) means that there is a negative sum game with respect 
to the columns of D  - viz. 
 ( )' ' 0 'nRi D i A A= − <  (20) 
Result (20) expresses the fact that final demand for the output of sector k  in country 
j  does have to ultimately translate to a combination of value added somewhere 
within the EU and to leakages via imports. The elements of any column of ( )nB  
represent a reallocation of the values in the corresponding column of B  less indirect 
leakages.  While any element in D  may be either positive or negative, they are (by 
construction) on balance negative since the column sums are negative (at least, non-
positive). 
Given the above, our interest is in elements of D  which are atypically large in size 
(and positive in sign). To pre-empt the results of the analysis of chapter seven 
(below) somewhat, we should note that typically the row vector elements that make 
up the block diagonal in (19) will be negative (and typically relatively large - this is 
invariably true for our results and would commonly be expected although it need not 
necessarily be so). To see why this result is likely and to investigate its implications it 
is useful to exhibit a detailed variant of (19), viz.: 
 
( ) ( )
1 11 11 1 1 1
( ) ( )
1 1
' ' ' '
' ' ' '
n n
n n
n n
n n n n nn nn
v A i A v A i A
D
v A i A v A i A
⎡ ⎤− −⎢ ⎥
= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
− −⎣ ⎦
L
M M
L
 (21) 
The typical block diagonal row vector in D  is ( )' 'nj jj jjv A i A− . The reason why this is 
likely to be a row vector of negative numbers is as follows. The second term ' jji A  
represents the sum of within country direct intermediate inputs for each sector. For 
the most part, these are large compared to cross country intermediate input 
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coefficients (which represent trade in intermediate inputs). Then, as second and third 
round effects are calculated to determine the eventual location of the value added, it 
is clear with a 15 country model that there will be dispersion of value added from 
any country to the 14 other countries with only a small flow back to the originating 
country in general. Thus ( )' nj jjv A  will tend to be smaller than ' jji A  unless there are 
very unusual cross-border inter-sectoral relationships. This, of course, should not be 
seen as a problem for country j . After all, sectoral final demand increases that 
originate in country j  provide direct value added per unit of output as indicated in 
the row vector 'jv . As pointed out, the value of within-country- j  direct intermediate 
inputs ' jji A  is likely to be quite large relative to cross border intermediate inputs 
such as ' iji A  and in subsequent rounds of inter-industry relationships indirect value 
added is likely to be transferred from country j  to other countries such as i  through 
a process of depletion of the value implied by ' jji A  and either addition to the value 
implied by ' iji A  (for i j≠ ) or further EU import leakages.    
This line of reasoning also suggests that if there are positive elements in D , these are 
to be found predominantly in the block off-diagonal row vectors. It is the relative 
sizes of these that will be of interest for identifying one form of clustering. We 
normalize each column of D  by calculating the indirect value added flows as 
percentage changes relative to a base level of potential indirect value added. For the 
base level we take the value of intermediate inputs (that is, based on direct business 
purchasing agreements), since this is the source of indirect value added in subsequent 
rounds of interactions, although it may be depleted by import leakages. Let *D  
denote the 15 x (25 times 15) table of these results. Then: 
 ( ) ฀ 1( )* 100* *( ' )nD B B i B −= −  (22) 
where ฀'i B  denotes a diagonal matrix formed from the vector 'i B . 
The information contained in the matrix *D  will be useful for identifying particular 
countries which need to be examined in greater sectoral detail when attempting to 
determine whether a particular sector, wherever located, is linked through value 
added flows to other sectors to such an extent as to be suggestive of supra-critical 
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cluster relationships. To support the development of this interpretation consider the 
detailed representation: 
 
฀
฀
1
( ) ( )
1 11 11 1 1 1 1
( ) ( ) 1
1 1
' ' ' ' '
* 100*
' ' ' ' '
n n
n n
n n
n n n n nn nn
n
v A i A v A i A i A
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In the thj  column block, the thk  element of the thj  row vector block, 
( ) ( )( )100 * ' ' / 'nj jj jj j kkv A i A i A− ฀  say, is likely to be negative. However, elements of 
the remainder of this column may be positive, although the entire column must be 
non-positive.  A typical such element (the thk  element of the thj  row vector block in 
row i  of *D , for example) is ( ) ( )( )100 * ' ' / 'ni ij ij j kkv A i A i A− ฀ . In fact, the 
interpretation of these elements off the block diagonal is that they represent the 
indirect value added that spills over into other EU countries, relative to the indirect 
value added potentially available for creation, as a result of the fact that activity in 
sector k  of country j  creates flow-on activity in those other EU countries. Since 
there are 14 such ‘other’ countries in this model, plus another region representing the 
rest of the world, and since, once indirect leakages are also accounted for, the sum of 
these effects exactly balances the (typically) negative term 
( ) ( )( )100 * ' ' / 'nj jj jj j kkv A i A i A− ฀ , the total of these within-EU effects can be at most 
( ) ( )( )100* ' ' / 'nj jj jj j kkv A i A i A− − ฀ , although this potential maximum will clearly be 
depleted by indirect imports. Given the potential indirect import depletion, the 
average value of these off diagonal elements is no more than 
( ) ( )( )(1/ )*100* ' ' / 'nj jj jj j kkn v A i A i A− − ฀ .  
From (20) it also follows that, within the thj  column block, the thk  column of D  
sums to the non-positive value ( )( ' ) 0nR j ki A A− ≤฀ , and the corresponding sum for this 
column of *D  is ( )100*( ' ) /( ' ) 0nR j k j ki A A i A− ≤฀ ฀ . As argued above for the matrix D , 
so also for the normalised matrix *D , the block diagonal row vector will typically 
be negative. It will only be in exceptional circumstances that such a term is positive. 
Given these two points, the column sum ( )100*( ' ) /( ' ) 0nR j k j ki A A i A− ≤฀ ฀  also serves 
Chapter 5: A Methodology for Measuring Inter-Country Linkages  
Brian Wixted 155
as a reasonable lower bound for the sum of the off diagonal elements in the thk  
column within the thj  column block of *D .  Let *ijkd  indicate the expected value 
for the ith element ( i j≠ ) in the thk  column within the thj  column block of *D . 
Since there are n–1 such off-diagonal terms, for any given off-row-diagonal elements 
in the thk  column contained in the thj  column block, a reasonable lower bound on 
the average value *ijkd  is 
( )(1/( 1))*100*( ' ) /( ' ) 0nR j k j kn i A A i A− − ≤฀ ฀ . Combining the 
upper and lower bound information on the typical value to expect in off-row-
diagonal terms in *D , we could expect to find that 
( ) ( )( ) ( )(1/( 1))*100*( ' ) /( ' ) * (1/ )*100* ' ' / 'n nR j k j k ijk j jj jj j kkn i A A i A d n v A i A i A− − ≤ ≤ − −฀ ฀ ฀
   (24
Our particular interest is in abnormally large individual effects, which are likely to be 
balanced by a dispersion of lower values for other elements in the same column of 
*D . Because countries will naturally have developed trade links with particular 
partners, it is not likely that the values of ( ) ( )( )100 * ' ' / 'ni ij ij j kkv A i A i A− ฀  for 
1,..., ,i n i j= ≠  will be spread evenly along the continuum indicated by the upper 
and lower bounds for the typical value *ijkd .  It is likely that some (major trading 
partners) will be located above the average upper bound while others (less closely 
linked) will be positioned nearer the average lower bound. However, with successive 
rounds of inter-industry relationships modifying the primary trading relationships, it 
would be expected that there would be some tendency for these “trading partner” 
effects to be ameliorated and for a greater spread in indirect value added adjustments 
to be evident along the continuum. What is much less likely, without the need for 
special explanation, would be to observe elements of *D  which are substantially 
above the average upper bound. Recalling that the average upper bound will be the 
operative average under the extreme assumption that there are no indirect import 
leakages, under this extreme assumption together with the null hypothesis that all 
regions are equally attractive as accumulators of indirect value added within the EU, 
and that the distribution of indirect flows is uniform across the continuum of possible 
linkages, the coefficients on the off-row-diagonal elements of  *D  will lie between 
zero and twice the average upper bound. We therefore use twice the average upper 
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bound as a critical value to assess violations of the null hypothesis and hence indicate 
the presence of special linkages suggestive of a certain form of clustering activity. 
In the normal situation, indirect value added will be less than the value of 
intermediate coefficients because of import leakages. Calculation of cases where 
indirect value added is more than the intermediate coefficients and then more than 
twice the average of available indirect value added would require the complementary 
existence of balancing lower values for other observations. Moreover, they would 
imply that country i  has captured an abnormally large proportion of the available 
indirect value added arising from the chain of activities originating in sector k  of 
country j . This would suggest that sector k  of country j  may well be connected to 
a cluster of industries within country i . There could in fact be several such supra-
critical-value entries for sector k  of country j , suggesting that the originating 
cluster is able to generate returns to trade higher than expected and the user clusters 
have a high dependency on the relevant products indicating one form of trans-border 
clustering.  
Output from the European model is presented both as a coefficients Excel workbook 
and as a final value added percentage based Excel workbook (Results).  The tables of 
results (one for each region) are presented in the form of percentage changes in 
indirect value added from what could have been expected based on the usage of 
direct intermediate inputs as the source of indirect value added under a base case 
assumption in which no modelling of further inter-industry relationships were to 
occur, viz. the matrix *D  described in the previous section. 
Both Excel workbooks are in the same format as the transactions file. For each cell in 
the transaction matrix, there is an equivalent cell in the final outputs matrix. 
Therefore, there are 16 regional square matrices for each of the 15 countries, each 
25*25 cells in the EU model. As noted earlier direct and indirect domestic value 
added arising from an increase in demand are presented separately. The indirect 
effects consist of extra-sectoral spillovers and some intra-sectoral indirect effects 
arising from the interrelationships with all other sectors.  
5.5 Notes on the use of the net value added flows data 
The production of linkage values for every industry (25 in the EU and 33 in the 
OECD models) across 16 regions and 10 regions respectively provides two huge 
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databases. It is possible to conceive of a large number of tests that could be 
developed to run on this dataset. Three analyses have been chosen to provide a 
structured overview of the results to address the central themes of the scale and 
spatial structure of trans-border connections whilst leaving deeper analysis to future 
work that can focus on generating detailed data for case studies. In chapters six 
through nine, the following three styles of analysis are presented: 
• absolute levels of the internationalisation of production by cluster (chapter 
six). 
• national clusters that gain most from trade [supra-critical flows] (chapter 
seven). 
• cluster-to-cluster interdependencies that have high linkage values: 
− transport equipment industry [EU model] and motor vehicles and 
aerospace [OECD model] (chapter eight); and 
− Office and data machines and electronics [EU model] and computers 
and radio, television and communications equipment [OECD model] 
(chapter nine). 
The details of each of these analyses follow. 
The internationalisation of production 
The starting point for the presentation of the results is to summarise them in terms of 
which industries require the most imports per dollar or ECU of value added (chapter 
six). The data collected from the modelling is supplemented by an analysis of the 
characteristics that may account for some higher technology industries requiring high 
levels of imports. 
Supra-critical flows 
Although, within the series of tests conducted for this research project the most 
interesting for descriptive purposes are the results on cluster networks (chapters eight 
& nine), the most intriguing for theory development is the calculation of supra-
critical flows. It has already been shown mathematically in the previous section that 
the difference between the pattern of indirect value added transfers and the pattern of 
intermediate input purchases is a zero sum game. To the extent that there are “big 
winners” from the flow of value added there must correspondingly be either big 
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losers or a sizeable number of small losers. Big winners in this sense provide prima 
facie evidence for the existence of some economic force of agglomeration that 
accumulate during rounds of added processing that leads to a substantially larger 
degree of value added going indirectly to certain regions than would be apparent 
from examination of the direct intermediate transactions pattern in isolation (trade 
ratios). Chapter seven does not identify all the sectors that must be part of supra-
critical ‘value spillover’ clusters, but it does begin the preliminary research task of 
identifying the regions from which such sectors would be drawn. Results for 
initiating sectors (that is, for various initial recipients of a final demand injection) are 
presented in Appendix 5 (below). The finding that some national clusters gain more 
economic value from trade than their direct trade volume would suggest, does not 
imply that all trade partners are not gaining from trade. 
Cluster networks: tightly linked clusters 
The data output of the modelling can be aggregated into tables of inputs into 
industries in the different regions. This reveals how much of a particular industry’s 
value added is imported on a trading partner basis. This produces a web diagram with 
all countries linked to all other countries (to some degree) in a particular industry. 
The data can then be processed to reveal whether the strength of particular linkages 
is significant or weak. This facilitates an analysis of spatial dimensions of cluster 
networking in motor vehicles, aerospace, ICT and electronics production systems. 
One important note is that chapters eight and nine introduce the idea of cluster 
‘hierarchy’. This word is used purely in an economic sense, as does Rose and 
Miernyk, going back to Leontief, who indicates that there are:  
‘four major concepts of structural analysis: interdependence, dependence, hierarchy 
and circularity. The first two refer to the extent to which an economy is composed 
of enclaves or interrelated industries. Hierarchy refers to the economic pattern of 
primary, secondary and tertiary production and their detailed components. 
Circularity, or robustness, refers to the extent of intermediate good requirements 
for production’ (1989: 245). 
Hierarchy is not intended to suggest centres of control, political power, leadership, 
imperial power or other sociological interpretations. It simply refers to the degree to 
which a particular cluster is important to other clusters.   
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6.1 The scale of dependence on intermediate goods 
It has been shown already in the present thesis that the systems of innovation 
research agenda at whatever scale of cluster or nations, has been defined, 
predominantly, within national borders. The research has emphasised the endogenous 
and proximity based characteristics of systemic innovation. Chapter five suggested 
that the structure of multi-spatial systems of innovation could be investigated though 
inter-country input-output modelling. In the next four chapters, a series of different 
perspectives are developed on the role, scale, and spatial structure of inter-regional 
interdependencies, with an interest in testing whether clusters are extending across 
borders,  through the specialisation of locations, globalised products and strong 
linkages between them.  
In this chapter, the data on imports is compared at the level of the aggregate value of 
transfers across borders arising from demand in each industry in each country. As 
such, this chapter is directed to determining one element of the scale of inter-regional 
linkages and highlight one role of imports (embodied technology). The modelling 
results can be used to measure the degree to which each industry in each country 
relies on international inputs (imports) per unit of value added.  
The results of the two models are compared to seek commonalities both for their 
significance to internationalisation debates and as a way of checking the validity of 
the models. One of the outcomes of this analysis is that a number of technology-
based industries have high import requirements, which indicates they have highly 
internationalised supply chains. As these industries are typically perceived as 
knowledge-based and heavily dependent on national or local systems of innovation, 
this is an important result. Analysis presented here begins to examine what is known 
about these industries with the aim of identifying the key characteristics that may 
account for this need for imports. As Pavitt’s (1984) taxonomy of industries proves to 
be a useful tool in understanding which industries require a high volume of imports, 
this chapter concludes with an overview of the demand and export trajectories of the 
OECD in these categories. 
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The structure of results 
Inter-country input-output modelling calculates the spread of value added for any 
given industry across all industries and countries that arises from an increase in 
demand for the products or services of that industry. In this way, it focuses attention 
on the industrial ingredients required to boost production. As an example, an increase 
in the demand for motor vehicles will result in an increase in purchases of rubber, 
plastics, glass, metals of various sorts and electronic components by the motor 
vehicle industry. Some of the required components will be imported. Because the 
approach adopted here has been to group all the value spillovers that stem from all 
industries arising from demand increases in each of the database classifications, into 
national agglomerations, the inter-industry linkages are considered here as national-
meso clusters (see Table 3.3). Figure 6.1 provides a diagrammatic representation of 
the way the import values stemming from industry growth is represented here and in 
later chapters.  
Figure 6.1: Domestic and imported valued added: cluster calculations 
France
Germany
A B C D E
Transport equipment
Germany’s imports from France 
in the transport cluster is calculated
by summing all supplies to Germany
initiated by demand growth in the 
transport industry.
Arrows in this analysis point in the
direction of the value added – goods
flow in the reverse direction.
 
In this chapter and those that follow, the structural patterns of the required 
ingredients is what matters. Therefore, different clusters are compared on the basis of 
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their differing input requirements and source countries rather than on the dollar or 
Euro value of their trade per se. The analysis is also restricted to production activities 
and does not include any investigation of trading patterns in finished goods (final 
demand).  
6.2 Industry import requirements 
The most straightforward methodology for examining the data output of the 
modelling is to look for industries that incorporate the highest levels of imports as a 
percentage of total value added and whether there are commonalities in industry lists 
across countries. It was decided that the best way to do this was to collate a list of the 
top five importing industries for each country, irrespective of the actual percentage 
value of those imports. It is noted that this approach potentially includes some 
industries that have a lower import value than industries in other countries which are 
outside of the top five importers. However, this approach was useful as a means of 
normalising for country differences (smaller countries have a tendency to have 
higher import ratios) when there are so few countries available for analysis. The ‘top 
5’ was a practical number to test for commonalities across countries (as can be seen 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2) as the profile of industries which result covers  industries 
which have a high frequency and some that arise as isolated examples. The next four 
tables are all based on the analysis of the import requirements of the top five 
national-meso clusters in each country. 
• 6.1: lists the top five importing clusters by initiating industry by their 
frequency in the results from the OECD model. 
• 6.2: lists the top five importing clusters by initiating industry by their 
frequency in the results from the EU 15 model. 
• 6.3: lists the top five importing clusters by country with their respective 
import share as a percentage of value added (OECD model). 
• 6.4: lists the top five importing clusters by country with their respective 
import share as a percentage of value added (EU 15 model). 
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Table 6.1 OECD national meso-clusters: prevalence in the top five 
importers 
National meso clusters #/9 
No. in top 5 / out of possible 9 instances  
Petroleum & coal products 8 
Non-ferrous metals 6 
Textiles, apparel & leather 5 
Motor vehicles 5 of 8 countries 
Industrial chemicals 4 
Office & computing machinery 4 of 7 countries 
Aircraft 4 
Radio, TV & communication equip 3 of 7 countries 
Other transport 2 
Wood products & furniture 1 
Paper, paper products & printing 1 
Rubber & plastic products 1 
Shipbuilding & repairing 1 
Total (9countries*5=45) 45 
Note: The OECD tables have missing values for some industries. E.g. the Australian data has Office 
and computing combined with Radio, TV & communications equip. This reduces the no. of possible 
instances. 
Table 6.2: EU national-meso clusters: prevalence in the top five importers 
National meso clusters 
#/15 
No. in top 5 / out of 15 possible instances 
Transport equipment 12 
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear 10 
Rubber and plastic products 10 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals 9 
Chemical products 9 
Office and data processing machines 6 
Maritime and air transport services 5 
Fuel and power products 4 
Electrical goods 3 
Recovery, repair services, wholesale, retail 2 
Services of credit and insurance institutions 2 
Metal products except machinery 1 
Agricultural and industrial machinery 1 
Paper and printing products 1 
Total (15 countries*5=75) 75 
Each cluster has the possibility of appearing 9 times in the OECD model (for most 
industries) or 15 times in the EU model. Tables 6.1 and 6.2 reveal that a list of the 
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top five importing industries (by the percentage of imported value added) for each 
country produces a spread of clusters, some with a high frequency and a few 
represented only in one country. Thus, in the OECD 1990 model only one country 
did not have the petroleum and coal cluster in its list of top five importing industries. 
Table 6.3 reveals that, that country as the United Kingdom. This is logical as the UK 
has access to North Sea oil and thus an important national source. In contrast, 
shipbuilding only appeared in the list for one country (Canada). In the EU model, 
transport equipment appears in the list for 12 out of 15 countries. The countries in 
which the transport equipment cluster does not have a high degree of dependency on 
imports, relative to other clusters (Germany, Greece and Ireland), is an interesting 
selection of countries (see Table 6.4). These three can be understood to a limited 
extent. Germany as it has an economically powerful national production system it 
has little dependency on other systems, it doesn’t appear for Ireland because it has 
five other clusters with very high import values and Greece probably because it has a 
small under-developed economy.  
The list of top five importing national-meso clusters by country is provided in Tables 
6.3 and 6.4. These tables also report actual imported value added percentages. 
Appendix 4 presents the import values for all industries in all countries in the two 
models. The degree of dependency on intermediate imports is a little surprising for a 
few of these clusters given the emphasis on national and local systems that are so 
prevalent in the literature.  
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Table 6.3: OECD Top 5 Industries by the level of international value spillovers by country (% of every $USD of value added) 
Country Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Australia Radio, TV, comms 0.32 Motor vehicles 0.27 TCF 0.23 Industrial chemicals 0.22 Petroleum 0.22 
Canada Office & computing 0.51 Motor vehicles 0.50 Radio, TV & comms 0.39 Petroleum 0.37 Shipbuilding 0.32 
Denmark Petroleum 0.53 Non-ferrous metals 0.44 Industrial chemicals 0.39 TCF 0.39 Other transport 0.39 
France Non-ferrous metals 0.44 Petroleum 0.37 Aircraft 0.33 Rubber & plastic 0.33 Office & computing 0.31 
Germany Petroleum 0.44 Non-ferrous metals 0.39 TCF 0.25 Paper & printing 0.23 Industrial chemicals 0.23 
Japan Petroleum 0.51 Non-ferrous metals 0.43 Aircraft 0.30 Industrial chemicals 0.19 Wood products 0.18 
Netherlands Petroleum 0.63 Aircraft 0.59 TCF 0.53 Motor vehicles 0.50 Other transport 0.47 
UK_ Office & computing 0.37 Non-ferrous metals 0.33 Aircraft 0.32 TCF 0.32 Motor vehicles 0.32 
USA Petroleum 0.27 Office & computing 0.17 Motor vehicles 0.15 Non-ferrous metals 0.15 Radio, TV & comms equip 0.13 
Table 6.4: EU Top 5 Industries by the level of international value spillovers by country (% of every EU of value added) 
 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5 
Austria TCF 0.519 Transport equip 0.501 Chemical prods 0.487 Ores & base metals 0.484 Rubber & plastics 0.482 
Belgium Ores & base metals 0.662 Transport equip 0.631 Fuel and power prods 0.617 Chemical prods 0.574 TCF 0.571 
Denmark Maritime & air trans 0.581 Transport equip 0.429 TCF 0.389 Ores & base metals 0.377 Electrical goods 0.344 
Finland Transport equip 0.357 TCF 0.336 Credit & insurance 0.109 Rubber & plastics 0.378 Wholesale & retail 0.121 
France Ores & base metals 0.220 Transport equip 0.196 TCF 0.178 Rubber & plastics 0.164 Chemical prods 0.156 
Germany Maritime & air trans 0.282 TCF 0.239 Fuel & power prods 0.224 Chemical prods 0.205 Paper and printing prods 0.196 
Greece Ores & base metals 0.423 Electrical goods 0.337 Fuel & power prods 0.333 Metal prods  0.312 Chemical prods 0.312 
Ireland Office & data mach 0.613 Rubber & plastics 0.507 Maritime & air trans 0.453 industrial machinery 0.451 TCF 0.450 
Italy Ores & base metals 0.391 Office & data mach 0.351 Rubber & plastics 0.330 Chemical prods 0.320 Transport equip 0.317 
Luxembourg Transport equip 0.764 TCF 0.314 Credit & insurance 0.270 Rubber & plastics 0.588 Wholesale, retail 0.086 
Netherlands TCF 0.471 Maritime & air trans 0.466 Transport equip 0.450 Rubber & plastics 0.418 Ores & base metals 0.388 
Portugal Transport equip 0.393 Electrical goods 0.347 Office & data mach 0.309 Rubber & plastics 0.290 Ores & base metals 0.285 
Spain Maritime & air trans 0.429 Office & data mach 0.399 Transport equip 0.351 Ores & base metals 0.342 Chemical prods 0.333 
Sweden Fuel & power prods 0.482 Office & data mach 0.460 Chemical prods 0.428 Transport equip 0.395 Rubber & plastics 0.392 
UK TCF 0.310 Transport equip 0.299 Rubber & plastics 0.277 Office & data mach 0.275 Chemical prods 0.265 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals – shortened to’ ores and base metals’ for convenience. 
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Concentrating on those industries that have a high re-occurrence in the top five 
importers for each model, it is possible to compare results. Table 6.5 selects those 
clusters which occur in 60% of possibilities (5 or more cases in the OECD model and 
9 or more for the EU model).  
Table 6.5: Similarities of industries in the top 5 in the two models 
 Industry Occurrences Matches
OECD model Petroleum & coal products 8/9  
OECD model Non-ferrous metals 6/9 -- 
OECD model Textiles, apparel & leather 5/9 ? 
OECD model Motor vehicles 5/9 ? 
OECD model Office machines, 4/7 ? 
EU model Transport 12/15 ? 
EU model Textiles & clothing, leather & footwear 10/15 ? 
EU model Rubber and plastic products 10/15  
EU model Chemical products 9/15  
EU model Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals 9/15 -- 
EU model Office and data machines 6/15 ? 
 
Three clusters are common to both the OECD model and the EU model, with one 
OECD based classification (non-ferrous metals) included as a subset of the wider EU 
NACE-CLIO category of Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals. As Table 6.5 
provides an approximate sensitivity analysis for the two models, it is reassuring that 
the two models have produced similar results. In both models, a relatively limited 
number of industries appear to have the highest requirement for imported 
intermediate goods. The level of statistical aggregation matters here, as different 
segments of a particular industry may be more or less reliant on imports. For 
example, the petroleum industry is well known to be dependent on resources from 
the Middle East, Africa and the North Atlantic. However, in the EU data, fuel and 
power, which is a much more nationally based activity, because it includes domestic 
power generation, is combined with petroleum. This combination has a low value 
added spillover (imports) score. Curiously, for 10 of the 15 European countries the 
import propensity for fuels and power are rated within the band of 12th -17th place of 
the 25 NACE CLIO industry classifications, perhaps suggesting some similarity for 
the co-efficient of petroleum imports in the overall system structure. 
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A short story of aluminium production 
The international input-output modelling results presented above demonstrates that 
non-ferrous metals (alumina, aluminium and gold etc) production is one of the most 
internationalised industries78 for which data are available. However, even this highly 
competitive and cost-based industry offers some opportunities for innovation system 
development. 
Box 2: Mozambique’s Mozal aluminium smelter
79 
Production outsourcing 
The example of aluminium production offers the chance to present a case study that 
highlights a little of both the nature of this industry and the possibilities for linked 
clustering and innovation. Billiton was80 a British-headquartered global metals and 
mining company with significant operations in South Africa. During the 1990s it 
negotiated with the Mozambican Government to construct an aluminium smelter 
near the capital, Maputo. The first stage of the Mozal (Mozambique Aluminium) was 
completed in 2000. By the end of 2003 the second stage of the plant, which will 
double production was nearing completion. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2004_e/section4_e/iv01.xls WTO reports non-ferrous 
global trade of US$127b in 2003 – approx one third of TCF trade and 18% of auto products. 
79 This case study was developed from a number of conversations with Government officials, 
information on the Mozal website at www.mozal.com and statistics analysed for Garrett-Jones, 
Wixted, and Turpin (2003). 
80 The Australian company BHP and Billiton merged in 2001 to form BHP Billiton. The new 
company is headquartered in Australia. See www.bhpbilliton.com  
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Figure 6.2: Comparison of industry output in Mozambique’s manufacturing 
sector 
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Source: Data from Table 4.3 in See Garrett-Jones, Wixted, and Turpin (2003). 
Alumina (processed bauxite) is shipped from Australia to Mozambique. The alumina 
is manufactured into 25 kg aluminium ingots at the Mozal processing plant and then 
exported predominantly to Europe. Aluminium processing consumes vast amounts of 
electricity which in this case is bought from the Southern African grid. Mozambique 
with significant hydroelectric power production sells into this grid.  
Mozal’s output in 2002 was approximately half of the manufacturing output81 of 
Mozambique. 
Possibilities for backwards engineering the innovation system 
Under the agreement with the Mozambican Government, within a relatively short 
period of time the Mozal plant should be operated completely by local staff. Serious 
efforts are therefore being made to upgrade the capabilities of the local teaching 
institutions. This includes improving the standards at the university engineering 
department to equip graduates with the skills necessary to keep a modern production 
plant operating at maximum effectiveness and efficiency. 
                                                 
81 See Garrett-Jones, Wixted, and Turpin (2003). 
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By the standards of an industrialised country’s developed set of innovation systems, 
this may not seem significant. However, the Mozal operations gives one of the 
poorest countries in the world82 an opportunity to begin organising a set of 
supporting learning infrastructures around internal markets (initially labour but also, 
hopefully, in time, supplier businesses), supporting one link in an competitive 
international supply system. 
6.3 A technological interpretive framework 
It has been argued by some, notably Audretsch and Feldman that knowledge and 
production activities cluster when new knowledge and knowledge spillovers are 
important. 
‘Indeed, we find that a key determinant of the extent to which the location of 
production is geographically concentrated is the relative importance of new 
economic knowledge in the industry. Even after controlling for the concentration of 
production we find evidence that industries in which knowledge spillovers are 
more prevalent – that is where industry R&D, university research and skilled labor 
are the most important – have a greater propensity for innovative activity to cluster 
than industries where knowledge externalities are less important’ (1996: 639). 
If industries that rely on new knowledge and which thus have relatively greater 
levels of research and development expenditure are more likely to cluster, they might 
be expected to import less if, as seems likely, clusters have been assumed to be 
synonymous with value chains. The relationship between technology and imports 
might then look something like that depicted in Figure 6.3. 
                                                 
82 See Human Development Report  (UNDP 2001).) www.undp.org  . 
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Figure 6.3: Conceptual relationship between technology and production 
imports 
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Instead, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 have already revealed that a number of high technology 
national-meso clusters can have high requirements for imports. This highlights an 
important disjuncture between the research on geographic space and high technology 
industries and the evidence generated from assessing the need for imports. 
Nevertheless, expected industries (e.g. textiles etc) that are driven by cost-based 
competitiveness, and which import from low wage countries, did appear on the lists 
in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. Importantly, however, whilst the production fragmentation 
literature (see chapter four) is most interested in the movement of production to 
lower cost production centres, much of the reported imported value added in the 
models presented here stems from high-income economies.  
At the very least, the tabulations suggest the existence of three high import intensity 
categories. These appear to be based around production costs (TCF), resources and 
resource processing (petroleum and non-ferrous metals) and those which are 
relatively technology intensive (motor vehicles, computers and aircraft). To process 
the data on imports two existing taxonomies of industry and innovation activity have 
been utilised in the first instance. These approaches are R&D intensity (the level of 
R&D expenditure as a percentage of industries value added) and Pavitt’s taxonomy 
of the innovation drivers of industry (1984). Stemming from the results gained from 
these analyses, it became necessary to develop the outline of a technological 
complexity (technological breadth v technological depth) based approach to 
classifying industries.  
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R&D intensity 
The R&D intensity measure of technology has been widely used as an indicator of 
innovativeness across at least two decades (see Sandven and Smith 1998 and OECD 
2003b). The collection of data on research and development expenditure at the 
industry level has facilitated the development of a classification of industry based on 
the intensity of their scientific knowledge inputs. The standard groups are high, 
medium and low technology, although the medium technology group is now 
commonly broken into high and low. The advantage of this approach is that it is 
empirically driven, in that it is based objectively on the average OECD R&D 
intensity for each industry, it can be calculated for most OECD countries and it can 
be updated regularly.  
As Figure 6.4 reveals, the international averages for industry R&D in the OECD, do 
separate into broadly dissimilar agglomerations. Low technology R&D intensities are 
quite tightly packed in the bottom left hand corner of the chart, whilst the high 
technology group averages are quite dispersed across the top right quadrant. 
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Figure 6.4: OECD analysis of R&D intensity 
 
Source: Redrawn from data in OECD (2001: 138) 
There are, however, problems with the R&D intensity categories devised by the 
OECD. Typically, the categories are adopted as if all countries had similar patterns of 
R&D intensity. This is not the case and Table 6.6 highlights (by shadings) those 
industries with R&D intensities substantially different from the OECD R&D 
intensity groups (shown in Figure 6:3). 
Chapter 6: The Internationalisation of Production 
Brian Wixted 173
Table 6.6: Classification of manufacturing industries based on R&D intensity R&D intensity(1) for 13 OECD countries, 1991-97 average 
 Total(2) USA Canada Japan Europe(2) Germany France Italy UK Spain Sweden Denmark Norway Finland Ireland(3) 
High-technology industries                   
Aircraft and spacecraft 14.2   14.6   10.1   9.9   14.6   28.1   14.1   11.9   9.3   16.0   15.3   ..   (4) 0.9   0.9   ..   (4) 
Pharmaceuticals 10.8   12.4   7.4   9.6   10.0   8.4   8.7   6.0   18.6   3.1   21.5   14.8   11.8   14.0   5.2   
Office, accounting & 
computing machinery 9.3   14.7   6.8   7.5   4.3   7.5   5.6   7.2   2.0   2.6   12.0   5.4   7.8   3.1   0.6   
Radio, television and 
communication equipment 8.0   8.6   12.7   6.0   10.2   13.0   10.3   11.7   5.2   6.3   17.8   7.7   25.7   11.4   8.6   
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments 7.3   7.9   ..   (5) 8.1   5.9   6.1   11.1   1.0   3.5   2.1   8.2   6.1   3.1   7.0   2.0   
Medium-high-technology 
industries                   
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus, n.e.c. 3.9   4.1   0.9   6.8   2.4   2.4  2.6   1.0   4.8   0.9   2.6   1.5   2.0   4.5   1.7   
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 3.5   4.5   0.2   3.1   3.6   4.6   3.2   3.3   2.9   0.8   6.1   ..   (6) 1.8   1.8   1.2   
Chemicals excluding 
pharmaceuticals 3.1   3.1   0.8   4.7   2.5   4.4   2.4   0.8   2.5   0.6   2.2   1.7   2.2   2.8   0.4   
Railroad equipment and 
transport equipment 2.4   ..   (7) 0.2   2.6   2.6   5.5   2.6   1.2   1.5   1.2   2.5   0.3   0.8   9.4   0.0   
Machinery and equipment, 
n.e.c. 1.9   1.8   1.2   2.2   1.8   2.3   2.0   0.5   2.1   1.0   4.0   3.2   2.6   2.4   1.1   
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Medium-low-technology 
industries                   
Coke, refined petroleum 
products & nuclear fuel 1.0   1.3   0.6   0.7   0.9   0.3   0.9   0.3   2.9   0.4   0.4   ..   (4) 0.8   0.8   ..   (4) 
Rubber and plastic products 0.9   1.0   0.4   ..   (8) 0.8   0.9   1.6   0.5   0.4   0.5   1.5   0.8   0.7   1.7   0.8   
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 0.9   0.8   0.2   2.2   0.5   0.7   0.8   0.1   0.5   0.2   0.9   0.4   0.5   1.4   0.9   
Building and repairing of ships 
and boats 0.9   ..   (7) 0.0   0.8   0.9   1.4   0.4   1.2   0.7   1.5   2.0   0.8   0.5   0.7   1.2   
Basic metals 0.8   0.4   0.6   1.3   0.6   0.6   1.1   0.3   0.4   0.2   0.8   0.6   1.5   0.7   0.4   
Fabricated metal products, 
except machinery 0.6   0.7   0.4   0.8   0.4   0.5   0.5   0.2   0.4   0.2   0.8   0.2   0.5   1.1   0.9   
Low-technology industries                   
Manufacturing, n.e.c. and 
recycling 0.4   0.6   ..   (5) 0.4   0.3   0.5   0.4   0.1   0.2   0.2   0.3   2.3   0.4   0.7   0.4   
Wood, pulp, paper, paper, 
printing & publishing 0.3   0.5   0.2   0.4   0.2   0.1   0.1   0.0   0.1   0.1   0.7   0.1   0.3   0.5   0.2   
Food, beverages & tobacco 0.3   0.3   0.2   0.7   0.2   0.2   0.3   0.1   0.4   0.1   0.4   0.4   0.3   0.6   0.4   
Textiles, textile products, 
leather and footwear 0.3   0.2   0.4   0.7   0.2   0.5   0.3   0.0   0.2   0.1   0.5   0.1   0.6   0.6   1.0   
Total manufacturing  2.5   3.1   1.2   2.8   1.9   2.5   2.4   0.8   2.1   0.6   3.7   1.6   1.4   1.9   1.0   
Original Data source: OECD (2001a) Annex 1.2.   
OECD note 1.  R&D intensity defined as direct R&D expenditures as a percentage of production (gross output). 
OECD note 2.  Aggregate R&D intensities calculated after converting countries' R&D expenditures and production using 1995 GDP PPPs. 
OECD note 3.  Production from industrial surveys. 
OECD note 4.  ISIC 23 and 353 not available for Denmark and Ireland. 
OECD note 5.  ISIC 36-37 production includes ISIC 33 for Canada. 
OECD note 6.  ISIC 34 included in ISIC 35 for Denmark. 
OECD note 7.  R&D expenditures in "Shipbuilding" (351) is included in "Other Transport" (352+359) for the United States. 
OECD note 8.  ISIC 25 production does not include plastics for Japan. 
Notes: The shaded areas have been added to highlight performances outside the average band ranges for the High and Medium-High groups. The High technology group is 
7% and above whilst the Medium-High technology group is between 2%-4.5%.  
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At the country level, there are wide discrepancies between the OECD average and 
individual country performance. Despite these limitations, R&D intensity is a useful 
metric to begin to exploring patterns of production internationalised.  
Table 6.7 breaks down the top five internationalised industries for each country by 
their position in the R&D intensity classification. In chapter five it was explained 
why the EU industry categories are not as helpful for analytical purposes as those 
developed by the OECD and for this reason, here slightly more emphasis should be 
placed on the outcome from the OECD model than the outcome from the EU model. 
Table 6.7: R&D intensity – No. of top 5 importing national-meso clusters by 
model 
Classification EU (#/75) OECD (#/45) 
High Technology 9 11 
Medium-High Technology 22 11 
Medium-Low Technology^ 24 16 
Low Technology 11 7 
Services 9 0 
Note: as each country provides five industries there are 75 counts for the EU 15 and 45 counts for the 
OECD.  
Within Table 6.7 comparisons of the actual numbers can only be made inside a 
column but the broad profile can be compared across the columns. Curiously, whilst 
there are differences between the EU model and the OECD model, there is a sense in 
which the results even out. Leaving aside services, the high technology and low 
technology categories are both at the bottom end of the distribution, high technology 
having the lowest in the EU model and low technology the fewest representatives in 
the OECD model. In the EU results medium-high and medium low have very similar 
results, whilst medium high is the same as high tech in the OECD.  
Clusters in the Medium low category account for highest frequency of highest 
importers in both models.   
The application of this methodology was unexpectedly limited in its ability to 
illuminate the drivers of production internationalisation. Neither low nor high 
technology industries appear to be any more represented that the other. Two 
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industries in the high technology group, instruments and pharmaceuticals83, are not 
intensively internationalised at all, whilst the other two, aircraft and computers do 
make it to the list in a number of countries. At the other end of the spectrum in the 
low technology industries, food and beverages retains a strong local focus, but 
textiles, clothing and footwear is intensely internationalised. The medium-high 
technology industry of industrial machinery (machinery n.e.c.) does not make it to 
the list of high importers, whilst the medium-low group of industries, with many 
resource based processing industries, has the highest score of high import clusters for 
both models.   
Returning to the proposition posed by Audretsch and Feldman (1996) that new 
knowledge matters for clustering, this can be examined by testing for a correlation 
between R&D intensities and the imported value added scores. Figure 6.5 is a scatter 
chart plotting R&D intensity (X axis) against the percentage of value added being 
imported (Y axis), generated from the OECD model, for Canada, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Japan, UK and the USA, for manufacturing based clusters.   
Figure 6.5: R&D intensity to imported Value Added percentage scatter. 
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83 Remembering this comment refers to the importance of imports and does not refer to the spread of 
production centres around the world or the ownership structures of relevant firms. 
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The scatter appears to be basically random. This is in contrast to the original 
speculation, represented in Figure 6.3, that high technology industries, based in new 
knowledge formation may have relied less on imports that lower technology 
industries. Instead, all variations of possibilities seem to be visible. At this 
aggregated level of industry data, the broad explanatory power of R&D intensity for 
the degree to which value is captured nationally thus appears to be poor. 
Pavitt’s industry & innovation taxonomy 
The absence of any strong association between R&D and imported value added 
makes it necessary to search for other analytical tools, perhaps developed on 
different basis. There have been a number of attempts to develop taxonomies of 
manufacturing industry that are an alternative to the one based on R&D intensities, 
but none of them have been widely adopted. One of the more useful approaches was 
put forward by Pavitt (1984).  
Pavitt’s taxonomy (1984), whilst being widely referenced has suffered from the 
degree of difficulty in updating it, or applying it to countries other than the UK – 
which is inherent in its original methodology and from a dearth of further 
development84. The taxonomy was based on an analysis of a database compiled by 
the Science Policy Research Unit of business innovations. Pavitt’s examination of 
innovations enabled him to categorise the innovations on the basis of their 
characteristics: explaining ‘similarities and differences amongst sectors in the 
sources, nature and impact of innovations, defined by the sources of knowledge 
inputs, by the size and principal lines of activity of innovating firms, and by the 
sectors of innovations’ production and main use’(1984: 343). 
From this analysis he suggested four sectoral innovation types: 
• Supplier-dominated (agriculture & traditional manufactures such as 
textiles); 
• Scale-intensive (bulk materials [metals etc], autos etc); 
• Specialised-suppliers (machinery and instruments); and 
• Science-based (electronics, electrical and chemicals). 
                                                 
84 with notable exceptions DeBresson et al. (1996) and Marsilli and Verspagen 2002 
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Later the OECD (1996c) modified this taxonomy in a way that has some benefits 
because it separates out two groups of process-based industries, namely: 
• Resource-intensive (food, beverages & tobacco, wood products, petroleum 
refining, non-metallic minerals, and non-ferrous metals); 
• Labour-intensive (TCF, fabricated metal products, and other manufactures), 
• Specialised-supplier (non-electrical machinery, electrical machinery, 
communications and semi-conductors); 
• Scale-intensive (paper & printing, chemicals, rubber & plastics, iron & 
steel, shipbuilding, motor vehicles, and other transport); and  
• Science-based (aerospace; computers; pharmaceuticals and instruments) 
This OECD taxonomy remains unsatisfactory because the methodology behind the 
revisions and the data for updating it are obscure. Further, as the data on 
internationalisation (above) reveals non-ferrous metals processing plants are not 
necessarily co-located with the resource base and thus this should therefore be 
treated as a special case and arbitrarily moved from the resource-intensive category 
back to scale intensive (where Pavitt had originally located it). Although there are no 
perfect taxonomies of industry – the design and usefulness depends upon on the 
purpose, Table 6.8 (which repeats the procedure used for 6.7) indicates that the 
modified Pavitt is quite useful in identifying some commonalities of high mport 
industries.  
Table 6.8: Modified Pavitt taxonomy – counts of top five internationalised clusters 
 EU model # / 75 OECD model # / 45 
Science based 6 8 
Specialised supplier 4 3 
Scale intensive* 41 20 
Labour intensive 11 5 
Resource intensive* 4 9 
Note: Based on OECD definitions but *Resource intensive modified to remove non-ferrous metals 
and put it back into the scale intensive group. 
In contrast to categories based on R&D intensity, the profile generated from the 
modified Pavitt taxonomy is much more persuasive. On this analysis scale 
intensiveness is clearly an important variable in considering the internationalisation 
of production – accounting for nearly four times more cluster counts than the next 
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nearest EU model), whilst in the OECD model it accounts for twice as many. This 
has considerable logic to it – production configured on the basis of large volumes of 
merchandise may need quantities of inputs that cannot be all supplied locally. A few 
scale-based sectors are based on resource processing with minerals likely to account 
for a large percentage of the imports and which could be sourced from either a wide 
range of developing economies or high income resource-based economies such as 
Australia and Canada.  
Whilst Pavitt’s taxonomy was based in a combination of assessing the knowledge 
inputs and product users, and the derivation of the OECD taxonomy is unclear, it is 
possible that what be considered as secondary factors may be important. For 
example, aerospace is defined as science-based but it may rely also on the scale of 
operations. Therefore, two secondary factors to start testing for include be capital and 
R&D. Figure 6.6 was designed to explore for a connection between capital intensity 
(a measure of scale intensiveness) and R&D intensity (science base) for six large 
OECD countries. The top right quadrant of Figure 6.6 groups industries that are high 
in knowledge and capital requirements  
A few of the national-meso clusters that appear in the top right quadrant of Figure 
6.6, such as motor vehicles, office and computing and radio and communications 
have high import requirements, yet the  pharmaceuticals and instruments clusters do 
not. In the bottom right quadrant are a number of industries which in the modified 
Pavitt taxonomy appear as either scale based or resource based. These results suggest 
that capital intensity is a reasonable starting proxy for a data driven approach to the 
notion of scale intensity. 
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Figure 6.6: Average of R&D and capital intensity for OECD large economies 
 
Data source: OECD STAN Database 2002c and 2003c. Note: countries included are Canada, France, 
Germany, UK and the USA. Tables for Japan do not yet include Gross Fixed Capital Formation. 
Note: Capital intensity was calculated over a five year period 1996-2000 as a share of value added. 
Figure 6.6 reveals that capital intensity and R&D intensity together do isolate a 
number of the technology-based high import industries. The exceptions are, in 
particular, aerospace, which does fit the high import group but surprisingly its capital 
intensity is not very high, pharmaceuticals and instruments both have high capital 
and R&D requirements but do not fit in the high import group.  Intuitively, what 
separates aerospace from pharmaceuticals is the complex integration of components 
versus a simpler manufacturing process which can be located in any number of 
countries. Is it then possible to measure the degree of the complexity of intermediate 
goods? 
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Complex technologies 
One dimension of the argument on technological complexity focuses on the 
geographic fragmentation of product design and development and manufacturing. 
Pavitt (2003a and 2003b) has argued that there is an ongoing process of 
geographically decoupling product design and manufacturing. Such a trend, he 
argued, would result in the separation of corporations that build components and 
companies that are ‘system integrators’. Pavitt proposes that the resulting multi-
organisational structure of production will reinforce an observed trend towards the 
outsourcing of factories to developing countries. The possibility of the fragmentation 
of production splintering amongst industrialised countries, rather than to the 
developing world, each with their own knowledge bases and specialisations was not 
part of Pavitt’s analysis. Pavitt’s argument of decoupling R&D from production is a 
direct continuation of the arguments of Patel and Pavitt’s earlier arguments (1991) 
that technology development was ‘non-globalised’ because it was strongly related to 
home nation technological specialisations. Curiously, the concept that clusters in 
advanced economies could be technologically specialised and fit within networks of 
nodes is also consistent with the evidence that countries and clusters maintain their 
specialisations across time.   
The geographic distribution of knowledge and production is one dimension, the 
breadth and depth of that knowledge formation, which according to Wang & 
Tunzelmann (2000) can be seen in technological complexity, markets, products, 
production processes and administration and management (p813) is a second 
dimension. Some products require a wide spread of capabilities, in contrast to others 
that require deep knowledge of just a few scientific fields. The concept of Wang & 
Tunzelmann (2000) is a good one and one that is relevant to the problem of 
production fragmentation. There is, however, a wide gap between the fledgling 
concept and the availability of data.  
To address this gap, for the present project, a unique data set created by Patel and 
Pavitt (1991) on the patenting structures of large corporations in a range of 
industries was re-configured. Patel and Pavitt devised an indicator system to 
designate whether a corporation’s patenting competency in a patent technology class 
was marginal (1 point), background (2 points), niche (3 points) or core (4 points). 
The data in their 1991 paper has been reconfigured here (Figure 6.7) to analyse 
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technological breadth and depth. The specialisation scores were summed for a count 
of technological activity breadth, whilst the count of core and niche strengths was 
tallied to indicate the degree of technological depth. Thus: 
• The X axis measures the total count of all patenting competency scores 
allocated by Patel and Pavitt for each industry. An industry with one of each 
type of competency (1, 2, 3 & 4 would score 10 points). Higher counts can 
therefore be achieved by either a number of high scores (patent classes – 
specialisation) or a large number of lower scores across a wide spread of 
patent classes). 
• The Y axis is a count of the number of patenting classes in which industries 
achieved a 3 or 4 on the measure of technological strength (i.e. niche or core 
strengths on Patel and Pavitt’s measure).  Therefore, the industry in the 
example above would score 2 points. 
Therefore for an industry to score in the top right hand quadrant, it must have a high 
total count of patent activity (x axis) and it must have a high number of patenting 
niche or core strengths.  
Figure 6.7: Patenting strengths and concentrations 
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Computing and instruments are high R&D intensive industries with a lower 
technology depth and breadth – both with similar capital intensities (Figure 6.6). 
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They both have a relatively low aggregate patent specialisation count (X axis) with a 
moderately low degree of concentration – only 3 patent classes received a 3 or a 4 (Y 
axis). The result for computing might be because the original data was restricted to 
the major companies and/or because patenting in the computer industry only delivers 
limited benefits – due to the speed of technological change, and is hence not as 
commonly adopted as other industries such as pharmaceuticals. That industry by 
contrast is an example of an industry highly focussed on technological depth. It has 
five patent classes with a score of three or four but it has a lower aggregate 
specialisation than the instruments and computing. As 18 of the pharmaceuticals 
industry’s 21 patenting points came in niche and core strengths, the assessment that 
technological depth is important to its competitiveness, appears accurate. Aircraft 
companies which have the same number of technological specialisations have an 
accumulated patent specialisation score of 46, which is more than twice that of 
pharmaceuticals. The chemicals industry has the largest spread of niche and core 
strengths (7 patent classes), whilst patenting by firms in the motor vehicles industry 
have neither a high degree of patenting breadth or depth.   
This analysis is not wholly satisfactory, as it is based on very old data, albeit 
appropriate to the modelling analysis conducted here. It is however, one way with 
existing data (Patel and Pavitt 1991) to separate industries on the basis of 
technological specialisation based in depth or breadth. The analysis succeeded in its 
goals as it did separate, analytically, various industries on the basis of their patenting 
profile. Especially relevant was the new information that was derived on the 
pharmaceuticals and aerospace industry, which are both science-based (Pavitt 1984) 
but low and high importing cluster respectively (I-O modelling). 
6.4 Broad international industry trends  
Because the modified Pavitt taxonomy proved to be useful for the analysis above, 
this section presents data on the trajectories for apparent consumption85 (demand) 
and exports across the five taxonomic categories for the OECD to understand any 
macro trends for these activities. The shaded areas in the charts that follow represent 
the area between the highest and lowest shares of consumption or exports as a 
percentage of GDP for OECD countries. 
                                                 
85 Demand has been defined here as production (sales) – exports (overseas sales) + imports. 
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Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 – Labour intensive: 
Figure 6.8: Labour-intensive apparent consumption 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Figure 6.9: Labour-intensive exports 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Across OECD countries, there is a general downward trend in the percentage of GDP 
devoted to consuming products such as textile, clothing, leather and footwear. The 
trend appears to be consistent to both those countries at the low end of consumption 
and also those at the high end. In contrast, the highest exporters of labour intensive 
industries have shown no downward secular trend, beyond business cycles between 
the mid 1980s and mid 1990s. Given this is OECD countries, this result is surprising. 
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Figure 6.10 and Figure 6.11 – Resource intensive: 
Figure 6.10: Resource-intensive apparent consumption 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Figure 6.11: Resource-intensive exports 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
As with the trajectory for labour intensive industries, the consumption of resource 
based products has been consistently declining as a share of GDP – at both the high 
and low ends of the scale.  
Exports at the high end of OECD activity have gone through a series of business 
cycles from the 1970s. The range, however, goes from countries with essentially no 
export profile of resource intensive industries, through to significant exporters such 
as Australia and Canada. 
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Figure 6.12 and Figure 6.13 – Scale-intensive:  
Figure 6.12: Scale-intensive apparent consumption 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Figure 6.13: Scale-intensive exports 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000).  
 
Demand for scale-based products has gradually been moving towards to a more 
common share of GDP across countries. At the high-end consumption fell fairly 
consistently across the period, whilst the lowest users only reduced demand by a 
small degree between 1970 and 1996.  
Exports, as a share of GDP, have been gradually growing at both the high and low 
end producers from the late 1970s.  
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Figure 6.14 and Figure 6.15 – Specialised suppliers 
Figure 6.14: Specialised supplier apparent consumption 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Figure 6.15: Specialised supplier exports 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Demand at the high end for specialised supplier based products (industrial machinery 
and communications equip etc) dropped dramatically during the mid-1970s and it 
took till the early-1990s to recover, whereupon it dropped again. Demand at the low 
end of consumption remained largely steady.  
In contrast, exports by the largest producers (as a percentage of GDP) grew from the 
mid-1980s to mid-1990s, including rapid growth in the period from the early to mid-
1990s.  
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Figure 6.15 and Figure 6.16 – Science-based: 
Figure 6.16: Science-based apparent consumption OECD countries 1970 – 
1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Figure 6.17: Science-based exports 1970 – 1996 
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Source: Original data from OECD (1998b) STAN Database and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
Consumption of science based products for the highest users, peaked during the mid-
1980s and then declined until 1996. For countries using the lowest percentage of 
GDP in consuming science-based products, the mid 1980s also marked the highpoint 
but moved through business cycles from then until 1996.   
Exports of science-based products have been growing steadily from the early 1970s – 
doubling during that period. However, the growth in science based exports is slower 
that of specialised supplier industries and remains small in comparison to the value 
of scale intensive industries. 
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6.5 Imports, science and scale 
In terms of the scale of cross border interdependencies, the first section of this 
chapter identified clusters in the EU and the OECD models which relied most 
heavily upon imported86 materials, components and services. This is possible 
because input-output modelling of inter-country production flows makes it possible 
to calculate the percentage of value added that is spent on imports. A list of high 
import-intensive national-meso clusters from the two models reveals that each model 
produced somewhat similar results, indicating that the original input-output data is 
relatively consistent. A wide range of clusters appeared in these lists.   
Given the literature which links new knowledge and clustering (see chapter three), it 
is perhaps surprising that R&D intensity reveals little of the key characteristics of 
high import clusters, as such clusters are spread reasonably evenly across R&D 
categories (Table 6.7 and Figure 6.5). In contrast, using a modified Pavitt taxonomy 
shows that the scale intensive category can account for nearly four times more 
clusters than other categories for the EU model and more than twice any other 
category for the OECD model. This result inturn highlights the deficiency of such 
taxonomies which are based on only one dimension. For example, science based 
industries might require scale and some scale based industries are also R&D 
intensive. Three clusters, namely ‘office and computing machines’ (science based) 
and ‘radio, television and communications equipment’ (specialised supplier) and 
‘motor vehicles’ (scale intensive) exhibit a combination of capital, R&D and import 
intensiveness. Identifying R&D and capital intensiveness also separated resource 
based scale industries and capitalised industries with a technology base. This 
evidence suggests one direction in which the Pavitt (1984) taxonomy could be 
developed further and updated, by allowing for distinctions between different types 
of labour intensive, resource intensive, specialised supplier, scale based and science 
based activities derived from available data.  
Important anomalies remain, however, notably; pharmaceuticals and instruments 
with a high capital ratio and low import values and aerospace with import intensive 
clusters but with a low capital ratio. One difference between two of these production 
systems was identified, with the aid of data from Patel and Pavitt (1991), as the 
                                                 
86 A comparison of the actual level of imports for various industries was not discussed, that topic 
being included in chapter eight on transport equipment and chapter nine on ICT clusters (below). 
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degree to which they focus alternatively on technological depth (pharmaceuticals) 
and technological breadth (aerospace). This analysis suggests that imports for 
particular clusters are a major source of technology, albeit embodied in components. 
These results on the value of imports to various clusters, simply adds weight to the 
need for a focus on the third element of cross-border interdependencies (spatial 
structure).  
The final section of this chapter revealed that there is an OECD trajectory of 
increases in the exports of science based and specialised supplier industries, whilst 
scale based industries have essentially maintained a more constant and larger share of 
GDP across the period from the early-1970s to the mid-1990s. Demand for labour, 
resource and scale based industries during the same period gradually moved towards 
a common share of GDP across countries, whilst demand in science based and 
specialised supplier categories was more variable, seemingly moving with business 
cycles. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
 THE ECONOMIC POWER OF CLUSTERS87 
 
‘localization is not at odds with the globalization 
of economic activity. Rather they are mutually 
reinforcing’ (Saxenian and Hsu (2001: 916).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 The methodology in this chapter was first presented in a paper by Wixted and Cooper (2002), being 
originally suggested by Professor Cooper.  
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7.1 The value of trade – more than meets the eye  
A concept of the scale of interdependencies, as it is applied in this thesis, has many 
dimensions. It can be interpreted as an indication of which industries rely most on 
imports and connections, as was the case with the previous chapter, or it can be used 
to note which associations within a spatial system are most significant, as is done in 
chapters eight and nine (below). The present chapter is designed to take advantage of 
a specific feature of input-output modelling that facilitates a different approach to 
mapping the scale and spatial structure of interdependencies. An input-output model 
does not just calculate the flows of value added for an industry once, because it does 
not simply apply a rate of trade to a fixed rate of inputs. The modelling must 
reconcile through successive rounds of calculations all the inputs and the changes in 
the value of those inputs arising from a particular increase in demand. Thus, if the 
transport industry requires a substantial volume of inputs from the electronics 
industry to increase production by $1 then that additional activity in electronics, and 
the flow on consequences to its suppliers, are measured and can be uncovered. In an 
inter-country situation, this can lead to country Y supplying inputs to country Z but 
in turn requiring inputs from countries A-X or even Z to make those components. In 
this way value added can move in an input-output model in ways that a calculation 
based simply on trade data cannot consider.  
The purpose of this chapter is to apply a statistical technique to identify supra-critical 
flows in trade between EU 15 countries (see Wixted and Cooper 2002). The focus 
here is on whether particular national-meso clusters have more economic influence 
than might be suspected from trade data alone. Put simply, do particular clusters 
achieve a ‘big bang for the buck’ from their trade relationships? For this analysis, the 
OECD dataset has been replaced by data for European countries for the years 1965 
and 1985 to provide a time dimension for the study. The earlier data88 for Europe was 
supplied by Professor Oosterhaven and van der Linden of the University of 
Groningen in The Netherlands. The datasets have been used here with their 
permission and only to provide a historical perspective on the development of the 
economic power of clusters, using the supra-critical methodology.  
                                                 
88 See Oosterhaven (1995), van der Linden and Oosterhaven (1995) and van der Linden (1998). 
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7.2 Methodologies for measuring influence 
7.2.1 Existing analytical tools 
Input-output analysts have constantly explored new ways of getting more 
interpretative value out of the data rather than simply relying upon the coefficients. 
The methodologies of hypothetical extraction and fields of influence were both 
explored in the methodology chapter (above) along with the rationale for this project 
adopting a net value added approach. Most existing tools have been developed for 
deriving the strength of inter-industry linkages, but a number have been developed to 
measure the economic significance of the linkages. 
Major analytical techniques in this regard include the ‘key sectors’ approach (see 
Sonis et al. 1995), the ‘fields of influence’ technique (see van der Linden et al. 2000) 
and the methodology employed by Nazara et al. (2001) to identify regional 
hierarchies (feedback loop analysis). Key sector analysis is typically built on 
hypothetical extraction to determine which sectors have the largest influence in the 
rest of the economy, a type of modelling identified earlier. Fields of influence is an 
interesting approach that analyses the sensitivity of input-output systems to particular 
changes. Van der Linden et al. (2000) looked at the dispersion of effects induced by 
productivity improvements through changes to the technological coefficients in the 
EC 1970 [five countries] and the EU 1980 [seven countries]. The analysis revealed 
that German manufacturing gained most from productivity improvements for both 
1970 and 1980, according to van der Linden et al., who also revealed that sector’s 
strong intra-sectoral backwards linkages.  Not surprisingly, the strongest influence on 
the dispersion of productivity changes, in general, is changes to intra-sectoral 
technological coefficients (manufacturing-to-manufacturing, agriculture-to-
agriculture etc).  
Lastly, feedback loop analysis (see Sonis and Hewings 2001 and Nazara, et al. 2001) 
has been developed for multi-regional input-output systems. This methodology 
captures for analysis the different flow on values that go back to the first region from 
subsequent activity in second and third rounds of modelling (i.e. regions). From the 
presentation of the construction of the model used in this current study (chapter five), 
it can be seen feedback loop data is internal to the final calculation of value added. 
Whilst hierarchical network diagrams possible with feed back loop analysis, thus 
provide a useful way of understanding core-periphery structures it cannot be adopted 
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here because the net value added approach (tracing value added flows) differs from 
hypothetical extraction (production effects) upon which feed back loop analysis is 
based. This provided both an opportunity and need to devise a new tool for 
measuring the significance of interdependencies based on the whole flow of trade – 
not just the initial trade.  
7.2.2 Supra-critical flows 
The idea for measuring supra-critical flows stems from an attempt to resolve a 
traditional problem of understanding the benefits of trade and the perceived 
economic power of some industries in particular countries. The methodology has 
particular relevance to understanding the importance of clustering. The technique 
may provide a way of testing for the influence of particular clusters and to look for 
those system actors that gain most from the trade. The premise that some regions 
gain more from trade does not undermine the principle that both parties gain from 
trade. 
 A simplified version of the methodology presented in chapter five (above) for 
calculating supra-critical value, follows: 
The ‘above coefficients’ flows are calculated by: 
The value of a value added linkage (to a particular country) [MINUS] the relevant 
trade coefficient.  [1] 
This ‘above coefficients’ value is then calculated as a percentage of the appropriate 
coefficient. 
The ‘above coefficients’ value / the direct coefficient * 100 [2] 
A statistical test of significance is then applied. 
If the ‘above coefficients’ flow (as percentage of the direct coefficient) is greater than 
twice that of the nominal average (i.e. 2 / 15 {no. of countries} = 13.3%) then that 
flow has achieved supracriticality. [3] 
The usefulness of this technique is that it is not reliant on the actual scale of the flows 
between countries. Quite small value added spillovers can be supra-critical if they are 
statistically significantly higher than what would be expected from the trade 
coefficient. This is not a measure of ‘key sectors’ but is closer to a measure of the 
economies of specialisation and profit taking.  
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7.3 The political and economic integration of Europe 
Since the end of World War II there has been a gradual process of greater political 
integration and the lowering of economic barriers between countries in Western 
Europe and, since the beginning of the 1990s, countries in Eastern Europe. The 
interplay and timing of the different economic and political associations is somewhat 
complex and so Table 7.3 has been pieced together to give some impression of the 
progression that has recently resulted in the European Union expanding to 
encompass 25 countries. 
In the 1950s and 1960s two competing economic associations emerged – the 
European Free Trade Area (EFTA) and the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC). EFTA was originally an agreement between seven geographically peripheral 
countries whilst the ECSC and its successor the European Economic Community was 
an agreement between countries more geographically and economically central to 
Europe, including France and Germany. During the 1960s the European Economic 
Community became the European Community which begun to expand in 1973. It has 
been expanding ever since, incorporating a few new countries every decade, with the 
most ambitious step the inclusion of 10 Eastern European countries on 1 May 2004. 
Table 7.1: Evolution of European Political and Economic Zones 
Country EFTA?, ECSC?, EEC†, 
EC‡ EU‡ 
Euro € EU 25 EEA◦ 
Austria 1960-1995 1995 (EU 15) 2002  ?
Belgium  1952 (ECSC 6) 2002  ?
Cyprus    2004 ?
Czech Republic     ?
Denmark 1960-1973 1973 (EC 9)   ?
Estonia    2004 ?
Finland 1961-1995 1995 (EU 15)) 2002  ?
France  1952 (ECSC 6) 2002  ?
Germany  1952 (ECSC 6) 2002  ?
Greece  1981 (EC 10) 2002  ?
Hungary    2004 ?
Iceland 1970    ?
Ireland  1973 (EC 9) 2002  ?
Italy  1952 (ECSC 6) 2002  ?
Latvia    2004 ?
Liechtenstein 1991    ?
Lithuania    2004 ?
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Luxembourg  1952 (ECSC 6) 2002  ?
Malta    2004 ?
The Netherlands  1952 (ECSC 6) 2002  ?
Norway 1960    ?
Poland    2004 ?
Portugal 1960-1986 1986 (EC 12) 2002  ?
Slovakia    2004 ?
Slovenia    2004 ?
Spain  1986 (EC 12) 2002  ?
Sweden 1960-1995 1995 (EU 15))   ?
Switzerland 1960    
United Kingdom 1960-1973 1973 (EC 9)   ??EFTA – European Free Trade Zone (1960). ?ECSC – European Coal and Steel Community (1952-58). 
†EEC – European Economic Community (1958-65). 
‡EC – European Community (1965-91). 
‡EU – European Union (1991). 
◦EEA – European Economic Area (1994) incorporates EFTA and EU – except Switzerland. 
Euro € – Euro currency countries – introduced in 2002. 
Sourced from: http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/InfoKit/Info_Kit/History and 
http://www.eurunion.org/profile/brief.htm 
 
The degree to which political integration and resulting economic policy changes have 
impacted on country performance is a question that has many dimensions, with many 
issues concerning its impact on innovation systems trajectories remaining to be 
addressed.  
Both Armstrong (1995) and Cappelen et al. (2000) agree that there has been some 
convergence in the GDP per capita of European Union countries from the 1950s to 
the 1990s, with most of the catch up during in the earlier years. Between 1965 and 
1985 there was both an increase in production specialisation and interdependence 
between the members of the European Community according to van der Linden 
(1998), who suggested that inter-country specialisation patterns ‘hardly changed’ 
(p267), reinforcing analysis presented earlier in this thesis on the stability of national 
specialisations. Small countries, he notes, became increasingly reliant on the larger 
economies, but the growing interdependence of neighbouring economies was a 
strong feature. Germany had a ‘central position’ (p267) in the industrial production 
systems of Europe as an important supplier to many of the industries of Europe in 
most countries (as thus the use of the term ‘central’). The theme of the industrial 
power of Germany re-occurs throughout the analysis presented of the spatial 
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structure of cluster linkages. Finally van der Linden found that ‘as regards individual 
sectors, the strongest interdependence is found for coal, oil, basic metals, cars, and 
chemicals’ (1998: 267), which is a somewhat different to the list generated from the 
imports analysis (1995 data, see chapter six above). 
7.3.1 Supra-critical links in the European Union (1995) 
In the search for supra-critical flows in the 1965, 1985 and 1995 models of the 
European Union, positive results only emerged in the 1995 data. The 1995 data will 
therefore be examined first here, with the next section examining explanations for 
why supra-critical flows are not present in the earlier periods. The entire set of supra-
critical results for 1995 in the non-services based clusters (manufacturing, agriculture 
and mining) is provided in Appendix 5 (below). A précis of the results is provided in 
Table 7.2. It emerges from the data that Germany dominates all industries in which 
supra-critical flows are observed.  
Table 7.2: Who gets the supra-critical flows – Germany vs. the rest 
Meso-national cluster Germany / total # of linkages 
Agriculture 4/6 
Fuels 3/4 
Ferrous & non-ferrous metals 4/4 
Non-metallic mineral products 4/4 
Chemicals 2/2 
Metal products 6/7 
Industrial machinery 8/8 
Office and data processing machines 12/14 
Electrical goods 6/7 
Transport 7/7 
Food 4/5 
TCF 5/6 
Wood & paper 2/2 
Rubber and plastics 3/5 
Total # of supra-critical links 70/81 
 
As supra-critical value flows are achieved through being a supplier to increased 
demand elsewhere in a multi-regional system, theoretically, a country could achieve 
a maximum of 14 such flows within the EU 15 model. Although no country achieves 
this, Germany does achieve 12 links for the office and data processing machines 
cluster. Of a possible 19689 supra-critical links, Germany achieves more than one 
                                                 
89 14 non-services clusters for 14 countries = 196. 
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third (70 = 36%). Germany manages to capture 86 per cent of all the measured supra-
critical interdependencies. It can also be seen in Table 7.2 that Germany achieves 
many of its supra-critical flows in the mid to higher R&D based technologies 
(transport, electrical, and office machines etc).  Table 7.3 shows the pattern of 
‘source countries’ for Germany’s supra-critical links. 
Table 7.3: Germany’s supracritical links by country 1995 
Country Score
Austria 8
Belgium 3
Denmark 11
Finland 3
France 10
Greece 0
Ireland 7
Italy 1
Luxembourg 0
The Netherlands 6
Portugal 3
Spain 3
Sweden 14
The UK 1
Note:  Shading highlights those countries with more than 10 supra-critical links with Germany. 
Both Italy and the UK only give up one supra-critical link each to Germany and that 
is in office and data processing machines. Although many of the links are with small 
countries such as Denmark, Austria and Ireland, France is an exception with 10 out 
of the 14 links in non-service sector clusters, a finding that confirms other evidence 
on the economic centrality of German production to the European economy not just 
in scale but also in economic power.  
According to Davies et al. (2001), between 1985 and 1995 there appears to have 
been a moderate growth in trade integration in the European Union. Their analysis 
points to an increase of intra-EU imports moving from 61 per cent to 68 per cent of 
all imports between 1987 and 1993. However, in the years between 1987 and 1993, 
Europe’s leading firms (identified by the authors) increased their turnover generated 
outside their home country but inside the EU from 30 to 37 per cent. Importantly for 
the analysis presented here, Davis et al. make the observation that the geography of 
production has been dispersed with German firms gaining market strength. Between 
1987 and 1993:  
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‘There appears to have been no general increase in geographical concentrations. In 
terms of the nationality of the EU’s leading firms, German firms have increased 
their share, whilst firms from France, Italy, and (particularly) the UK have had a 
reduced presence. In terms of the location of production, the leading firms appear 
to have dispersed their operations across more, rather than fewer, member states’ 
(2001: 71). 
This indicates that there is a trend towards greater intra-firm trade whilst the 
geographic pattern of trade routes remains intact. 
The other countries that achieve supra-critical links are France (5), the UK (3), the 
Netherlands (2) and Belgium (1). Importantly, only three supra-critical links are 
achieved by countries other than Europe’s big three economies (Germany, France 
and the UK). Strikingly, however, despite the high level of imports by Ireland of 
products from the UK (the ICT example is discussed in Chapter nine) does not give 
the UK a statistically higher flow of value added than would be indicated from the 
volume of trade. This finding might indicate that in order to supply Ireland, the UK 
needs to import from other countries such as Germany. As it happens, the UK cluster 
that does provide Germany with a supra-critical connection is in office and data 
processing machines. In turn Ireland, although heavily dependent on the UK for the 
direct supply of ICT components, gives up supra-critical linkages to both France and 
Germany. This might indicate that other industries are buying off these countries to 
make their components for supply to the office and data machines cluster. 
The two examples of small and medium sized countries benefiting from supra-
critical connections is quite unexpected and some caution needs to be expressed. The 
two for the Netherlands are achieved with Luxembourg (metal products and office 
and data processing machines) whilst Belgium’s is also with Luxembourg in rubber 
and plastics. Because of the problems with creating trade splits for Belgium and 
Luxembourg90, the Belgium and Luxembourg links are considered highly doubtful, 
although such links should not be dismissed completely). 
The above constitutes a once off snapshot in time. Understanding how things have 
been changing is vital for assessing the theoretical and empirical significance of the 
findings presented here. 
                                                 
90 The two countries are grouped together in the OECD (2002b) Bilateral Trade Database so the trade 
ratios were made identical for both countries. 
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7.3.2 Supra-critical linkages in the European Community (1965-
1985) 
The 1965 model includes Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands and 
the 1985 model includes those same countries with the addition of Denmark. The 
availability of these additional datasets has encouraged an inter-temporal analysis of 
supra-criticality.  
Unfortunately, there are no supra-critical results for either 1965 or 1985. This was 
both surprising and disappointing. It was expected and hoped that there would be 
some but perhaps fewer examples of supra-critical flows.  
There appear to be three possible explanations for the absence of these special 
interdependencies appearing in either the 1965 and 1985 models. These are that: 
• the models do not capture enough economic activity internal to the model, 
• the specification of the formulae based, as it is, on a nominal average, is 
biased towards finding supra-critical flows within systems with more 
regions, because the more countries included, the lower the twice the 
average benchmark is; and 
• the increases in trade are leading to greater opportunities for countries to 
capture more gains from trade (real world phenomena). 
To analyse the significance of each of these points, the outcomes of the 1985 and 
1995 models were used to understand what might be occurring to produce two quite 
different results.  
Endogenous regions 
To address the first point, Table 7.4 calculates the increase in the value added which 
becomes a part of the model due to the increase in the number of countries in the 
1995 model. This is possible because the 1985 data is disaggregated beyond six 
European countries to separate imports from the rest of the world and imports from 
the rest of Europe. On the basis that the greater the number of interactions (country to 
country) the more likely it is that supra-critical links will appear, the value added 
devoted to imports from the other EC countries in 1985 model represents the degree 
to which the model is limited by a reduced number of countries (compared to the 
1995 model).  
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Table 7.4: Imports in 1985 included within the rest of Europe territory  
 Belgium Denmark France Germany Italy Netherlands 
Agriculture, forestry & fish 11.3 12.0 14.9 13.8 8.9 11.1 
Fuel & power  11.8 23.5 15.8 15.9 5.2 14.6 
Ores & metals 9.0 13.9 8.5 11.2 6.8 7.2 
Non-metallic mineral  15.9 13.7 14.3 14.6 9.1 11.8 
Chemical  14.6 16.3 16.6 17.2 11.7 16.1 
Metal except machinery 13.6 13.9 11.9 13.2 7.6 11.1 
Ag & industrial mach 14.0 14.9 11.3 13.4 9.2 12.3 
Office & data mach 16.4 14.0 12.0 14.9 17.1 9.3 
Electrical goods 13.3 14.4 12.3 13.8 9.6 10.7 
Transport equipment 14.3 18.9 12.2 13.7 11.4 14.8 
Food, beverages, tobacco 10.2 11.0 11.3 9.7 8.4 8.8 
TCF 13.0 20.9 14.7 13.2 10.3 14.0 
Paper & printing  10.2 8.5 10.6 10.2 8.0 9.0 
Rubber & plastic  15.3 16.4 16.0 15.6 14.0 17.0 
Other manufacturing  20.5 11.2 11.6 11.3 6.1 10.2 
Building & construction 12.5 12.5 13.3 13.7 9.4 14.5 
wholesale, retail 14.7 16.2 17.3 13.7 8.6 11.8 
Lodging & catering  13.8 19.1 13.6 11.2 9.4 11.6 
Inl & transport  17.1 19.6 19.4 16.4 7.8 19.2 
Maritime & air transport  19.5 10.3 13.2 16.5 9.9 2.6 
Auxiliary transport  13.0 15.3 16.5 15.8 8.8 11.4 
Communication  16.2 14.6 15.6 15.8 7.7 11.2 
Credit & insurance 19.7 14.3 22.6 16.0 14.5 4.7 
Other market  14.3 12.6 12.9 14.8 9.6 10.3 
 
It appears that a 1985 model with a full range of EU 15 countries would internalise 
an additional 10 to 20 per cent (with a high of 23.5 and a low of 2.6 per cent) of 
value added for many industries. But this is only the additional activity for these 
countries. Figure 7.1 shows the difference between different model configurations, 
with each square representing a country (25*25 industry matrix) 
Figure 7.1: Comparison country counts in the 1985 and 1995 models. 
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Although this reduced system of endogenous activity, possibly contributes to the 
absence of supra-critical links, it should also be pointed out that the main countries 
involved in supra-critical flows in 1995 are included in the 1985 model. The reduced 
amount of economic activity may, therefore, not be the cause of the absence of supra-
critical result. 
The supra-critical formula 
The second possible reason for the failure to find supra-critical flows in the earlier 
periods is that the formula specifically uses a nominal average. With a small number 
of countries in the 1965 and 1985 models the ‘average’ trade point is much higher 
than for models with a larger number of countries. The ‘twice the average’ focal 
point moves from 2/15 (13.33%) in the 1995 model to 2/6 (33.33%) in the 1985 
model. It could not be expected that any country could achieve this level of higher 
gain over the trade coefficient. 
This problem can be subjected to a sensitivity test. By changing the ‘twice the 
average’ point the flows between six countries can be examined as if they are within 
a larger system. Quite surprisingly, when this is done it makes only a small 
difference. Using the 1995 model supra-criticality cut-off (2*1/15) produces three 
supra-critical flows.  
Table 7.5: Supra-criticality 1985 – twice the average with fifteen countries 
 Belgium Netherlands 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery products France  
Lodging and catering services France  
Other market services  Germany 
Progressively easing the rules of the formulae to try and get more links to appear is 
quite astonishing. At the level of the 1995 supra-critical calculation three linkages 
appear (Table 7.5). For the 1985 data, the rules have to be significantly lower than 
the 1995 position –down to near the average, before a noteworthy number of links 
appear. Thus, although the formula is problematic and needs improvement, the tests 
of the data suggest that it is not a major cause of absence of supra-critical flows 
appearing. 
Supra-critical links as an indicator of a real world phenomenon 
The above findings force a consideration of the final hypothesis - that the proximate 
cause of an increase in the number of supra-critical links appearing after 1985 is an 
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increase in trade and technological specialisation driving higher than expected value 
added flows. For supra-critical flows to appear in the format they do in the 1995 
analysis, particular clusters must be able to either command high prices for their 
output or are so placed in the overall production system that they are supplying 
intermediate goods to countries which are themselves suppliers. The particular 
methodology employed here makes it difficult to turn to other sources for answers 
but there is a trend towards an increased use of imported components (see Table 7.6). 
The table reveals the changes in imports as cents in EMU (European Monetary 
Units) between 1965 and 1985. For many industries, the increase was between 5 and 
10 cents for every dollar of production. These results are derived from the use of the 
Cooper-Wixted modelling software rather than the previously employed 
methodologies on the same data (van der Linden 1998). 
Table 7.6: Total Imports contributions to VA – change from 1965 to 1985 
 Belgium France Germany Italy Netherlands 
Agriculture 16.5 8.6 10.7 4.5 8.9 
Fuel and power 25.5 16 17.4 9.4 -6.9 
Mining ores & metals 16.4 9.5 0.3 6.5 -0.6 
Non-metallic min 20.7 6.3 7.8 7 9.1 
Chemicals 21.4 11.2 9.4 10.3 16 
Metal prod 10.2 5.7 5.4 1.4 6.6 
Industrial mach 11.5 10.2 2.4 6.1 2.4 
Office mach 19.2 7.6 8.3 10.5 22.9 
Electrical goods 7.5 2.6 2.3 -0.2 -0.9 
Transport  5.1 9.2 3.5 4.3 4.3 
Food 11.6 5.7 3.6 4.3 7.7 
TCF 11.9 5.1 3.4 2.3 2.7 
Paper  14.7 7.3 3.5 2.9 6.7 
Rubber & plastic 7.8 12.2 4.4 7.1 9.8 
Other mfg 7.2 3.1 -1 1.7 0.1 
Build & construction 8.5 4.8 3.3 3.4 0.8 
Trade 4.3 -1.6 2.8 0 4 
Accommodation 4.6 -2 2.2 -0.4 1.5 
Inland transport  19.5 3.8 1.1 4.7 2.3 
Sea & air trans 11.6 5 36 4 10.6 
Aux transport -0.6 3 11.9 1.1 3.2 
Communications -0.3 1.6 4.2 1.4 1.6 
Finance & insurance -4.2 3.2 -0.7 2.2 14.9 
Market services 5.1 3.5 2 1.7 0.1 
 
The possibility that supra-critical linkages are an indicator of changes in the 
interdependencies of economies would appear to be consistent with the findings by 
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Andersson and Fredriksson (2000) investigated the operations of Swedish 
multinationals, differentiating between trade in intermediate and finished goods in 
their analysis. Their research focused on vertical and horizontal value chain 
integration. Multinationals that concentrated foreign affiliate:  
‘production to a small number of countries favors internal supplies of intermediate 
goods but exerts no significant effect on the propensity to import finished goods. 
High export ratios in affiliates stimulate imports of intermediates, but diminish the 
propensity to import finished goods’ (2000: 787). 
Thus, export oriented affiliates were purchasing greater levels of intermediate 
imports as well.  Later, the authors comment that during the 1980s there was ‘a shift 
in the composition of intra-firm exports from Swedish parents in favor of 
intermediate products (2000: 787).  This suggests that intra-firm purchases could be 
one factor in driving the emergence supra-critical links across time. 
7.4 Interpreting supra-critical values 
A number of conclusions stem from this research on the evolution of supra-critical 
connections between European clusters, despite the need to develop an adjusted 
formula.  
There are important reasons for deducing that the supra-critical indicator is a 
measure of some changes in the economic performance of nations. A higher 
percentage of value added was retained locally in 1965 and 1985 than in 1995, 
indicating that across time there has been a growing opportunity to capture supra-
critical links through trade. A second reason to take the results seriously is that the 
1985 model has within it a number of the countries that generated a large number of 
Germany’s supra-critical flows in the later model. Denmark, France and the 
Netherlands are in both models and therefore it was expected that some of these 
would have revealed supra-critical flows, as was the case in 1995. Third, the 1995 
model reveals that Germany received a wide dispersal of supra-critical flows not just 
across industries but from many countries as well. Lastly, when the formula was 
weakened for 1985, three linkages did appear. 
It is not entirely possible to interpret or posit the implications of these results. 
Changes in the European economy appear to have facilitated the emergence of supra-
critical flows over a comparatively rapid period (10 years). Taken on face value the 
1995 results suggest that Germany is in a much more powerful position, 
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economically, than trade data alone would imply (see Davies et al. 2001). This 
evidence is taken as prima facie evidence for the existence of a particular type of 
trans-border clustering. More research needs to be done with the methodology; 
developing it to a second stage and using it on other data sets – particularly intra-
national inter-regional data. 
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CHAPTER 8:  
 THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF TRANSPORT
 CLUSTER NETWORKING 
 
‘alongside hollowing-out (in the sense of 
relocation from Europe) there is an ongoing and 
parallel process of inward investment into 
Europe. It is in the precise balance of these two 
forces that the structure of the automotive 
components industry in Europe is currently taking 
shape’ Sadler (1999: 118). 
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8.1 Chapters eight and nine – cluster networking 
It was shown earlier in this thesis that the study of systems of innovation has 
primarily emphasised geographic spaces within national borders or intra-national 
politico-administrative boundaries. Research has focussed on benchmarking 
comparative characteristics and investigating the dynamics of endogenous 
technology development, in contrast to the exogenous characterisation of technology 
within neo-classical economics. This agenda has been useful but it has been to the 
detriment of considering innovation within a multi-spatial environment. As chapter 
six (above) revealed, scale-based industries in particular and many leading 
technology sectors were reliant on an internationalised production system, at least as 
early as the beginning of the 1990s. Chapter seven presented results from inter-
country input-output modelling which indicated Germany is accumulating more 
value added from within Europe than would be suggested from the trade data alone. 
This suggests that Germany’s innovation capabilities in particular production systems 
enables it to benefit from industrial activity spread across various sites across 
Europe.  
This chapter and the next (nine) trace the lines of traded interdependencies across 
borders to examine the geographic spread of value chains. In so doing they measure 
the scale of bilateral extra-territorial linkages to determine the spatial structure of 
cluster networking. Just two sets of relatively R&D intensive national-meso clusters 
account for approximately one third all of the top five most internationalised 
production systems across the EU and OECD models. They are:  
• Transport: transport equipment (EU); motor vehicles, (OECD), and aircraft 
(OECD); and 
• ICT and electronics: office and data processing machines (EU), electrical 
goods (EU) office and computing (OECD) and radio, TV and 
communications (OECD). 
This research on both the economic value of traded interdependencies (scale) and the 
geography of linkages (spatial-structure), combined is useful in assessing their 
economic closeness rather than purely physical proximity. Appendix 6 provides 
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network diagrams for 19 EU systems and Appendix 7 provides diagrams for 25 
OECD systems. 
8.2 Transport industries 
There is already a huge literature on the international industrial structure and the 
technological systems of transport related industries for many of the countries 
relevant to the discussion in this chapter on European and other OECD countries. 
Transport industries, and in particular global auto production, have been analysed 
from many different angles and often by authors with an intimate knowledge of the 
activities in any individual country. Although the analysis developed here cannot 
have this depth, nevertheless it is important to go beyond a single territory or the 
linkages between a particularly obvious contiguous cluster (Detroit-Windsor) to 
encompass associations of between widespread systems.  
It is not the intention here to reiterate the wealth of information already available but 
to relate that information to other data on production geographies and then to the 
literature on clustering and innovation systems. This chapter focuses on the EU 
modelling results for ‘transport equipment’ and in separate sections discusses the 
OECD modelling results on automotive and aerospace. To establish the context for 
the discussion that follows, the first section of the chapter deals with the export 
structure of the transport industries.  
8.3 Exports: a traditional perspective 
Although auto-related production is not the totality of the transport industry 
category, the spread of car production to a wide range of countries makes it a 
valuable starting point for establishing which countries have a significant role in the 
total transport equipment sector. World Trade Organisation data (Figure 8.1, WTO 
2003) reveals that exports by countries within the EU to other countries within the 
EU (intra-exports) are nearly three times larger than external exports and 
approximately four times greater than the USA’s exports to all other countries91 in 
1990. This evidence on the level of intra-EU activity is helpful because it points to 
the degree to which the EU model used in this thesis captures a very significant share 
                                                 
91 It would be valuable to know what intra-US cross-state trade looks like. 
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of global economic transactions in automotive industries. What the WTO data does 
not reveal, is the different scale of exports by individual nations within the EU 15.  
Figure 8.1: Automotive exports 1990 (share of world exports) 
0.00 10.00 20.00 30.00 40.00 50.00
Australia
Taipei, Chinese
Brazil
Korea, Republic of
Mexico  (b)
Canada
United States
European Union (15) Extra-exports
Japan
European Union (15) Intra-exports
 
Notes: (b) Includes significant exports from processing zones. 
Source: based on data from WTO (2003) Table IV.5492.  
Intra-European exports even in 2002 still represented a major share of global cross-
national trade (Table 8.1). Trade between the USA and Canada was the next largest 
grouping of trade between countries. One feature of the data in Table 8.1 to note is 
that, according to the WTO, the fastest growing trade interactions between 1995 and 
2000 are from Latin America to North America. However, the WTO division of 
countries has Mexico, which is a part of the NAFTA arrangements, within the group 
of Latin American countries. It would seem likely, then, that the Free Trade 
Agreement has facilitated the rapid development of auto production in Mexico (see 
Figure 8.2).  
By contrast, intra-Asian trade in auto products is relatively small. The lack of cross 
border regional trade could, in part, be due, as Dicken suggests, Japanese 
manufacturers re-creating separate supply chains not out of choice but ‘out of the 
necessity created by high levels of import protection in virtually all the East Asian 
countries, particularly those in South East Asia (notably Malaysia)’ (2003:45). The 
difference between the absence of integration apparent in the auto industry in East 
Asia and the situation in the ICT and electronics industries, where Asia is the largest 
multi-country regional intra-trade block (see Table 9.2), is striking.  
 
                                                 
92 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its03_bysector_e.htm WTO (2003). 
Regional blocks 
and Countries 
% World exports
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Table 8.1: Major regional trade flows of automotive products (US$b) 
 Value Annual percentage change 
 2002 1995-00 2001 2002
Intra-Western Europe 219.5 3 0 8
Intra-North America 93.0 7 -10 6
Asia to North America 60.9 7 -3 14
Western Europe to North America 36.0 10 5 24
Latin America to North America 31.2 17 0 2
North America to world? (other than N-AM) 30.5   
Intra-Asia 23.8 -2 -10 21
Source: WTO  (2003) Table IV.49 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its03_bysector_e.htm  and ?WTO (2003) Table 
IV.51 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/section4_e/iv51.xls  
Between 1990 and 2001, as already suggested, Mexico achieved very rapid growth in 
its share of world exports (Figure 8.2), gaining about 4 per cent. Korea gained 2% 
extra of world exports and the EU 15 around 1%. For the same period, Japan and 
intra-European Union exports dropped as a share of world automotive trade by more 
than 6% each.  
Figure 8.2: Changes in world export share of automotive products 1990-01 
-8.00 -6.00 -4.00 -2.00 0.00 2.00 4.00 6.00
Japan
European Union (15) Intra-exports
Romania
Sw itzerland
Singapore domestic exports
Norw ay
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Brazil
Russian Federation ( c)
South Africa
Argentina
China  (b)
Turkey
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Canada
United States
Czech Republic (b)
European Union (15) Extra-exports
Korea, Republic of
Mexico  (b)
 
 
Notes: (b) Includes significant exports from processing zones. (c) Includes Secretariat estimates. 
Regional blocks 
and Countries 
Change in % of world exports 
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Source: WTO (2003) Table IV.54 
.http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its03_bysector_e.htm 
 
This World Trade Organization data is very useful as it includes a large number of 
countries but it is configured in a way which emphasises a triadic +1 (Latin America) 
configuration of trade. The WTO data also emphasises the degree to which 
automotive production is still dominated by high-income economies. Thus, a 
bilateral trade perspective for the OECD countries can be useful for highlighting the 
relations between specific countries. It is possible to configure the OECD Bilateral 
Trade database in a way that provides a country-to-country export pattern, at an 
industry level (Figure 8.3). The chart is developed from the viewpoint of the exporter 
and the measure selected is export intensity as a share of GDP, represented by the 
darkening shadings. This takes Figures 4.2 and 4.3 presented earlier, one-step deeper. 
The USA, France, Germany and the UK are the most important destinations for 
exports, with Japan a minor market. The following linkages are important to the 
exporter: 
• Austria to Germany. 
• Canada to the USA. 
• Finland to the USA. 
• France to Germany, Spain, the UK and the USA. 
• Germany to Belgium-Luxembourg, France, Italy, the UK and the USA. 
• Italy to France and Germany. 
• Japan to the USA. 
• Netherlands to Belgium-Luxembourg, Germany and the UK. 
• Portugal to France 
• Spain to France, Germany, Italy, Portugal and the UK 
• Sweden to Germany, Netherlands, Portugal and the UK 
• The UK to Germany and the USA (& to a lesser degree France). 
• USA to Canada (& to a small degree the UK). 
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Figure 8.3: Transport industry exports (as % of GDP) to export destinations (mid 1990s) 
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0
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0.8
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Sources: Original data from OECD (1998c) and GDP data from IMF (2000).
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8.4 Measuring inter-cluster linkages 
Multi-regional input-output modelling based on net value added flows enables an 
analysis of the connectivity of industries in different locations in proportion to the 
production system of the initiating economy. This chapter and chapter nine develop 
three configurations of network analysis to display the spatial structure of cluster-to-
cluster interdependencies and the degree to which separate production systems are 
networked into wider value chain complexes. The charts are a diagram of absolute 
bilateral value flows and two charts based on statistical test for significant 
relationships.  
Flows as share of each dollar of value added  
Complete model network diagrams reveal all links between all countries for the EU 
and OECD models. The linkages between the national clusters are indicated by both 
the size of the lines and the numbers beside them. As was discussed in chapter five 
(above) the amount of imported value is the percentage of value added. Thus, the 
arrows are not indicators of absolute value but of relative value (percentages). In 
general, accordance with modelling practice the arrows point in the direction of 
the value spillovers not the direction of the goods and services flows. However, 
the flow of goods, services and any embodied knowledge is naturally just the reverse 
and it does not take long to adjust to reading the charts. 
The first test 
As would be expected with trade analysis between such a limited set of similar 
countries (developed members of the OECD or the European Union), there are 
linkages between all clusters to some degree, however small. This makes it necessary 
to reduce these webs of interactions to a small number of economically significant 
connections between national clusters. 
For each national cluster in all the countries in the two models, import value added 
(including the contribution by the Rest of the World) was totalled and then the 
bilateral value added contribution to total imports was calculated as a percentage of 
that total. The first statistical benchmark of linkages sought bilateral links with a 
share of the total imported value added greater than 2 times the ‘average’ link. The 
strength of these concentrated connections has been distinguished from those first 
tier links and second tier links with values between 1.5 and 2 times the average.  
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In this first test for strong links between clusters, the average was set using a similar 
methodology to that used for obtaining supra-critical values (1/15 for the EU and 1/9 
for the OECD). Thus, for the EU, the average (100/15) is 6.66% and so 1.5* the avg 
= 10.005 and twice the average is 13.33 (16.7% and 22% respectively for the OECD 
model). Just to meet the secondary measure, a particular country needs to capture 
more than 10 % of the indirect value added that is leaving the original country (i.e. 
imports), but, which itself may represent only 20 or 30 per cent of total value added 
accumulating from an increase in demand.  
The modified test 
When the first test was applied to the data output from both models, it was apparent 
that for the OECD model the test appeared to remove too many linkages. This is a 
somewhat subjective perspective, but it was decided a modified calculation would be 
developed. The modified test changed the basis of the calculation of the bilateral 
share of imports from total imports to one that removed imports the Rest of the World 
and was therefore based on the endogenous regions in the model.  
As becomes apparent in the analysis that follows, this modification improves the 
definition of the cluster associations in the OECD model and it is a matter of 
conjecture whether it improves the clarity of the EU 15 data. More analysis is needed 
of methodologies that can be used for the desired purpose but there is an expectation 
that the share of imported value added from the rest of the world for each country in 
each industry is an important variable to include and thus a better statistical test is 
desirable.  
Nevertheless, both statistical tests produce very useful results which give powerful 
insights into multi-country trade structures that have been called here – linked cluster 
networks.  
8.5 EU transport equipment clusters – supply 
relationships 
The data for the fifteen countries of Europe combines all transport related industries 
into a single classification, aggregating aerospace, motor vehicles, shipbuilding and 
other transport (railways etc). These different industries are separated in the OECD 
data, and motor vehicles and aerospace are considered separately later in this chapter. 
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The degree to which any transport national meso-cluster in Europe relies upon 
imports is hugely variable. Chapter six revealed that transport had the most 
internationalised production system, ranked by the number of times it appeared in a 
list of the top 5 internationalised clusters for each nation in the European model. 
However, chapter six did not focus attention on the actual level of value added being 
contributed by imports. Table 8.2 provides the share of value added (as a percent of 
each Euro) imported by each of member of the EU 15 in 1995.  
Table 8.2: Transport: inter-country international purchasing 
 Transport equipment 
Greece 0.18 
France 0.20 
Germany 0.24 
UK 0.30 
Ireland 0.30 
Italy 0.32 
Spain 0.35 
Finland 0.36 
Sweden 0.39 
Portugal 0.39 
Denmark 0.43 
Netherlands 0.45 
Austria 0.50 
Belgium 0.63 
Luxembourg 0.76 
Source: EU modelling data see Appendix 4. 
The larger economies import notably less per Euro than most economies, but 
curiously, France imports less than Germany. Greece imports less than any, due to an 
under-developed industry structure. Countries that appear in the tail of the list require 
more than 40 per cent of their value added to be imported to support production.  
Figure 8.4 presents the strength of individual bilateral interdependencies based on 
their original net value flows calculated by the modelling. 
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Figure 8.4: EU Transport cluster links: indirect value spillovers 1995 
 
Note 1: Arrows point in direction of value added flows. 
Note 2: The structure of flows for Luxembourg result from minor errors in the original I-O tables, but 
adjusting them generates too many flow-on problems, in comparison to drawing attention to the 
problem. 
Table 8.3: EU bilateral interactions greater than 5cents per Euro 1995  
 Aut Bel Den Fin Fra Ger Gre Ire Ita Lux Neth Port Spa Swe UK 
Aut  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bel 0.01  0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Den 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Fin 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00
Fra 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.03
Ger 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.05
Gre 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ire 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Ita 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01
Lux 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Neth 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.14  0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01
Port 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00 0.00
Spa 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.01 0.01
Swe 0.01 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01
UK 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.04
ROW 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.17 0.16 0.24 0.17 0.13 0.12 0.15 0.16
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It is important to note here that: 
• whilst it is typical for multi-regional input-output modelling to highlight the 
overall weak associations between industries in different regions, Figure 8.4 
(and Table 8.3) shows that in a number of cases for the EU 15 there are very 
major bilateral flows;  
• many countries, with the important exceptions of France and Germany have 
strong links with the rest of the world; 
• Austria, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden are strongly 
dependent on supplies from Germany with between 10 and 20 cents per 
Euro of value added flowing there, whilst other countries although linked to 
Germany have a lower level of linkage; and 
• Finland buys more from the Rest of the World than Germany and Ireland is 
predominantly dependent on supplies from the UK. 
As the classification here is transport equipment, the spatial production structure of 
the automotive component would strongly influence these patterns. The strength of 
the backwards links to the Rest of the World (ROW), may suggest, however, that the 
structure of aerospace cluster interdependencies, which are generally strongly 
connected with the USA (see Figure 8.12 and 8.13 below), may be showing up in the 
chart. 
It is not known whether the linkages in Figure 8.4 are the basis for innovation 
generating, user-producer relationships; even though the evidence discussed in 
chapter five (above) would suggest they probably do indicate the pattern of cross-
border innovation flows. Analyses of global production networks (see any of Ernst’s 
work but in particular Ernst 2003) emphasises the innovation potential of networks 
of corporations but GPN research is often focussed on the ICT sector and restricted 
to Asia – US relations. A better approach is to suggest that the patterns of relations 
represent a structuring of the market (proposed by Maskell and Lorenzen 2004), as 
discussed in chapter four (above), and they therefore probably represent an effort to 
extend the benefits of clustering to cross-border purchasing behaviour.  
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To reduce the number of linkages between systems from the ‘spider webs’ of real 
value flows down to the primary cluster networks, it is necessary to apply tests for 
significance. Interdependency test one was applied (see section 8.4) to generate 
Figure 8.5. This Figure makes it clear that virtually all countries in the EU are 
strongly reliant on Germany for transport equipment products. This interdependency 
with Germany of so many countries could be thought of as a cluster complex. France 
has a much smaller complex of buyers than Germany’s, which includes Belgium, 
Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain and Italy. However, smaller (simpler) 
structures, what might be called cluster networks exist with the bilateral link between 
the UK and Ireland and Portugal is the only country significantly dependent on 
Spain. In drawing attention to these interdependencies, Figure 8.5 shows clearly why 
the structure of relations matter and highlights the inadequacy of concepts such as 
supra-national innovation systems or Rugman and D’Cruz’s (1993) double diamond.   
Figure 8.5: EU Transport cluster complexes: cluster links test 1 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection. Thus, for example, one quarter of Dutch imports in transport products comes from 
Germany and another 14% from France. The dotted lines represent secondary links, i.e. those between 
1.5 and 2 times the average. 
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Removing the ROW component from the calculation of links and thus, moving to the 
second test of interdependency, makes the picture more complicated, with many 
more connections. Figure 8.6 does, however, draw attention to an interesting feature 
of spatial structure of supply chains. The primary importance of Germany is still 
clear, but the complex around France fills out, and instead of just one link with the 
UK a group of second tier interdependencies become visible (dotted lines). 
Figure 8.6: EU Transport cluster complexes: – cluster links modified test (2) 
 
 
Note: Arrows point in direction of value added flows. 
The analysis of the spatial structure of interdependencies reveals a layered structure 
to the inter-industry relations for the transport clusters in European countries. 
Germany is the primary location of production with a Europe-wide set of inter-
linkages, followed by France and then UK with smaller spheres of influence across 
Europe. Other countries such as Sweden, Italy and Spain are suppliers of 
intermediate goods to an even smaller segment of Europe. This structure of 
production and trading hierarchy has not gone unobserved, although the input-output 
modelling presented here brings new clarity to the discussion. Hudson observes: 
‘The automobile production system is seen, by some, as organised within 
European-wide networks, encompassing a three-fold hierarchy of regions, 
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qualitatively differentiated in terms of their role in the production system. R&D 
and high level and knowledge-intensive competencies are increasingly 
concentrated in the core, centred on Germany, as routine production, especially of 
lower value models is increasingly dispersed to the eastern and southern 
peripheries. This emergent hierarchy ‘is based upon the cumulative competencies 
of the actors, the density of networks of relationships and proximity to the seats of 
power where strategic decisions are taken … distributing other activities over 
space’ (Bordenave and Lung, 1996: 320). However, creating such a regionally 
hierarchical Europeanised production system is complicated in at least two ways. 
First, ‘national champions’ still dominate in some national markets (Bordenave and 
Lung, 1993; Hudson and Schamp, 1995). Secondly, supply chains are being 
extended beyond Europe (Sadler, 1999)’ (2002: 14). 
Lung (2003) attributes this layered, poly-central pattern to the history of national 
development prior to the processes of economic integration, with Paris, Turin and 
Munich part of the centrifugal dynamic and the centres in Belgium and Northern 
France being more peripheral. The input-output data would suggest that Italy is also 
more peripheral than economically central. The trend in R&D expenditures in 
Europe’s auto industry, as analysed by Leoncini and Montresor, supports this tiered 
structure and suggests a co-evolutionary process where different layers have 
differential rates of investment in technology. ‘The progressive increase of the (total 
manufacturing weighted) R&D expenditure, and of the revealed (by patents) 
technological advantage of the German motor vehicles, as opposed to, respectively, a 
less substantial increase and a decrease in France and Great Britain’ (1999: 34). A 
question that arises from the literature and this analysis but which largely goes 
unanswered is the technological specialisation of clusters and in particular the 
products that are being supplied between countries (the technological links between 
clusters).   
Lung (2003), who has examined the location decisions for car assembly plants in 
Europe between 1991 and 2005, has revealed that many of the new plants have been 
established and will continue to be concentrated in Germany. His tally of car plants 
opening and closing in Europe was:  
• Austria: gained 1 plant; 
• France: 2 shut down and 2 opened; 
• Germany: lost none and gained 6 new car plants; 
• Italy: 4 plants shut down and only 1 opened; 
• Spain: 2 plants closed but 1 new plant opened; 
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• Sweden has had 3 plants shut and only gained one; and  
• the UK has had 4 plants shut, with 2 opening.  
If the location of car assembly influences the pattern of interdependencies, it is 
probable that modelling of a later period would reveal a strengthening of Germany’s 
position, France perhaps maintaining its position and other countries, including the 
UK, losing ground.  
8.6 OECD auto and aerospace cluster networks 
As has already been pointed out the OECD data has the very important advantage of 
a more useful division of industry classifications, but the disadvantage of being 
limited by the number of countries in the dataset. Even if the data is getting old, the 
ability to separate interactions between motor vehicle clusters and aerospace clusters 
is valuable.  
8.6.1 Motor vehicles 
Alongside Germany, which has just been shown to be a major producer of transport 
(automobile) components, Diehl (2001) observes that the other major producers of 
auto components are the USA and Japan. Together these three countries account for 
two thirds of all auto parts. Figure 8.7, based on the OECD 1990 data shows this 
structure clearly.  
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Figure 8.7 OECD Motor vehicle cluster links: indirect value spillovers 1990 
 
Note: In Figure 8.7 Denmark is distinctive because it receives value added spillovers but does not buy 
imports. This is because the original dataset agglomerated motor vehicle information with other 
transport equipment. 
The strong cluster networks visible on the basis of net value added spillovers for 
imports are:  
• Canada is very strongly linked to the USA 
• Australia is dependent on component supplies from Japan 
• The Netherlands purchases from the Rest of the World and Germany. 
• The UK and France are both linked to the Rest of the World. 
Table 8.4 assists with the reading of Figure 8.7 and only includes data for bilateral 
links greater than 5 cents in the dollar of value added. The table highlights the 
sparsity of relations that exist between geographically distant cluster networks. 
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Table 8.4: OECD bilateral interactions greater than 5cents per USD 1990 
 Users 
Suppliers Aus Can Den Fra Ger Japan Neth UK_ USA 
Australia          
Canada          
Denmark          
France          
Germany    0.05   0.14 0.07 0.01 
Japan 0.11 0.07        
Netherlands          
UK_          
USA  0.33        
ROW 0.08 0.08  0.14 0.13 0.05 0.23 0.15 0.07 
 
Technological and industrial specialisation patterns exhibiting a ‘high degree of 
stability in the face of change’ in the motor vehicle industry is achieved, according to 
Leoncini and Montresor (1999: 34) by a high degree of internal technological 
change. Dicken, however, draws attention to the shifting geographic pattern of motor 
vehicle production and the supporting component supply base.  
‘As the same supplier observed: Quite clearly, our goal is ultimately to develop 
manufacturing plants in lower wage cost countries. We will develop a supply base 
around those. In simple terms, the route we are taking at the moment is that we take 
a UK assembly and a UK supply base and the first thing we move is the assembly, 
then we need to develop the infrastructure around the new locations. (Supplier 
company interview)’ (2003: 25). 
The twin emphases of the existing literature, the stable technological and skill 
patterns and the changing supplier networks, are hard to reconcile. Inter-temporal 
and a greater geographic breakdown would be needed to map changes suggested in 
the quote. Preliminary modelling93 for the period 1970-1990 indicates a slight trend 
towards greater concentration of interdependencies based on fewer countries in the 
OECD model. It would be valuable, however, to be able to go beyond just the 
interactions of national clusters alone and model a multi-state system for the USA to 
monitor the internal production geography of the USA as the core apparently shifts 
away from Detroit. The Economist has argued that Detroit as a production centre is 
in trouble as the Japanese manufacturers are establishing competing production 
activities in other locations across America, particularly in the southern states. ‘In the 
past seven years Detroit’s share of the American market has slid from 73% to 63%. If 
                                                 
93 Wixted and Cooper (2004).  
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SUVs [sports utility vehicles], pick-ups and the like are excluded, the big three’s 
share of the passenger-car market is already under half’ (2003a:11).  
What happens to the Detroit cluster may be important to Canada because the latter’s 
cluster is co-located and America is a major export market for Canada (see Figure 
8.3). Whether supply lines will (are) stretch(ing) to the new locations in the Southern 
USA from Canada or whether these new production locations will drive further 
growth in Mexico are important questions for the countries of NAFTA. On the basis 
of current data (see Fitzgibbons et al. 2003) the declining share of Detroit is not 
leading to a decline in the absolute level of output from the Windsor-Toronto auto 
corridor. To the contrary, this Canadian cluster actually grew strongly during the 
1990s.  
Using the first test for significant links, illustrated in Figure 8.8 it is possible to 
clarify the weight of bilateral links, not just of the value of bilateral 
interdependencies. Two unrelated complexes of cluster networks emerge. There is 
apparently a clear dichotomy between a European complex focused on Germany 
(essentially the same result as the analysis of transport equipment production in the 
EU 15) and an Asia-North Americas complex (Canada, USA, Japan and Australia). 
Figure 8.8, as with all the input-output charts in this thesis, depicts backward links 
and therefore the arrows represent the share of the home country value added. 
Therefore, Canada has not achieved a significant share of the USA, even if it is a big 
market from the Canadian perspective. 
Figure 8.8: OECD Motor vehicle cluster complexes: cluster links test 1 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection. 
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The Asia-North America complex appears to be a series of cluster networks. Canada 
is heavily reliant on components from the USA, the link between the USA and Japan 
is a binary network of mutual dependency and Australia is dependent on production 
in Japan. The European complex, here shown to be dependent on Germany was 
earlier shown (Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7), to be made up of a series of cluster links 
constructed on Germany, France and the UK production. It was noted above that the 
pattern of a limited number of strong links generally goes against what is often found 
in multi-regional input-output studies.  
The separation of the Euro and Asia-North America complexes breaks down a little 
under the modified test. The chart reveals that the structure of linkages inside the 
Asia-North America complex intensifies, with Australia having a second tier 
interdependency with the USA, and America’s dependency on Canada becomes 
apparent. 
Figure 8.9: OECD Motor vehicle cluster complexes: cluster links modified test 
(2) 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection. 
Whilst the Asia-North America complex is distinct, the Euro complex has linkages 
across the divide to the USA (exporting to the UK) and Japan (selling to Germany). 
The absence of a significant level of exports from Germany to either Japan or the 
USA is the most striking feature of this analysis. Germany dominates the European 
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industry, but it has not used its national production base to develop big markets in the 
other geographic regions. This is, however, not the same as corporate strategy. It is 
probable that German firms are strongly established in these countries with their own 
production and supply chains, just as Japanese firms have created in the USA (see 
Dicken 2003: 50ff).  
The global auto industry well highlights the difference between the innovation 
systems literature’s emphasis on local technological competencies and the approach 
of authors concerned with the shift of production away from traditional locations, 
particularly to low cost developing economies. Malerba for example, on the one 
hand, observes that ‘automobiles, with few innovators, geographically concentrated 
with local knowledge boundaries are associated to technological regimes 
characterized by high cumulativeness at the firm level and a system type of 
knowledge with some tacit components’ (2002: 260) focuses on the geographic 
concentration of knowledge development.  
The growing trend of major global manufacturers to develop their car platform 
strategies on the basis of increased product modularisation94, is important for the 
issues of innovation and coordination, may not be breaking down the geo-centric 
nature of assembly – as might be assumed. Sadler argues that ‘component 
manufacturers were less dependent on home (national) markets than assemblers, and 
had developed a wider spatial spread of operations even before 1990, a difference 
which became more marked in the period up to 1995’ (1999: 118). On the other hand, 
Sturgeon and Florida suggest that suppliers follow assemblers to new markets to be 
involved in the design process, even whilst manufacturers in high income countries 
seek to import components from low cost countries (see 1999: 83). Dicken (2003) 
notes that government policy has been a very significant factor in auto production 
location decision making. Quotas, content requirements, incentives for export based 
development and tariffs have all been adopted in many countries to encourage the 
establishment of assembly plants and, eventually, encourage suppliers onshore.  
                                                 
94 Sako (2003) as well as Takeishi and Fujimoto (2003) both have good discussions of ‘product 
hierarchy’and ‘product architecture’ (Sako 2003:250). It is apparent that from the mid-1990s product 
modularisation increased, especially through the construction of new plants by the large German 
manufacturers Volkswagen (in Brazil, Czech Republic and, Eastern Germany) and Damlier Chyrsler 
in France and the USA (Takeishi and Fujimoto 2003). Whilst the ‘suppliers develop and assemble 
subassemblies’ (Takeishi and Fujimoto 2003: 261), these suppliers ‘surround’ new assembly plants 
(p262). 
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Alliances and the popularity of mega-mergers within the motor vehicle industry have 
facilitated access to technology without necessarily increasing cross-border traded 
interdependencies through product licensing (etc) (see Dicken 2003, Sturgeon and 
Florida 1999 and Howell and Hsu 2002). 
The modelling conducted here reveals that in 1990 the larger countries in the OECD 
only imported 20 cents in the dollar of value added in the motor vehicle industry. 
Such value spillovers were much higher for some other countries, such as Canada 
(50 cents in the dollar). Although local technological capability does seem to be 
important, limiting innovation systems analyses to national or national sub-national 
systems excludes the emerging shape of the world economy. This tension between 
globalisation and localisation processes remains a critical issue. Despite the general 
trend towards multi-national regional production systems to be integrated across the 
nearest available high-income border (Japan-Australia, France-Germany, Canada-
USA, Mexico-USA), as Figure 8.9 (and research discussed in chapter four) revealed, 
the spatial structure of inter-country dependencies are not limited to such bilateral 
flows or the multi-country triad.  
8.6.2 Aerospace 
While car assembly requires the integration of a very large number of parts within a 
mass production system, aerospace assembly needs to bring together a huge number 
of components with a low unit output and absolute quality assurance. Chapter six 
(above) revealed aircraft and aerospace companies spend a high proportion of their 
turnover on R&D and invest it across a very diverse range of technological fields. 
The commercial aircraft industry is now highly concentrated but nevertheless has 
developed an internationalised production system. Niosi and Zhegu characterise 
global aircraft and aerospace production as having ‘large dominant firms, high 
barriers to entry, increasing returns and high upfront R&D costs, world markets for 
products, and inertia: large plants imply high sunk costs. Attractors are large systems 
integrators, not universities, government laboratories or other institutions’ (2002: 3). 
One component of the barriers to entry is need for a high degree of technological 
competency, as observable through the strong evolutionary trajectories visible in 
aircraft designs (see Frenken and Leydesdorff 2000), which nevertheless also 
displays technological disjunctures, from time to time, which disrupts industry 
development.       
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Of the eight possible clusters studies here, aerospace has a higher imported value 
added than the relevant auto industry in five countries. Those cases where the import 
percentage was less are the USA (the largest national system), Canada (with a niche 
industry) and Australia (with a negligible aerospace industry in 1990). 
Table 8.5: Aircraft & motor vehicle – inter-country component sourcing 
 Aircraft Motor vehicles 
USA 0.088 0.155 
Australia 0.156 0.269 
Germany 0.212 0.200 
Canada 0.245   0.502 
Japan 0.304 0.086 
UK_ 0.320 0.316 
France 0.332 0.242 
Netherlands 0.588 0.503 
 of $1 of VA of $1 of VA 
For more details see Appendix 4. 
The spatial dimension of these connections indicates the strength of the USA in 1990 
(see Figure 8.10). 
Figure 8.10: OECD aircraft cluster links: indirect value spillovers 1990 
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In Figure 8.10 it is possible to see the very strong backward links between countries, 
mostly with America, but also with the Rest of the World. Given that it is the Dutch, 
French, Germans and British that have strong links to the Rest of the World (ROW), 
it is probable that a number of the suppliers to these countries are in Europe. Because 
the bilateral link values are so similar it is difficult to identify the significant 
interdependencies and thus Figure 8.11, based on the first test of significance, is 
provided.  
Figure 8.11: OECD Aircraft cluster complexes: cluster link test 1 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection (includes ROW). 
In 1990, America was unmistakably a first tier production system. Only businesses in 
France supplying Germany’s cluster, achieve a non-US dependency. Local systems 
of innovation in the aerospace industry were therefore clearly oriented toward the 
USA for components. In this case of aerospace, the modified test was particularly 
pertinent to detect secondary linkages (Figure 8.12). 
Chapter 8: Transport Cluster Networking 
Brian Wixted 230
Figure 8.12: OECD Aircraft cluster complexes: cluster links modified test (2) 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection. 
Unlike auto production where European and Asia-North American complexes could 
be identified, only one complex exists in aerospace, one based on the USA. Three 
binary networks emerge from the data developed from the modified test. The 
Canadians achieve some sales to the USA, which on the basis of Niosi and Zhegu 
(2002) could be in business jet parts where Canada has a technological and industrial 
specialisation. The other binary systems are Japan and the USA and a French – 
German interdependency.  
It is possible to speculate that this dual link between France and Germany apparent in 
the 1990 data (Figure 8.12) is the nascent Airbus Industries global production 
network. The transition between 1989, when Airbus (based in France) had one third 
of the global market95, and 2003 when Airbus reported it had gained 52 per cent of 
commercial jetliner orders and 67 percent of the value of transactions96, must have 
reconfigured the supply architecture of aerospace clusters. Notwithstanding this 
performance, total global aerospace production is still dominated by the USA which 
accounts for about one half of all turnover and the European Union for about one 
third (STAR 21 2002: 14). 
 
 
                                                 
95 http://www.centennialofflight.gov/essay/Aerospace/Airbus/Aero52.htm 
96 http://www.airbus.com/media/commercial_aspects.asp  
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Table 8.6: Worldwide aerospace industries comparison 2001 
 Turnover+ in billion Euro Employment++ (’000) 
USA* 116.6 588.6 
EU 80.6 435.5 
Japan 13.0 31.3** 
Canada 15.9 83.6 
Others*** 10.3 102.0 
Total 236.3 1241.0 
Notes:  
(+) consolidated turnover 
(++) at year end 
(*) excluding sales and employment not directly pertaining to aerospace 
(**) includes company staff only directly related to aerospace production (i.e. figure not comparable 
with other regions) 
(***) estimate, PR China and CIS not included 
Source:  AECMA Fig 35 (2002: 38) 
The manufacturing of aerospace products is one with large investment and 
technological barriers to entry and the number of prime integrators has been 
declining across both military and civil applications. Consolidation in the 
commercial segment in the USA during the 1990s resulted in Boeing being left as the 
only manufacturer of large civil aircraft. These changes and the drive for productivity 
improvements have enabled twice as many commercial jet aircraft to be produced in 
2000 as in 1980, albeit with large-scale job losses. For example, America’s 
employment in this industry declined by a third between 1989 and 2000 (Botham et 
al. 2001) and the USA was not alone: the main centres of European production (the 
UK, France and Germany) fail to maintain employment. 
‘In France employment has fallen by 10% since the early 1980s and in Germany it 
has been static. The situation in Great Britain and Scotland is shown in Figure 2.1. 
Continuing a steady reduction which began during the 1970s, GB employment has 
declined by over 40% since 1981 (81,300 jobs). The equivalent figures for 
Scotland are almost 50% and 5,500 jobs. Much of this decline occurred in the early 
1990s’. (Botham et al. 2001: 7) 
Even after falls in employment, the UK’s aerospace cluster still employs twice as 
many as the third biggest (Germany), (see Table 8.8 and Figure 8.13).  
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Table 8.7: Employment in Aerospace industries by country of the EU 2001 
Country Number of Employees 
Austria 3,844 
Belgium 7,447 
Denmark 1,346 
Finland 1,108 
France 104,378 
Germany 74,810 
Greece 4,089 
Ireland 4,320 
Italy 39,157 
Luxembourg 540 
Netherlands 11,261 
Portugal 3,849 
Spain 19,586 
Sweden 12,703 
UK 147,101 
Total 435,539 
Source: AECMA 2002b (Fig 24 p37) 
Figure 8.13: Aerospace employment in Europe 
 
Source: redrawn from ACEMA (2002a: 1). 
What then is the likely scale and spatial structure of today’s aerospace production 
and innovation systems? European-based activities have downsized employment but 
increased their share of the value of global production. To keep pace with the USA, 
projects in the EU are increasingly designed on a pan-European basis (STAR 21: 15). 
Airbus has centred its assembly in Toulouse France, just as Boeing centres its 
assembly activities on Seattle, Washington. Recent research, however, appears to 
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have shown little interest in the spatial structure of links, concentrating more on 
national innovation systems than global production systems. Botham et al. do, 
however, make this interesting observation:  
The success of Airbus will benefit the UK industry. However, it should be noted 
that the major UK companies are (and long have been) important suppliers to 
Boeing. At least some increase in output and employment due to the growth of 
Airbus could be at the expense of suppliers to Boeing. (2001: 10) 
Although the degree to which UK based firms can become a part of the successful 
Airbus supply system would seem to be a critical issue for future growth, the authors 
quoted here are more concerned to investigate the input-output based multiplier 
effects of Scottish local aerospace activities on Scotland. They reveal a disregard for 
considering the demand side of the products of a cluster and where they fit into a 
broader product system. This is, however, not surprising as demand is not a popular 
topic in either economic geography or systems of innovation research, which is 
identified by Bresnahan et al. ‘”demand is important for growth”. In a debate over-
emphasizing supply side factors like agglomeration economics and external effects, 
however, this remark is often overlooked’ (2001: 843).  
In the case of Airbus,97 the supply chain is particularly spatially extended. Table 8.8 
identifies the production sites for the new super-jumbo A380, an aircraft with a 
passenger capacity of 550 and will enter service in 2006. 
                                                 
97 It is harder to obtain information on Boeing’s production activities but its latest endeavour, the 7E7, 
will involve inter-regional supply lines 
http://www.compositesworld.com/hpc/issues/2004/January/334 . 
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Table 8.8: Airbus A380: geography of major component production  
Major aero-structure components Production location 
Cruciform fittings from aluminium as well as the wing box, 
from carbon fibre reinforced plastic. 
Nantes, France. 
Two formed sheet aluminium parts for integration into the 
fuselage section aft of the wings. 
Bremen site in Germany. 
Manufacture of the first aluminium frame assembly for the 
rear fuselage section. 
Varel, Germany. 
Production sites Nordenham and Stade, in 
Germany. 
The first metal cut of components for the A380 wing. Filton In the UK. 
Production of the carbon fibre rear fuselage section. Illescas, Spain. 
During April 2003, the first part of the first A380 belly 
fairing central area was assembled. 
Puerto Real, Spain. 
The centre wing box - the ‘heart’ of the aircraft - located at 
the junction of the wings and the fuselage. 
Nantes, France. 
Lower part of the central fuselage: Parts include the 
central section of the wing, forward lower shell, landing 
gear boxes, central lower shell and floor grid. 
Various sites across the world. 
(wingtips will be made in 
Australia) 
The forward, central and rear upper shells. Delivered to Saint Nazaire from 
Hamburg and from Italy. 
A380 central belly fairing. Puerto Real, Spain. 
The first nose section and forward fuselage sections. Delivered from Meaulte, France 
to be assembled together at 
Saint Nazaire. 
Central fuselage to be delivered to Toulouse, France . 
Assembly of the complete rear fuselage. Hamburg, Germany. 
Assembly of the first horizontal tail plane. Spain. 
The wings. Broughton in the UK. 
Engines, the first approved are Rolls Royce (Trent 900) UK 
Final assembly line. Toulouse, France. 
Source: information derived from Airbus (2004)98. 
The complexity of moving this number of components from across Europe and the 
world (from as far away as Australia) to Toulouse has required Airbus to develop an 
integrated logistics plan and the construction of specialist transport equipment. An 
Airbus report states:  
‘Transport of the aircraft sections to the final assembly line in Toulouse includes a 
mix of sea, river, road and air transport. An itinerary for the oversized loads has 
been developed to move sections from Airbus sites across the world. A huge roll-
on, roll-off sea vessel will be used to take components on the first stage of the 
journey, by sea, from Airbus sites in the UK, Germany, France and Spain to the 
French city port of Bordeaux. Specially designed barges will then carry the 
components on the penultimate part of the voyage, along the Garonne River, from 
Bordeaux to the river harbour of Langon. Here the aircraft components will be 
                                                 
98 Airbus has removed previous programme updates from the website but similar information seems to 
stay available with the latest updates http://www.airbus.com/media/programme.asp and more detailed 
information at http://www.airbus.com/pdf/media/library/A380_suppliers_partners.pdf  and 
http://www.airbus.com/media/press_kits/en/04_a380_work_allocation.asp?en=4  
Chapter 8: Transport Cluster Networking 
Brian Wixted 235
transferred to road trailer to continue the final part of the journey to the final 
assembly line’ (2004: 3). 
This degree of integration of production and technologies from across the world 
would suggest that a more current inter-country input-output modelling exercise 
would show that the industry has become less focussed on the USA over the last 15 
years. The scale of this change and whether it means that aerospace 
interdependencies have changed to resemble a cross between the bipolar motor 
vehicles complexes of the mid-1990s and the uni-polar aerospace complex of the 
early 1990s that was constructed around the USA is uncertain.  
8.7 Cluster linkages, networks and hierarchies  
The analyses in this chapter of European transport equipment, OECD motor vehicle 
and OECD aerospace national-meso clusters connections reveal a number of features 
about the scale and spatial configuration of cross-national interdependencies. In 
general, the scale of bilateral linkages is small, in line with previous inter-regional 
modelling experience. For every country, however, there are apparently concentrated 
inter-industry linkages that extend beyond national borders. These pathways of 
traded interdependencies tend to fit with previous trade analysis that suggests 
geographic proximity is important for international trade. Particular production 
systems, such as aerospace, do not fit this pattern with strong backward linkages for 
all countries to the USA. 
The spatial structure of each set of cluster linkages investigated in this chapter are 
different, indicating both that the level of aggregation matter and that different 
products have evolved their own supply chain architecture. The production of 
transport equipment in the EU 15 in 1995 was significantly dependent on industrial 
components supplied from Germany, although production was typically 
predominantly local (national). Nations like the UK or France were unable to 
position themselves with a larger stake of the available trade flows. In both cases, 
they managed to only be important suppliers for a small number of countries. How 
this spatial structure will change with the introduction of the 10 accession countries 
into the EU in 2004 is open for debate. Lung (2003), Hudson (2002) and Dicken 
(2003) have all discussed this topic with a common interest in how much of Europe 
production will move east. In the view of Lung (2003), the core areas of auto 
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specialisation are not threatened but production on the periphery is prone to shifting 
more easily. 
The more detailed modelling possible through the OECD data revealed that the 
spatial structure of motor vehicle and aerospace inter-industry linkages are very 
different. Motor vehicles linkages tended to be framed within a wider global 
geography, Asian and North American economies were linked, whilst European 
cluster networks were essentially separate to that system and centred on Germany. In 
aerospace, the USA dominated for all countries. The geography of such cluster 
complexes raises interesting questions regarding the deep processes that drive 
economic development99 and also again highlights the deficiency of the innovation 
systems literature in not developing a production centred basis of analysis.  
This apparent economic hierarchy of clusters apparent in the network charts and the 
earlier analysis of supra-critical links (chapter seven above) strongly indicate that 
particular clusters have been more successful technologically and industrially than 
others, requiring other players to be linked into these sources of components and 
technology. Hierarchy, as it is used here, is only intended to indicate the different 
layers of economic linking and is not intended to imply any political or colonial 
influence or power, which might be the understanding of the term in sociology, 
political sciences or political economy studies. These layers emerge naturally out of 
the modelling performed here.  
One last important issue emerges from the analysis of the aerospace industry, and 
especially the current trajectory of Airbus aircraft, for innovation theory. Whilst 
geographic outsourcing is occurring it is not moving to developing economies, as 
suggested by Pavitt (2003a and 2003b), and, although the product is internationalised 
the R&D is not. For example, Rolls Royce has invested its own capital into 
researching and developing the engines for the Airbus A380100. This is a case of 
nationalised R&D for an international product platform, the reverse logic of most 
analyses of the non-globalisation of R&D which are attempting to identify 
                                                 
99 Tellier (1997) speaks of the spatial logic of development and Dodgshon (1998) indicates that across 
large periods of time there has been a general westward trend in development as peripheral zones open 
up on the edge of developed spaces because of cheaper land and production costs etc.  
100 See for example www.rolls-royce.com The Trent 900 engine was developed for the A380, but 
noting that this is not different to the way it generally operates. Rolls Royce engines are developed 
and sent to Seattle for fitting to Boeing aircraft e.g. the Trent 1000 for the new 7E7. 
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internationalised movements of R&D for local products. This is another difference 
between the current perspectives on local clusters, which are perceived as local value 
chains, and the position put forward here of local knowledge contributions to 
international value chains. 
This input-output derived evidence on networks appears to be supported by the more 
direct evidence on component purchasing behaviour and production geography and 
is thus encouraging for continuing to develop this form of multi-spatial systems of 
innovation analysis. What remains is to track the interplay between national and 
inter-connected systems across time and with a wider set of countries (and regions) 
rather than the limited set for which I-O data is currently available.    
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CHAPTER 9:  
 THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF CLUSTER 
 NETWORKING IN ICT AND ELECTRONICS  
 
‘To date regionalization [in East Asia] has not 
generated significant reverse exports to Japan, as 
the product cycle theory predicts; rather it has led 
to trade triangles in which technology and 
components are sourced from Japan while the 
finished goods are exported to third country 
markets, principally to the United States and 
western Europe’ (Bernard and Ravenhill  
1995: 178). 
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9.1 The rise of ICT clusters 
The growth and economic effects of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) have generated huge interest, both academic and otherwise, before and after 
the dot com crash. ICT hardware and the related software industries have been seen 
as opening up large opportunities for productivity increases and thus economic 
growth in developed and developing economies, both through their application to 
manufacturing processes and through e-commerce developments. Amongst others, 
Jorgensen et al. (2003) are believers in the productivity benefits derived from ICT 
activities. The OECD which has conducted a large project on the economic growth 
effects of ICT concluded with largely positive sentiments, indicating that: 
‘Governments today are faced with a new economic environment. ICT has 
emerged as a key technology with the potential to transform economic and social 
activity and has led to more rapid growth in countries where the conditions for 
macroeconomic stability are in place. While it is too early to say how important 
ICT’s transformations will be compared with those of previous innovations, like 
electricity, governments should nonetheless take action to manage adjustment and 
keep the social costs low. All governments can do more to exploit this new 
technology further, by accelerating its diffusion, providing the right skills and 
building confidence’ (2001b: 97). 
On the other hand, Leamer and Storper (2001) are sceptical of the degree to which 
the new technologies will change the patterns of international trade and Smith points 
to the proponents of the benefits of ICT bundling it with unrelated technologies, 
commenting:  
‘A related methodological issue concerns the link between technological 
complexity and interdependence, on the one hand, and economic effects on the 
other. We have noted several times that ICT is not one technology but many. At the 
same time, ICT is put to work in the context of major organizational changes, and 
often in the context of the application of other (unrelated) technologies. These facts 
are often neglected, with the effect that claims are made for the economic impacts 
of ICT which are not justified: the problem is to establish and use a framework 
which will allow interaction and multiple causality between technologies, 
organizational forms, and economic processes’ (2002: 42). 
Alongside the proposition that information and communications technologies are 
useful to increasing productivity has been the argument that manufacturing such 
technologies can also be a spur to growth. The economic rise of places such as 
California, East Asia, Ireland, and Finland has been attributed to this strategy.  With 
this background, it was no surprise that the analysis presented in chapter six (above) 
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revealed information, communication and electronic goods had a significantly 
internationalised production structure, even in the mid 1990s.  
This, therefore, is an important case on which to apply the concepts and 
methodologies argued for in this thesis. Although businesses within the group of 
manufacturing and (sometimes) service101 activities that are combined as ICT often 
make components for assembly in a different location, the existing analyses largely 
ignore the linkages focusing instead on locating local technological skills and 
production agglomerations. In this chapter, the interdependencies between national 
ICT and electronics clusters are explored. It has been already acknowledged that the 
two systems modelled for the present thesis do not include countries in East Asia102, 
apart from Japan, which are significant to a discussion of the spatial architecture of 
linkages for these technologies.  Their role in the global structure of ICT production 
is nevertheless discussed, based on available information, in section 9.5 and 
Appendix 2 is devoted to mapping the changing of export patterns of these countries. 
The purpose here, then, is the same as in chapter eight in that it seeks to discover 
which national-meso clusters have close associations. So once again, the scale and 
spatial structure of linkages is of primary importance. 
The rest of this chapter adopts a methodology identical to that utilised in chapter 
eight. Here only statistical test 1 results are displayed for EU and statistical test 2 
results for the OECD model for the reasons expressed in section 8.4, namely, test 2 
retains too many links in the EU diagrams and test 1 simplifies the OECD structure 
too much. 
                                                 
101 Unfortunately, trade data for services is adequate and thus the spatial structure of interdependencies 
can not be adequately analysed.  
102 Neither of the two models developed here include countries in Asia (apart from Japan) and 
therefore cannot shed any light on the most interesting characteristics of the last thirty years in global 
development in these technologies.  At some point in the future it is hoped that by using the Institute 
of Developing Economies’ Asian input-output tables the scale and spatial configuration of linkages 
can be analysed in a way it deserves. However, leaving it all to the future was not a satisfying position 
for this project, so Appendix 2 presents a series of charts that reveal the changes in the bilateral export 
structure of China, Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, and Taiwan. Ireland, as an economy that 
has achieved similar success in this product system is also included. The charts cover the periods 
1970, 1994 and 2000 to map the evolution of trade in both product and export partner specialisations 
across the period.  
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9.2 The International ICT export structure 
Back in 1990, (Figure 9.1) the major players in office and telecoms equipment were 
Japan, Europe, and the USA. Japan held more than 20 per cent of world exports. 
Similar shares of exports were internal to the EU (15) and external to the USA, 
which had more than 15% of world exports. A group of nine East Asian103 economies 
each separately had around 5% or less, but together, not including Japan and not 
including re-exports by Singapore and Hong Kong, already had 21.7 per cent of 
world exports. Canada’s export profile probably stands out as a traditional OECD 
country with a strong position in ICT products that may not have been expected. 
Figure 9.1: Office machines & telecom equip: share of world exports (1990) 
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Source: WTO (2003) data from Table IV.46 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its03_bysector_e.htm  
Between 1990 and 2002 (Figure 9.2), the East Asian 9 economies (excluding Japan) 
exhibited a rapid rise in their share of world exports. Indeed the fastest growing 
country in ICT exports, China, captured an additional 7.25 % of world exports 
                                                 
103 Used in this chapter to refer to important East Asian economies: Singapore, Korea, Chinese Taipei, 
Malaysia, Hong Kong China, Thailand, China, Philipines  and Indonesia. 
Regional blocks 
and Countries 
% of world exports 
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between 1990 and 2002, largely at the expense of Japan, in particular, which lost 
13% from its share of world exports, falling to 9.7 per cent. The USA, intra-EU 
trade, Hong Kong and Singapore also lost market share. By 2002 the East Asian 9 
group held 36.2 per cent of world exports (up by 14% of world exports), whilst 
internal EU trade was down to 18.5% and EU external trade was down to 9.4 per 
cent.  
Figure 9.2: Office & telecom equip: change in share of world exports 1990 to 
2002 
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Source: WTO (2003) data from IV.46  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its03_bysector_e.htm  
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Detailed industrial structure data for the East Asia countries is difficult to obtain but 
data exists for OECD countries Within the OECD, employment in the ICT sector is 
predominantly within the USA (Figure 9.3). Japan’s employment is about half that of 
America, with individual European countries considerably smaller.  
Figure 9.3: Country share of OECD employment in ICT manufacturing 2000 
Korea
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Nordic
3%
Other OECD
11%
United States
34%
United Kingdom
9%
Italy
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Canada
4%
Japan
18%
France
6%
Germany
6%  
1. “Other OECD” includes: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Mexico, the Netherlands, 
Spain and Portugal. 
2. “Nordic” includes: Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
Source: OECD (2002a) 
 
Taking a different perspective, Figure 9.4 analyses country specialisations by 
comparing the ICT share of manufacturing value added. In this analysis, Finland and 
Ireland, as would be expected, are seen to be intensely oriented towards these 
industries. In contrast, countries such as Australia have a very low degree of 
specialisation in this sector. 
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Figure 9.4: Share of ICT manufacturing
5
 in total mfg value added (%) 2000 
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Source: OECD (2003b). 
Notes. 1. Data for rental of ICT goods (7123) are not available. 
2. Postal services included with telecommunications services. 
3. Data for ICT wholesale (5150) are not available. 
4. Includes only part of computer related activities (72). 
5. “Other ICT manufacturing” includes communication equipment, insulated wire and cable and 
precision instruments. “Other ICT service” includes wholesale and rental of ICT goods. 
6. 1996 instead of 1995 for New Zealand, Norway and Portugal. 
 
Analysis of bilateral trade patterns (Figure 9.5) reveals only a few interactions of 
interest between countries, but mostly they are unsurprising. Ireland has a strong 
concentration of exports focussed on the French, German and UK markets. Canada 
exports to the USA and the Netherlands exports to Germany. In part, this would be 
due to the overall importance of the East Asian economies in this product system. 
 
Countries
Share of mfg value added 
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Figure 9.5: Computer exports (as % GDP) to export destinations – mid 1990s 
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Source: Data derived from OECD (1998c) and GDP data from IMF (2000). 
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9.3 EU ICT and electronics cluster networks 
The modelling of the European Union office and data processing machines cluster 
linkages produces some fascinating results. Although there are some caveats104 to 
this data, it is presented as indicative of the structural relations between the industrial 
players in Europe. The actual flows between countries (percentages of net value 
added) are mapped in Figure 9.6. 
Figure 9.6: EU office & data processing machines: indirect value spillovers 
1995 
 
 
Several features of these flows to are worth noting. There are some very significant 
trade flows between countries, even at the level of absolute value added. For 
example, Ireland’s purchasing from the UK is more than 30 cents in the Euro of Irish 
                                                 
104 In private conversations with researchers attending the 14th International Conference on Input-
Output Techniques in Montreal 2003, the quality of data for both the office and data processing 
machines sector and Ireland were both criticised separately. Thus, this data suffers from a dual 
problem. However, the criticisms are mitigated here because the emphasis is on the spatial structure of 
interactions (driven by trade data). The data for Ireland is roughly corroborated by the level of import 
requirements presented in section 9.5. 
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value added. The overall level of imports of office equipment by European countries 
per Euro of value added is provided in Table 9.1. 
Table 9.1: Country imports per Euro of value added for office equipment 
Country Imported value added
Austria 0.39
Belgium 0.38
Denmark 0.30
Finland 0.29
France 0.15
Germany 0.14
Greece 0.26
Ireland 0.61
Italy 0.35
Luxembourg 0.15
Netherlands 0.39
Portugal 0.31
Spain 0.40
Sweden 0.46
UK 0.27
Many countries in Europe are importing at least a third of their value added in office 
and data processing machines, and as Figure 9.6 revealed, the ROW obtained a 
significant slice of the supply chains. Analysing the profile of strong ties between 
national clusters (Figure 9.7), reveals that Germany benefits from its sales across 
Europe. Although at first glance this dominance of Germany looks similar to the 
motor vehicles case, there are important differences. 
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Figure 9.7: EU Office & data processing cluster complexes: cluster links test 1 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection (includes ROW). 
Germany’s office and data processing machines complex is just as strong but, in 
contrast to the motor vehicles spatial complex, there are two secondary cluster 
networks in Europe – the UK and France. Sweden, Finland and Ireland purchase 
from the United Kingdom and France is selling products to Portugal, Spain, 
Luxembourg and Belgium.  
In terms of understanding systems of innovation more accurately, it would be very 
valuable to map the technological systems (the characteristics of the actual physical 
components) that are being traded across these systems (Germany, the UK and 
France). Such information would begin to tell us a great deal about the 
internationalisation of production and technology clustering. Taking just one of these 
examples, Sweden’s high level of purchasing concentration from Germany and the 
UK, it remains unclear what computer equipment is being purchasing from either 
location. The literature search and other research105 did not shed any light on the 
topic. In contrast to these computing equipment relations, the structure of linkages 
                                                 
105 This issue was raised during a presentation at Chalmers University October 21 2002. 
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between electronics goods clusters takes on a more familiar (European) shape, with 
Germany dominating the flows (Figure 9.8). 
Figure 9.8: EU electrical goods cluster networks: cluster links test 1 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection (includes ROW). 
France is the only country other than Germany to achieve its own mini-complex. The 
UK’s only significant purchaser is Ireland. This is in contrast to office machines 
clusters, where the UK was benefiting from links with Northern Europe. Curiously, 
outside of Germany it is Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and France that are 
the linked countries, a phenomena perhaps related to geography and the old Benelux 
customs union. 
9.4 OECD ICT & electronics cluster networks 
Although the EU analysis revealed that Germany was a key part of European 
production for both office machines and electronic equipment, the flows across the 
OECD are not as concentrated (Figure 9.9). The Rest of the World is an important 
source of supplies and the USA is a very important source for Canada. Apart from 
these links, the majority of the bilateral linkages only account for less than 5 cents in 
every dollar of value added.  
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Figure 9.9: OECD office equip clusters: inter-country value spillovers 1990  
 
NOTE:  The original input-output data for both Australia and Denmark did not separate this industry 
from that of the Radios, TVs and communications equipment industry. Therefore both countries are 
only shown as receiving income from exports (inward arrows), with no outward arrows indicating 
imports.  
In the electronics industry (Figure 9.10), the linkages to the Rest of the World tend to 
be even stronger, whilst again the Canada – USA link is a special case, with Canada 
importing 22 cents in the dollar. 
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Figure 9.10: OECD Radio, TVs & comms equip: indirect value spillovers 1990  
NOTE:  The original input-output data for both Germany and the Netherlands did not separate this 
industry from that of office and computers industry. Therefore, both countries are only shown as 
receiving income from exports (inward arrows) with no outward arrows indicating payments for 
imports.  
In general, though, the bilateral linkages appear to be in a similar ballpark range to 
those for the office machines (computing) industry.  
Although there are restrictions on this data due to the number of countries with data, 
it is still sensible to reconfigure the data on flows to show strong ties between 
national-meso clusters. Both analyses (Figure 9.11 & 9.12) reveal that there are three 
important nodes in the global production of computing and electronic equipment. 
These are Germany, the USA and Japan. Whilst Germany is important for the 
European countries, Japan and the USA are critical to most countries in the analysis. 
There is also a very strong dual link in both international production systems 
between the USA and Japan. 
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Figure 9.11: OECD Computing equip cluster networks: cluster links test 2 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection. 
Figure 9.12: OECD Radio, TV & Comms cluster networks: cluster links test 2 
 
Note: The numbers beside the arrows represent the share of imported value added accounted for by 
each connection. 
The configurations of these spatial structures are quite different to those for either 
motor vehicles or aerospace. These diagrams reveal no European – Asia North 
America split in production. Except that, European countries purchase from 
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Germany as well as America and Japan but the latter linkages are not reciprocated. 
This shows the benefit of the dual modelling strategy as this reveals Germany, within 
the global structure, is not as dominant as it appeared within just the EU system. 
Thus, the diagrams provide a snapshot in time revealing the strength of the Japanese 
industry in the early 1990s. The spatial structure of linkages for these clusters also 
hints at one other feature of these technologies. Unlike the structure for motor 
vehicles (Figure 8.9) and aerospace (Figure 8.12) which appear as rather simple 
spatial systems, these diagrams (Figures 9.11 and 9.12) reveal a more complex 
system of interactions for office equipment and electronics. This provides evidence 
on what is known to be a set of technologies that are more amenable to creation in 
different places with more complex assembly patterns.  
9.5 Contemporary and emerging nodes of global ICT and 
electronics production 
Introduction 
Section 9.2 of this thesis revealed that economies in Asia have managed to achieve a 
remarkable growth in their computing and electronics industries during the 1990s. 
By 2002, 9 Asia countries (excluding Japan) had a larger share of world exports in 
ICT than the countries of the European Union 15 when intra-EU and external trade 
are combined. This is somewhat apparent in the inter-country models through the 
large value added flows to the ‘rest of the world’ and more clearly in  Appendix 2106, 
which presents a series of charts that map the evolutionary changes in export 
industries and bilateral country patterns for Asian economies. Unfortunately, Asia-to-
Asia trade cannot be assessed in this manner. The series of charts presented in 
Appendix 2 do show the change in export profile of many Asian countries has been 
very substantial. This shift has essentially been from low technology industries to a 
very high concentration of manufacturing activity in electronics and computing. 
Their process of development is not complete yet, but Best (1999) notes that 
countries which have managed to develop modern electronics industry such as 
                                                 
106 The OECD bilateral trade database (OECD 1998c and OECD 2002b), which was used to create 
these charts does not facilitate direct analysis of the exports of Asian countries, apart from Korea (as a 
new member OECD). The BTD has two types of countries – those for which export and import 
partners are listed and those which are included only as partners of OECD countries.  Most Asian 
countries appear in this second component of the database. Thus, for trade with OECD countries the 
database can be turned around, as it were, to assume that imports entering OECD countries are a de 
facto measure of exports.  But trade between Asian countries cannot be assessed. However, the charts 
in Appendix 2 do show a combination of country partner and industry specialisation.  
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Malaysia, have also made significant general economic gains, although its per capita 
income still lags behind others in Asia.   
The global production network research by Ernst (discussed in chapter four, above) 
and the production fragmentation approach of Athukorala (2003) both emphasise that 
these new production activities have much to do with the relocation of multi-national 
enterprise operations. Although Ernst (2003) and Chen (2002) discuss the importance 
of developing technological capability and national characteristics in Asian countries, 
they emphasise the role of firms, with less information on what features of particular 
places have been influential in attracting the investment.  
East Asia 
Many accounts of East Asian development have arisen, but amongst the most popular 
has been the ‘flying geese model’ (e.g. see Blomquist 1997, Barker and Goto 1998 
and Mathews 2003). Not only has it been seen as an empirical assessment of history 
but, a theory which is useful for policy development. In essence, the flying geese 
conceptualisation of development envisages products within a hierarchy of 
technological complexity and production costs. As products move up the hierarchy, 
production centres successively move between the countries of Asia. What 
complicates this picture is that some components have seemingly never been 
outsourced from Japan (see Matthews 2003). Undoubtedly, there has been some 
movement of production as costs rise and technological capabilities improve, 
however the flying geese model underplays the interaction between different players 
in constructing different components of products. Barker and Goto point to a spatial 
structure in the relevant industries in Asia that has commonalities with what has 
already been observed for interdependencies in transport, computing and electronic 
goods across the EU. They comment: 
‘production in the Asia-Pacific region is becoming interdependent. It is organised 
in the form of coincidental hierarchical networks stretching across different 
countries, driven by the strategies of firms who look to comparative and 
technological advantage of particular territorial sites for particular parts of the 
productive processes. Production structures are thus increasingly linked across 
countries’ (1998: 269). 
This indicates a high degree of integration in the structuring of intra-regional 
networks with similarities to the EU, but very different to diverse structure apparent 
in the OECD diagrams (Figures 9.11 and 9.12). For the limited OECD model, there 
is a more complex system of interdependencies in computing and electronics when 
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compared against the motor vehicles and aerospace systems. Intra-Asian trade is now 
greater in office and telecommunications equipment than trade between the countries 
of the EU (Table 9.2). Table 9.2 also indicates that there is more trade between Asian 
economies than between Asia and the rest of the world, despite the final markets for 
these products remaining predominantly in high income countries such as the USA 
(Athukorala 2003). 
Table 9.2: Regional flows of exports in office & telecom equip 2002 ($b & 
change) 
 Value Annual percentage change 
 2002 1995-00 2001 2002 
Intra-Asia 211.3 10% -14% 14% 
Intra-Western Europe 169.5 10% -7% -5% 
Asia to North America 108.4 5% -21% 4% 
Asia to Western Europe 76.0 8% -16% 1% 
North America to Asia 47.4 9% -20% -7% 
Latin America to North America 32.4 24% 0% -6% 
Source: WTO. Table IV.41 http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2003_e/its03_bysector_e.htm  
To investigate the intra-Asian spatial relations Figure 9.13 (below) based on data in 
Ng and Yeats (1999), shows the export pattern for parts and components summed 
across all industries. As the industrial and trade structure of these countries is highly 
concentrated in computing and electronics goods, as shown in Appendix 2, the data 
used here was considered relevant. For example, Malaysia’s electronics industry, as 
Best comments: 
‘accounts for half of Malaysia’s total exports and employs a quarter of the 
manufacturing labor force. The annual rate of growth of manufacturing exports 
during 1970 to 1995 was over 25 percent per year and electronics accounts for two 
thirds of manufacturing exports. Over the same 1970 to 1995 period … 
manufactures share [of exports] increased from 11 percent to 80 percent’ (1999: 2). 
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Figure 9.13: Intra-Asian exports 1996 (% of their world exports of 
components) 
 
Source:  Based on original data in Ng and Yeats (1999).  
Notes:  Exports are shown as a share of the country’s world exports of parts and components. Arrows 
point in the direction of the exports. 
 
Some of the major features of the East Asian production system evident in Figure 
9.13 are:  
• Japan is a major destination for intra-regional exports for many East Asian 
countries; 
• Japan’s major intra-Asian trade partners for components, as a share of 
Japan’s world exports of components are Taiwan (5.6%) South Korea (5.5) 
and Thailand (5.1%); 
• Thailand is strongly oriented towards exporting to Singapore (22.6% of 
exports) and the Philippines is exporting to Thailand; 
• Singapore and Malaysia have a strong bilateral link; and  
• Hong Kong and China also have bilateral link (HK to China - 50.9% of 
HK’s exports of components and China to HK - 25.1% of China’s exports). 
Figure 9.14 utilises the same data but includes the rest of the world as a destination 
and removes linkages of less than 5 per cent of a country’s world exports.  
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Figure 9.14: Exports by East Asian economies 1996 (% of their world exports 
of components) 
 
Source: Based on original data in Ng and Yeats. 
Notes: Arrows point in the direction of the exports and represent linkages greater than 5% of world 
exports. 
 
Figure 9.14 adds important details: 
• all countries in Asia are significantly oriented towards exporting to 
countries outside of Asia (the USA as revealed in Appendix 2);  
• South Korea (65%), Japan (60%) and Taiwan (57%) have a greater focus on 
markets in the rest of the world, than they are towards intra-Asian markets; 
and  
• importantly, however, the other countries in this analysis all export intra-
regionally more than 50% of their sales of components and for Indonesia 
and Hong Kong this figure is around 70%. 
This current position is the result of progressive evolution towards more intensive 
levels of regional integration, particularly intra-regional intra-industry trade (see 
Blomquist (1997: 53). 
Such patterns and trends in production and trade raise the question of whether the 
rise of East Asian manufacturing has been based simply on the transfer of overseas 
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technology to where labour is cheap or whether it reflects national and regional sets 
of capabilities? Unfortunately, constructing a profile of the technological capacity is 
somewhat more difficult than trade analysis. Understanding indigenous innovative 
capability is problematic even though East Asia has been one of the key topics in 
industrialisation and innovation research (see e.g. Cardoza 1999, Saxenian and Hsu 
2001, and Chen 2004). Roessner et al., for example, who developed an index of high 
technology capabilities reveals that data on external patenting by relevant countries 
has too many uncertainties and so they use ‘Non-Resident Applicant data’ because it 
provides: 
‘the most effective solution in terms of coverage, ease of use, and availability. 
Although this indicator is the least capable of speaking directly to a nation’s ability 
to innovate, it does provide insight into other nations perceptions of a nation’s 
capacity to develop, produce, and market new technology’ (2001: 37). 
This logic seems a bit of a stretch, so instead, Table 9.3 presents more direct data 
from the U.S. Patent Office on foreign applications for patents by Asian countries, 
Japan and Ireland, together with Australia and Canada for reference purposes, as two 
medium sized economies.  
Table 9.3: Percentage of foreign U.S. patent applications: 1991–99 
Residence of 
inventor 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
    China 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2
    Hong Kong 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3
    Malaysia  0.1 0.1
    Indonesia   
    Philippines   
    Singapore 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4
    South Korea 1.7 1.8 2.2 2.8 3.2 4.8 5.2 5.1 4.2
    Taiwan 2.9 3.3 3.8 4.3 4.6 5.4 5.8 6.9 7.8
    Thailand   
    Ireland 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
    Japan 48.3 47.9 46.6 45.7 45.1 44.7 44.1 42.1 39.7
    Canada 4.8 4.7 5.2 5.1 5.4 5.0 5.0 5.3 5.1
    Australia 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.2
  Foreign patents 76,351 80,650 74,788 82,624 88,419 88,295 94,812 107,579 120,362
  Patents by 
residents of USA. 
 
87,955 92,425 99,955 107,233 123,958 106,892
 
120,445 135,483 149,825
Source: National Science Board (2002) Appendix table 6-13. Note: Blanks = 0.0 
Most Asian countries do not have a strong patent profile in the USA but Taiwan, in 
particular, and, to a lesser degree, South Korea have both managed to grow their 
level of patenting. Taiwan has a stronger patenting performance in the USA than both 
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Australia and Canada, whilst South Korea although considerably stronger than 
Australia, is patenting less than Canada. One factor here is the known disincentives 
for taking out patents on electronics based technologies, because the speed of change 
makes secrecy a better protection (see Hall and Ziedonis 2000 and Graham 2003). 
The level of technological strength may be higher in Asia, therefore, than these 
shares of foreign patent applications in the USA would suggest. Below is a sketch of 
technological capabilities for a few countries in East Asia, developed from a variety 
of research sources.  
Taiwanese local firm strengths include: 
• PC components – motherboards, mouse pointers, monitors and scanners 
(Matthews 2003:21). 
• Taiwan is a major DRAM (semiconductor) producer (Ernst 2001). 
• Taiwanese firms have been able to align local strengths with international 
production networks - ‘characterised by vertical disintegration but with 
strong linkages between local firms and across national borders’ (Chen 
2002: 22). 
Taiwanese local firm weaknesses include: 
• Taiwanese firms have been unable to move into hard disk drives, video 
cassette players and recorders and ‘until the late 1990s’ flat panel displays 
(Matthews 2003:21). 
South Korean local firm strengths include: 
• semiconductors (DRAM), advanced computer displays (Ernst 2001: 2). 
• sophisticated mass produced electronics – microwave ovens, TVs and 
picture tubes (Ernst 2001:13). 
South Korean local firm weaknesses include: 
• firms are focussed on price sensitive hardware rather than software (Ernst 
2001: 2) 
The local firm strengths of other East Asian countries include: 
• television sets, DRAM semiconductors and PC components (Ernst 2001: 7). 
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The local firm weaknesses of other East Asian countries include: 
• differentiated design based products, services and software (Ernst 2001: 7). 
• Japanese consumer electronics was initially outsourced to Malaysia and 
Thailand was then moved to China (Ernst 2001: 8). 
• Malaysia has three specific weaknesses; significant reliance on imports due 
to restricted local supply chains, export reliance on the USA market and a 
concentration in low end assembly products (Ernst (2002: 41).  
This structure of East Asia’s capability and production, according to Ernst and Kim, 
is strongly influenced by GPNs which they argue typically have at their core a 
‘flagship’ multinational that coordinate the network. As these are ‘networks’, 
opportunities arise for capacity and capability upgrading of national firms 
participating in global production, as indicated by Ernst and Kim:  
‘Flagships place business orders and transfer valuable knowledge to local suppliers 
with only one objective in mind: to strengthen the competitiveness of their GPN. In 
response to intensifying global competition, the flagships’ outsourcing 
requirements have become more demanding. Typically, suppliers are selected by 
three criteria: a solid financial standing; high ratings on a quarterly scoreboard 
measuring performance in delivery, quality etc. and speed of response’ (2002: 
1427).  
Looking across all the evidence, it appears that the combination of low cost 
production and the design features of ICT equipment, specifically the huge variety of 
modular components which are easily transportable, has resulted in an Asian regional 
production complex specialising in computing and electronics. Traded and 
knowledge interdependencies have developed spatially within Asia and are linked 
with the other producers of these products across the world. 
Ireland 
Another great success story of ICT-driven economic growth, which is often quoted, 
is the Celtic Tiger (Ireland107). Ireland is considered to have two ICT related clusters 
– the first is based on foreign direct investment in hardware production facilities 
while the second is a local software industry (Roper and Grimes 2003). The 
following analysis pays particular attention to the former cluster, questioning the 
degree to which it is a cluster at all under existing uses of that term.  
                                                 
107 Irish GDP doubled between the early 1990s and early 2000s 
http://www.esri.ie/content.cfm?t=Irish%20Economy&mId=4 viewed 15 Sept 2004. 
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Earlier in this chapter, it was noted that Ireland’s office and data processing national-
meso cluster was reliant to an extraordinary degree on imported components from 
the United Kingdom. Although the OECD (2003c) STAN Database does not yet 
include industrial structure data for Ireland, the OECD (2002b) Bilateral Trade 
Database enables an analysis of a time series of import propensities to test whether 
the earlier modelling result is plausible. Table 9.4, indeed does add support to the 
result that Ireland relies on imports to feed its ‘cluster’. 
Table 9.4: Ireland’s import propensity 1988-2001: (imports as % of exports) 
 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Office, & computing 45 46 47 53 51 49 55 60 60 59 62 55 58 44
Electrical mach & 
apparatus, nec 108 109 114 125 143 106 97 96 99 96 91 92 106 90
Radio, TV & comms 
equipment. 123 150 139 122 142 176 142 115 91 82 95 76 79 82
Source: Data from OECD (2002b). 
Across three hardware based ICT industries, Ireland’s requirement for imports is very 
large. Table 9.4 reveals that Ireland was importing nearly 1.5 times its exports in the 
Radio, TVs and communications equipment category for the early 1990s and even in 
2000 it was around 80 per cent. The trend for imports in all three industries peaked in 
the early to mid 1990s (Figure 9.15), which corresponds to the EU 15 model. 
Figure 9.15: Ireland’s import propensity 1988-2001 (imports % of exports) 
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Source: Data from OECD (2002b) Bilateral Trade Database 2002.  
The OECD rated Ireland has having the highest import to export ratio for ICT in 
OECD countries in both 1995 and 2000 when compared against the import 
propensity of manufacturing (2002a: 32). The OECD also found Ireland to have the 
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largest ICT trade surplus as a percentage of manufacturing trade (2002a: 29). When 
the argument, however, is that this group of activities represents a cluster bounded by 
the political borders of Ireland, the degree of dependence on imports is highly 
relevant. The literature on Ireland focuses on the performance of the ICT sector’s 
growth and as a driver of a modern knowledge based economy. For example, Green 
et al. write: 
‘As an emerging knowledge-based economy, Ireland has one of the highest 
concentrations of information and communications technology (ICT) activity and 
employment in the OECD. This activity comprises primarily electronics hardware 
manufacturing, such as personal computers (PCs); software products and services, 
especially business application products and “localisation”; and call centres. It has 
largely been driven by foreign direct investment (FDI), although recent evidence 
suggests that indigenous firms are now growing at a much faster rate than the 
multinational sector. It is also a major factor in high-skill, high-wage job creation 
since the early 1990s and comprises a key element of Ireland’s national innovation 
system, which is also a regional one in the European context’ (2001: 47). 
There is little mention of either the scale of imports, or their source(s). Green et al. 
do, however, acknowledge the important role of payments for technologies.  
‘Yet the economy’s dependence on FDI has also encouraged the use of imported 
rather than locally generated technologies. This is reflected in the very large deficit 
in Ireland’s “technology balance of payments”, which measures flows in 
knowledge and “disembodied” technologies between countries’ (2001: 50) 
[emphasis added]. 
Predominantly, it is the growth and importance of exports (see Green et al. 2001: 49) 
that receives attention. Roper and Grimes (2003) research a range of emerging IT 
clusters (Helsinki, Tel Aviv and Dublin) but only mention imports in connection with 
the Finnish IT cluster centred on Helsinki. Without denying that Ireland has made 
substantial progress in improving per capita GDP and the living standards of its 
population off the back of rapid industrialisation, O’ Sullivan (1999) is somewhat 
circumspect about the capability of Irish industry. 
‘we are far from being able to understand the long term significance of the current 
boom. In part, the problem is that the evidence available is ambiguous. The main 
issue, however, is a dearth of empirical studies that might allow us to understand 
the innovative capacity’ (1999: 277). 
Far from diminishing the value of location, the analysis presented in this chapter 
suggests that a high level of imports is commonplace for computing and electronics 
production. This is not discussed widely, but it appears to be a part of the nature of 
the technology – its modular nature facilitates and encourages both specialisation and 
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high levels of trade. Given this, together with the evidence on the strength of the link 
between Ireland and the United Kingdom, to discuss the Irish cluster in isolation 
from discussions of its major suppliers in Britain seems to make no sense. A more 
accurate characterisation of Irish production might nominate this as an example of, as 
already suggested (above), a networked cluster. 
The reluctance highlighted here, to acknowledge the overall evidence on imports 
seems to stem from a deeper problem, the view that it would deny evidence on the 
development of a local skills base and a local supply architecture (promoted by 
Porter 1990). More importantly, it again points to the absence of framework within 
the systems of innovation research than integrates the emergence of new clusters 
initially based on FDI and imported components and the continuing strength of 
existing places. Sturgeon comments:  
‘We need to better understand the various roles that local agglomerations 
play within spatially extensive value chains and begin to map the 
activities that tend to concentrate in particular places even as the 
geographic ‘footprint’ of linked economic activity expands. It is the 
linkages mechanisms, between firms and between places that especially 
deserve more of our research attention’ (2003: 200) 
9.6 Network relations in a modular technology 
Whilst the spatial configuration of traded interdependencies in motor vehicles and 
aerospace lent themselves to the description of cluster complexes, it does not seem as 
appropriate for describing computer and electronics linkages. This is due to 
difference in the number and geographic spread of the central system nodes.  
Germany, is a dominant supplier of computing and electronics products across the 
spatial scale of Europe, but is not so central when the countries outside of Europe are 
introduced to the analysis. Even within Europe, however, this is a simplification as 
there are three central nodes of differing strengths (Germany, France and the UK) in 
the office and data processing machines production system. Within the OECD model 
for both office and computing and electronics cluster systems the USA, Japan and 
Germany all emerged as important nodes for supplies. Inturn these primary nodes are 
themselves being supplied by countries in East Asia. Export patterns108 across Asia 
are revealed as both strongly intra-regional as well as focussed on Japan and the 
                                                 
108 Notwithstanding Figures 9.13 and Appendix 2, it would have been nice to access I-O modelling for 
Asia. 
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USA. Interestingly, although East Asian countries have a strong intra-regional trade 
pattern, they do not seem to have developed a European styled key node system. 
This analysis also begins to suggest the structure of modular value chains (see 
Sturgeon 2003) as opposed to vertically integrated production (aerospace), develops 
within a different spatial framework, even though the modelling has been conducted 
at a highly aggregated level. As computing and electronics products integrate 
modular units composed of easily transportable components, emerging IT clusters109, 
have been able to specialise in complementary rather than competing products, as 
Bresnahan et al., indicates: 
‘Emerging ICT clusters in Israel, India, Ireland and Taiwan all have significant ties 
with the United States, which helped them to exploit the ICT-intensive US growth 
of the second half of the 1990s. In this respect, it was critical for these regions to 
position themselves in product spaces that were complementary to the main 
sources of demand (notably Silicon Valley and the US) rather than directly 
competing with them’ (2001: 851) [emphasis added]. 
This finding is of the greatest significance. It connects the local and the global 
economic environments. It indicates that cluster development is not an isolated 
creation but occurs in association with the wider technical community through the 
establishment of standards and to consumer preferences through wider technological 
trajectories. By focusing on national systems of innovation, neo-Schumpeterians 
have largely ignored the linkages between systems. In contrast, a multi-spatial 
framework in considering the particularities of broad product domains makes it 
possible to examine and understand the development paths of territorial innovation 
systems. 
 
                                                 
109 Ireland, Cambridge UK, Israel, Scandinavia, India, Taiwan and Northern Virginia. 
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CHAPTER 10:  
 CONCLUSIONS ON THE ARCHITECTURE OF 
 ECONOMIES 
 
‘For the economic actor, space exists only to the 
extent that others have given shape to it by their 
actions. Input-output represents this space by a 
web of supplier-user relationships. Past economic 
actions create field forces. Methodological 
individualism’s atomistic view supposes great 
degrees of freedom for individuals, and this 
presupposes a homogeneous space, which 
amounts to no space at all. In contrast, we find it 
more realistic to assume that two actors, once 
they have interacted, can be bound by some 
relationship and sometimes not even be 
separable’ DeBresson (1996: 151-152). 
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10.1 Atolls of innovation versus a ‘beyond borders’ 
approach  
The neo-Schumpeterian research agenda has a wide variety of foci, but during the 
1990s it became increasingly dominated by a geographic emphasis on systems of 
innovation which are typically described as national or sub-national (clusters and 
regions). The attitude of Freeman (2002: 209) in choosing to concentrate ‘on 
developments at the national level in the belief that the major phenomena of forging 
ahead, catch-up and falling behind in 19th and the 20th centuries can most plausibly 
be explained in terms of national systems’ is representative of a more general attitude 
of many researchers to spatial development. The sub-national systems perspective 
although examining a different spatial scale (characteristically terminating with 
national borders) also takes on the same methodological interest in identifying places 
of interest and studying their history, looking for endogenous regional factors of 
success and policy options. There is no consistent evidence that the research agenda 
is expanding the link between what happens within a set of borders with what 
happens outside of them. 
Because the study of systemic innovation has taken on this limited spatial framework 
the present research project was designed to investigate the degree to which this was 
an appropriate paradigm and specifically to investigate: 
1. Why does the ‘innovation systems’ agenda give primacy to political 
geography (nation states and regions within nations) over other possible 
frameworks including economic space, which may lead to more research 
on extra-territorial links;  
2. What is it about linkages between economic actors (relationships 
particularly between users and producers) within innovation theory that 
makes them so important for the development and diffusion of new 
products and services; 
3. What is known about product and knowledge linkages that extend beyond 
the borders of particular innovation systems (especially industrial 
clusters); 
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4. To construct an analysis of the spatial structure of external linkages, is it 
best to use an intensive case study approach or a statistical tool such as 
input-output modeling; 
5. Can multi-regional input-output modelling be used to analyse the strength 
of user-producer relationships between places in a way that can highlight 
connections more clearly that other methodologies including trade data; 
6. Do the results of inter-country modelling reveal linkages between systems 
that are statistically important; 
7. Does the structure of international input-output relations make sense 
when other evidence on knowledge flows, technological specialisations 
and national and sub-national systems of innovation are considered; and 
8. What new insights into systems of innovation and the interdependencies 
between them emerge from understanding the spatial structure of 
linkages? 
These specific questions can be summarised as whether innovation systems are 
delineated by borders or whether it is more appropriate to follow production in 
economic space to combine the advantages of the analysis of location together with 
trade in a multi-spatial perspective. To follow these lines of connection between 
places it is necessary to focus on the role, scale and spatial structure of 
interdependencies that cross borders (intra or inter-nationally). A particular interest, 
here, in furthering the understanding of the spatial structure was the desire to uncover 
whether clusters develop within wider networks of clusters or have no particularly 
discernable extra-territorial structural dimension. To meet the objectives of this 
research it was determined that being able to analyse a large number of industries and 
geographic locations was a better approach than a case study of just one cluster 
(objective four above). Thus, two inter-country input-output datasets along with 
modelling software were constructed for the research. The results have broadly 
revealed that inter-country modelling is a useful tool. Interdependencies across 
borders are important in some production systems and that the spatial dimension is 
informative for comprehending innovation system development.  
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10.2  Inter-regional modelling and innovation systems 
Researching the idea of cluster interdependencies required a methodology that was 
suited to network interactions and supplier-customer relationships. The obvious 
source of data is input-output tables and, in particular, inter-country datasets. There 
were important advantages and disadvantages to this choice. 
Disadvantages 
There is always a long delay in the production of national input-output tables and 
very long delays and/or uncertain production schedules for multi-country input-
output datasets. As one example, the updated OECD database which has been 
expected for a number of years was only released in early 2005, and thus, too late to 
be incorporated into this study. 
Importantly, existing inter-country input-output datasets have combinations of 
countries and industries that are problematic. The 1995 European tables (Eurostat 
2000) were restricted to the EU 15, which provides a large sample of countries but 
the industry classification combines too many important activities (crucially, all the 
different elements of transport: motor vehicles, aerospace etc). On the other hand, the 
existing OECD dataset has a very good classification of industries but, at least with 
the first release, had too few countries and is now getting very old. Other types of 
multi-regional data such as city based, intra-provincial or inter-provincial are rare, 
many having to be specifically constructed each time a researcher is interested in a 
region. The Canadian inter-provincial and the IDE inter-country tables were simply 
too expensive to be used in the present research. 
One feature of the modelling used here which creates a particular bias is that there 
are vast differences in the scales of economies included in the analysis. Linkage 
values are currently calculated as a share of the initiating sector’s value added. Thus, 
large nation states tend to be significantly dependent only on other large economies 
and small countries will almost inevitably only represent a small share of the 
initiating sector, regardless of how important the trade is to the supplier. It is 
therefore rare for a small country to capture a large enough share of a large economy 
for it to show up in the reduced (i.e. statistically significant) bilateral input-output 
flows. A perfect approach is not possible but a methodology for rebalancing this 
perspective is necessary. It is possible to conceptualise a methodology that converts 
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these shares of new demand into a share of the supplier’s value added. This would 
generate data on the flow of economic growth arising from new demand and give 
insight into the role of smaller export driven countries in spatially extensive value 
chains. If this were presented side by side with the current analysis, it would provide 
an excellent presentation. 
Lastly, input-output modelling can only provide indicative results on the dimensions 
of multi-spatial innovation systems. The data is highly aggregated production data. 
Case studies are needed to confirm the role of person-to-person connections across 
borders, the role of institutions, policy and the degree to which inter-regional or 
international trades go hand in hand with knowledge transfers and the generation of 
innovations. 
Advantages 
Despite these drawbacks, inter-regional input-output data still presents unique 
opportunities for the analysis of multi-spatial network structures. Input-output 
economics has a long tradition (Rose and Miernyk 1989) of developing a range of 
mathematical tools for measuring the linkages between industries and working on 
multi-regional analyses (Polenske and Hewings 2004). The modelling conducted for 
the present thesis was based on calculations of net value added multipliers and thus 
imports as a share of value added. This has allowed the results to be easily 
interpreted and analysed alongside the existing literature on clustering and 
internationalisation. 
Input-output analysis has been used in a wide number of innovation studies of 
knowledge flows and clustering (see section 5.2.2 above). Crucially for the present 
study, the range and depth of analysis made possible through the development of the 
two inter-country models, which span 19 different countries providing information 
on the international configuration of a wide range of industries (see Appendices 6 
and 7) justifies the choice. A small case study based approach could have provided 
information on only an extremely limited number of cluster connections and would 
not have provided the structural overview that resulted from the modelling and 
presented across chapters six through nine (above).  
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Future modelling and software development 
The net value added approach adopted here and previously only theorised by Cooper 
(2000), has worked extremely well in delivering easily understandable and 
methodologically rigorous results. Nevertheless, there are a few areas of the 
modelling or the research that could be extended.  
As the basis of the modelling analysis presented in the current study was just the 
intermediate transactions, the modelling software could be extended to incorporate 
the final consumption component of input-output matrices. Hewings et al. (2001) for 
example has used a Miyazawa framework to analyse sectoral and income flows inter-
regionally within the Chicago metropolitan economy. Further research in this 
direction would require some detailed data preparation as the EU dataset appears to 
have serious inconsistencies in the export and final demand sections of the I-O 
tables.  
In terms of data analysis, it is possible to conceive of extending the modelling 
through the three dimensions of more countries, different spatial scales and inter-
temporal analysis. It would be undoubtedly preferable to have access to input-output 
modelling information for East Asia, rather than rely purely on trade data. Asian 
tables produced by the Institute of Developing Economies110 in Japan could be 
profitably analysed in a similar way to that done with the OECD and EU data in the 
present thesis. Ideally, it would be possible to access a database of about 25 countries 
(EU 15 + other major OECD countries + major rapidly industrialising countries 
(Taiwan, Korea and Mexico etc). To some extent it might be possible to piece 
together a combination of existing datasets to create such a transactions matrix. Of 
equal worth would be the analysis of regional linkages intra-nationally. For example 
the spatial production geography of the American economy111 is an important issue 
but it is unfortunately usually treated (as it was here) as a single economy. 
Segmenting America’s economy would facilitate a consideration of how important 
imports are to California’s Silicon Valley or the mid-western auto cluster. Possible 
intra-national databases that are currently available include: 
                                                 
110 http://www.ide.go.jp/English/Publish/Books/Sds/index.html  
111 Garreau (1981) interestingly proposed that there were ‘nine nations’ (economies) in North America 
with zones crossing Canadian, US and Mexican borders. 
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• The provinces of Canada [data is available from StatCan112]; 
• The State Government of Queensland [a state of Australia] has developed a 
regionalised input-output dataset; and  
• Sydney [AEGIS113 is developing an input-output model for the city]. 
Inter-temporal analysis is possible with the OECD data, and has been begun in a 
preliminary manner in Wixted and Cooper (2004 and forthcoming).  
Beyond the cluster-to-cluster linkages presented in this thesis, the modelling can be 
extended to disaggregate the inter-industry flows to investigate all linkages above a 
specified statistical level of significance. This could test whether inter-regional 
linkages are intra-industry or inter-industry (e.g. computing to computing or 
electronics to computing).  
Finally, chapter seven has already identified that the concept of supra-critical values 
needs to be developed further to determine which country-industry interactions are 
generating the additionality and also through detailed data analysis and further 
modelling ‘map’ the lines of supra-critical value transmission. Understanding 
whether these value chains have implications for agglomeration theory or are 
measures of the ability of innovation systems to generate abnormal profits should to 
be explored. 
10.3 Systems of systems: Interdependencies beyond 
borders  
Throughout the present study it has become apparent that a number of economic 
phenomena seem consistent at different spatial scales. As one example, production 
agglomerates at levels as small as individual streets through to national 
specialisations, as Malmberg and Maskell point out:  
‘One problem relates to the issue of spatial scale. The notions local and regional, 
which are often central in analyses of spatial clustering, are extremely elastic. First, 
the two notions are often used more or less as synonyms in the literature. 
Furthermore, they may denote a number of geographical scales, extending from the 
local neighbourhood (a street or block in a city, or a small town) through to entire 
nations or even groups of nations. Similar mechanisms or forces are held to explain 
both why advertising agencies flock together at a particular street (Madison 
Avenue) in New York, and why the ‘European banana’ developed as a core area of 
                                                 
112 http://www.statcan.ca/english/sdds/1401.htm#Datafile  
113 www.aegis.uws.edu.au  
Chapter 10: Conclusions on the Architecture of Economies 
Brian Wixted 272
heavy industrialization during the 19th century, an area which is extended across 
several countries in the heartland of what is now the European Union. It does not, 
however, seem possible to define, once and for all, a specific geographical scale at 
which one could argue that agglomeration economies exert a particularly strong 
influence. Rather, it seems reasonable to allow the scale to vary according to which 
type of phenomenon that is emphasized in the analysis’ (2002: 442). 
The concentration of related economic activities, horizontally (similar) or vertically 
(suppliers and buyers) is therefore, seen as a structural dimension of development. 
Larger agglomerations tend to not only be centres of industrial production or services 
(Sassen 2002) but also the hubs of innovative effort. Twenty-one statistical 
geographic zones across Europe account for more half of the high technology patents 
applied for to the European Patent Office (Eurostat 2002). Additionally, multinational 
firms are only slowly internationalising their R&D effort away from traditional 
centres (OECD 2003b). This combination of factors has resulted in only a slow 
change to national technological specialisations (Laursen 1998b). 
The persistence of locations as places of economic advantage has often been argued 
to be the intensity of a range of interdependencies that attract new players and 
encourage technology adoption and creativity in new product development and the 
marketing of innovations. The range of specialised products and services, the 
information transfer embedded in user-producer relations enabling innovation and 
the local chatter of people in the same industry (untraded knowledge flows) assisting 
with problem solving are all interdependencies that encourage the co-location of 
businesses (see chapter three). Indeed, long term user-producer connections are so 
important for innovation that they can be considered a predictive variable (von 
Hippel 1988 and DeBresson 1999). Interdependencies, in the view of Edquist 
(1997b), are one of the dominant themes of systems of innovation research.  
The concern to study the endogenous features of particular places is understandable. 
Nonetheless, although national specialisations are relatively stable (Wolff 2000 and 
Metcalfe et al. 2002), they are not perfectly so. Laursen (1998b) has shown that 
bilateral trade patterns are slowly de-specialising and the trend in industry location in 
Europe appears to be favouring dispersion rather than geographically concentrating 
(see Storper et al. 2002). The re-location of production has been observed in low 
technology industries such as TCF (Gereffi 1998) and in high technology alike 
(Matthews 2003). Indeed a large part of economic activity, but maybe not knowledge 
production, in computing and electronics has been accumulating in East Asia (see 
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chapter nine). Not surprisingly, the processes of locational change can also be 
observed intra-nationally (Hewings et al. 1998).  
Looking to the future Pavitt observes that: 
‘firms specializing in systems design and integration are not 
postindustrial. They are instead the prolongation of the industrial system 
into a period of growing specialization and complexity, and of growing 
capacities to store, transmit and manipulate information. High wage 
countries may indeed find themselves specializing increasingly on 
‘services’, but not as an alternative to manufacturing activities but as the 
skill-intensive components within them. The Visible Hand of 
manufacturing will not become invisible (Langlois 2001), but continue to 
exploit economies of physical scale, speed, and scope. At the same time, 
the Visible Brain of systems integration could become the dominant form 
of business organization in the world’s advanced countries’ (2003b: 18-
19). 
Pavitt’s view is probably correct for modular technologies such as electronic 
components, and is more a more promising perspective than that of the 
jurisdictionally bounded systems approach. Until quite recently, it was difficult to 
identify a body of literature that specifically drew attention to the limitations of this 
latter approach. This is beginning to change, see for example Carlsson (2003), Wolfe 
and Gertler (2004) and Simmie (2004), all of whom draw attention to an urgent need 
to incorporate extra-regional linkages and to not seek all dimensions of Porter’s 
diamond inside a region. 
The present thesis has attempted to begin this work of defining ‘functional’ 
innovation systems. Rather than affixing interdependencies within geographies, it is 
necessary to follow them through economic space, which being infrequently 
continuous or autonomous, requires a multi-geographic (multi-spatial) perspective. 
What gives a particular location an advantage and how is that location linked to other 
locations with different technological advantages – in a given production system? 
There is considerable evidence that multinational enterprises through global 
production networks and intra-firm trade link the capabilities of different places to 
one another. However, whilst other fields of research (world cities in particular) have 
been developing an understanding of the spatial linkages and industrial hierarchy of 
economic activity, neo-Schumpeterians have by and large stuck to comparative 
analysis of systems. This thesis has identified a number of findings on the role, scale 
and spatial structure of interdependencies that extend across borders. 
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10.3.1 The role of interdependencies 
In the earlier chapters of this thesis, particularly chapter three (above), the role of 
interdependencies within local or national economies was discussed at length. A 
recurring finding of current research is that the processes which drive knowledge 
(and above all, tacit knowledge) diffusion have a preference for proximity. For 
example, technology spillovers via national linkages have a higher correlation with 
export market shares than spillovers through international imports (see Laursen and 
Meliciani 2001). 
It is apparent that there are three types of interdependencies, namely:  
• trade - the transfer of goods and services; 
• long term business- to-business interactions; and  
• the untraded flow of tacit information through local talk.  
The impact that these types of interdependencies on innovation can be summarised 
as: 
• the acquisition of embodied innovation [access to the benefits of the 
innovative work of others]; 
• the development of user-producer relations facilitate the transfer of 
commercial information and thus encourage innovation, and  
• information that assists with solving technical and other context based 
problems. 
Some evidence for all three types of connections extending across borders was found 
in this research project. Naturally, given the methodologies adopted, the strongest 
evidence was found for the role of traded goods and services with the implication of 
embodied technology transfers. The weakest evidence was on the nature of business-
to-business relationships across borders but evidence on the operations of industrial 
marketing techniques and global production networks, for example, suggest that 
trans-border associations do transfer knowledge and could therefore, be the basis of 
innovative activity. 
Interestingly, very strong evidence, albeit, indirect was discovered on the possible 
role of person-to person knowledge flows in trans-border networks. The connection 
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between social networks, migration patterns and trade is a new field but the work of 
Rauch (1999 and 2001) and others reveals that the movement of people and the 
movement of goods across the world are closely associated. More direct evidence on 
untraded interdependencies extending around the world is provided by Saxenian and 
Hsu (2001) who have shown that the technical communities in Taiwan and Silicon 
Valley work together closely, not just virtually through electronic communications, 
but physically, through frequent visits in both directions. 
10.3.2 The scale of connectedness – do these links matter? 
A large number of the results presented in the current thesis relate to attempts at 
measuring the scale of trans-border traded interdependencies. In the first instance, 
chapter six (above) revealed a range of industries require significant levels of 
imported inputs. A few of these were resource industries such as petroleum and a 
number were, the expected, cost based industries such as textiles, clothing and 
footwear. Amongst the list, however, were industries with higher R&D intensities. 
Aerospace, electronics and communications, office and computing equipment and 
motor vehicles all emerged as dependent to varying degrees on imported 
components. The pharmaceuticals and instruments industries required noticeably less 
imported inputs. Based on a modified version of Pavitt’s (1984) innovation 
taxonomy, the majority of high import industries in both the OECD model and EU 
model were identified as scale based, with a few science-based sectors also included. 
A number of promising research leads emerged from the preliminary analysis of 
technological complexity, presented in chapter six, which attempted to differentiate 
high technology component based activities from more other industries. 
The findings on the scale of individual linkages between clusters, appears to be 
generally supportive of the conclusions of other inter-regional I-O studies including 
those of Hewings et al. arising from a multi-regional analysis of the Chicago 
metropolitan area. In that study the authors found that ‘while the interindustry 
relationship generates circulation of economic activity and hence creates impacts 
outside the region of original stimulus, the size of these impacts is relatively small’ 
(2001: 214). For the most part the bilateral international inter-cluster linkages were 
quite small. The top three countries in Europe; Germany, the UK, and France and in 
the OECD model, Japan and the USA often retained the highest share of value added 
domestically.  
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In contrast to this expected result, the research has also uncovered a number of 
bilateral links between countries at the cluster level that are statistically important. 
Most countries were dependent on imports from one or two key suppliers and, in 
some cases, such as Ireland’s reliance on the UK for office and computing 
components, this dependence was extraordinary high. Pursuing this further, it was 
found that it was possible for countries (mainly Germany, as it turned out) to capture 
statistically significant more value added from trade than their initial volume of trade 
would suggest (chapter seven above).  
Knowing that many I-O studies reveal only small inter-regional flows of value but 
being aware that studies of international trade have indicated concentrated 
specialisation patterns it was, nevertheless, a surprise to discover the actual strength 
of many connections between countries. When pared back to the main trunk routes 
for trade it became very apparent that the scale of cross-border traded 
interdependencies were economically significant and they had very definite spatial 
structures. 
10.3.3 The spatial structure of extra-territorial linkages 
It is already known that manufacturing goods are generally traded in accordance with 
economic gravity – the largest nearest market (Wolf 2000) and innovative regions 
have been found to positively impact on neighbouring regions (Beaudry and Breschi 
2003). Business services appear to follow a different pattern with business services 
linked across distant nodes (e.g. cities, see Beaverstock et al. 1999). A nodal 
structure to external linkages also appears to be characteristic of some biotechnology 
clusters (Gertler and Levitte 2003). 
The charts in Appendix six and seven reveal that the spatial structure of each 
production systems is quite different. Chapter eight (transport equipment, motor 
vehicles and aerospace) and nine computing and electronics and communications 
equipment) each explored in detail the spatial structure of inter-country cluster 
networks. The analysis in those chapters indicated that each country had primary 
dependency links. Also, very preliminary results from modelling the earliest data 
(circa 1970) in the OECD input-output database (1996) reveals that the patterns of 
inter-country inter-cluster linkages have been changing and that the approach 
adopted in the current research project can be used to highlight inter-temporal 
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changes (see Wixted and Cooper 2004 and forthcoming). The use of the updated 
OECD I-O database will also facilitate wider system analysis as it includes data for 
twenty countries.  
Although the evidence presented in chapter eight appeared to suggest the existence 
of wider spatial systems with motor vehicle complexes in Europe and Asia-North 
America, and with aerospace (1990) principally based on the USA. On the other 
hand, chapter nine indicated that the spatial structure for ICT related industries is 
more intricate. This finding is reviewed in section 10.4.2 (below). The cumulative 
evidence provides support for the initial project design to track interdependencies at 
the industry/cluster level across borders and also provides support for not being 
locked into a concept of supra-national innovation systems. 
10.3.4 Future research on multi-spatial innovation systems 
There are too many future research angles on innovation systems opened up by a 
multi-spatial research agenda, for them to be all considered here. Apart from 
continuing to examine inter-regional flows and linking the network structures with 
technological specialisations and trajectories, which is an obvious continuum of the 
research in the present thesis, there is the important issue of knowledge globalisation.  
Current approaches to this issue have considered the spatial dimension of knowledge 
adoption and the location of MNE’s research activities. Patent citations diffuse first 
to nearby regions whilst the degree of MNEs engaging in foreign patenting ranges 
from zero to 100 percent (Verspagen and Schoenmakers). International payments for 
technology are slowly on the rise in the OECD, Japan and the USA but rapidly 
increasing for the EU (OECD 2003b: 129). Foreign affiliate funded research makes 
up anywhere between 10-40 percent of manufacturing R&D for many OECD 
countries for which data is available (OECD 2003b: 123).  
In contrast to these methodologies to test the flow of knowledge, if, as appears 
certain, the volume of trade in components is increasing (OECD 1999b), whilst 
regions remain important centres of knowledge production, then the integration of 
foreign built components into products becomes an ever more critical question. 
Questions of, what drives technological choice and compatibility, why are businesses 
in particular countries chosen as partners, is the product knowledge in house or 
licensed and what information is flowing between the parties, are shown from the 
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research here to be important. How does local knowledge contribute to global 
products? Unfortunately, to completely map a single product chain (including the 
related knowledge investments) for an artefact such as a computer or motor vehicle 
would compromise commercial confidentiality, be expensive, and something that 
granting agencies may be reluctant to fund. Nevertheless, the issue is of such 
importance that new methodologies and data will need to be explored. 
10.4 The international architecture of production systems 
The research presented in this thesis is in broad agreement with Pavitt (2003a and 
2003b) that the location of centres of design, manufacturing and integration is a 
fundamental issue, even if the answers suggested here might indicate different 
outcomes.The modelling presented here has, therefore, shown that the scale of cross-
border interdependencies is significant and rather than adopting a vague notion of 
globalisation, connectedness is highly specialised.  In doing so, the research results 
have generated a series of insights into the phenomena of clustering which include 
the structure, organisation and innovativeness of cluster networks. 
10.4.1 Linked cluster structure: nodes, flows and hierarchies 
The charts of multi-country inter-cluster connections in chapters eight and nine 
suggest that there are three structural dimensions of clustering. These are: 
• locational nodes – including the local labour market, technological 
specialisations, industrial specialisations, institutions and policy, 
• linkages – the strength and type of interdependencies with other places; and 
• hierarchy – the strength of individual regions in particular technologies and 
within particular value chain networks.   
There is an extensive literature on the locational features of clusters but the evidence 
presented in the current thesis indicates that, just as firms form business-to-business 
networks, then clusters also seem to be specialising within networks, to locate 
themselves on international value chains. All clusters analysed above, have particular 
linkages that represent a high share of imports and some of these are so strong it 
would appear to make little sense to think in terms of nation-state clusters.  
These cluster networks tend to, differing degrees, agglomerate around particular 
supplier clusters. In all the production systems examined, within Europe, the UK was 
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the supplier of only a few countries, with France doing only a little better. In all 
cases, Germany had a clearly economically superior hierarchical position, with all 
other countries in the Europe Union 15 highly dependent its exports. The OECD 
model did not have enough countries to make strong conclusions, yet Japan and the 
USA emerged as other important nodes. This result can’t be divorced, unfortunately, 
from the size of these countries and limitations of modelling, which as already noted, 
were based on entire economies. The results do, however, appear to reflect the global 
competitive positions of countries.  
Finally, the diagrams of cluster networking made it possible to visualise the 
organisation of production in different value chains. For example, the spatial 
structure of motor vehicle production has similarities to the structure of aerospace 
value networks but, their extra-territorial linkage structure is different to those for 
computing or electronics and communications equipment.  
10.4.2 Linked cluster organisation: assembler sectors v 
modular technologies 
Although the spatial shape of production differs from product to product, chapter 
eight and nine (above) suggest that different spatial structures are related to particular 
product typologies. The two assembler complexes of motor vehicles and aerospace 
(transport) both consisted of network structures closely associated with, what might 
be called, first tier nodes. The office and computing and the radio, TV and 
communications (electronics) networks, however, were constructed around a much 
more diverse geographic system.  
In the European Union, Germany was the major node for transport equipment and, 
even, in the OECD model it was possible to see that motor vehicle cluster 
interdependencies were largely separated into an Asia-North America complex (a 
series of separate networks) and a European complex based around purchases from 
Germany. The data for aerospace (1990) revealed that the USA was the major node 
for supplies across Europe and OECD countries. What these two production systems 
have in common is that they are both based around large scale assemblers; integrator 
companies that must bring together a wide range of technologies into relatively high 
priced products for mass consumer markets (autos) or specialised business markets 
(aerospace).  
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In contrast, the ICT networks are much more diversified. Although Germany is the 
primary node in the EU 15, the UK and France are both nodes of more importance, 
than was the case in transport and secondly the OECD modelling data reveals that 
the UK, France and Germany are more dependent on the USA and Japan than they 
were in the motor vehicles industry. In turn, export data for East Asian countries 
suggests that the USA and Japan had become, by the end of the 1990s, heavily 
dependent on supplies from Taiwan, South Korea and others countries in Asia. This 
web of networks would also appear related to the modular nature of the technology 
(Sturgeon 2003). Not only is there is a wide variety of components being assembled 
into final products, but there is a huge variety of final products and an equally broad 
price range. Various electronic components are integrated into everything from 
stereos through to continental wide command systems (defence or air traffic control). 
Thus, component specifications, price, manufacturing quality and position in the 
technological product life cycle etc, all allow clusters in ICT to position themselves 
in niches of the market, to a greater extent than is possible in assembler oriented 
production systems.   
10.4.3 Clusters don’t innovate in isolation 
In the course of studying the processes that drive innovation, researchers have 
progressively moved further and further away from the neoclassical presentation of 
technology as an exogenous ‘manna from Heaven’ or knowledge as a freely available 
good. The neo-Schumpeterian literature has also been on a trajectory that is taking it 
further and further away from what is called the ‘Schumpeter Mark I innovator’ 
(Malerba and Orsenigo 1996), the heroic individual entrepreneur who brings 
inventions to the marketplace. The whole paradigm shift in innovation studies has 
been towards considering its systemic nature. At the level of businesses we know 
now that ‘entrepreneur[s] cannot innovate alone’ it takes networks of firms to bring a 
new innovation to the market (DeBresson 1999). Further still, it has been observed 
that the combinations of history, institutions, government policies, legal frameworks, 
education systems and even the competencies of competing businesses, in particular 
geographic places, influence the innovativeness of businesses. However, to date, 
these innovation spaces have been mostly understood as limited by national borders, 
a view that can be contrasted with that of Leamer and Storper (2001), who suggest 
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that the global division of labour is geographically specialising and growing more 
connected simultaneously. 
If, as the research presented here suggests, the relationships between clusters closely 
resembles the dynamics inside clusters, in terms of risk reduction, supplier networks 
and social relationships, why should innovation systems be co-terminus with political 
geographies? The analysis of existing research and the new data possible through 
inter-country input-output modelling presented here supports a view, which is not 
new, that clusters and national innovation systems are not atolls of innovation but are 
intricately embedded within the wider architecture of global production. Saxenian 
and Hsu, for example, state that ‘as governments around the world clamour to 
establish venture capital industries and technology parks in efforts to replicate the 
Silicon Valley experience, the Taiwanese case suggests that new centres of 
technology and entrepreneurship cannot be created in isolation’ (2001: 917). Such a 
finding should come as no surprise – innovation stems from, as many authors (e.g. 
Lundvall 1992b) have emphasised previously, a social process of learning, which are 
by their nature interactive and interdependent. Even clusters, then, seem to rely on 
interdependencies within networks of systems. 
.  
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APPENDIX 1: MARKET SHARE ANALYSIS  
 1970-1992 
 
 
One of the disadvantages of the input-output modelling was that it lacked an inter-
temporal consideration. Because of this and because it is one of the contentions in 
the literature that bilateral trade patterns remain relatively stable, it was seen as 
useful to include an empirical assessment in this thesis. This appendix maps the 
changes in the market share achieved by countries in manufacturing industries. The 
changes rather than representing the change in final market share are calculated from 
the basis of the importer. Thus a country that managed to move its market share from 
5% to 10% achieved a 100 per cent improvement in market share. Market share is 
defined here as apparent consumption =Production -Xexports+Mimports . Once a country 
share for two time periods was calculated, change was calculated as ∆S = (1992-
1970)/1970*100. 
The countries for which it was possible to analyse market shares changes were: 
Appendix Table 1-1: Countries in the market share analysis  
1 AUSTRALIA 
2 AUSTRIA 
3 CANADA 
4 DENMARK 
5 FINLAND 
6 FRANCE 
7 GERMANY 
8 GREECE 
9 ICELAND 
10 ITALY 
11 JAPAN 
12 NETHERLANDS 
13 NEW ZEALAND 
14 NORWAY 
15 PORTUGAL 
16 SPAIN 
17 SWEDEN 
18 UK 
19 USA 
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The charts in this appendix are configured so that on each page there are two figures. 
The first enables the industry to be identified and the second enables the importing 
country to be identified. By looking at both charts it is possible to see the 
combination of importing industry and country. Because of the number of variables 
the charts do not include actual names – the following table is provided to supply the 
relevant codes. 
Appendix Table 1-2: Market share industries and importing countries 
INDUSTRIES CHART CODE 
NO. 
IMPORT TRADE PARTNERS CHART CODE 
NO. 
FOOD, DRINK & TOBACCO 1 AUSTRALIA 1 
TEXTILES, FOOTWEAR & LEATHER 2 AUSTRIA 2 
WOOD, CORK & FURNITURE 3 BELUX 3 
PAPER, PRINT & PUBLISHING 4 CANADA 4 
INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS 5 DENMARK 5 
PHARMACEUTICALS 6 FINLAND 6 
PETROLEUM REFINING 7 FRANCE 7 
RUBBER & PLASTIC PRODUCTS 8 GERMANY 8 
STONE, CLAY & GLASS 9 GREECE 9 
FERROUS METALS 10 ICELAND 10 
NON-FERROUS METALS 11 IRELAND 11 
FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS 12 ITALY 12 
NON-ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 13 JAPAN 13 
COMPUTERS & OFFICE MACHINERY 14 NETHERLANDS 14 
ELECTRICAL MACHINERY 15 NZL 15 
COMMUNICAT. EQUIP & SEMICONDUCTORS 16 NORWAY 16 
SHIPBUILDING 17 PORTUGAL 17 
OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT 18 SPAIN 18 
MOTOR VEHICLES 19 SWEDEN 19 
AEROSPACE 20 SWITZ 20 
INSTRUMENTS 21 TURKEY 21 
OTHER MANUFACTURING 22 UK 22 
  USA 23 
  ARGENTINA 24 
  BRAZIL 25 
  CZECH & SLOVAK 26 
  HUNGARY 27 
  POLAND 28 
  HONG KONG 29 
  INDIA 30 
  INDONESIA 31 
  MALAYSIA 32 
  MEXICO 33 
  PHILIPPINES 34 
  SINGAPORE 35 
  KOREA 36 
  THAILAND 37 
  CHINA 38 
  TAIWAN 39 
  ROW 40 
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The total number of market share changes calculated in this analysis = (19[prime 
countries]*22[industries]*40[import source countries]) = 16,720. 
Australia 
Appendix Figure 1-1:  Change in share of Australian market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-2: Change in share of Australian market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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Both the USA and Japan increased their market share in a number of industries. The 
UK lost market share in a number of industries, notably shipbuilding, whilst the Rest 
of the World lost market share in petroleum refining. Those industries in which 
countries increased their market share substantially were motor vehicles, aerospace, 
computers and communications equipment.  
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Austria 
Appendix Figure 1-3: Change in share of Austrian market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-4:  Change in share of Austrian market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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In Austria a range of countries extended their market share but curiously rather than 
having a country focus the profile has an industry centricity. Market share was 
gained by a number of countries in the shipbuilding industry and lost in the other 
manufacturing category. Germany was at both ends of the spectrum with the largest 
gain and the largest loss. Austria also exhibits the widest spread change of any 
country in the analysis.  
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Canada 
Appendix Figure 1-5:  Change in share of Canadian market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-6:  Change in share of Canadian market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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The USA and Japan both managed to increase their market share in a number of 
industries. The USA lost market share in shipbuilding, aerospace and non-electrical 
machinery. 
 
Appendix 1: Market Share Analysis 1970-1992 
Brian Wixted 318
Denmark 
Appendix Figure 1-7:  Change in share of Danish market by importing industry 
(1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-8:  Change in share of Danish market by importing country 
(1970-92) 
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The USA massively increased its market share in the Danish instruments industry. 
But this was a one off and other American industries did not increase by more than 
20 percent. The UK computer industry achieved a forty percent increase in market 
share during the period. Other than Germany and Japan most countries did not alter 
their share of the Danish market. 
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Finland 
Appendix Figure 1-9:  Change in share of Finnish market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-10: Change in share of Finnish market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
 
Germany and Japan both gained a larger slice of the Finish market between 1970 and 
1992. Germany benefited the most with an almost 50 per cent rise in its stake in 
motor vehicle sales in Finland. Japan also managed to increase its share of both the 
motor vehicle market and the communications and semiconductor markets. There 
were only these three combinations that changed by more than 20 per cent. 
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France 
Appendix Figure 1-11:  Change in share of French market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-12:  Change in share of French market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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The scale of change in France’s industrial markets is much less than in many others. 
There was no industry category where a country grew its market by more than 20 per 
cent. The USA achieved three gains of greater than 10 per cent. The highest of these 
was aerospace followed by instruments and then computers. Whilst other countries 
gained moderately in a single market Japan, Germany and Italy were the better 
performing of the other countries.   
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Germany 
Appendix Figure 1-13:  Change in share of German market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-14:  Change in share of German market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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The change in market share was quite constrained in Germany, with the notable 
exception being France’s achievement of a rise of over 80 per cent in its market share 
in the aerospace industry. 
Japan and America both had single market gains (instruments and aerospace) of 
nearly 20 percent.  
 
Appendix 1: Market Share Analysis 1970-1992 
Brian Wixted 322
Greece 
Appendix Figure 1-15:  Change in share of Greek market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-16:  Change in share of Greek market by importing country 
(1970-92) 
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The industrial markets in Greece at first appear to show some volatility, but the range 
is quite limited. The largest change is in the textiles industry with Germany gaining 
nearly 15 per cent more. Italy also gained in this industry with around 12 percent 
more, together with its gains in ferrous metals and fabricated metal products. 
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Iceland 
Appendix Figure 1-17:  Change in share of Icelandic market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
 
 
Appendix Figure 1-18:  Change in share of Icelandic market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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A number of countries have increased their share of Iceland’s markets by very large 
percentages. In particular, Australia’s imports in non-ferrous metal represented 120 
per cent more of apparent consumption in that industry in 1992 than was the case in 
1970. Another notable case is Norway’s petroleum industry increasing their market 
share by 80 per cent. Lastly, Sweden’s motor vehicle industry improved its market 
share by 60 percent when 1992 is compared against its market share in 1970. 
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Italy 
Appendix Figure 1-19:  Change in share of Italian market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-20:  Change in share of Italian market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
 
 
Only three countries increased their share of markets in Italy by 10 per cent or more. 
These country – industry combinations were; Germany in motor vehicles, the United 
Kingdom in computers and office machinery and the Rest of the World in petroleum 
refining.  
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Japan 
Appendix Figure 1-21:  Change in share of Japanese market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
 
 
Appendix Figure 1-22:  Change in share of Japanese market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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Only one country (the USA) increased its market share in Japan by more than 10 per 
cent. This was achieved in aerospace and instrument industries. France also increased 
its share of the Japanese aerospace market (by slightly less than 10 per cent). 
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The Netherlands 
Appendix Figure 1-23:  Change in share of Dutch market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-24:  Change in share of Dutch market by importing country 
(1970-92) 
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A significant number of different industries exporting to the Netherlands gained more 
than a 10 per cent increase in their market share. However, as the second chart 
reveals, mostly the changes were limited to particular countries achieving across a 
wide spread of industries. Countries such as Belgium-Luxembourg (a database 
combination), France, Germany, Japan UK, USA and Taiwan were the countries that 
attained the most important changes. 
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New Zealand 
Appendix Figure 1-25:  Change in share of New Zealand market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-26:  Change in share of New Zealand market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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In contrast to the Dutch economy, New Zealand’s exhibited a remarkable degree of 
import stability between 1970 and 1992. Only USA and Japan based exports of 
instruments gained 10 per cent or more of the New Zealand’s market. Notably, the 
United Kingdom lost market share across a range of industries. 
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Norway 
Appendix Figure 1-27:  Change in share of Norwegian market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-28:  Change in share of Norwegian market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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Like the Netherlands, exports to Norway attained a higher market share in wide 
range of industries. Japan, Sweden and the USA were the main countries to benefit 
from these changes. Swedish and British industries achieved mixed success with 
gains but losses in shipbuilding, computers, motor vehicles and petroleum refining.  
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Portugal 
Appendix Figure 1-29:  Change in share of Portuguese market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-30:  Change in share of Portuguese market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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The Spanish industries of motor vehicles (observable in the EU 15 I-O transactions) 
and ferrous metal gained the two largest increases in import shares. Only the Rest of 
the World’s exports of other manufacturing lost more than 10% of their 1970 market 
share. 
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Spain 
Appendix Figure 1-31:  Change in share of Spanish market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-32:  Change in share of Spanish market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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Whilst a few exporters improved their position by 10-15 per cent, it is the USA with 
a 40 gain in its share of the Spanish aerospace market which is most notable. 
However, the key feature of this analysis is the lack of losses of market share. Only 
one country (Germany) lost nearly 5 % in any industry (computers).  
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Sweden 
Appendix Figure 1-33:  Change in share of Swedish market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-34:  Change in share of Swedish market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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Like a number of other small to mid sized European countries, exporters enhanced 
their market share across a wide variety of industries. The USA, in particular, stands 
out for its achievements. Again, the losses in share are limited. 
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United Kingdom  
Appendix Figure 1-35:  Change in share of the United Kingdom’s market by 
importer by industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-36:  Change in share of the United Kingdom’s market by 
importing country (1970-92) 
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
 
 
Germany (notably motor vehicles), Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland (other 
manufacturing) and the USA (instruments) were the primary beneficiaries of change. 
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USA 
Appendix Figure 1-37:  Change in share of the American market by importing 
industry (1970-92) 
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Appendix Figure 1-38:  Change in share of American market by importing 
country (1970-92) 
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Although, Canada and Japan (computers and motor vehicles) were two high-income 
countries that improved their position in the USA’s markets, but most importantly it 
is the emerging countries on the right of the second chart that gained a higher share 
of markets.  
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APPENDIX 1 SUMMARY 
The most striking feature of the charts presented in this Appendix is not the easily 
identifiable large gains by particular countries in particular industries but, it is the 
small number of market share losses that is interesting. Typically for any of the 
countries presented in the above charts reveal that there are fewer market share 
losses than gains. The break-up is interesting. In five countries (France, Germany, 
Japan, Spain and the USA) no exporter in 1992 had lost more than five per cent of 
their 1970 market share. In a further four countries (Greece, Italy, Sweden and the 
UK), no exporter lost more than 10 percent of their 1970 market share. Of the 
remaining countries, in six examples (Australia [2], Canada [2], Finland [3], 
Netherlands [1], New Zealand [2] Portugal [1]) there were a total of eleven industry–
country combinations (out of a possible 5280 such combinations) where the losses 
were greater than 10 per cent. This leaves just 4 countries where a number of 
importers had 10 per cent less market share in 1992 than they had in 1970.  
Therefore, the analysis of 40 exporting countries (including Belux and a Rest of the 
World category) trading with 19 OECD countries in 22 manufacturing across 22 
years reveals that the number of occassions in which the market share of the 
exporters dropped more than 10 percent over of their 1970 share was very few. On 
this basis it appears that economic processes encourage the maintenance of 
interdependencies. 
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APPENDIX 2: THE EVOLUTION OF EAST ASIAN  
  AND IRISH EXPORT PATTERNS –  
  1970-2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As the OECD Bilateral Trade Database does not have data on Asian countries, the 
calculation of the data behind the charts presented here is based upon the imports 
into OECD countries and as the data are in US$ they have been converted to a 
percentage of GDP for each country.      
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Appendix Figure 2-1: Korea 1970 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Data source:  OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000). 
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Appendix Figure 2-2: Korea 1994 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
A
u
s
tr
a
lia
A
u
s
tr
ia
B
e
L
u
x
C
a
n
a
d
a
D
e
n
m
a
rk
F
in
la
n
d
F
ra
n
c
e
G
e
rm
a
n
y
G
re
e
c
e
Ic
e
la
n
d
Ir
e
la
n
d
It
a
ly
J
a
p
a
n
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
N
Z
L
N
o
rw
a
y
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
S
p
a
in
S
w
e
d
e
n
S
w
itz
T
u
rk
e
y
U
K
U
S
A
 Food, drink & tobacco
Textiles, foot & leather
Wood, cork & furniture
Paper, print & publish
Industrial chemicals
Pharmaceuticals
Petroleum refining
Rubber & plastic prod
Stone, clay & glass
Ferrous metals
Non-ferrous metals
Fabricated metal products
Non-electrical machinery
Computers & office machinery
Electrical machinery
Communicat. equip. etc
Shipbuilding
Other transport equipment
Motor vehicles
Aerospace
Instruments
Other manufacturing
Discrepancy (Scrap Metal)
2.50-3.00
2.00-2.50
1.50-2.00
1.00-1.50
0.50-1.00
0.00-0.50
 
Data source: OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000).. 
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Appendix Figure 2-3: Korea 2000 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Appendix Figure 2-4: Taiwan 1970 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Data source:  OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000).. 
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Appendix Figure 2-5: Taiwan 1994 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Data source:  OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000). 
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Appendix Figure 2-6: Taiwan 2000 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Data source:  OECD (2002c). 
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Appendix Figure 2-7: Hong Kong 1970 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Data source:  OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000). 
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Appendix Figure 2-8: Hong Kong 1994 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Appendix Figure 2-9: Hong Kong 2000 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Appendix Figure 2-10: Singapore 1970 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Data source:  OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000). 
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Appendix Figure 2-11: Singapore 1994 – industry by country exports 
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Data source:  OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000). 
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Appendix Figure 2-12: Singapore 2000 – industry by country exports 
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Appendix Figure 2-13: Malaysia 1970 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Data source:  OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000). 
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Appendix Figure 2-14: Malaysia 1994 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Data source: OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000).. 
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Appendix Figure 2-15: Malaysia 2000 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Appendix Figure 2-16: China 1970 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Appendix Figure 2-17: China 1994 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Appendix Figure 2-18: China 2000 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
A
us
tr
al
ia
A
us
tr
ia
B
eL
ux
C
an
ad
a
D
en
m
ar
k
Fi
nl
an
d
F
ra
nc
e
G
er
m
an
y
G
re
ec
e
Ic
el
an
d
Ir
el
an
d
Ita
ly
Ja
pa
n
N
et
he
rla
nd
s
N
Z
L
N
or
w
ay
P
or
tu
ga
l
Sp
ai
n
S
w
ed
en
S
w
itz
Tu
rk
ey U
K
U
S
A
 Food, drink & tobacco
Textiles, foot & leather
Wood, cork & f urniture
Paper, print & publish
Industrial chemicals
Pharmaceuticals
Petroleum refining
Rubber & plastic prod
Stone, clay & glass
Ferrous metals
Non-ferrous metals
Fabricated metal products
Non-electrical machinery
Computers & office machinery
Electrical machinery
Communicat. equip. etc
Shipbuilding
Other transport equipment
Motor vehicles
Aerospace
Instruments
Other manuf acturing
Discrepancy (Scrap Metal)
2.00-3.00
1.00-2.00
0.00-1.00
 
Data source:  OECD (2002c). 
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Appendix Figure 2-19: Ireland 1970 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Appendix Figure 2-20: Ireland 1994 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
A
u
s
tr
a
lia
A
u
s
tr
ia
B
e
L
u
x
C
a
n
a
d
a
D
e
n
m
a
rk
F
in
la
n
d
F
ra
n
c
e
G
e
rm
a
n
y
G
re
e
c
e
Ic
e
la
n
d
Ir
e
la
n
d
It
a
ly
J
a
p
a
n
N
e
th
e
rl
a
n
d
s
N
Z
L
N
o
rw
a
y
P
o
rt
u
g
a
l
S
p
a
in
S
w
e
d
e
n
S
w
itz
T
u
rk
e
y
U
K
U
S
A
 Food, drink & tobacco
Textiles, foot & leather
Wood, cork & furniture
Paper, print & publish
Industrial chemicals
Pharmaceuticals
Petroleum refining
Rubber & plastic prod
Stone, clay & glass
Ferrous metals
Non-ferrous metals
Fabricated metal products
Non-electrical machinery
Computers & office machinery
Electrical machinery
Communicat. equip. etc
Shipbuilding
Other transport equipment
Motor vehicles
Aerospace
Instruments
Other manufacturing
Discrepancy (Scrap Metal)
4.00-4.50
3.50-4.00
3.00-3.50
2.50-3.00
2.00-2.50
1.50-2.00
1.00-1.50
0.50-1.00
0.00-0.50
 
Data source:  OECD (1998c) and IMF (2000). 
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Appendix Figure 2-21: Ireland 2000 – industry by country exports (%GDP) 
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Ferrous metals
Non-ferrous metals
Fabricated metal products
Non-electrical machinery
Computers & office machinery
Electrical machinery
Communicat. equip. etc
Shipbuilding
Other transport equipment
Motor vehicles
Aerospace
Instruments
Other manufacturing
Discrepancy (Scrap Metal)
6.00-7.00
5.00-6.00
4.00-5.00
3.00-4.00
2.00-3.00
1.00-2.00
0.00-1.00
 
Data source:  OECD (2002c). 
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APPENDIX 3: MODELLING NOTES 
 
 
 
 
OECD 1990 DATA 
Australia 
• Sector 16: Office and computing machinery is not separately available and is 
included in Sector 18. Radio, TV and communication equipment. 
• Sector 21: Motor vehicles includes other transport equipment nec. 
• Sector 20: Other transport consists of rail road equipment only. 
• Sector 35: Other producers is not separately available and is included in 
Sector 33: Community, social and personal services. 
Canada 
• Sector 35: Other producers includes flows corresponding to fictive 
industries/commodities of the SIC. This is a technique for routing groups of 
commodities as inputs into industries when the precise commodity content 
is unknown. These are Office supplies, Cafeteria requirements, Laboratory 
supplies, Travel and entertainment, Advertising and promoting, Operating 
supplies and Transport margins.  
• Sector 35: Other producers, further includes Owner-occupied dwellings. 
Denmark 
• Sector 15: Non-electrical machinery includes Sector 16: Office and 
computing machinery. 
• Sector 20: Other transport includes both Sectors 21: Motor vehicles and 22: 
Aerospace. 
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France 
• For 1972 and 1977, Sector 32: Real estate and business services is not 
separately available and is included in Sector 31: Finance and insurance. 
Germany 
• Sector 6: Paper, printing and publishing does not include publishing 
services; these are included in Sector 33: Community, social and personal 
services. 
• Sector 8: Drugs and medicines is not separately available and is included in 
Sector 7: Industrial chemicals. 
• Sector 18: Radio, TV and communication equipment is not separately 
available and is included in Sector 17: Electrical apparatus, nec. 
• Sector 20: Other transport is not separately available and railway-engines 
and wagons are included in Sector 14: Metal products. Tractors, excavators, 
etc., are included in Sector 15: Non-electrical machinery and bicycles in 21: 
Motor vehicles. 
• Sector 35: Other producers comprises services of private non-profit 
institutions and domestic services. 
Italy 
• Sector 34: Producers of government services is not separately available and 
is included in Sector 33: Community, social and personal services. 
• Sector 35: Other producers is defined as scrap activities, and does not 
include activities of non-profit organisations. 
 Japan 
• Self-education, Self-research, Self-transport are included Sector 33: 
Community, social and personal services. 
• Sector 34: Producers of government services includes the services of public 
administration and national and public institutions for education, health and 
R&D. Subsequently they were included in the row 36: Statistical 
discrepancy and the Final demand column Government consumption 
according to the adjustment concerning the « Exogenisation of the 
government sector ». 
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•  Sector 35: Other producers is services of private non-profit institutions. 
• Sector 36: Statistical discrepancy contains not only activities not elsewhere 
classified but also office supplies. Additionally the row 36: Statistical 
discrepancy includes Sector 34: Producers of government services 
according to the adjustment concerning the « Exogenisation of the 
government sector ». 
The Netherlands 
• Sector 13: Non-ferrous metals is not separately available and is included in 
Sector 12: Iron and steel. 
• Sector 18: Radio, TV and communication equipment is not separately 
available and is included in Sector 17: Electrical apparatus, nec. 
United Kingdom 
• Sector 18: Radio, TV and communication equipment includes electrical 
consumer goods and musical recordings. 
OECD 
For further notes see OECD (1996b). 
 
EUROSTAT 1995 DATA 
Greece 
• Base data calculations 
− EU 14 Domestic + EU 14 Trade = EU 14 Total 
− EU 15 Total – EU 14 Total = Greece ROE Total. 
− Spain & Portugal EU trade / Spain & Portugal domestic + trade = 
Spain trade ratio 
− Divide errors (0/0) replaced with 0.1% 
− Spain & Portugal trade ratio * Greece ROE Total = Greece trade 
− Greece ROE Total - Greece trade = Greece ROE Domestic. 
− EU 15 external trade – EU 14 external trade = Greece ROE external 
trade. 
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Appendix Figure 3-1: ISIC to NACE CONCORDANCE 
OECD ISIC REV 3 NACE-CLIO (Classification I-O)
AGRICULTURE, HUNTING, FORESTRY AND FISHING
MINING AND QUARRYING
TOTAL MANUFACTURING
FOOD PRODUCTS, BEVERAGES AND TOBACCO Agriculture, forestry and fishery products
TEXTILES, TEXTILE PRODUCTS, LEATHER AND FOOTWEAR Fuel and power products
WOOD AND PRODUCTS OF WOOD AND CORK Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals
PULP, PAPER, PAPER PRODUCTS, PRINTING AND PUBLISHING Non-metallic mineral products
CHEMICAL, RUBBER, PLASTICS AND FUEL PRODUCTS Chemical products
….COKE, REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS AND NUCLEAR FUEL Metal products except machinery
….CHEMICALS AND CHEMICAL PRODUCTS Agricultural and industrial machinery
……..CHEMICALS EXCLUDING PHARMACEUTICALS Office and data processing machines
……..PHARMACEUTICALS Electrical goods
….RUBBER AND PLASTICS PRODUCTS Transport equipment
OTHER NON-METALLIC MINERAL PRODUCTS Food, beverages, tobacco
BASIC METALS AND FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear
….BASIC METALS Paper and printing products
……..IRON AND STEEL Rubber and plastic products
……..NON-FERROUS METALS Other manufacturing products
….FABRICATED METAL PRODUCTS Building and construction
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT Recovery, repair services, wholesale, retail
….MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, N.E.C. Lodging and catering services
….ELECTRICAL AND OPTICAL EQUIPMENT Inland transport services
……..OFFICE, ACCOUNTING AND COMPUTING MACHINERY Maritime and air transport services
……..ELECTRICAL MACHINERY AND APPARATUS, NEC Auxiliary transport services
……..RADIO, TELEVISION AND COMMUNICATION EQUIPMENT Communication services
……..MEDICAL, PRECISION AND OPTICAL INSTRUMENTS Services of credit and insurance institutions
TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT Other market services
….MOTOR VEHICLES, TRAILERS AND SEMI-TRAILERS Non-market services
….OTHER TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT
……..BUILDING AND REPAIRING OF SHIPS AND BOATS
……..AIRCRAFT AND SPACECRAFT http://www.econ.ucl.ac.be/ECON/FR/SERVICES/LOGISTIQUE/NOMENCLATURES/ACTIVITES/NACECLIO/naceclio3_R44EN.html 
……..RAILROAD EQUIPMENT AND TRANSPORT EQUIPMENT N.E.C.
MANUFACTURING NEC; RECYCLING
ELECTRICITY, GAS AND WATER SUPPLY
SCRAP METAL
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SERVICES TRADE 
(both OECD 1990 & EUROSTAT 1995) 
1. Australia 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
2. Austria 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
3. Belgium 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
4. Canada 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
5. Denmark 
• Calculated from the average of manufacturing bilateral flows. 
6. Finland 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
7. France 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
8. Germany 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
9. Greece 
• Calculated from the average of manufacturing bilateral flows. 
10. Ireland 
• Calculated from the average of manufacturing bilateral flows. 
11. Italy 
• Calculated from the average of manufacturing bilateral flows. 
12. Japan 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
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13. Luxembourg  
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
14. The Netherlands 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
15. Portugal 
• Calculated from the average of manufacturing bilateral flows. 
16. Spain 
• Calculated from the average of manufacturing bilateral flows. 
17. Sweden 
• Calculated from the average of manufacturing bilateral flows. 
18. UK 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
19. USA 
• Calculated from aggregate bilateral services flows. 
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 Appendix Table 4-1: OECD Model: Country comparisons of national meso-cluster requirements 1990 
 AUSTRALIA CANADA DENMARK FRANCE GERMANY JAPAN NETHERLANDS UK_ USA 
Ag, Forestry & Fishing 0.070 0.108 0.202 0.124 0.157 0.055 0.164 0.142 0.055 
Mining & Quarrying 0.087 0.069 0.076 0.230 0.142 0.073 0.059 0.132 0.047 
Food, Beverages & Tobacco 0.081 0.128 0.238 0.160 0.205 0.117 0.316 0.188 0.066 
Tcf 0.230 0.257 0.391 0.255 0.249 0.146 0.531 0.317 0.118 
Wood Products & Furniture 0.161 0.131 0.313 0.177 0.173 0.177 0.386 0.269 0.068 
Paper, Paper Prod & Printing 0.185 0.121 0.282 0.195 0.235 0.089 0.279 0.233 0.075 
Industrial Chemicals 0.221 0.208 0.395 0.271 0.234 0.185 0.419 0.280 0.095 
Drugs & Medicines 0.166 0.119 0.255 0.243 0.000 0.078 0.328 0.157 0.052 
Petroleum & Coal Products 0.215 0.366 0.534 0.374 0.438 0.507 0.629 0.161 0.267 
Rubber & Plastic Products 0.202 0.230 0.381 0.326 0.202 0.114 0.409 0.283 0.087 
Non-Metallic Mineral Products 0.108 0.128 0.230 0.112 0.135 0.092 0.212 0.175 0.062 
Iron & Steel 0.150 0.217 0.314 0.248 0.197 0.166 0.286 0.250 0.087 
Non-Ferrous Metals 0.100 0.231 0.437 0.442 0.390 0.430 0.000 0.331 0.149 
Metal Products 0.153 0.211 0.332 0.185 0.163 0.101 0.323 0.238 0.090 
Non-Electrical Machinery 0.196 0.246 0.308 0.212 0.139 0.087 0.334 0.239 0.084 
Office & Computing Machinery 0.000 0.508 0.000 0.308 0.184 0.097 0.438 0.367 0.172 
Electrical Apparatus, Nec 0.198 0.217 0.321 0.210 0.150 0.116 0.417 0.259 0.094 
Radio, Tv & Communication 
Equip 0.318 0.386 0.366 0.180 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.285 0.126 
Shipbuilding 0.185 0.321 0.380 0.268 0.209 0.086 0.337 0.219 0.080 
Other Transport 0.122 0.281 0.389 0.112 0.000 0.090 0.472 0.283 0.115 
Motor Vehicles 0.269 0.502 0.000 0.242 0.200 0.086 0.503 0.316 0.155 
Aircraft 0.156 0.245 0.000 0.332 0.212 0.304 0.588 0.320 0.088 
Professional Goods 0.208 0.249 0.281 0.151 0.134 0.084 0.299 0.231 0.074 
Other Manufacturing 0.180 0.245 0.266 0.156 0.180 0.090 0.321 0.259 0.093 
Electricity, Gas & Water 0.047 0.054 0.168 0.116 0.160 0.155 0.063 0.264 0.077 
Construction 0.120 0.132 0.180 0.142 0.113 0.072 0.244 0.152 0.056 
Wholesale & Retail 0.057 0.045 0.069 0.045 0.050 0.033 0.050 0.153 0.019 
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Restaurants & Hotels 0.053 0.075 0.141 0.080 0.137 0.080 0.124 0.132 0.043 
Transport & Storage 0.086 0.102 0.297 0.120 0.141 0.079 0.097 0.108 0.064 
Communication 0.079 0.034 0.055 0.034 0.084 0.018 0.037 0.093 0.045 
Finance & Insurance 0.044 0.051 0.040 0.112 0.054 0.024 0.029 0.102 0.019 
Real Estate & Business Services 0.031 0.034 0.045 0.043 0.045 0.022 0.026 0.093 0.014 
Community, Social & Personal 
Services 0.060 0.055 0.107 0.056 0.087 0.046 0.088 0.089 0.034 
Appendix Table 4-2: EU Model: Large country cluster ranking by import requirements 
FRANCE  GERMANY  ITALY  UK  
Ores & base metals 0.22 Maritime & air transport srvs 0.28 Ores & base metals 0.39 TCF 0.31 
Transport equipment 0.20 TCF 0.24 Office & data processing mach 0.35 Transport equipment 0.30 
TCF 0.18 Fuel & power  0.22 Rubber & plastic  0.33 Rubber & plastic  0.28 
Rubber & plastic  0.16 Chemical  0.21 Chemical  0.32 Office & data processing mach 0.27 
Chemical  0.16 Paper & printing  0.20 Transport equipment 0.32 Chemical  0.27 
Office & data processing mach 0.15 Food, beverages, tobacco 0.19 Electrical goods 0.30 Electrical goods 0.26 
Non-metallic mineral  0.15 Transport equipment 0.19 Maritime & air transport srvs 0.30 Ores & base metals 0.26 
Metal  except mach 0.15 Rubber & plastic  0.18 TCF 0.29 Other manufacturing  0.24 
Agricultural & industrial mach 0.14 Ores & base metals 0.18 Agricultural & industrial mach 0.28 Maritime & air transport srvs 0.24 
Other manufacturing  0.14 Agriculture, forestry & fishery 0.16 Other manufacturing  0.28 Paper & printing  0.23 
Electrical goods 0.13 Other manufacturing  0.16 Food, beverages, tobacco 0.25 Non-metallic mineral  0.23 
Maritime & air transport srvs 0.12 Auxiliary transport srvs 0.15 Paper & printing  0.23 Metal  except mach 0.21 
Food, beverages, tobacco 0.12 Office & data processing mach 0.14 Fuel & power  0.23 Agricultural & industrial mach 0.21 
Agriculture, forestry & fishery  0.12 Electrical goods 0.14 Metal  except mach 0.23 Fuel & power  0.19 
Building & construction 0.12 Agricultural & industrial mach 0.13 Non-metallic mineral  0.16 Food, beverages, tobacco 0.19 
Paper & printing  0.11 Lodging & catering srvs 0.13 Agriculture, forestry & fishery 0.14 Agriculture, forestry & fishery 0.16 
Fuel & power  0.09 Non-metallic mineral  0.12 Building & construction 0.13 Building & construction 0.14 
Srvs of credit & ins 0.08 Metal  except mach 0.12 Lodging & catering srvs 0.11 Lodging & catering srvs 0.13 
Inland transport srvs 0.06 Srvs of credit & ins 0.12 Inland transport srvs 0.08 Srvs of credit & ins 0.12 
Non-market srvs 0.06 Building & construction 0.10 Wholesale & retail 0.07 Wholesale & retail 0.08 
Lodging & catering srvs 0.05 Inland transport srvs 0.07 Auxiliary transport srvs 0.05 Non-market srvs 0.08 
Auxiliary transport srvs 0.04 Communication srvs 0.05 Non-market srvs 0.05 Inland transport srvs 0.07 
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Wholesale & retail 0.03 Non-market srvs 0.05 Srvs of credit & ins 0.05 Communication srvs 0.07 
Other market srvs 0.03 Wholesale & retail 0.05 Communication srvs 0.05 Other market srvs 0.04 
Communication srvs 0.02 Other market srvs 0.05 Other market srvs 0.03 Auxiliary transport srvs 0.03 
Appendix Table 4-3: EU Model: Small & mid sized country cluster ranking by import requirements 
AUSTRIA  BELGIUM  DENMARK  FINLAND  
TCF 0.52 Ores & base metals 0.66 Maritime & air transport srvs 0.58 Transport equipment 0.36 
Transport equip 0.50 Transport equip 0.63 Transport equipment 0.43 TCF 0.34 
Chemical  0.49 Fuel & power  0.62 TCF 0.39 Srvs of credit & insurance instit 0.11 
Ores & base metals 0.48 Chemical  0.57 Ores & base metals 0.38 Rubber & plastic  0.38 
Rubber & plastic  0.48 TCF 0.57 Electrical goods 0.34 Wholesale & retail 0.12 
Electrical goods 0.45 Maritime+air trans 0.52 Chemical  0.34 Paper & printing  0.21 
Auxiliary trans 0.45 Other mfg  0.48 Rubber & plastic  0.34 Other market srvs 0.07 
Office & data mach 0.39 Food 0.46 Metal  except mach 0.33 Other manufacturing  0.16 
Ag & indust mach 0.38 Rubber & plastic  0.46 Agricultural & industrial mach 0.31 Office & data processing mach 0.29 
Paper & printing  0.37 Ag & indust mach 0.45 Office & data processing mach 0.30 Non-metallic mineral  0.21 
Metal except mach 0.37 Paper & printing  0.45 Other manufacturing  0.29 Non-market srvs 0.10 
Fuel & power  0.32 Metal except mach 0.39 Fuel & power  0.28 Metal  except mach 0.21 
Other mfg  0.29 Office & data mach 0.38 Paper & printing  0.26 Maritime & air transport srvs 0.32 
Maritime+air trans 0.27 Electrical goods 0.38 Food, beverages, tobacco 0.24 Lodging & catering srvs 0.14 
Non-metallic min 0.24 Ag, for & fish 0.35 Non-metallic mineral  0.23 Inland transport srvs 0.10 
Food 0.23 Non-metallic min 0.33 Agriculture, forestry & fishery  0.22 Fuel & power  0.39 
Ag, for & fish 0.21 Building & construct 0.32 Building & construction 0.19 Food, beverages, tobacco 0.20 
Building & construct 0.20 Inland transport  0.24 Lodging & catering srvs 0.16 Ores & base metals 0.43 
Fin & ins 0.18 Lodging & catering  0.21 Srvs of credit & insurance 0.14 Electrical goods 0.47 
Inland transport  0.15 Fin & ins 0.14 Communication srvs 0.09 Communication srvs 0.07 
Lodging & catering  0.13 Wholesale & retail 0.12 Wholesale & retail 0.08 Chemical  0.33 
Wholesale & retail 0.11 Other market  0.08 Non-market srvs 0.06 Building & construction 0.20 
Other market  0.09 Non-market  0.06 Inland transport srvs 0.06 Auxiliary transport srvs 0.15 
Non-market  0.05 Communication  0.03 Auxiliary transport srvs 0.06 Agriculture, forestry & fishery  0.12 
Communication  0.04 Auxiliary transport  0.02 Other market srvs 0.06 Agricultural & industrial mach 0.31 
 
Appendix 4: Data on the Internationalisation of Production 
Brian Wixted 367
 
Appendix Table 4-4: EU Model: Small & mid sized country cluster ranking by import requirements 
IRELAND  LUXEMBOURG  NETHERLANDS  PORTUGAL  SPAIN  SWEDEN  
Office & data mach 0.61 Transport equip 0.76 TCF 0.47 Transport equip 0.39 Maritime+air trans 0.43 Fuel & power  0.48 
Rubber & plastic  0.51 TCF 0.31 Maritime+air trans 0.47 Electrical goods 0.35 Office & data mach 0.40 Office & data 
process mach
0.46 
Maritime+air trans 0.45 Fin & ins 0.27 Transport equip 0.45 Office & data mach 0.31 Transport equip 0.35 Chemical  0.43 
Ag & indust mach 0.45 Rubber & plastic  0.59 Rubber & plastic  0.42 Rubber & plastic  0.29 Ores & base metals 0.34 Transport equip 0.39 
TCF 0.45 Wholesale & retail 0.09 Ores & base metals 0.39 Ores & base metals 0.29 Chemical  0.33 Rubber & plastic  0.39 
Electrical goods 0.44 Paper & printing  0.25 Office & data mach 0.39 Metal except mach 0.25 Rubber & plastic  0.30 Ores & base metals 0.38 
Metal except mach 0.43 Other market  0.05 Food 0.37 Chemical  0.24 Ag & indust mach 0.30 Metal  except mach 0.35 
Ores & base metals 0.37 Other mfg  0.31 Other mfg  0.36 Ag & indust mach 0.23 TCF 0.27 TCF 0.34 
Paper & printing  0.36 Office & data mach 0.15 Chemical  0.36 TCF 0.21 Electrical goods 0.26 Ag & industrial 
mach 
0.33 
Chemical  0.36 Non-metallic min 0.28 Metal except mach 0.35 Paper & printing  0.21 Fuel & power  0.25 Electrical goods 0.28 
Building & 
construct 
0.32 Non-market  0.05 Ag & indust mach 0.34 Other mfg  0.20 Paper & printing  0.24 Aux trans srvs 0.27 
Non-metallic min 0.32 Metal except mach 0.29 Paper & printing  0.33 Building & 
construct 
0.19 Other mfg  0.23 Other mfg 0.27 
Food 0.32 Maritime+air trans 0.27 Electrical goods 0.32 Food 0.19 Metal except mach 0.22 Inland transport 
srvs 
0.26 
Transport equip 0.30 Lodging & catering 0.16 Fuel & power  0.29 Fuel & power  0.17 Food 0.16 Maritime & air 
trans srvs 
0.26 
Other mfg  0.29 Inland transport  0.21 Non-metallic min 0.26 Non-metallic min 0.17 Non-metallic min 0.13 Non-metallic 
mineral  
0.26 
Fuel & power  0.27 Fuel & power  0.38 Building & 
construct 
0.25 Fin & ins 0.17 Ag, for & fish 0.12 Food, bev & 
tobacco 
0.25 
Ag, for & fish 0.20 Food 0.32 Fin & ins 0.18 Maritime+air trans 0.17 Inland transport  0.12 Build & construct 0.22 
Inland transport  0.19 Ores & base metals 0.72 Ag, for & fish 0.17 Ag, for & fish 0.16 Building & 
construct 
0.09 Paper & printing  0.22 
Wholesale & retail 0.16 Electrical goods 0.30 Lodging & catering 0.16 Lodging & catering 0.12 Lodging & catering 0.07 Ag, forestry & 
fishery  
0.20 
Auxiliary transport 0.15 Communication  0.06 Wholesale & retail 0.16 Other market  0.12 Non-market  0.07 Lodging & catering 0.16 
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Lodging & catering 0.14 Chemical  0.53 Inland transport  0.13 Inland transport  0.11 Other market  0.05 Srvs of credit & ins 0.13 
Fin & ins 0.12 Building & 
construct 
0.22 Non-market  0.08 Wholesale & retail 0.10 Wholesale & retail 0.05 Wholesale & retail 0.13 
Communication  0.10 Auxiliary transport 0.16 Communication  0.07 Auxiliary transport  0.09 Auxiliary transport 0.04 Communication 
srvs 
0.12 
Non-market  0.08 Ag, for & fish 0.29 Auxiliary transport 0.07 Communication  0.06 Fin & ins 0.03 Non-market srvs 0.06 
Other market  0.06 Ag & indust mach 0.38 Other market  0.05 Non-market  0.06 Communication  0.03 Other market srvs 0.05 
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Appendix Table 4-5:  OECD Model larger countries – Rank-order of industry imports as percentage of value added  
France  Germany  Japan  UK_  USA  
Non-ferrous metals 0.44 Petroleum 0.44 Petroleum 0.51 Office & computing 0.37 Petroleum 0.27 
Petroleum 0.37 Non-ferrous metals 0.39 Non-ferrous metals 0.43 Non-ferrous metals 0.33 Office & computing 0.17 
Aircraft 0.33 TCF 0.25 Aircraft 0.30 Aircraft 0.32 Motor vehicles 0.15 
Rubber & plastic 0.33 Paper & printing 0.23 Industrial chemicals 0.19 TCF 0.32 Non-ferrous metals 0.15 
Office & computing 0.31 Industrial chemicals 0.23 Wood products 0.18 Motor vehicles 0.32 Radio, TV & comms 0.13 
Industrial chemicals 0.27 Aircraft 0.21 Iron & steel 0.17 Radio, TV & comms 0.28 TCF 0.12 
Shipbuilding 0.27 Shipbuilding 0.21 El, gas & water 0.16 Rubber & plastic 0.28 Other transport 0.11 
TCF 0.25 Food 0.21 TCF 0.15 Other transport 0.28 Industrial chemicals 0.09 
Iron & steel 0.25 Rubber & plastic 0.20 Food 0.12 Industrial chemicals 0.28 Electrical mach 0.09 
Drugs & medicines 0.24 Motor vehicles 0.20 Electrical mach 0.12 Wood products 0.27 Other mfg 0.09 
Motor vehicles 0.24 Iron & steel 0.20 Rubber & plastic 0.11 El, gas & water 0.26 Metal products 0.09 
Mining 0.23 Office & computing 0.18 Metal products 0.10 Electrical mach 0.26 Aircraft 0.09 
Non-electrical mach 0.21 Other mfg 0.18 Office & computing 0.10 Other mfg 0.26 Iron & steel 0.09 
Electrical mach 0.21 Wood products 0.17 Radio, TV & comms 0.09 Iron & steel 0.25 Rubber & plastic 0.09 
Paper & printing 0.20 Metal products 0.16 Non-metallic minerals 0.09 Non-electrical mach 0.24 Non-electrical mach 0.08 
Metal products 0.18 El, gas & water 0.16 Other transport 0.09 Metal products 0.24 Shipbuilding 0.08 
Radio, TV & comms 0.18 Ag forestry & fish 0.16 Other mfg 0.09 Paper & printing 0.23 El, gas & water 0.08 
Wood products 0.18 Electrical mach 0.15 Paper & printing 0.09 Professional goods 0.23 Paper & printing 0.08 
Food 0.16 Mining 0.14 Non-electrical mach 0.09 Shipbuilding 0.22 Professional goods 0.07 
Other mfg 0.16 Transport 0.14 Motor vehicles 0.09 Food 0.19 Wood products 0.07 
Professional goods 0.15 Non-electrical mach 0.14 Shipbuilding 0.09 Non-metallic minerals 0.17 Food 0.07 
Construction 0.14 Restaurants etc 0.14 Professional goods 0.08 Petroleum 0.16 Transport 0.06 
Ag forestry & fish 0.12 Non-metallic minerals 0.14 Restaurants etc 0.08 Drugs & medicines 0.16 Non-metallic minerals 0.06 
Transport 0.12 Professional goods 0.13 Transport 0.08 Wholesale & retail 0.15 Construction 0.06 
El, gas & water 0.12 Construction 0.11 Drugs & medicines 0.08 Construction 0.15 Ag forestry & fish 0.06 
Other transport 0.11 Community 0.09 Mining 0.07 Ag forestry & fish 0.14 Drugs & medicines 0.05 
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Non-metallic minerals 0.11 Communication 0.08 Construction 0.07 Restaurants etc 0.13 Mining 0.05 
Fin & ins 0.11 Fin & ins 0.05 Ag forestry & fish 0.06 Mining 0.13 Communication 0.04 
Restaurants etc 0.08 Wholesale & retail 0.05 Community 0.05 Transport 0.11 Restaurants etc 0.04 
Community 0.06 Real est & business srv 0.05 Wholesale & retail 0.03 Fin & ins 0.10 Community 0.03 
Wholesale & retail 0.04 Drugs & medicines 0.00 Fin & ins 0.02 Real est & business srv 0.09 Wholesale & retail 0.02 
Real est & business srv 0.04 Radio, TV & comms 0.00 Real est & business srv 0.02 Communication 0.09 Fin & ins 0.02 
Communication 0.03 Other transport 0.00 Communication 0.02 Community 0.09 Real est & business srv 0.01 
Government services 0.00 Government services 0.00 Government services 0.00 Government services 0.00 Government services 0.00 
 
Appendix Table 4-6:  OECD Model small & Medium sized countries: Rank-order of industry imports as percentage of value added 
Australia  Canada  Denmark  Netherlands  
Radio, TV & comms equip 0.32 Office & computing 0.51 Petroleum 0.53 Petroleum 0.63 
Motor vehicles 0.27 Motor vehicles 0.50 Non-ferrous metals 0.44 Aircraft 0.59 
TCF 0.23 Radio, TV & comms equip 0.39 Industrial chemicals 0.39 TCF 0.53 
Industrial chemicals 0.22 Petroleum 0.37 TCF 0.39 Motor vehicles 0.50 
Petroleum 0.22 Shipbuilding 0.32 Other transport 0.39 Other transport 0.47 
Professional goods 0.21 Other transport 0.28 Rubber & plastic 0.38 Office & computing 0.44 
Rubber & plastic 0.20 TCF 0.26 Shipbuilding 0.38 Industrial chemicals 0.42 
Electrical mach 0.20 Professional goods 0.25 Radio, TV & comms equip 0.37 Electrical mach 0.42 
Non-electrical mach 0.20 Non-electrical mach 0.25 Metal products 0.33 Rubber & plastic 0.41 
Shipbuilding 0.19 Aircraft 0.25 Electrical mach 0.32 Wood products 0.39 
Paper & printing 0.18 Other mfg 0.24 Iron & steel 0.31 Shipbuilding 0.34 
Other mfg 0.18 Non-ferrous metals 0.23 Wood products 0.31 Non-electrical mach 0.33 
Drugs & medicines 0.17 Rubber & plastic 0.23 Non-electrical mach 0.31 Drugs & medicines 0.33 
Wood products 0.16 Iron & steel 0.22 Transport 0.30 Metal products 0.32 
Aircraft 0.16 Electrical mach 0.22 Paper & printing 0.28 Other mfg 0.32 
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Metal products 0.15 Metal products 0.21 Professional goods 0.28 Food 0.32 
Iron & steel 0.15 Industrial chemicals 0.21 Other mfg 0.27 Professional goods 0.30 
Other transport 0.12 Construction 0.13 Drugs & medicines 0.26 Iron & steel 0.29 
Construction 0.12 Wood products 0.13 Food 0.24 Paper & printing 0.28 
Non-metallic minerals 0.11 Non-metallic minerals 0.13 Non-metallic minerals 0.23 Construction 0.24 
Non-ferrous metals 0.10 Food 0.13 Ag forestry & fish 0.20 Non-metallic minerals 0.21 
Mining 0.09 Paper & printing 0.12 Construction 0.18 Ag forestry & fish 0.16 
Transport 0.09 Drugs & medicines 0.12 El, gas & water 0.17 Restaurants etc 0.12 
Food 0.08 Ag forestry & fish 0.11 Restaurants etc 0.14 Transport 0.10 
Communication 0.08 Transport 0.10 Community 0.11 Community 0.09 
Ag forestry & fish 0.07 Restaurants etc 0.07 Mining 0.08 El, gas & water 0.06 
Community 0.06 Mining 0.07 Wholesale & retail 0.07 Mining 0.06 
Wholesale & retail 0.06 Community 0.05 Communication 0.05 Wholesale & retail 0.05 
Restaurants etc 0.05 El, gas & water 0.05 Real est & business services 0.05 Communication 0.04 
El, gas & water 0.05 Fin & ins 0.05 Fin & ins 0.04 Fin & ins 0.03 
Fin & ins 0.04 Wholesale & retail 0.05 Office & computing 0.00 Real est & business services 0.03 
Real est & business services 0.03 Real est & business services 0.03 Motor vehicles 0.00 Non-ferrous metals 0.00 
Office & computing 0.00 Communication 0.03 Aircraft 0.00 Radio, TV & comms equip 0.00 
Government services 0.00 Government services 0.00 Government services 0.00 Government services 0.00 
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Appendix Table 4-7: Prevalence of national clusters in the top 5 (OECD Model). 
 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Total 
Agriculture, forestry & fishing  
Mining & quarrying  
Food, beverages & tobacco  
Textiles, apparel & leather 3 2 5 
Wood products & furniture 1 1 
Paper, paper products & printing 1 1 
Industrial chemicals 1 2 1 4 
Drugs & medicines  
Petroleum & coal products 5 1 1 1 8 
Rubber & plastic products 1 1 
Non-metallic mineral products  
Iron & steel  
Non-ferrous metals 1 4 1 6 
Metal products  
Non-electrical machinery  
Office & computing machinery 2 1 1 4 7 countries
Electrical apparatus, nec  
Radio, TV & communication equipment 1 1 1 3 7 countries
Shipbuilding & repairing 1 1 
Other transport 2 2 
Motor vehicles 2 1 1 1 5 
Aircraft 1 3 4 
Professional goods  
Other manufacturing  
Electricity, gas & water  
Construction  
… (all other service sector activities)  
Total 9 9 9 9 9 45 
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Table 5.4: EU national cluster prevalence in the Top 5 
 #1 #2 #3 #4 #5 Total 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery products  
Fuel and power products 1 3 4 
Ferrous and non-ferrous ores and metals 4 3 2 9 
Non-metallic mineral products  
Chemical products 2 3 4 9 
Metal products except machinery 1 1 
Agricultural and industrial machinery 1 1 
Office and data processing machines 1 3 1 1 6 
Electrical goods 2 1 3 
Transport equipment 3 5 2 1 1 12 
Food, beverages, tobacco  
Textiles and clothing, leather and footwear 3 3 2 2 10 
Paper and printing products 1 1 
Rubber and plastic products 1 2 5 2 10 
Other manufacturing products  
Building and construction  
Recovery, repair services, wholesale, retail 2 2 
Lodging and catering services  
Inland transport services  
Maritime and air transport services 3 1 1 5 
Auxiliary transport services  
Communication services  
Services of credit and insurance institutions 2 2 
Other market services  
Non-market services  
Totals 15 15 15 15 15 75 
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Appendix Table 5-1: Agriculture (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] – demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGA SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE  4.51              
GERMANY 4.75  2.22        3.39   3.64  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUX                
NETHER                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK        5.22        
CRITICAL VALUE 2.29 3.63 1.83 2.29 1.15 1.57 1.67 2.53 1.85 2.29 3.06 1.88 2.12 2.77 1.80 
Appendix Table 5-2: Fuels (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] – demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE                
GERMANY 3.61  1.68           1.49  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUX                
NETHER                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK        2.39        
CRITICAL VALUE 2.60 1.19 1.64 2.91 0.87 1.35 2.16 2.03 1.18 2.09 1.74 1.72 1.23 1.18 1.78 
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Appendix Table 5-3: Ferrous & non-ferrous ores & metals (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - initiating  [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE                
GERMANY   1.78  1.88   1.99      3.57  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 1.66 2.41 1.43 2.60 1.50 1.35 2.40 1.62 1.68 1.24 1.53 1.66 1.93 2.67 1.72 
Appendix Table 5-4: Non-metallic mineral products (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRI
A
BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE                
GERMANY 5.22  1.93        1.69   3.45  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 2.32 2.68 1.64 2.05 1.03 1.38 2.45 1.62 1.90 1.87 1.67 1.79 1.95 2.64 1.32 
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Appendix Table 5-5: Chemicals (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE                
GERMANY     1.05         2.54  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 1.78 1.28 1.43 1.92 1.03 1.59 1.31 0.94 1.97 1.59 1.95 1.74 1.22 2.12 1.42 
Appendix Table 5-6: Metal Products (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA    
BELGIUM    
DENMARK    
FINLAND    
FRANCE    
GERMANY 3.47  2.18 1.80 2.01 2.33 3.56  
GREECE    
IRELAND    
ITALY    
LUXEMBOURG    
NETHERLANDS   4.24  
PORTUGAL    
SPAIN    
SWEDEN    
UK    
CRITICAL VALUE 2.10 2.42 1.66 2.60 1.42 1.30 2.71 1.22 2.66 3.40 1.93 1.82 2.12 2.56 1.71 
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Appendix Table 5-7: Industrial Machinery (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE                
GERMANY 3.40  2.29 2.09 1.33   2.15   2.26  1.84 2.78  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 2.00 1.74 1.66 1.91 1.07 1.21 2.44 1.60 2.12 2.40 1.81 1.82 1.76 2.05 1.77 
Appendix Table 5-8: Office & data processing mach (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRI
A
BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE        0.76        
GERMANY 2.10 2.13 2.09 1.65 1.02   1.72 1.28  1.41 1.99 1.98 2.18 1.61 
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS          7.12      
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 1.59 1.79 1.45 1.63 0.86 0.98 1.82 0.51 1.27 4.22 1.32 1.60 1.53 1.25 1.39 
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Appendix Table 5-9: Electrical goods (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE        0.94        
GERMANY  2.33 2.36  1.30   0.92    2.05  2.67  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 1.61 2.16 1.69 1.03 1.07 1.22 2.00 0.70 1.90 3.04 1.22 1.99 1.51 1.92 1.38 
Appendix Table 5-10: Transport equip (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETH PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE                
GERMANY   2.77 2.00 1.64      2.34 2.34 2.14 2.64  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 1.36 0.96 1.93 1.88 1.26 1.30 1.91 1.13 2.12 0.62 1.80 1.92 2.07 2.06 1.56 
Appendix 5: Supra-Critical Connections 
Brian Wixted 380
Appendix Table 5-11: Food industries (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] – demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE                
GERMANY 5.69  3.04  1.06         2.98  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK        4.76        
CRITICAL VALUE 2.37 2.39 2.40 2.06 1.06 1.47 1.12 2.32 1.66 2.32 1.83 1.75 1.56 2.39 1.63 
Appendix Table 5-12: TCF industries (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - demand initiating nations [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE           1.88     
GERMANY  1.44 1.92  1.08   1.04      2.93  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 1.37 1.40 1.76 1.77 1.07 1.42 1.68 0.98 2.08 1.54 1.43 1.92 1.71 2.22 1.19 
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Appendix Table 5-13: Wood and paper (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - demand initiating countries [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM                
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE                
GERMANY 2.99             3.35  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 2.10 1.60 1.74 2.31 0.94 1.47 1.95 1.36 1.91 1.85 1.71 1.82 1.61 2.63 1.18 
Appendix Table 5-14: Rubber & plastics (countries benefiting from supra-critical flows [Rows] - demand initiating nations  [Columns]) 
 AUSTRIA BELGIUM DENMARK FINLAND FRANCE GERMANY GREECE IRELAND ITALY LUX NETHER PORTUGAL SPAIN SWEDEN UK 
AUSTRIA                
BELGIUM          0.33      
DENMARK                
FINLAND                
FRANCE        1.11        
GERMANY     1.25   1.11      2.13  
GREECE                
IRELAND                
ITALY                
LUXEMBOURG                
NETHERLANDS                
PORTUGAL                
SPAIN                
SWEDEN                
UK                
CRITICAL VALUE 1.31 2.00 1.27 1.26 1.11 1.38 1.48 0.95 1.84 0.24 1.39 1.81 1.24 1.83 1.30 
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APPENDIX 6: EUROPEAN UNION (15) 
NATIONAL  MESO-CLUSTER NETWORKING 
1995 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-1:  European Union 15 – with enlargement (10) 
and remaining candidate countries 
 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/cia04/european_union_sm04.gif  
Most of the maps scanned by the University of Texas Libraries and served from this web site 
are in the public domain. No permissions are needed to copy them. You may download them 
and use them as you wish. A few maps are copyrighted, and are clearly marked as such.  
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/faq.html#8.html  
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Appendix Figure 6-2:  Accommodation 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-3:  Agriculture 
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Appendix Figure 6-4:  Communication services 
 
Appendix Figure 6-5:  Construction services 
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Appendix Figure 6-6:  Electrical goods 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-7:  EU electrical goods: linked clusters modified 
test (2) 
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Appendix Figure 6-8:  Food, beverages and tobacco 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-9:  Fuel 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-10: Industrial chemicals 
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Appendix Figure 6-11: Industrial machinery 
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Appendix Figure 6-12: Ores and metals (steel and non-ferrous) 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-13: Non-metallic mineral products 
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Appendix Figure 6-14: Metal products 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-15: Office and data processing machines 
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Appendix Figure 6-16: EU Office & data processing: linked clusters 
modified test (2) 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-17: Other market services 
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Appendix Figure 6-18: Paper and publishing 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 6-19: Rubber and plastics 
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Appendix Figure 6-20: Textiles, clothing and footwear 
 
Appendix Figure 6-21: Transport equipment 
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APPENDIX 7: OECD (9) NATIONAL MESO-
CLUSTER  NETWORKING (1990) 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-1: World Map  
 
Source: Downloaded from 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/world_pol02.jpg   
‘Most of the maps scanned by the University of Texas Libraries and served from this 
web site are in the public domain. No permissions are needed to copy them. You may 
download them and use them as you wish. A few maps are copyrighted, and are 
clearly marked as such’. http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/faq.html#8.html 
Appendix 7: OECD National Meso Cluster Networking 
Brian Wixted 394
 
Appendix Figure 7-2: Agriculture 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-3: Aircraft 
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Appendix Figure 7-4: Business services 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-5: Office and computer machines 
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Appendix Figure 7-6: Electrical machinery 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-7: Finance and insurance services 
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Appendix Figure 7-8: Food, beverages and tobacco 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-9: Industrial chemicals 
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Appendix Figure 7-10: Iron and steel 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-11: Metal products 
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Appendix Figure 7-12: Mining 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-13: Motor vehicles 
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Appendix Figure 7-14: Non-electrical machinery 
 
Appendix Figure 7-15: Non-ferrous metals 
 
 
 
Appendix 7: OECD National Meso Cluster Networking 
Brian Wixted 401
Appendix Figure 7-16: Non-metallic mineral products 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-17: Other manufacturing 
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Appendix Figure 7-18: Other transport (railways etc) 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-19: Paper 
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Appendix Figure 7-20: Petroleum refining and coal products 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-21: Pharmaceuticals 
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Appendix Figure 7-22: Professional goods (instruments) 
 
 
 
Appendix Figure 7-23: Radios, Tvs and communications equipment 
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Appendix Figure 7-24: Rubber and plastics 
 
Appendix Figure 7-25: Shipbuilding 
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Appendix Figure 7-26: Textiles, clothing and footwear 
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